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TCMARDS A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF WORK: A CRITICAL APPROPRIATION Of 
THE THOUGHT OF Jt'JRGEN HABERMAS 
Philip Laurence West 
Jesus College 
The thesis makes use of the thought of the leading contemporary 
philosopher/sociologist J~rgen Habermas for a critical reconstruction of 
a theology of work. 
After setting the agenda, the introductory chapter briefly surveys 
thought about work in a selection of the sociological/philosophical 
literature from Hegel to Habermas. 
There follows an exposition of the relevant aspects of Habermas' 
thought: up to the 1970s (chapter 2), and in the 1981 Theorie des 
kommunikati ven Handelns (chapter 3 ). Chapter 4 consists in a critical 
examination of themes from Habermas' account in the light of the secondary 
literature. 
The last two chapters deal specifically with the relevant theological 
literature in the light of the above. Chapter 5 considers themes therein 
such as the domination of nature and the importance to be attached to 
social labour in the human enterprise. The final chapter attempts a 
reapplication of the themes of sabbath, cross, creation, kingdom and 
vocation in a reformulated theology of work. 
The thesis argues against the romantic rejection of technology found in 
some of the philosophical and theological literature, and against the 
advisability of tying theological categories such hs "creation" to the 
, I 
pe r formance of social labour . It suggests that thes e categories should 
' instead be r elated to the transformation of social relations, of which the 
r ela t io ns o f pr oduction f o r m a part. 
To the best of my knowled ge , ther e exists no other significant work 
relating the thought of Habermas, including his 1981 magnum opus, to the 
issue of a theology of wo rk. 
PREFACE 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes 
nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over 
all the earth' •••• So God created man in his own image ••• male 
and female he created them. And God blessed them, and God said 
to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and 
subdue it .•• behold, I have given you every plant yielding 
seed ••• and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have 
them for food' •••• And it was so. And God saw everything that he 
had made, and behold, it was very good. [Genesis 1:26-31, 
RSV] [1] 
And to Adam he said, 'Because you have listened to the voice of 
your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, 
"You shall not eat of it", cursed is the ground because of you; 
in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns 
and thistles it shall bring forth to you •••• In the sweat of 
your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, 
for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you 
shall return' ••• therefore the LORD God sent him forth from 
the garden of Eden , to till the ground from which he was taken. 
[Genesis 3:17-19, 23, RSV] 
The pastors, the theologians and the faithful who demand that 
a theology of work should be produced quickly, which would be 
well suited to present circumstances, well-structured, 
obviously of un iversal significance, and which would leave no 
room for question or doubt, seem to forget that work has 
enjoyed very different r eputations in Christianity down the 
centuries, sometimes very bad, sometimes very good. Is work 
blessed or is it cur sed? Is it the imitation of God , the 
creator, or the curse of God on the sin of Ada111? [2] 
U' IV~ri...il ;y 
L ARAAv' 
.:::A~, fie;,,.) '€. 
[1 J For list of abbreviations, see pp. viii-ix. 
\ 
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[2] Pohier and Mieth 1982, p. ix. For bibliography, see p. 2)5' 
1.1 Hebrew myths and the human condition 
In the second of the Hebrew myths of origins quoted above, from the 
account of the Fall in Genesis 3, there is a sober lack of high-flown 
rhetoric about the existential or cosmic significance of work. Work, at 
least as known to the author, is seen as part of the curse; [3] it is an 
unpleasant but necessary function if we are to eat - and that is that. The 
spirit of this view is echoed by the contemporary theologian Karl Rahner: 
There are people who surround [work] with a halo and hymn its 
praises as the expression of the great and glorious creative 
ability of mankind in the mass •••• [But in fact] it is just 
work, that's all, a tiresome thing but tolerable enough, 
nothing to make a fuss about, for it comes round regularly 
with the clock. It sustains life on the one hand and wears 
life out on the other. It is a thing that cannot be avoided •••• 
The first thing, then, that theology has to say about work is 
simply that it is, and will continue to be, work, tiresome and 
monotonous and involving the surrender of the worker's will to 
the demands of the daily round ••• a sign of the fallen state 
of mankind. [4] 
Work here is simply a matter of bringing a recalcitrant nature under 
control, of laboriously keeping down the "thorns and thistles", so as to 
extract the wherewithal to keep a material being in existence. 
However, much recent theology has refused to see this as the only 
significance to be attached to work, in general and in the Genesis 
narratives in particular. This sort of approach concentrates more on the 
account of the creation in Genesis 1. God in Genesis 1, it points out , works 
and creates, and creates man [5] in his own image: ergo man must work too, 
\ 
(3] Richardson (1952, pp. 25f), von Rad (1972, pp! 94f) and others insist 
that the Jahwist does not. regard work as such as a r esult of the fa ll , 
as man al r eady works at tilling and keeping the garden in Gen 2:15. 
But this is to place too much weight upon what is essentially an 
incidental feature of the story (compare Barth 1961, p. 472). Moreover 
it supposes anachronistically that the Jahwist was philosophizing 
about "work in general" rather than simply reflecting upon work as he 
knew it. See al so 1.2.2 and 6. 1 below. 
[4.J Rahner 1973, pp. 17f. 
(5] This is one instance where it is difficult to avoid sexist language 
while yet retaining the same sense. I use the words "man" and "his" 
here generically. On the issue of gender and work, see 5.2 below. 
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both to fulfil his own nature, and to cooperate in the completion of the 
cosmos. Moreover, the words 'subdue' and 'dominion' in Genesis 1:28, ho wever 
understood in detail, [6] imply work on man's part as God's viceregent . [7] 
Work, therefore, is more a matter of co-creation or creativity [8] than of 
mere survival, an essential part of the fulfilling of God's purposes for 
individual worker, society and cosmos alike. Here are two modern examples 
of this sort of thought: 
Work is God's intention for mankind entirely apart from sin. 
The ordinance of work, like every other aspect of the divine 
Law, is good and wholesome, and in it man can and should find 
blessing .... it is his proper nature to be a worker, and to be 
denied the opportunity of work is to be treated as something 
less than a human being, created in the image of God, who is 
himself represented as a worker. [9] 
Wild nature is not enough, because it is prehuman and 
premoral. Through man's work the wilderness is to be made a 
garden the products of volcanoes, earthquakes and 
sedimentation, to be made into great sculptures and buildings. 
God through Christ redeems human nature in man himself; and 
through his work man extends redemption to wild nature. [10] 
Work, then: a part of the curse, only contingently connected to human 
nature, a matter of mere necessary control and survival; or work a part of 
the divine creative ordinance, essential to human nature as such, a matter 
of creativity, Blessing or curse? Control or creativity? 
\ 
I 
[6] See further 1.3.1 below. 
[7] For example Wojtyla 1984, p. 1. 
[8] Compare Schottroff and Schottroff 1983, p. 7; Wojtyla 1984, pp. 51-53; 
Novak 1983. 
[9] Richardson 1952, pp. 25, 27. 
[10] Cupitt 1975a, p. 118. 
3 
1.2 The problem of definition 
1.2. 1 Past and present 
Let us now make a quantum leap from the Bronze Age peasant farmer of 
Genesis 3 to the worker of modern Britain. Several things about "work" 
have changed in the transition, almost to the point where it becomes 
misleading to use the same word in both cases. 
Firstly, and most obviously, the level of technological control of the 
environment has been greatly increased. Moreover, our modern worker is 
aware that the level of this control is not static, but on the contrary is 
increasing ever more rapidly. Whereas the sweat and thistles were an 
ineluctible fact of life in ancient Palestine, the modern worker knows 
that, at least in principle, unpleasant tasks are replaceable by a 
combination of information technology and machinery. Prometheus has been 
unbound; man has it within his grasp to undo the curse. Yet paradoxically, 
this advance is also threatening: lives are devalued when identities 
defined in terms of a function in the community, a job, are destroyed; [ 11] 
much work is "deskilled" to the level of mere mechanical repetition; [12] 
and the power to destroy is given along with the power to create. 
Secondly, labour has far more clearly become social labour. Whereas the 
Palestinian peasant to a large extent produced directly what the family 
needed to survive, [13] that is true of no-one in Britain today, "back to 
nature" communes notwithstanding. Most workers now only produce one 
product, and a re therefore reliant upon society for the rest of their 
needs. [14] Moreover a large section of the workfqrce do not even produce 
a material object/commodity at all, but work · in s + bols: teachers, bankers, 
clerks etc. [15] Modern society is predicated ' upon the division of 
[11] As an introduction to the literature on unemployment, Littler 1985, 
pp. 190-206. 
[12] On the deskilling debate, P. Thompson 1983, pp. 89-121. 
[ 13] On work in non- industrial societies, Littler 1985, pp. 13- 71. 
[ 14] A situation facilitated by, among other things, "space-time 
convergence": Giddens 1982b, pp. 141-3; 1985b, pp. 172-178. 
[ 15] On theservice sector, Offe 1985, pp. 101-128. See further 4.6 below. 
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labour. [16] 
Thirdly and relatedly, work for many members of modern society is 
coterminous with paid employment. [17] This usually entails, among other 
things: 
(1) a distinct division of time (day/week/year/life-span) into work 
and leisure, [18] accompanied by a commodification of time. [19] 
(2) a di vision of space between home and workplace, accompanied by 
high levels of institutionalization and surveillance in the 
latter, [20] and 
(3) a network of social relationships connected with the workplace, 
distinct from those of the home. [21] 
None of which applies to the ancient peasant farmer. 
If we now return to the question posed in the opening section, and ask 
whether there is more to work than mere survival, it is clear that for the 
modern worker there now is. For the modern worker, along with the pay 
cheque, comes also a social network which constitutes part of his or her 
identity, social status, and (usually at least) some sense of achievement 
and/or of contributing to society at large. [22] "Work" has clearly become 
a much more complex phenomenon than it was in Genesis 3. Yet this only 
presses more urgently a second question: that of definition. Can we pin 
down what work is, so as to be able to say something useful about it? 
[ 16 J 
[ 17] 
The implications of this for social integr
1
ation were classically 
investigated by Durkheim in The Di vision \of Labour in Society (Durkheim 1933), See further chapter 3 below. ) 
The obvious exception is housework (Oa~ley 1974, 1976). For 
introduction to the growing literature on _ women and work, Oakley 
1982, pp. 135-207; P. Thompson 1983, pp. 180-209; Mayes 1986, pp. 32-61. 
[ 18] On work and leisure, Parker 1983, pp. 1-12 and passim. 
[19] Giddens 1981, pp. 130-135. 
( 20 J Ibid., pp. 135-140. On surveillance in institutions, Foucault 1979. 
[21 J Parker 1983, pp. 25, 32. 
[22] Parker (1983, pp. 25-27) briefly lists aspects of modern work that 
militate against this last factor, while Braverman 1974 is the 
classic modern study (for exegesis and comment, P. Thompson 1983 , pp. 
67-88). See also Levidow and Young 1981; Littler 1985, pp. 117-131, 
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1.2.2 Work and Wittgenstein 
Here we hit a snag that dogs much of the philosophical discussion about 
work. A definition that confines work to what happens on production lines 
in factories is too narrow -· according to that definition most people, 
even in the modern industrialized societies, do very little work. [23] 
However, the other extreme seems equally unsatisfactory. Consider this 
definition from Pope John Paul II: 
It is man's duty to work. It is by his work that he must 
procure his daily bread; by his work that he must contribute 
to the continuing development of the technical arts and 
sciences; by his work - of particular importance, this - that 
he must help to raise ever higher the moral and cultural 
standards of the society in which he shares his life with his 
brothers. The word 'work' means everything that man 
accomplishes, whatever its nature or attendant 
circumstances. [24] 
This definition potentially includes almost all forms of human physical or 
mental activity, and thus is too broad if we want to discuss work as 
opposed to human action in general. Once we start narrowing this 
definition down, however ( for instance to "employment" or to "physical 
labour") we start excluding cases that we usually think of as work in some 
sense, such as housework, or studying for examinations. In the Christian 
tradition we might even be inclined to call prayer "work"! [25] 
So we have a synchronic and a diachronic problem. Not only does the 
nature of work change over historical time, but also 'the contemporary 
forms of social activity usually designated "work" have neither a common 
rationality nor shared empirical characteristics'. [26] The activities we 
usually classify as work bear only a 
Wittgenstein's sense, rather than all 
family resemblance 
. t t . . t. \ ins an 1a 1nf some 
I 
to each other in 
essence of "work 
[ 23 J In West Germany in 1980 about 7 3 per cent of the workforce were 
employed in service industries rather than in manufacturing (Offe 
1 985, p. 327, note 9). 
[24] Wojtyla 1984, p. 1. 
[25] In the rule of Saint Benedict the term for 'divine office' is 'opus 
divinum' (Benedict 1955, p. 77; compare Benedict 1958, p. 307). On the 
problem of definition, Arendt 1958, pp. 7-9 and passim; Parker 1983, 
pp. 1-3; Offe 1985, pp. 135-140, 148. 
[ 26 J Offe 1985, p. 148. 
6 
as such". [ 27] 
Bearing this problem in mind, in what follows I shall be paying 
particular attention to "work" in the sense of the pr oduction of t he 
mater i al basis of life within the economic system. There are three reasons 
why this i s a crucial aspect of work to examine: 
(1) It remains one constant factor [28] during human social evolution: 
a material being must interchange with its material environment in 
order to survive. 
(2) It involves considering work in relation to other problematic 
phenomena of the modern world, such as the ambiguities of modern 
science and technology, and the ecological question. 
(3) Most importantly, one whole tradition of thought, that stemming 
from Hegel and Marx, regards precisely this aspect of work as 
absolutely fundamental to an understanding of the human condition. 
It is to this Hegel-Marx tradition (with certain important caveats, as 
will become clear below) that Habermas belongs. 
1.3 Two key questions 
I have already hinted at two key questions that will underlie much of 
the discussion of this thesis. We may conveniently make them explicit in 
r elation to the Genesis 1 passage quoted at the beginning. The first is the 
question of the problematic status of "control" and "domination" in human 
l ife . 
\ 
I 
I 
[27] Wittgenstein 1968, pp. 31f. 
[281 Although, in view of Wittgenstein above, we need also to be aware of how it changes, it is impossible to conceive of a human society in which work of this kind did not occur. 
7 
1.3. 1 Control or couanunication 
The injunction to 'subdue the earth' and 'have dominion' over the other 
species in Genesis 1 :28 [29 J has attracted considerable attention in 
recent years. Some writers have . cheerfully endorsed it. [30] But to 
others [31] it epitomizes all that is wrong with modernity in general, and 
with modern scientific technology in particular. [32] Painfully aware of 
the evils of the ecological problem and the arms race, to look no further, 
this group of writers calls into question the legitimacy of the control of 
nature upon which science and technology are predicated. They present the 
alternative of a communicative harmony with nature, in which the human 
being is "at home" in the cosmos rather than dominating and exploiting it 
like an occupying army. Such writers are dubious about the value of the 
project initiated by the Enlightenment, and the modernity that is based 
upon it. They embrace instead various degrees of romantic reaction (of an 
optimistic or pessimistic kind) to the modern world. 
A distinguishable position, but one sometimes to be found in the same 
writer, [33] can be related to the observation that 'subdue' and 'dominate' 
are political terms used metaphorically for human dealings with the 
[29] These terms have been variously used to justify a complete subjection of the natural world to human purposes on the one hand, or the need for a sympathetic stewardship of it on the other (Passmore 1980, pp. 3-40; Attfield 1983, pp. 20-50). Insofar as it is relevant, the Hebrew roots provide little backing for the latter position. The root k~~ ('subdue') is used elsewhere for bringing peoples and individuals into subjection as slaves (Jeremiah 34:11,16; 2Chronicles 28:10; Nehemiah _5:5), for raping a woman (Esther 7:8), and for treading down an enemy in battle (Zechariah 9:15). The root rdh ('have dominion') is used for the ruling of enemies (Psalms 110:2; Isaiah 14:6) [Brown, Driver and Briggs 1968, pp. 461, 921f]. Thi~ raises the general problem of biblical hermeneutics, which ·cannot be dealt with here. See, for example, Thisel ton 1980. / 
[30] For example Wojtyla 1984, p. 7. 1 
[31] See for example Gorz 1980, and several of the figures discussed in 1.4 and 5.2 below. Leiss 1972 provides a useful discussion. [32] Lynn White's 1967 essay 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis' (White 1968, pp. 75-94), an essay severely critical of the role of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in determining modern western attitudes to the exploitation of nature, sparked off a debate in the English-speaking world on this topic that is still in progress. See further Peacocke 1975b; Passmore 1980, pp. 3-40; Attfield 1983, pp. 20-50; Thomas 1984, pp. 17-25; Santmire 1985, passim. [33] Gorz is a good example. 
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natural world. [34] Writers in this camp argue that the same pattern of 
reason tends to inform our attitudes to other persons and to the world of 
nature. Thus, they argue, in our technocratic society, 'the total domination 
of nature inevitably entails a domination of people by the techniques of 
domination'. [35] These writers are usually hostile to the pervasive use 
of power for social control in modern life - be it direct military or 
police power, bureaucratic power, or methods of surveillance and control 
in the workplace - and they locate the basis of much of this power in the 
various modern technologies that are also used for controlling nature. 
Rejecting this social control in the name of freedom, they argue that our 
interpersonal relationships cannot be transformed without a corresponding 
transformation of our relationship to nature. 
Variations on these positions will be elucidated further in 1.4 below, 
and considered explicitly in relation to Habermas' work in 2.2. As 
suggested, the status of science, technology, bureaucracy, and 
Enlightenment thought are all tied up with this question of the status of 
"control". 
1.3.2 The centrality of work 
In 1. 1 above, I noted a disagreement in the theological literature 
concerning the degree of importance to be attached to work. Whereas for 
some writers work is mundane and uninteresting, merely instrumental in 
keeping human life in existence, for others it is expressive of the very 
creative capacity that renders the human being imago Dei. For the latter, 
work is an activity of profound significance, that is to be interpreted 
using important theological categories such as creation and vocation. 
I This fundamental disagreement over the status rf work is reflected in 
the philosophical and sociological literature Jhat I will shortly be I 
examining in some detail. One position taken up athere is so significant 
.I 
that it needs underlining even at this preliminary stage: the position 
defended by Karl Marx. 
[34] Compare Gorz's graphic term "ecofascism" (Gorz 1980, p, 77). 
[35] Gorz 1980, p. 20. Compare the position of Horkheimer, discussed in 1.4 
and 3.4 below. See also West 1986d, p. 2. 
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For Marx, an understanding of work is to all intents and purposes the 
key that unlocks the meaning of the whole of human history. The way i n 
which work is organized, and the technology that it employs, are in his 
opinion ultimately determinative of the structure of society as a whole: 
of its laws, its politics, and its ideas - including its r eligious ideas. [36] Moreover, Marx regards human work as the process through which 
the species creates itself. [37] Work is not only the determinant of 
social life as it is now lived, but also the agent of its transformation. 
Thus to understand work in all its various dimensions is to understand the 
one utterly basic fact of human existence. [38] 
This Marxian belief in the centrality of work has been enormously 
influential, both in the sociological and in the theological literature. 
In 5.3 below I will examine some of the latter that implicitly accepts it. 
But it has not gone unchallenged, even by those who are deeply influenced 
by Marx's ideas. [39] In 2.3 below I shall examine how Habermas deals with 
this aspect of his Marxian heritage, while in chapter 3 both of the key 
questions that I have raised come under discussion in Habermas' 
presentation of a model of modernity. 
First, however, in order to highlight Habermas' importance and 
distinctiveness, I shall trace the development of some important and 
relevant ideas in the literature from the time of Hegel. 
1.4 From Hegel to Habermas 
Any history "of ideas is inevitably a distortion, not only in te rms of 
what it leaves out, but also in treat ing the ideas in abstraction from the 
concrete situation in whi ch they arose. This is par~icularly true of the 
type of brief thumbnail sketch that follows. HowJver, I think it is important, both for a theology of work in general, anµ for an understanding 
[ 36] For example Marx 1977, pp. 160-168, 389; compare McLellan 1980, pp. 135-137. 
[ 37] For example Marx 1975, p. 357; compare McLellan 1980, p. 164. [ 38) Compare Marx 1977, pp. 160f. 
[39] See, for example, Giddens 1984, p. 243. 
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of Habermas in particular, to have a basic "map" of the origins and 
development of a small number of crucial ideas. 
In each case, I make no at tempt to give a balanced account of the 
thinker(s) involved, but merely extract a few points from their thought 
salient for my overall discussion. · 
1.4.1 Hegel: master and slave 
In a famous passage of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, usually known 
as the dialectic of the master and the slave, [40] Hegel to all intents and 
purposes invented modern philosophical interest in work. [41] This passage 
is also a locus classicus for the ineluctibly social (rather than 
individualistic) nature of the human consciousness, and indicates 
something of Hegel 's philosophy of history. 
In the Phenomenology, [42] Hegel presents the histories of the 
universe, of mankind, and of philosophy alike as an odyssey of Geist (mind 
or spirit) in the process of becoming self-conscious. The material 
universe, according to Hegel, is the result of Geist's self-positing to 
produce something apparently external and alien to it; and the evolution 
of life, consciousness and self-consciousness within it is the history of 
Geist coming closer and closer to recognizing itself in its creation. This 
progression proceeds by a series of "negations" - at once logical and 
ontological - whereby each stage is superseded as it falls prey to its own 
self-contradictory nature. The development of human consciousness is thus 
tied in with the evolution of the universe as a whole, both being facets of 
the history of Geist. This history is followed from its beginnings in a 
non-conceptual sense- certainty, [43] through a series of transformations, 
to the point of 'Absolute Knowledge or knowing itself as 
[40] Hegel 1931, . pp. 229-40. For commentary, Taylor 1975, pp. 153-157; 
Singer 1983, pp. 59-62. 
[ 41] Although behind Hegel stands the Kantian concept of the active, 
synthetic consciousness; see for ex ample Kant 1933, pp. 19, 23; compare 
KHI, pp. 10, 12. 
[42] For the whole work, Taylor 1975, pp. 127-221; Singer 1983, pp. 45-74. 
[43] Hegel 1931, pp. 149-160. 
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Spirit'. [44] Here Geist realizes [45] that what it had all along sought to 
know as something other than itself (as an "object") is, in fact - itsel~ 
At this point, the self-alienation of the human condition is finally 
overcome; harmony is achieved. [ 46] 
The master and slave dialectic is a crucial stage within this overall 
process, involving the development of self-consciousness out of 
consciousness. It has a suggestiveness that transcends Hegel 's overall 
schema of absolute idealism. 
Self-consciousness, suggests Hegel, cannot exist in isolation. To form a 
picture of itself, it needs some contrast - I can only become aware of 
myself when I am also aware of something that is not myself. Yet, Hegel 
argues, as something foreign, that external object becomes the object of 
desire. [47] To desire it is to wish to possess it, and thus to transform 
it into something that is no longer foreign. (48] But such an assimilation 
must leave desire unsatisfied, because self-consciousness has now 
destroyed the very thing that it needs for its own existence - the other. 
How, then, may self-consciousness develop? The solution to this dilemma is 
the existence as object of another self-consciousness, [49] as this is the 
only entity that cannot simply be processed and negated. This launches us 
into a new situation, an interaction between two self-consciousnesses or 
persons. 
Now, Hegel argues, each of these self-consciousnesses exists 'only by 
being acknowledged or "recognized"' by the other. [50] However, in an 
attempt to show that it is not attached to mere material objects - its own 
[44] 
[45] 
[46] 
Ibid., p. 808. 1 
Hegel's position is that the minds of individ~al persons are aspects 
of (universal) mind itself. Thus this realizatlion is at the same time 
I 
a realization by an individual human mind an& a realization by Geist (compare Singer 1983, p. 68) . 
--
' Although the enigmatic closing reference to history as the 'Golgotha' 
of Absolute Spirit suggests that Hegel was not lacking in a sense of 
the tragedy of history (Hegel 1931, p. 808). 
[47] Ibid., p. 225. 
[48] A parallel is being drawn with animal assimilation of food (Taylor 
1975, pp. 150f) . 
[49] Hegel 1931, p. 226. 
[ 50] Ibid., p. 229. 
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body or t hat of its opposite number - each engages the other in a 
life- and-death struggle, risking the death, and hence loss, of both of 
these supports. (51] Yet actual death suits neither; so the victor in the 
struggle, realizing that the other is essential to him (to pr ovide 
recognition) spares his life and enslaves him instead. (52] 
The master , the apparent victor at this point , sets the slave to work on 
the material world for his benefit. (53] But this leads to a paradoxical 
conclusion. The slave, ceasing to be an equal person in the master's eyes, 
cannot provide him with adequate recognition. (54] Moreover, in working on 
the material world the slave shapes and fashions material objects, and in 
so doing makes his own ideas into something permanent - external objects. 
The slave thus becomes aware of his own self-consciousness in a way that 
the master cannot, because he sees it in front of him as something 
objective: 
Through work and labour, however, this consciousness of the 
bondsman comes to itself •••• The negative relation to the 
object passes into the form of the object, into something that 
is permanent and remains ••• this activity giving shape and 
form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure 
self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it 
does is externalized and passes into the condition of 
permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves 
accordingly attai ns by this means the direct apprehension of 
that independent being as its self. [55] 
The slave thus achieves a higher state of self-consciousness than the 
master. [ 56] 
In the Phenomenology, therefore, work is both existentially significant 
and an agent of social transformation. Moreover it is an integral part of 
t he enti r e process of the self-positing of Geist that is the key to the 
universe as a whole. ·) 
I 
--------------------
(51] Ibid., pp. 232f. 
[52] Ibid., pp. 233f. 
(53] Ibid., p. 235. 
[54] Ibid., pp. 236f. 
[55] Ibid., p. 238. 
(56] Ibid., p. 237. 
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Now, to paraphrase a comment originally applied to Plato, the 
subsequent history of Marxist philosophy can be seen as a set of footnotes 
to Hegel's Phenomenology. And in this respect Habermas is no exception: the 
Phenomenology is still governing the agenda for his work - both positively 
and negatively - from the 1950 1s .to the 1980 1s. [57] Points of contact 
include: ( 1) the importance of the ideas of dialogue, reciprocity, and 
consensus, ( 2) the need to at tack and reconstruct the notion of a 
philosophy of history, (3) the critical analysis of the concept of 
alienation, (4) the attempt to present human social evolution as a 
rationally reconstructible process, and last, but not least, ( 5) the 
importance of work as an agent of social transformation. 
1.4.2 Feuerbach and Marx: alienation 
In the early writings of Karl Marx, [58] the active link between the 
material and the mental realms forged by Hegel is retained, but 
inverted. [59] Whereas for Hegel the material world is posited by Geist, 
and is thus at bottom a logical/mental construct, [60] for Marx the world 
of ideas is dependent upon the material world which is the ultimate 
reality. [61] In contrast to Feuerbach, however, Marx's materialism is 
active rather than passive. [62] Both the world and human nature are in 
the process of being created by human work, [63] in the context of which 
activity alone may human ideas be properly understood. [ 64] Human work 
replaces the self-positing of Geist - 'abstract mental labour' [65] - as 
the motor 'of, and central explanatory category for, human history. 
[ 57 J Although Habermas himself would locate his philosophical debt to Hegel elsewhere, i.e. in Hegel' s Jena lectures ( TP, pp. 142-169). 
I [58] On Marx see Avinieri 1968; Giddens 1971, pp. \ 1-64; McLellan 1980; Elster 1985. For a theological appropriation of Marx, Lash 1981; contrast Turner 1983. 
1 [59] Marx considers Hegel's Phenomenology at the end of the 1844 MSS (Marx 1 975, pp. 379-400). i [60] The position of idealism. On idealism, Bradley 1983. [61] Marx 1977, p. 164. 
[62] A feature retained from idealism (Marx 1975, p. 421 ). On Marx's materialism, Lash 1981 , pp. 88-152. 
[ 63] See, for example, Marx 1976, p. 283; Capital is a "mature" wor k. [ 64 J Marx 1977, p. 164. 
[ 65] Marx 1975, p. 386. 
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I shall be looking at some of these ideas in more detail whilst 
discussing Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism in section 
2.3 below. What interests me at this stage is Marx's adaptation of the 
concept of "alienation", which is mediated through Feuerbach. 
Hegel had introduced the concept of "alienation" in the context of the 
self-positing activity of Geist. [66] Failing to recognize itself in its 
product, Geist had remained estranged or alienated from its own self until 
the achievement of Absolute Knowledge. This idea was taken up by Ludwig 
Feuerbach in the 1841 The Essence of Christianity, [67] where he reapplied 
it in the context of an explanation of religion. Man, he argued, has 
projected his essence as a "species being" into the heavens, in a way 
parallel to the positing by Geist of the material world. Only by means of 
this process does man come to recognize himself. [68] At first he mistakes 
what he sees for an autonomous being - God [69] - and thus while 
recognizing the nature of his essence, remains alienated from it. But by 
finally realizing that the projection (God) is a projection he can 
"negate" it, and repossess his own essence in full 
self-consciousness. [70] Thus for Feuerbach, as well as for Hegel, 
alienation is to be overcome by philosophy, on the level of ideas. [71] 
Now for Feuerbach, religion is the essential defining feature of 
man, [ 72] and human development can most adequately be charted by a 
description of the process of religious development. For Marx, however, 
religion is merely superstructural rather than foundational. [ 73] Its 
central place is taken by work or labour, [74] and the history of the human 
race for Marx is most fundamentally described as a history of different 
forms of labour or "modes of production". [75) However, the early Marx at 
[66] Hegel 1931, p. 251. 
[67] Feuerbach 1957. 
[68] Ibid., p. 5. 
[69] Ibid., p. 270~ 
[70] Ibid. 
\ 
I 
' 
[71] A notion scathingly mocked by Marx (Marx 1977, pp. 159f). 
[72] Feuerbach 1957, pp. 1f. 
[ 73 J Marx 1977, pp. 164, 389. 
[74] Ibid., p. 160. 
[ 75 J Ibid., pp. 389 f. 
15 
least [76] retained from Feuerbach the idea of the alienation of man's 
essence, transposing it into the multiple alienations resulting from the 
operation of the capitalist economic system. Thus he fused two originally 
Hegelian ideas - the significance of labour as the objectificat ion of the 
worker's ideas or self-consciousness, and the concept of alienation - into 
the new concept of "alienated labour". [77] 
In the 11844 Manuscripts', [78] Marx argues that when a worker in the 
capitalist economic system produces a product as a wage-labourer: 
( 1) the object produced, as belonging to his employer, confronts him as 
an alien being, and, in the form of capital, enslaves him, [79] and 
(2) the act of production is not truly expressive of his essence, such 
that his labour makes him miserable instead of happy. [80] 
This, Marx argues, involves a quadruple alienation: of man from nature, 
which is his 'inorganic body', [81 J of man from man, [82] of man from his 
own human essence, [83] and of man from the product of his labour. [84] 
As the now-alien power of the worker's product is possessed by his 
employer in the form of private property, the solution to all of these 
forms of alienation is only to be found in an advanced form of communism: 
'the positive abolition of private property and thus of human 
self-alienation and therefore the real reappropriation of the human 
essence by and for man'. [ 85 J This , and only this , is 
[76] 
[77] 
[78] 
[79] 
[80] 
[81] 
[82] 
[83] 
[84] 
[85] 
the genuine solution of the antagonism between man and nature 
and between man and man. It is the true solution of the 
On the problem of the early and the mature Marx, Lash 1981, pp. 10-23. 
Marx 1975, pp. 322- 334. ~ 
An early collection of manuscripts (Marx 19 5, pp. 279- 400), not published until 1932, and portraying a I more humanist and existentialist Marx than the hitherto generally accepted picture of him. See McLellan 1980, pp. 18, 24- 28. 1 
Marx 1975 , p. 324. 
Ibid., p. 326. 
Ibid., p. 328. On the concept of "nature" in Marx, A. Schmidt 1971. 
Ibid., pp. 329f. 
Ibid ., p. 329. 
Ibid., pp. 330-332. 
Marx 1977, p. 89 (McLellan's translation). 
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struggle between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and 
necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution 
to the riddle of history, and knows itself to be this 
solution. [ 86 J 
Man under this communism is constituted as truly 'social man', [87] man in 
a completed sense, such that all of his previous history may be considered 
merely 'prehistory' by comparison. [88] At the same time he is reconciled 
with nature and other men: 
Only to social man is nature available as a bond with other 
men •••• Only as such has his natural existence become a human 
existence and nature itself become human. Thus society 
completes the essential unity of man and nature, it is the 
genuine resurrection of nature, the accomplished naturalism 
of man and the accomplished humanism of nature. [89] 
For Marx, in contrast to Hegel, alienation is only to be overcome by 
action that establishes a new form of society. Whereas 'the philosophers 
have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point is to change 
it' as well. [90] 
1.4.3 Bloch: utopian nature 
This belief in a utopian future characterized by a reconciliation with 
a "resurrected" nature, was pushed to extremes in the work of Ernst 
Bloch. [91] 
For Bloch, the human being is essentially future-orientated and 
utopian, 'believing in a perfect world and anticipating the future with 
[ 86 J Ib id. 
[ 87 J Marx 1975, p. 349, compare p. 348. 
[88] Marx 1977, p. 390. 
[ 89] Ibid., p. 90. 
[ 90 J Marx 1975, p. 423. 
\ 
I 
[91] For Habermas' (perjorative) assessment, PPP, pp. 61-77. See also A. Schmidt 1971, pp. 156-163; Kolakowski 1978, pp. 421-449; Bentley 1982, pp. 79-97; Hudson 1982; Jay 1984a, pp. 174-195. Bloch is influential in left wing theological circles, and particularly in the thought of 
Jurgen Moltmann (for which see 5.2 below). J 
f\ IV I" I , l 
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undying hope'. [92] This perfect wor ld, a r gues Bloch, (ostensibly on the 
basis of the last passage from Marx quoted above) will be characterized 
not only by freedom and a classless society, but also by a reconciliation 
with nature. 
In Bloch's thought this view is predicated upon a left-Aristotelian 
conception of matter as creative. Matter, in Bloch's opinion, has an 
entelechy or telos, which is continually expressing itself in new forms , 
and which will eventually reconcile matter with consciousness - [93] a 
view of matter which Newtonian mechanics fails to grasp. It is thus by no 
means 'a mere mechanical lump' : [94] 'inorganic nature, no less than human 
histor y, has its Utopia' . [95] 
At matter ' s higher stages of evolution, continues Bloch, it requires the 
participation of human subjectivity in order to realize its utopian 
potentiality. As Kolakowski paraphrases: 
Man is a pr oduct of matter, but since he appeared on the scene 
he has been, as it were, in charge of its further development: 
he is the head of creation •••• That which is 'not yet 
conscious' in us is correlated •• • with the 'not yet' of nature 
itself; the subjective 'not yet' is to become e xplicit through 
our efforts, thus making manifest the essence of the 
uni verse. [ 96 J 
The result is an ultimate reconciliation of nature with history, involving 
the eme r gence of the potential subject in nature - the resurrection of a 
"natura l subject". [97] 
Two f urther points are r elevant . Fi r stly, although basing himself upon 
a Marxian t eit, Bl och criticized Marx f or over-es t imati ng t he i mport ance 
of prod uctive labour: 
) 
[92] 
[93] 
Kolakowski 1978, p. 429. The definitive s tatement of Bloch's posi tion 
in this r espect i s t o be f ound in t he 1959 Da~ Prihzip Hoffnung. 
Jay 1984a, p. 186. 
[ 94] Kolakowski 1978, p. 439, quoting Bloch. 
[ 95 J Ibid., p. 44 0, quoting Bloch. 
[96] Kolakowski 1978, pp. 441. For the "not yet conscious", Bloch 1959, pp. 
129-166. 
[97] Jay 1984a, p. 185. 
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the man who expelled any element of fetishism from the process 
of production ••• who banished all dreams, effective utopias 
and religiously garbed teleologies from history: the same man 
now treated the 'productive forces' in the same 
over-constitutive, pantheistic, and mythicizing way; and 
accorded to the design of a 'productive process' ultimately 
the same power of using and guiding which Hegel had granted 
the 'idea'. [98] 
There is a more primal reality, which, al though manifested in economics, is 
expressed also in religion and art. Thus labour lacks the centrality that 
Marx had erroneously and ironically attributed to it. Secondly, Bloch's 
non-Newtonian view of nature led him to postulate a non-exploitative, 
non-Euclidian technology. [99] But that leads on to my next section. 
1.4.4 Har:z: and Marcuse: new society - new science? 
Marx, in the final analysis, was an optimist about the promise of 
technological progress, arguing that it paves the way for a future 
communism of plenty to replace the communism of scarcity of the distant 
past. [ 100] Nevertheless he was well aware of the dehumanizing effects 
upon workers of the industrial revolution and the technology upon which it 
was founded. [101] Indeed, in Capital vol.! chapter 15, [102] and in a few 
pages of the Grundrisse, [ 103] he gives us a classical description and 
analysis of this aspect of nineteenth century life. 
Marx's discussion of this topic, apart from a straightforward 
documentation of the conditions of factory workers, operated on two 
different levels. The first was an explanation in terms of economic 
principles. Denying the common-sense notion that mechanization is 
introduced in order to make work easier for the worker, [104] he looked 
for an explanation in terms of the category of "surplus value": 
) 
[98] Bloch 1970, p. 35. J 
[ 99 J Jay 1984a, p. 186. 
[100]Compare McLellan 1980, p. 244; Marx 1973, pp. 705f. 
[101 ]For both points, Marx 1975, p. 355. 
[ 102]Marx 1976, pp. 492-639. 
[103]Marx 1973, pp. 692-706. 
[ 104]Marx 1976, p. 492. 
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Like every other instrument for increasing the productivity 
of labour, machinery is intended to cheapen commodities and, 
by shortening the part of the working day in which the worker 
works for himself, to lengthen the other part, the part he 
gives to the capitalist for nothing. The machine is a means 
for producing surplus-value. [105] 
The incentive for the introduction of machinery was the search for profit 
on the part of the entrepreneur: machinery, by rendering production more 
efficient in terms of man-hours per unit product, gave the entrepreneur a 
larger profit-margin. The welfare of the wage-labourers was not under 
consideration at all, except insofar as they must be kept alive so as to 
reproduce their next generation. 
But secondly, Marx also attempted to explain the experience of factory 
workers "from the inside", in terms of their relationship to the machines 
they operated. The automated machine of the factory, he argued, was 
a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting of 
numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the 
workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages 
•••• Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and 
makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose 
handling therefore depends upon his virtuosity. Rather it is 
the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the 
worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the 
mechanical laws acting through it •••• The worker's activity, 
reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and 
regulated on all sides. [106] 
The workers, in other words, lose control of the process of production, 
being reduced to mere "cogs in the machine". Organized to suit the overall 
process, and -11 deskilled", they feel themselves treated as things rather 
than as people. This implicit reduction of persons to things in the 
capitalist production process was later developed ~y Georg Luklcs into an 
explanatory tool - "reification" [107] - applicab~e to a wide variety of 
I 
I phenomena in capitalist society. This aspect of LtJ;kacs' work, and Habermas ' 
reaction to it, is discussed in 3.4 below. 
[105]Ibid. 
[106]Marx 1973, pp. 692f. 
[107]Luka'cs 1971, pp. 83-110. 
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These two types of interpretation of the phenomenon of mechanization -
one from "inside" dealing with the experience of the actors involved, the 
other from the "outside" abstracting from them in the categories of 
economics Habermas terms "lifeworld" and "system" approaches 
respectively. We shall see in chapter 3 below that he finds the 
relationship between these two approaches crucial for an understanding of 
the complexities of late capitalist society. 
Now, as regards the status of science and technology, Marx does drop 
some ambiguous hints in the '1844 Manuscripts' about a transformation of 
these under communism. Shortly after the passage about the "resurrection 
of nature" quoted above, [108] he writes that in communist society 
natural science will ••• lose its one-sidedly materialist, or 
rather idealistic, orientation and become the basis of human 
science as it has already, though in an alienated form, become 
the basis of actual human life •••• Natural science will later 
comprise the science of 
will embrace natural 
science. [ 109] 
man just as much as the science of man 
science; they will be one single 
Yet this embryonic concept of a unified, humanized science is not 
developed, and does not lead Marx to oppose the methods of natural science 
as such in the present. 
Herbert Marcuse, [110] however, had no such inhibitions. For Marcuse, 
the socialist utopia would involve a transformed re lationship of man not 
only to his fellow man, but also to his own nature and to external nature 
as such. This implies the need for a new, human, technology: 
The very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. 
Not only the application of technology but technology itself 
is domination (of nature 
calculated, calculating 
interests of domination 
'subsequently' from the 
[ 108 ]Marx 1977, p. 90. 
[109]Ibid., pp. 93f. 
and men) - methodii.cal, scientific, 
control. SpecifiJ purposes and 
are not foisted ~pon technology 
I outside; they enter the very 
,; 
J 
[ 11 O]On Marcuse, see Kolakowski 1978, pp. 396-420; Held 1980, pp. 137f, 223-246; Giddens 1982a, pp. 144-163; Jay 1984a, pp. 220-240; Kellner 1984. Kellner provides an overview of Marcuse's corpus as a whole. For Habermas' assessment of Marcuse, PPP, pp. 165-170; TRS, pp. 81-90; Habermas 1968b; 1985c. 
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construction of the t echnical apparatus. Technology is always 
a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society 
and its ruling interests intend to do with men and 
things. [111] 
Marcuse, then, rejected the claim that technology per se is neutral, but 
open to misuse in the interests of domination. The value-neutrality that 
Max Weber had claimed for " formal r ationality" he relativized as a 
valuation peculiar to capitalism. [112] Modern scientific technology, he 
claimed, is as culturally relative as any other aspect of western 
life. [113] 
On the issue of science itself, however, Marc use seems to have 
vacillated. On the one hand 
science, by virtue of its own method and concepts, has 
projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of 
nature has remained linked to the domination of man •••• Nature, 
scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the 
technical apparatus of production and destruction which 
sustains and improves the life of individuals while 
subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus. Thus the 
rational hierarchy merges with the social one. If this is the 
case, then the change in the direction of progress, which 
might sever this fatal link, would also affect the very 
structure of science - the scientific project. Its hypotheses, 
without losing their rational character, would develop in an 
essentially different experimental context (that of a 
pacified world); consequently, science would arrive at 
essentially different concepts of nature and establish 
essentially different facts . The rational society subverts 
the idea of Reason. [114] 
But on the other hand , Marcuse also denied that th i s i mpl i ed ' the need for 
s ome sor t of "quali t at i ve physics ", r evival of teleological philosophies , 
etc .' . While admitting that ' this suspicion is justified', he asserted that 
' no such obscurant i st i deas ar e intended'. [ 115] 1 ar cuse ' s position here 
[111 ]Marcuse 1968, pp. 223f. 
[ 112] I bid., pp. 222f. 
[113]Compare Feyerabend 1978. 
[114]Marcuse 1964, pp. 166f. 
[115]Ibid., p. 166. 
I 
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remains unclear. [ 116 J The impression that he is being inconsistent is 
strong. Yet plainly Marcuse does not regard either Enlightenment natural 
science or modern scientific technology as merely neutral instruments, 
usable equally for good or ill. They are a good deal more sinister than 
that. 
1.4.5 Freud and Harcuse: eros and civilization 
Marcuse is also notable for the introduction of Freudian categories 
into an essentially Marxian view of human labour. 
Sigmund Freud had maintained, for example in The Future of an 
Illusion, [ 117] that civilization is based upon enforced labour and a 
concomitant renunciation of the instinctual (mainly sexual) wishes. 
Mankind, he argued, is caught in the clash between a "pleasure principle" 
and a "reality principle", and the harsh realities of existence dictate 
that the former must be denied in order that men and women might work so as 
to survive at all: 
Every civilization must be built up on coercion and 
renunciation of instinct; it does not even seem certain that 
if coercion were to cease the majority of human beings would 
be prepared to undertake to perform the work necessary for 
acqu1 r 1ng new wealth every civilization rests on a 
compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct. [118] 
As Freud locates the source of all the motive power (libido) for human 
life in the sexual drive, it follows that there is a need for the transfer 
of some of this power from the sexual drive into the execution of human 
labour. [ 119 ] _ And this, in his opinion, is not to be achieved without a 
measure of coercion - in Marxian terms we might say of class domination: 
It is j ust as impossible to do without ·contrLl of the mass by 
a minority as it is to dispense with coerciJn in the work of 
civilization. For masses are lazy and unintelligent; they have 
~ 
) 
[116]Leiss (1972, pp. 199-212) presents a Marcuse closer to the orthodox 
position (that science and t echnology have a validity independent of 
their social context) than perhaps these texts allow. 
[ 117 ]Freud 1962. 
[ 118 )Ibid., pp. 3, 6. 
[119]Freud quoted in Marcuse 1969, pp. 32f. 
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no love for instinctual renunciation, and they are not to be 
convinced by argument of its inevitability •••• It is only 
through the influence of individuals who can set an example 
and whom masses recognize as their leaders that they can be 
induced to perform the work and undergo the renunciations on 
which the existence of civilization depends •••• men are not 
spontaneously fond of work. (120] 
Freud's attitude towards civilization and its advantages was thus 
essentially ambiguous, (121] and his outlook pessimistic: civilization can 
at best be a painful compromise, the lesser of two evils, as indeed the 
structure of the personality must be a compromise between the conflicting 
demands of the id and ego. Neither human life nor civilization can ever be 
finally "liberated", in Freud's opinion. The human-nature relationship is 
ineluctibly one of struggle, not of harmony, both internally and 
externally. 
In his 1955 Eros and Civilization [ 122] Marcuse accepted much of 
Freud's analysis, but argued that increased productivity in social labour 
has rendered the need for repression obsolete. According to Marcuse, 
Freud's analysis is historically specific. Once indeed it was true that the 
sheer facts of existence (i.e. scarcity) compelled undue repression of the 
pleasure principle and the retention of social domination. But in modern 
societies 'the very progress of civilization ... has attained a level of 
productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be 
spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced'. [ 123] Modern 
society, as now constituted, is carrying a large measure of surplus 
repression over and above that basic minimum needed for a society at our 
stage of tec~nological development. This, Marcuse argues, is irrational -
if human needs can be satisfied without repression, then repression has 
lost the rationale it had in the Freudian schema. Lt follows not only that 
politic al domination must have some other · expl i nation in the modern 
world, (124] but also that human work is ripe for a 1qualitative revolution. 
----------------- ·--
[120]Freud 1962,pp. 3f. 
-; 
I 
[ 121 ]Freud 1962, p. 3; see further Freud 1963, passim. 
[122]Marcuse 1969. 
[ 123]Ibid., p. 111. 
[ 124]Ibid. 
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The exact change in work that Marcuse has in mind is not completely 
clear , involving as it does two apparently contradictory elements. Firstly, 
he rejects the idea that essential work should be humanized, or made 
expressive of man's essence; it should r ather be reduced to vanishing point 
so as to leave as much room as possible for the real stuff of human 
existence, which is: 
Play ••• play is unproductive and useless precisely because it 
cancels the repressive and exploitative traits of labor. (125] 
To believe otherwise - to look for pleasure in necessary labor - is to 
fall prey to ideology: 
The typist who hands in a perfect transcript, the tailor who 
delivers a perfectly fitting suit ••• the laborer who fulfills his quota - all may feel pleasure in a 'job well done'. However, 
either this pleasure is extraneous (anticipation of reward), 
or it is the satisfaction (itself a token of repression) of 
being well occupied, in the right place, of contributing one's 
part to the functioning of the apparatus . In either case, such pleasure has nothing . to do with primary instinctual 
gratification. To link performances on assembly lines, in 
offices and shops with instinctual needs is to glorify dehumanization as pleasure. [126] 
Thus here Marcuse sees the realm of freedom as lying beyond the realm of 
necessity: 
freedom is not within but outside the 'struggle for existence'. 
Possession and procurement of the necessities of life are the prerequisite, rather than the content, of a free society •••• 
Necessary labor is a system of essentially inhuman, 
mechanical , and routine activities .... Reasonably, the s ystem 
of societal labour would be organized rather with a view to 
saving time and space for the development of individuality 
outside the inevitably repressive work-w.or ld. \ [ 127 J 
I 
[125]Ibid., p. 157. By 'useless' he alludes to Max Weber's concept of purposive rationality (see 2. 1 below) • 
. [ 126] Ibid., p. 176; my stress. 
[ 127 ]Ibid., p. 157. 
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However, secondly, Marcuse also seems to envisage 'a change in the 
character of work by virtue of which the latter would be assimilated to 
play - the free play of human faculties'. [ 128] Such work could be 
'socially useful activity', [129] but would not be part of the system of 
necessity that now characterizes labour. Marcuse envisages the release of 
libidinous energy in such activity, so that the boundaries between work 
and play, work and art crumble. Yet this must have nothing to do with 
production in the Marxian sense: 
The true spirit of psychoanalytic theory lives in the 
uncompromising efforts to reveal the anti-humanistic forces 
behind the philosophy of productiveness: 'Of all things, hard 
work has become a virtue instead of the curse it was always 
advertised to be by our remote ancestors'. [ 130 J 
Whatever the relationship between Marcuse's two emphases, it is clear 
that he lacks Freud's pessimism. Not only will technological advance 
remove the scourge of scarcity, but the embattled ego itself, and its 
rationality, can be redeemed and reintegrated with the forces of the 
unconscious - forces that were experienced as irrational and destructive 
during earlier stages of human history: 
philosophy ends in the vision of a higher form of reason ••• 
receptivity, contemplation, enjoyment. Behind the definition 
of the subject in terms of the ever transcending and 
productive activity of the ego lies the image of the 
redemption of the ego: the coming to rest of all transcendence 
in a mode of being that has absorbed all becoming, that is for 
and with itself in all otherness. [131] 
This optimistic utopianism is in marked contrast to the pessimism of the 
1944 work of Horkheimer and Adorno, with which I conclude my survey. 
[128]Ibid., p. 171. 
[ 129]Ibid. 
[130]Ibid., p. 176 (quoting Chisholm). 
[131]Ibid., pp. 111f. 
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1.4.6 Horkheimer and Adorno: dialectic of enlightenment 
Several of the ideas already discussed in this section are drawn 
together into a novel synthesis in Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, (132] and more particularly in the first essay therein, 'The 
Concept of Enlightenment'. (133] This work is also considered at length by 
Habermas. [ 134] It is therefore a fitting note upon which to conclude. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, "enlightenment" represents not just a 
movement of eighteenth century thought culminating in Kant, but a cast of 
mind that has sought from classical times to break the powers of myth and 
the natural world, so as to establish man's sovereignty and set him 
free. (135] Yet, they argue, this Promethean movement has had disastrous 
consequences; aiming to undo the curse, it has led to a new form of slavery. 
This is the origin of Horkheimer and Adorno's pessimism; the belief that 
'the only kind of thinking that is sufficiently hard to shatter myths is 
ultimately self-destructive'. (136] How is this so? 
The paradigm of enlightenment thinking, argued Horkheimer and Adorno, 
is to be seen in natural science and mathematics. These disciplines 
"disenchant" the world by the destruction of meaning. Substance, quality, 
being and, finally, even cause itself, are categories that it abandons in 
its reduction of all phenomena to mere numbers: (137] 
From now on, matter would at last be mastered without any 
illusion of ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities. 
For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule 
of computation and utility is suspect ••.• The multiplicity of 
[ 132 ]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979. My treatment is anachronistic: these 
essays predate the works of Marcuse discussed above, and were 
influential upon them. On Horkheimer and Adorf\o 1979 see Jay 1973, pp. 
253-280; Kolakowski 1978, pp. 372-386; Heid 1980, pp. 148-174. 
Horkheimer and Adorno are discussed largely together, and with 
special reference to this work, in TCA1, pp. 339-399; Habermas 1985a, 
pp. 130-157. On Horkheimer, see Held 1980, pp;. 175-199; Jay 1984a, pp. 
) . 196-219. On Adorno, see Buck-Morss 1977; Rose 1978; Held 1980, pp. 200-
222; Jay 1984a, pp. 241-275; Jay 1984b; Habermas 1968c; PPP,pp. 99-109. 
[ 133 ]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, pp. 3-42. 
[ 134 ]See 3.4 below. 
[135]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 3. 
[ 136]Ibid., p. 4. 
[ 137 ]Ibid., p. 5; compare pp. 7, 24. 
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forms is reduced to position and arrangement, history to fact, 
things to matter. [138] 
And this cast of mind is inherently 'totalitarian', [ 139] invading all 
areas of life and reducing them to its own categories. 
Now, while this mode of thought and action has been extremely 
successful in giving man mastery over nature, it has led at the same time 
to a destruction of individuality. Not only matter but also persons have 
been reduced to mere units, and rendered basically interchangeable. [140] 
This reduction process, they argue, is currently ( that is, in 1944) 
manifested in two ways. The first is the reduction of all persons and 
qualities to a common denominator in the "market" of developed capitalism 
- a characteristic dicussed by Marx under the heading of "commodity 
fetishism", [ 141 J and made prominent in the thought of Lukfcs under the 
name of "reification". [142] While the second is the horde mentality of 
German fascism. [143] 
Further, while the enlightenment mentality aims at knowledge which will 
give it power over the material world, this also results in the domination 
of other human beings. [144] It therefore leads to an alienation of man 
from other men, from nature, and from himself: 
Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from 
that over which they exf ercise their power. [145] 
World domination over nature turns against the thinking 
subject himself. [ 146] 
Finally man's subjectivity is abolished completely, to be replaced by the 
[138]Ibid., pp. 6f. 
[139Jibid., p. 6. 
[ 140 ]Ibid., p. 1 o. 
[141]Marx 1976, pp. 163-177. 
[142]So 1.4.4 above. 
) 
; 
[ 143 ]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 13. Many members of the Frankfurt 
School saw fascism as a logical result of the dynamic of capitalism, 
rather than a freak aberration from it (Held 1980, pp. 52-65). 
[144]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 4. 
[ 145 J Ibid., p. 9. 
[ 146 ]Ibid., p. 26. 
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machine: 
in the end the transcendent subject of cognition is 
apparently abandoned as the last reminiscence of subjectivity 
and replaced by the much smoother work of automatic control 
mechanisms. [147] 
This alienation and loss of freedom and individuality, Horkheimer and 
Adorno argue, is indicative of the fact that modern thought involves a 
regression to the very mythical thought patterns that it sought to escape. 
Science is inherently incapable of grasping the concepts of uniqueness or 
individuality, and can instead only deal in repeatable abstractions. But 
this very repeatability is the basic characteristic of the mythical 
worldview. In attempting to banish the tyranny of mythical thought in the 
name of human freedom, the Enlightenment has merely yielded another 
tyranny of its own: 
The essence of enlightenment is the alternative whose 
ineradicability is that of domination. Men have always had to 
choose between their subjection to nature or the subjection 
of nature to the Self. With the extension of the bourgeois 
commodity economy, the dark horizon of myth is illumined by 
the sun of calculating reason , beneath whose cold rays the 
seed of the new barbarism grows to fruition. Under the 
pressure of domination human labor has always led away from 
myth but under domination always returns to the jurisdiction of myth. [148] 
Dialectic of Enlightenment is thus characterized by a deep pessimism, 
and an ambiguous relationship to the Enlightenment project. Its view of 
the human sit~ation is tragic. With Horkheimer and Adorno we have in some 
sense come full circle. The movement of Hegel 's dialect i c of the master and 
the slave, and the final optimism [ 149] \ f Marx's materialist 
transformation of Hegel's Phenomenology, have rvapor ated . Under the 
conditions of modern capitalism, the slave's experience is so impoverished 
~ that his contact with the material world in work 1 has lost its liberative 
[ 14 7 ]Ibid., p. 30. 
[ 148] Ibid., p. 32. 
[149]But see Heller 1982, pp. 23, 37f on Marx's understanding of the tragic 
nature of human progress. 
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power: 
The regression of the masses today is their inability to hear the unheard-of with their own ears, to touch the unapprehended with their own hands - the new form of delusion which deposes every conquered mythic form. [150] 
[Odysseus'] men - despite their closeness to things - cannot enjoy their labor because it is performed under pressure, in desperation, with senses stopped by force. The servant remains enslaved in body and soul; [151] the master regresses. [152] 
As the attempted changing of the world [153] thus leads the human race 
deeper and deeper into bondage, Horkheimer and Adorno retreat from Marx to 
Hegel, and look for salvation in reflection: 
With the abandonment of thought, which in its reified form of mathematics, machine, and organization avenges itself on the men who have forgotten it, enlightenment has relinquished its own realization •••• But true revolutionary practice depends on the intransigence of theory in the face of the insensibility with which society allows thought to ossify. [154] 
Marx's synthesis of the dialectic of the master and the slave with the 
concept of alienation is broken, and human labour loses its redemptive 
force in human history. 
1.5 Enter Habermas 
Jurgen Habermas (b. 1929), currently professor of sociology and 
philosophy at the University of Frankfurt am Main, is the leader of the 
second generation of the Frankfurt School thinkers, whose first generation 
included Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. [155] 
\ 
I [150]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 36. 
,; [ 151 J Not just in the body, as was the case I . for the Stoic in Hegel 's Phenomenology (Hegel 1931, pp. 242-246). [152]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 35. 
[ 153]Marx 1975, p. 423. 
[154]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979, p. 41. 
[155]For an overall account of the history and thought of the Frankfurt school, and the Institut fur Sozialforschung on which it was initially based, Held 1980; see also Jay 1973; Buck-Morss 1977. 
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In some ways, Habermas might be thought a curious figure to be studying 
in this context. Part of his programme, after all, has been to challenge 
the central position of labour in the Marxist tradition, for the sake of an 
increased recognition of the importance of language. However, while much 
of his most important recent book [156] is concerned with developing this 
aspect of his project, it also provides critiques of Weber, Luklcs, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Durkheim, and Marx - many of the most important 
figures in the history of the philosophy of work. Moreover, much of 
Habermas' earlier output [157] is very much concerned with precisely the 
sorts of issues that I have been discussing so far. 
In terms of the above discussion, Habermas' position may be 
characterized roughly as follows. Although emerging from Marxist roots of 
the Frankfurt School variety (his doctoral dissertation on 
Schelling [158] was under Adorno), Habermas is critical of three aspects 
of his background: 
( 1) he defends the validity of Enlightenment thought against the 
attack of Horkheimer and Adorno (and indeed a variety of thinkers from 
Nietzsche to the French post-structuralists) [159] 
(2) the essential shape of his epistemology is drawn from Kant rather 
than from Hegel, and 
( 3) as a result, he is suspicious of the centrally integrative 
function accorded to labour in the Marxist tradition, including the 
formulations of Luka"cs. 
[ 156 ]Theorie des kommunikati ven Handelns 1981, discussed in chapter 3 below. This is not now his latest book, bu~ it ~emains the definitive and systematic statement of his position. . ) [ 157 J Especially Theorie und Praxis 1963, Erkenntni,s und Interesse 1968, Technik und Wissenschaft ais 'Ideologie' 1968, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapi talismus 1973, and Zur Rekonstruktion. des Historischen Materialismus 1976. Unfortunately ( for the sake of clarity when citing references) the English translations rarely coincide with the contents of the German works. For details of this, see Gortzen 1982 and the bibliography. 
[158]Habermas 1954. Habermas provides a brief sketch of his intellectual history in ASI, pp. 149-153. The other interviews in this volume contribute many further details. 
[ 159 ]Habermas 1985a, passim. 
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This, however, is to oversimplify; for each of the above points there is a 
rider to be added: 
(1) although he does not consider modernity as such to be an 
unfortunate development in human history, he considers it to be in a 
"pathological" state as at present constituted, 
(2) he retains the Marxian link between theory and practice, although 
fiercely critical of its formulation in writers such as Lukics, and 
(3) he still regards the development of the forces of production as 
crucial in the dynamics of social evolution. 
It is probably best to see Habermas as attempting a synthesis of two 
opposed traditions - the Hegel/Marx and the Kant/Weber - seeing in both 
some vital insights needed for an adequate understanding of modernity. 
In this attempt to understand modernity, including the role of work in 
it, Habermas uses an interdisciplinary approach. He draws upon continental 
and English-speaking philosophy, sociologists such as Durkheim, Weber and 
Parsons, and the psychology of Freud and Piaget, moulding this disparate 
material into a synthesis of outstanding scope and explanatory power. I 
will be examining aspects of this work in chapters 2 and 3 below, while in 
chapter 4 I extract some issues for critical discussion. However, no 
attempt is here made to offer a rounded presentation of Habermas' thought 
or oeuvre as a whole. My thesis is not about Haberrnas as such, but an 
attempt to appropriate critically aspects of his thought in the service of 
a theology of work. 
One further point should be stressed at this stage. Habermas' accounts 
of past figures ( such as Weber, Marx, and Durkheim) are often idiosyncratic 
if considered as reconstructions of these thi1nkers "in and for 
purpose in \discussing them, for 
ideas for its own sake. Habermas 
themselves". But this is rarely Habermas' 
he does not set out to write a history of 
'i treats these figures rather as dialogue-partners fbr the elucidation of 
his own problems. His apparently historical studies are always undertaken 
with systematic intent. 
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2. WORK IN HABERMAS' EARLIER THOUGHT 
In this chapter I shall survey Habermas' account of the nature and 
significance of work, given in his writings up to, but not including, the 
1981 Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. [1] It is convenient to start by 
reconsidering the problem of definition. 
2.1 Work and instrumental action 
In Toward a Rational Society, [2] Habermas offers the following 
definition of Arbeit, [ 3] in the context of setting out a fundamental 
distinction between "work" and "interaction": 
By 'work' or purposive-rational action I understand either 
instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction. 
Instrumental action is governed by technical rules based on 
empirical knowledge. In every case they imply conditional 
predictions about observable events, physical or social •••• 
The conduct of rational choice-· [involves] deductions from 
preference rules ( value systems) and decision procedures •••• 
Purposive-rational action realizes defined goals under given 
conditions. [4] 
In thi~ broad sense, "work" stands for any form of goal-directed action: 
for any form of action that involves the attaining of pre-set goals by the 
choice and organization of the means to achieve them. This definition may 
usefully be compared with Max Weber's definition of "instrumentally 
rational" action, upon which it is dependent: 
[ 1 J 
) 
Systematic consideration of the 1973 Le_,,gitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus is omitted , partly for reasons of space, and partly because its model of late capitalism has been superceded by the 1981 
work. 
[2] TRS. In this chapter I shall be considering the part of this work translated from the 1968 Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie' (Habermas 1968a), 
[3] Variously translated as "work" as here, or "labour". See 4.2 below. 
[4) TRS, pp. 91f; compare Habermas 1968a, p, 62. 
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Social action may be instrumentally rational (zweckrational), that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and 
calculated ends. [5] 
In his later writing, however, Habermas introduces two changes to this 
terminology. 
Firstly, he abandons the term Arbeit as too misleading for the 
designation of purposive-rational action. In the 1982 'A Reply to my 
Critics', for example, he writes: 
By 'labour' Marx understood as a rule 'socially organized labour' •••• In social labour we are dealing essentially with a 
combination of communicative and instrumental action. [6] 
That is, social labour in Marx's sense is not simply a conjunction of 
individual instrumental actions, [7] but also the communicative 
co-ordination of these actions in society. Social labour is thus a complex 
concept that Habermas analyses into two components. To use Arbeit for one 
of these leads to misunderstandings. [8] 
Secondly, Habermas tidies up his subdivisions of purposive-rational 
action. Whereas in Toward a Rational Society "instrumental action" can be 
used for actions directed either to the physical or the social worlds, in 
'A Reply to my Critics' it is restricted to the physical. A new term, 
"strategic action", is introduced for purposive-rational social actions: 
Actions· orientated to success are termed instrumental when 
they are understood as following technical rules and can be 
appraised from the standpoint of the ~ efficiency of goal-oriented intervention in the physical w rld ... strategic 
only if they are understood as following r les of rational 
I 
7 
[5] M. Weber 1978~ p. 24. The other Weberian action types are "value-rational 11 (wertrational ), 11 affectual", and 11 tradi tional" (Ibid ., pp. 24f). 
[6] RC, pp. 267f. Unfortunately, the second part of this crucial passage is omitted from the German text (Habermas 1984a, p. 546) • 
. [ 7 l RC, p. 267; Haber mas 1984a, p. 546. 
[ 8] See further 4.2 below. 
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choice and can 
efficiency of 
opponents. [ 9] 
be appraised from the standpoint of the influencing the decisions of rational 
Hence in this later work Habermas isolates three types of action, which he 
tabulates thus: [10] 
Table 1: Types of action 
Action / Actor Orientated to Orientated to reaching 
success understanding 
Non-social Instrumental 
---
Action 
Social Strategic Communicative 
Action Action 
Social labour in Marx's sense always involves both instrumental action on 
the physical world, and communicative action with respect to the social 
world. [ 11] And, as a later elucidation makes clear, 'strategic actions are 
as much involved as communicative actions'. [ 12] I shall delay further discussion of the relation between these types of action until 4.2 below. 
It is Habermas' concept of instrumental action [instrumentales Handeln] 
that I want to examine most closely in the next section. [ 13] Under 
consideration here will be the human relationship to external nature in 
social labour, with the accompanying 
forming the background. As a material 
environment is the basis upon which all 
[9] RC, pp. 263f. 
[ 10] RC,p. 263; compare TCA 1, p. 285. 
[ 11 ] RC, p. 268. 
[12] Habermas 1984a, p. 602. 
social dimensions of that labour 
being, excha~ge with the material 
human life is) built, a fact clearly 
.., 
J 
[ 13] For the concept of communicative action, see 3.3 below. 
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recognized by Marx, as indicated in chapter 1. Whether the concept of 
instrumental action as used by Habermas is adequate to conceptualize this 
exchange is a key question. Habermas thinks that it is: 
instrumental actions, that is, interventions in the objective 
world, present themselves as the medium through which the 
material substratum of the life-world is reproduced, that is, 
through which the life-world develops processes of exchange 
with external nature. [14) 
To evaluate this issue requires a closer analysis, firstly of the concept 
and scope of instrumental action, and secondly of the place of social 
labour in Habermas' whole anthropology. 
In what follows I shall, as far as possible, use terms in the following 
ways: ( 1) "instrumental" and "strategic" action in the senses used by 
Habermas in the 1982 'A Reply to my Critics', (2) "labour" or "social 
labour" in the Marxian sense of work within the economic system, and (3) 
"work" in a more inclusive sense, as suggested by Parker, to encompass 
other forms of purposive activity as well: 
work has a wider biological and physiological meaning of purposeful and sustained action •••• work in its broad meaning is the opposite of rest. [15) 
In quotations from Habermas, however, I shall retain the usage of his 
translators, if necessary giving the original German as well. 
2.2 The place of instrumental action in the human project 
2.2.1 The characterization of Instrumental Action 
A: THE SCIENCES AND CONTROL ) 
In the 1968 essay 'Technology and Science as 11 Icieology"', [ 16) Habermas 
[ 14] RC, p. 268. 
[15] Parker 1983, p. 2. 
[16] TRS, pp. 81-122; Habermas 1968a, pp. 48-103. 
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provides the following brief characterization of the relationship between 
the natural sciences, [17] technology, and the control of external nature: 
the empirical sciences have developed since Galileo's time 
within a methodological frame of reference that reflects the 
transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control. Hence 
the modern sciences produce ·knowledge which through its form (and not through the subjective intention of scientists) is 
technically exploitable knowledge, although the possible 
applications generally are realized afterwards. [18] 
Several points require elucidation here. 
Firstly, the term "transcendental" signals that Habermas is operating 
with a development of the Kantian epistemological framework. This is made 
explicit in Knowledge and Human Interests. [19] Kant, says Habermas, had 
pursued a 'transcendental-logical inquiry into the conditions of possible 
knowledge', taking 'modern science as the starting point of an 
investigation into the constitution of possible objects of 
causal-analytic knowledge'. [20] In other words, rejecting what we might 
call crude realism, Kant had asked himself what must be true about the 
knowing subject for it to be capable of the sort of knowledge exemplified 
by Newtonian physics. He had, in brief, concluded that "things in 
themselves" were unknowable, [21] but that the knowing subject imposed the 
categories of space, time etc. upon the sensory input to constitute the 
objective world of theoretical knowledge, [22] The knowing subject is 
active in the constitution of the world that it knows, in 'the constitution 
[17] Habermas uses more or less interchangeably the six terms "empirical sciences", "empirical-analytic sciences", "nomological sciences", 
"natural sciences", "modern sciences", ~nd "ijectifying sciences". In each case a different aspect of this grou of sciences is under scrutiny. However, in accordance with German u1 ge, the term "science" (Wissenschaft) is of much .wider application, embracing most forms of methodologically rigorous study. ; 
[ 18] TRS, p. 99. 
[19] KHI. First German edition 1968. 
[20] KHI, p. 67. 
[21] Kant 1933, pp. 24, 27. "Thing in itself" denotes for Kant the unknowable world of reality as it exists in itself apart from any knowing subject . 
[ 22] Compare Kant 1933, p, 22. 
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of the objects of possible experience'. [23] This basic "critical" [24] 
insight, Habermas says, has been abandoned by "positivism", [25] which 
'ignore[ s] the synthetic achievements of the knowing subject', resulting in 
'the naive idea that knowledge describes reality ••• accompanied by the 
copy theory of truth, according to which the reversibly univocal 
correlation of statements and matters of fact must be understood as 
isomorphism'. [26] 
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas develops the Kantian 
position, arguing that reality can be constituted by the subject so as to 
yield knowledge in more than one framework, reflecting more than one 
"knowledge-constitutive interest". Each framework is pursued by one branch 
of the sciences, using a distinct methodology, and working on reality 
conceived from the point of view of one process crucial for the 
reproduction of the human species. From the 1965 Appendix to Knowledge and 
Human Interests [27] I have distilled the following schema of the three 
frameworks that Habermas proposes: [28] 
[23] KHI, p. 68. 
[24] In German philosophy, the adjective "critical" is usually an allusion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. However, the term "critical 
theoristi" as applied to Habermas and others includes a reference to 
the Young Hegelian position on theory and practice (Bubner 1982, p. 42). For an analysis of Habermas' version of ~itical theory in the light of this , Bubner 1982; for Habermas ' r .espon , e , RC, pp . 229- 238. 
[25] "Positivism" is a much wider term for Habermas han in English usage, 
where it tends to be restricted to the earlie~ Logical Positivists. For Habermas it signifies a broadly empiricist approach to the philosophy of science, and includes figures s~ch as Karl Popper. See Habermas 1976d, and the other essays in Adorno et. al. 1976. 
[26) KHI, pp. 68f. 
[27) AKHI. 
[28] Compare AKHI, pp. 308-311. However, there is some ambiguity as to the 
relationship between the body of Knowledge and Human Interests and the Appendix in this context, especially about the status of the 
emancipatory interest. 
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Table 2: Epistemological frameworks 
I Interest Sciences Reality 
technical empirical- objectified from 
analytic the standpoint of 
sciences possible prediction 
and control 
practical historical- disclosed subject 
hermeneutic to a constitutive 
sciences interest in the 
expansion of possible 
action-orientating 
understanding 
emancipatory critical disclosed by a 
social process of self-
sciences reflection, releasing 
the subject from 
dependence upon 
hypostatizing powers 
In each case, the framework prejudges the meaning of possible statements 
that can be made within it. In the case of knowledge within the framework 
of the technical interest (i.e. empirical-analytic knowledge) the meaning 
of its desc r ipti ve/predictive statements is 'their technical 
exploi tability'. [ 29] That is, knowledge within this framework is 
constituted by the subject in such a way tha t i t is inherently capable of 
generating predictions, and therefore may be 
the control of the physical environment. 
exploited 
) 
in the interests of 
Habermas expands on this in chapter 9 of Knowledge and Human Interests: 
I n the behavioral system of instrumental ac tion , r eal i t y is constituted as the totality of what can be experi enced from the viewpoint of possibl e technic a l control. The reality that 
[ 29] AKHI, p. 308. 
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is objectified under these transcendental conditions has its 
counterpart in a specifically restricted mode of experience. The language of empirical-analytic statements about reality is formed under the same conditions •••• Both restricted language and restricted experience are defined by being 
results of operations, whether with s igns or mov ing bodies •••• Operations of measurement permit the reversibly univocal 
correlation of operatively determined events and 
systematically connected signs. If the framework of 
empirical-analytic inquiry were that of a transcendental 
subject, then measurement would be the synthetic activity that genuinely characterizes it. [30] 
Within this framework both experience of, and statements about, reality 
are restricted to measurable quantities ( such as mass, length, time etc.). 
Habermas rarely illustrates this sort of abstract statement, so I shall 
try to elucidate it by means of an example. Taking the paradigmatic case of 
Newtonian mechanics, the motion of any body (say, an artillery shell) can 
be quantified and described by the use of algebraic equations. [31] Any 
such description of the motion of the shell of necessity allows two 
further operations: (1) once the initial conditions are known (i.e. the 
speed and direction of flight), the point of landing of the shell may be 
predicted, and (2) the flight of the shell may be controlled so as to hit a 
particular target by the choice of the initial conditions (i.e. the 
direction in whi ch the shell is launched and its speed). The sort of 
description involved in Newtonian mechanics, generating 
"empirical-analytic knowledge" in Habermas' terms, is thus internally 
related to the ability to predict and to control events in the physical 
world. The decision to approach the phenomenon of the shell in this way, at 
the same time determines the use that can be made of the information 
gained . As Habermas puts it, 'the meaning of such predictions, that i s their 
technical exploitability, is established only by 
which we apply theories to r eality'. [ 32] 
[30] KHI, pp. 191f. 
the 
'i 
) 
) 
rules according to 
[ 31] These link the velocity of the shell at various times, the time 
elapsed, the force of gravity, the distance travelled etc . For details, Nelkon and Parker 1971, pp. 1-9. 
[32] AKHI, p. 308. 
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To return to the quotation at the beginning of this section, two points 
should now be clear . Firstly, the decision to describe an object like our 
artillery shell in terms of mass, length, and time - rather than, say, its 
aesthetic qualities, or the historical significance of its flight -
establishes ipso facto 'a methodological frame of reference that reflects 
the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control 1. [ 33] And 
secondly, this is irrespective of the likelihood that Newton, in first 
investigating the motion of falling bodies, had no such belligerent 
application in mind (or, indeed, any application at all) for his 
discoveries. In all probability his 'subjective intention' was to pursue 
the quest for truth for its own sake. Nevertheless the form of the 
knowledge that he produced was objectively 'technically exploitable', even 
if that was not realized until later. [34] 
In Habermas' view, this casts doubts upon the "positivism" that posits a 
two step process: firstly the production of pure disinterested theory 
(science), and secondly its subsequent application (technology). The first 
step Habermas calls 'the ontological illusion of pure theory', because it 
is linked to 'the basic ontological assumption of a structured, 
self-subsistent world'. (35] Rather, scientific knowledge is characterized 
by its applicability from the outset. It is not disinterested, speculative 
knowledge, but knowledge orientated to a certain use. It is, as he puts it, 
characterized by a 'technical cognitive interest'; [36] and no clear line 
of demarcation can be drawn between modern science and technology. 
B: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INSTRUMENTAL ACTION 
The foregoing is directly relevant to this section about the nature of 
instrumental action for the following reason: ~aberts 
and technology, not as a totally novel phenomenon I f 
I natural outgrowth of a form of knowledge and mode of 
[ 33 J TRS, p. 99. 
(34] Ibid.; compare ITP, p. 8. 
[ 35 J AKHI, p. 307; stress removed. 
· [ 36 J Ibid., p. 308; stress removed. 
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J 
sees modern science 
modernity, but as a 
action available to 
the human species from the beginning. 
This is made explicit for the case of technology in a passage from 
Toward a Rational Society, where Habermas is refuting Marcuse's ideas 
about a new science and technology: [37] 
Hence: 
there is an immanent connection between the technology known to us and the structure . of purposive-rational action •••• technological development lends itself to being interpreted as though the human species had taken the elementary components of the behav ioral system of purposive-rational action ... and projected them ••• onto the plane of technical instruments, thereby unburdening itself of the corresponding functions •••• Technological development thus follows a logic that corresponds to the structure of purposive-rational action regulated by its own results, which is in fact the structure of work. [38] 
technology, if based at all on a project, can only be traced back to a 'project' of the human species as a whole, and not to one that could be historically surpassed. [39] 
The control of nature, which is the goal of modern technology, pace Marcuse 
is one of the authentic goals of the human species as such. Technology 
results simply from a separating out, refining, and objectifying of the 
processes of instrumental action that are used by all in everyday life. 
Modern science, Habermas believes, is similarly connected to the world 
of everyday life. Science is a development of that everyday form of 
knowledge - "truth" about the way the objective world is - that can be 
expressed in · .constative speech acts. [40] This , he claims, is knowledge 
resulting from experience constituted in the framework of the technical 
knowledge-constitutive interest. [41] What is pew a~out modern science is 
of inquiry has b~en separated 
I 
that a particular mode 
out, 
institutionalized in abstraction from the life-wor~d, and made the subject 
J 
[ 37 J See 1.4.4 above. 
[ 38] TRS, p. 87. 
(39] Ibid. 
[ 40] Compare CES, pp. 58, 68; TCA 1, pp. 23, 238. [41] Compare KHI, p. 126. 
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of research and discussion among a scientific community. [42] 
Now, Habermas is at pains to distance his position here from the 
instrumentalism of Dewey, calling his own position 'transcendental 
pragmatism'. [43] In 'A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests' [44] 
he denies that 'the success of · instrumental action is a sufficient 
criterion of the truth of propositions'. [45] Instead he combines a 
pragmatic theory of meaning with a consensus theory of truth, [46] a 
position which he ascribes to the Peirce [47] of the middle period: 
Peirce anticipated the separation of problems of 
object-constitution from those of truth. The pragmatist maxim 
regulates the meaning of empirically permissible expressions, 
confining the application of these expressions to objects of 
experience belonging to the realm of instrumental 
action. [48] 
This implies that the meaning of an expression is regulated by the use to 
which it can be put, [49] in this case to 'grasp reality with the aim in 
mind of controlling it through technology'. [50] However, the objectivity 
of experience is not a sufficient condition for the truth of statements 
about it, because 'theoretical progress [is] a critical development of 
theory languages which interpret the prescientific object domain more and 
more "adequately"'· [51] To rely on experience alone to verify linguistic 
truth claims would mean that 
theoretical progress would have to be conceived as the production of new experience, and could not be conceived as 
[42] KHI , pp. 124, 137. For elucidation of the term "life-world", 3.5 below. [43] PKHI, pp. -374. 
[44] Added to the second (1973) German edition of Knowledge and Human Interests, in which Habermas replies to sol e of the criticisms levelled against the first edition. , 
[45] PKHI, p. 374. 
1 [46] Hesse 1982, p. 99. 
[47] Charles Sanders Peirce, with John Dewey and iwnHam James, was the founding father of American pragmatism. In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas develops his philosophy of the natural sciences by a critical appropriation of his work. On Peirce, Apel 1981. [48] PKHI, p. 374; compare pp. 360f. 
[49] Compare Wittgenstein 1968, p. 20. 
[ 50] PKHI, p. 37 4; compare KHI, p. 195 • 
. [51] PKHI, p. 375. 
43 
reinterpretation of the same experience. (52] 
So, the objectivity of the experience (guaranteed in Kantian fashion by 
the object constitution within the framework of instrumental action) 
guarantees not the truth of statements about the experience, but the 
identity of the experience in the various statements interpreting it. 
In this statement we see a move towards the division between action and 
discourse/argumentation (53] that characterizes Habermas' later work. The 
problem with this solution is that it detaches the theory language from 
experience in a way that leaves very hazy its connection with the 
constraints of the external world; an objection put by Hesse, [54] whose 
force Habermas partly admits. [55] 
C: "INTERESTS" AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas attempts to relate his 
transcendental frameworks to the anthropological constitution of the 
species, using the category "knowledge-constitutive interests". He tries 
here (56] to steer a middle course between the Scylla and Charybdis of 
idealism and naturalism. Knowledge, he claims, is 'neither a mere 
instrument of an organism's adaptation to a changing environment' like 
teeth, claws etc. (naturalism), nor yet 'the act of a pure rational being 
removed from the context of life in contemplation' (idealism). [57] 
Correspondingly: 
'cognitive interest' is ••• a peculiar category, which conforms 
as little to the distinction between empirical and 
transce·ndental or factual and symbolic determinations as to 
that between motivation and cognition. (58] 
) 
[ 52 J Ibid. 7 
[53] E.g. ITP, p. 18; compare TCA 1, p. 18. 
[54] Hesse 1982, p. 114; compare Hesse 1980, pp. 206-231 and passim. 
[ 55] RC, p. 275. 
[56] Not entirely successfully; see 4.3 below. 
[ 5 7] KH I, p. 19 7. 
[58] Ibid., compare pp. 134f. 
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It fits in between the two. 
Nietzsche is the r epr esentative of the naturalism that Habermas wishes 
to avoid here. [ 59 J Nietzsche, says Habermas, 'saw the connection of 
knowledge and interest', but had made it 'the basis of a metacritical 
dissolution of knowledge as such'. ·[60] Correctly rejecting the positivist 
idea of pure disinterested theory in science, he had made the mistake of 
equating "interests" with "instincts". [61] His 'criterion of truth' had 
thus become mere 'biological utility', with the result that 'any illusion 
at random' could claim validity 'as long as some need interpret[ed] the 
world through it'. [62] 
Habermas traces this unsatisfactory position back to Nietzsche's 
acceptance of a positivistic model of the natural sciences. [63] Starting 
from the view that only empirical-scientific knowledge could count as 
knowledge at all, so devaluing other forms of knowledge, [64] he had then 
undercut this position by applying the positivistic critique to science 
itself. [65] The result was to deny the possibility of any knowledge at 
all, scientific or otherwise: [66] epistemology was replaced by 
perspectivism. [67] But Nietzsche's position is ultimately 
self-contradictory, argues Habermas, because he implicitly claims truth 
for his critiques of science and philosophy, despite the fact that "truth" 
is a category that he explicitly denies himself: 
Nietzsche ••• denies the critical power of reflection with and 
only with the means of reflection itself •••• [he] is so rooted 
in basic positivist beliefs that he cannot systematically 
take cognizance of the cognitive function of self-reflection 
from which he lives as a philosophical writer. [68] 
--------------------
[59] Ibid., pp. 290-300. On Nietzsche, see 1982a, pp. 505-528; 1985a, pp. 104-129. 
[60] KHI, p. 290. 
[61] Ibid., p. 298. 
[62] Ibid., p. 297. 7 
[63] Ibid., p. 291 . 
[64] Ibid. 
[65] Ibid., p. 297. 
[66] Ibid. 
[67] Ibid., p. 298 
[68] Ibid., p. 299. 
45 
Habermas' attempt to steer a via media between idealism and naturalism 
starts instead from a recognition of the crucial role that language plays 
in human life: a stress that is repeated again and again in various ways in 
his work. He sees the change from animal proto-society to human society as 
involving the penetration of linguistic interpretations into the 
needs/motivation system of the organism, [69) changing animal "instincts" 
into human "knowledge-constitutive interests". These new interests are not 
merely instinctive desires for the gratification of needs. Their 
realization 'leads not to happiness but to success', which has 'has both a 
life function and a cognitive function'. [70) Naturalism thus makes a 
fundamental epistemological mistake. It attempts to explain human society 
completely in biological categories, whereas in fact these very categories 
have been derived by abstraction from our primary experience of cultural 
life, which is on a different plane. [71) We are forced, instead, to apply 
to the human species some of the properties of the (idealistic) notion of 
the "subject". [ 72) Knowledge-constitutive interests take the place of 
instincts for a species that creates itself and its world 'culturally by 
work and interaction'. [73) They 'mediate the natural history of the human 
species with the logic of its self-formative process'. [74] 
In Habermas' 1968 work, then, he denies that the "natural history" of 
the human species can be grasped adequately in merely biological 
categories. Nevertheless he writes as if the human being was objectively 
made up · of discrete "systems", each of which embodied one of the 
knowledge-constitutive interests. In his later work this form of 
expression has been abandoned; likewise also the concept of the 
knowledge-constitutive interests, which has been subjected to sustained 
criticism. [ 75] · This, however, seems to have weakened the link between 'the 
[ 69] Ibid., p. 285; see further 2.3.1 below. 
[70] Ibid., p. 134. 
(71] Ibid.,p.285. 7 
) 
[72] Ibid., p. 135. Compare Marx's reintroduction of the idealist concept of 
the active subject against the materialism of Feuerbach (Marx 1975, 
p. 421 ). 
[73] KHI, p. 196. 
[74] Ibid., p. 196. 
[75] For example Ottmann 1982; Dallmayr 1974, pp. 107-134, 153-168 and 
passim. 
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natural history of the human species' and 'the logic of its self-formative 
process' that the knowledge-constitutive interests had forged. 
The division of knowledge into various types, however, linked with 
different forms of argumentation and validity claims, has been retained 
and developed. [76] 
2.2.2 The scope of instrumental action 
Habermas adopts an intermediate position concerning the legitimate 
scope of instrumental action and the scientific/technological progress 
that has arisen from it: 
neither the model of the original sin of scientific-technical 
progress nor that of its innocence do it justice. [77] 
A: THE LEGITIMACY OF TECHNICAL CONTROL 
Habermas rejects the idea that there is anything wrong as such with an 
objectifying or technical control of the material world. In fact, he 
argues, this has always been a desideratum of human existence. A 
fundamental experience of archaic societies was 'the experience of being 
delivered up unprotected to the contingencies of an unmastered 
environment', [78] and human existence has always involved the attempt to 
control this contingent nature that otherwise threatens it. [79] In 
societies with a mythical [80] understanding of the world, the flood of 
this contingency could be stemmed only in the realm of thought, by the 
anthropomorphizing of nature. [81] But Enlightenment natural science 
[76] 
[77] 
[78] 
[79] 
[80] 
[81] 
See further 3.2 and 4.4 below. 
TRS, p. 89 . ) 
TCA 1, pp. 46f. 
Compare the concept of "creation" as the orderlng of chaos: 6.3 below. 
By which term Habermas denotes primitive societies such as that of 
the Azande of Evans-Pritchard fame, (TCA1, p. 44) and their ancient 
counterparts. 
A device which 'makes possible not only a theory that explains the 
world narratively and renders it plausible, but also a practice 
through which the world can be controlled in an imaginary way' which 
is a 'technique of magically influencing the world' ( TCA 1, p. 48 ). 
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achieves this goal in reality. It is therefore to be welcomed. 
In Habermas' view, then, control of the physical world is a necessary 
and authentic aspect of the human project. This involves him in a 
rejection of the views of earlier members of the Frankfurt School on this 
matter [82] such .as Horkheimer and Adorno [83] and Marcuse. As we saw 
above, it had seemed to the thinkers of the Frankfurt school that the 
control of nature was internally related to man's repression of his fellow 
man and of his own self: that 'domination of nature involves domination of 
man'. [84] This implied that a transformed attitude to external nature 
would have to be an essential component of any future human emancipation. 
Habermas analyses Marcuse's views thus: 
Marcuse envisages not only different modes of theory formation but a different scientific methodology in general. 
The transcendental framework within which nature would be 
made the object of a new experience would then no longer be 
the functional system of instrumental action. The viewpoint of 
possible technical control would be replaced by one of 
preserving, fostering, and releasing the potentialities of 
nature: 'there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a 
liberating one'. [85] 
Habermas rejects this. "Domination" and "repression" are political terms. 
It would certainly be legitimate to use them for human-nature 
relationships if nature could be our interaction or dialogue partner, 
because then: 
instead of treating nature as the object of possible 
technical control, we can encounter her as an opposing partner 
in a possible interaction. We can seek out a fraternal rather 
than an- exploited nature. At the level of an as yet incomplete 
intersubjectivity we can impute subjectivity to animals and 
plants, even to minerals, and try to communicl ate 
instead of merely processing her. [ 86] , 
I 
[82] See 1.4.4 and i.4.6 above. 
[83] TCA 1, p. 379. 
[ 84] Ibid. 
[85] TRS, pp. 86f, quoting Marcuse. 
' I 
with nature 
[86] TRS, p. 88. Here he alludes to the future "natural subject" postulated by Bloch (see 1.4.3 above). 
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But that is a category mistake. Human interaction, he argues, is inherently 
linguist ic it is 'symbolic interaction in distinction to 
purposive-rational action' (87] - and symbolic interaction with nature is 
obviously out of the question. [88] It follows that 
the achievements of technology, which are indispensable as such, could surely not be substituted for by an awakened nature •••• The idea of a New Science will not stand up to logical scrutiny any more than that of a New Technology For this function, as for scientific-technical progress in general, there is no more 'humane' substitute. [ 89] 
The human project, then, is not to be furthered on the basis of 
communication with, or dissolution into oneness with, nature; it is to be 
based upon control of it. Habermas rejects any elements of Vitalism or 
Romanticism in his view of external nature. He traces the views of Marcuse, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Bloch in this area back to the Romanticism of Schelling, (90] and behind him to the mysticism of Boehme and the Jewish 
Kabbalah. (91] Habermas will have no truck with critiques of technology or 
instrumental action that display this pedigree. 
Habermas' position here will be considered critically in 4.3 below. 
B: THE LIMITS OF TECHNICAL CONTROL 
Habermas is much more critical of the extension of technical control 
from control of the natural world to cont r ol of the social or subjective 
worlds. (92] I shall consider these in turn. 
Much of Habermas' early work is devoted to attacking the modern 
extension of technical 
[ 87] TRS, p. 88. 
[ 88] Ibid. 
[ 89] Ibid. 
cont r ol 
[ 90 J On Schelling, Habermas 1954. 
into the s~cial \ world. 
I 
.., 
) 
[ 91] TRS, p. 86. Compare PPP, pp. 67f; KHI, pp. 32f. 
(93] In 'The 
(92] On Habermas' concept of the "three worlds" , 3.2 and 4.4 below. [93lThis is, in various guises, a main emphasis in Habermas 1962; 1971d; 1974a. 
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Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy' [94] for 
example, he contrasts ancient Greek and modern ideas of "politics", to the 
detriment of the latter. For the ancient Greeks, he argues, 
politics referred exclusively to praxis, in the narrow sense 
of the Greeks. This had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and the expert mastery of objectified 
tasks. In the final instance politics was always directed 
toward the formation and cultivation of character; it 
proceeded pedagogically and not technically. [95] 
However, in the seventeenth century Hobbes had established a political 
science on the model of the new natural sciences, so reducing praxis to 
techne. For Hobbes, 
the relationship of theory and praxis is defined in 
accordance with the model of classical mechanics. The 
scientific analysis of the relationships of life, objectified 
as an object of nature, informs us about causal lawfulness •••• The construction of Natural Law can be understood as a general physics of sociation •••• it specifies those institutional 
arrangements, the physically effective compulsive force of 
which can be expected to produce the natural modes of reaction 
that will lead to an orderly cohabitation of human beings. [96] 
This, Habermas insists, involves a category mistake, reducing persons to 
the level of things. Politics ceases to be 'the doctrine of the good and 
just life the continuation of ethics', [97] as it had been for the 
Greeks. Ceasing to be related to ethics it became instead a dubious branch 
of the natural sciences, 'having little more than the name in common with 
the old politics'. [98] 
This has all come home to roost, Habermas argues, despite the interlude 
characterized by the discussions in the bourgeois 
[94] TP, pp. 41-81. 
[ 95] Ibid., p. 42. 
[96] Ibid., p. 71. 
[ 97] Ibid., p. 42. 
[98] Ibid., p. 41. 
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sphere" of the 
I I 
nineteenth century, [ 99 J in the bureaucratic states of late 
capitalism. [ 100] Society is here treated as a self-regulating system, 
whose objective is the control of its members so that the system can 
survive. [ 101] When systems theory thus extends a model drawn from the 
functioning of biological organisms to the level of human society, 
discussion about the nature of "the good life", and, ultimately, public 
discussion of any substantive issues at all, is eliminated. Administration 
becomes a matter of mere technological control. The technocrats: 
want to bring society under control in the same way as nature by reconstructing it according to the pattern of self-regulated systems of purposive-rational action and 
adaptive behavior. [102] 
This critique of modern societies is further developed in Theorie des 
kommunikati ven Handelns, and is dealt with in 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
Secondly, technical control is also extended to the subjective worlds 
of individuals. Habermas looks forward (with distaste) to the 
detaching [of] human behavior from a normative system linked to the grammar of language-games and integrating it instead into self-regulated subsystems of the man-machine type by means of immediate physical or psychological control. Today the psychotechnic manipulation of behavior can already liquidate the old fashioned detour through norms that are internalized but capable of reflection. Behavioral control could be instituted at an even deeper level tomorrow through biotechnic intervention in the endocrine regulating system, 
not to mention the even greater consequences of intervening in the genetic transmission of inherited information. [103] 
[99] For Habermas' acoount and interpretation of the rise and fall of this political public sphere, Habermas 1962; Habermas 1974c translates a much abbreviated form of the argument. · \ [100]Spatkapitalismus (e.g. Habermas 1973a, p. 9) is H)abermas' term for the societies of the modern western democracies. Much of what is said here also applies to the ea~tern European states (Arato 1982; RC, pp. 281-283). 
I ' [ 101 ]For Habermas' dispute with Niklas Luhmann on this issue, Habermas 1971c, especially pp. 142-405. Habermas' position is later developed in TKH2, pp. 173-293, for which see 3.5, 3.6, 4.5 and 4.6 below. For Luhmann's position in English translation, Luhmann 1982, especially pp. 229-270. 
[ 1 02 ]TRS, p. 117. 
[103]Ibid., pp. 117f. 
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However, the fulfilment of ' this cybernetic dream of the instinct-like 
self-stabilization of societies' [ 104] by the technocratic takeover of 
both social and subjective worlds, would be at the expense of precisely 
that which marks off the human being as (normatively) human: the process 
of arri ving at norms of behaviour by open discussion. Such a development 
would therefore be a . regression, not an advance. Essential features of 
human society would be neglected: communication, emancipation and 
individuation. Habermas believes that a complementary "rationalization" 
can occur in these areas as well as in the legitimate spheres of 
purposive-rational action, but that it must take a different form: 
Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework 
can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, that is, through removing restrictions on communication. Public, un r estricted discussion, free f r om domination, of the 
suitability and desirability of action-orienting principles 
and norms ••• does not lead per se to the better functioning of 
social systems, but would furnish the members of society with the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individuation. The growth of productive forces is not the same 
as the intention of the 'good life'. It can at best serve it. [ 105] 
These ideas are, once again, developed in Habermas' 1981 work, and are 
considered in 3.2 and 3.3 below. 
Habermas' treatment of Freud in Knowledge and Human Interests [106] is 
in basic accord with this model. In Habermas' opinion, Freud made the 
mistake of seeing psychoanalysis as a branch of natural science. Thus he 
looked forward to the replacement of its provisional results by surer 
biochemical methods. [ 107] But in fact , argues Habermas, Freud's 
"scientific" account of the dynamics of the psyche in terms of energy 
flows has validity only within the limits of the psychoanalytic process, 
where its appl ication is necessarily "practibal" .~1 08] It is knowledge 
constituted in the framework of the emancipatory ra4her than the technical 
[ 104 ]Ibid., p. 118. 
[ 105 ]TRS, pp. 118f; see further 3.3.3 below. 
[ 106 ]KHI, pp. 214-290. 
[107]Ibid., p. 247 • 
. [ 108 ]Ibid. 
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knowledge-constitutive interest: 
The energy-distribution model only creates the semblance that psychoanalytic statements are about measurable transformations of energy. Not a single statement about quantitative relations derived from the conception of instinctual economics has ever been tested experimentally. The model of the psychic apparatus is so constructed that 
metapsychological statements imply the observability of 
events they are about. But these events are never observed -
nor can they be observed. [ 109] 
Freud's assumptions to the contrary led him to projective faith in the 
power of psychopharmacology, but in fact 
psychopharmacology only brings about alterations of 
consciousness to the extent that it controls functions of the human organism as objectified natural processes. In contrast, the experience of reflection induced by enlightenment is precisely the act through which the subject frees itself from 
a state in which it had become an object for itself. This 
specific activity must be accomplished by the subject itself. There can be no substitute for it. [110] 
Once again the subject, constituted by the penetration of language into 
the needs structure of the organism, resists theoretical eradication. Its 
emancipation is not achievable by any form of technology, biochemical or 
otherwise, that uses causal connections: 
Psychoanalytic therapy is not based, like somatic medicine, 
which is 'causal' in the narrower sense, on making use of known 
causal connections. Rather it owes its efficacy to overcoming 
causal connections themselves. [111] 
It is these causal connections, which have 'the driving, instinctual 
character of something that uncontrollably compels consciousness from 
outside', [112] that are responsible for the sort 
[ 109 ]Ibid., p. 253. 
[110]Ibid., pp. 247f. 
"i ) 
illness that is 
[ 111 ]Ibid., p. 271. This causality within the psyche that opposes the subject is not merely biological, however; like the subject itself, it too has a symbolic structure. So psychoanalysis 'certainly does grasp causal connections, al though not at the level of physical events' (Ibid., p. 271 ). 
· ( 112 ]Ibid., p. 256. 
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accessible to psychoanalytic treatment. 
Here again, then, the idea of scientific objectification and consequent 
technical control is rejected, as it was rejected in the case of the social 
world. Technical control, if it is not to lead t o pathologies of various 
kinds, needs to be retained within its legitimate limits: and those limits 
are defined by the scope of the human relation to the physical 
world. [113] 
C: SCIENCE AS "IDEOLOGICAL" 
In the 1968 essay 'Technology and Science as " Ideology"', [114] Habermas 
places an important additional caveat alongside his welcome for 
scientific and technological progress. Science, he argues, has acquired an 
ideological role in late capitalism, because here 'the development of the 
social system seems to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical 
progress'. [115] He reasons as follows. 
Up until the nineteenth century, technological innovation was largely 
fortuitous; [116] but since the end of that century we have witnessed a 
' scientization of technology' whereby 'technical development [has] entered 
into a feedback relation with the progress of the modern sciences', each 
reinforcing the other. [117] As a result (in Marxian terminology) 
'scientific-technical progress has become an independent source of surplus 
value'. [118] No longer is it sensible, as Marx did, to measure the value of 
[ 113Jin his later work, Habermas makes significantly less use of Freud, and 
much more use of the developmental psyc,holog~ of Piaget. Even in Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, however, h has not disowned his 
earlier work completely. Here he calls the for~ of discourse used in psychoanalysis "therapeutic critique", and refers the reader to Knowledge and Human Interests for further exp l ication (TCA1, pp. 20f; 410, note 18). See further 4.4 below. 
[ 114]TRS, pp. 81-122~ 
[ 115]Ibid., p. 105; stress removed. On meanings of the term "ideology", West 1985b, pp. 429 f (appended). 
[ 116]TRS, p. 104. 
[ 117] Ibid. 
[ 118]Ibid. 
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the product by the number of man-hours put into its manufacture, [ 119 J 
because we are fast approaching the situation where virtually no man-hours 
will be required in manufacture at all. 
This situation does indeed have some potential for progressive social 
change: it makes more and more implausible the conservative 
'achievement-ideology', which legitimates the linkage of wealth and status 
to effort and achievement in the productive process. [120] However in the 
meantime, the development of society comes to be seen as internally linked 
to scientific-technical progress, and therefore to be autonomous from the 
power of rational human agreement: 
The quasi-autonomous progress of science and technology ••• appears as an independent variable on which the most important single system variable, namely economic growth, depends. Thus arises a perspective in which the development of the social system seems to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress. The immanent law of this progress seems to 
obeyed by any 
needs. [ 121 J 
produce objective exigencies, which must be 
politics oriented toward functional 
If this is the case, however, politics is no longer concerned with 
decision-making about real ethical/practical problems; it is merely 
concerned with releasing the productive power of science and technology 
most efficiently in the generation of wealth. The direction of change is 
pre-established (economic growth); the argument is only about who can 
engineer the growth most efficiently. Democracy is reduced to mere 
periodic plebiscites to choose alternative sets of administrative 
personnel . [122] As a result , 
men lose consciousness of the dualism of work and interaction 
•••• the culturally defined self-understand1· ng of a social life-world is replaced by the self-reificati n of men under categories of purposive-rationa l action and adaptive behavior. [123] 1 
'i 
I 
[ 119 ]Ibid., But n.b. Marx 1973, pp. 704-706, discussed in 2.3 below. [120]TRS, p. 122. 
[ 121 ]Ibid., p. 105. 
[ 122 ]Ibid. 
[ 123 ]Ibid., pp. 105f. 
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[ 122 ]Ibid. 
[l23]Ibid., pp. 105f. 
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The ope r ation of such a society is parallel to t he self- maintenance of a 
biological or ganism, and is accessible to an exclusively s ystems anal ysis 
perspective. ( 124] 
Ha bermas rejects this model of pol i tics. To accept i t is , he argues , to 
submit to the control of fate; whereas the nature of the human being is to 
excercise control over its world. This ideological function of 
scienti fi c-technical advance must be r ejected 
rejecting scientific-technical advance itself. 
without, however, 
The sort of democracy- technology relationship that Habermas approves 
of is sketched in the 1966 essay 'Technical Progress and the Social 
Life- World ' . [ 125] The problem is set up thus: 
In what follows we shall understand ' technology ' to mean 
scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes 
••• • 'democracy' to mean the institutionally secured forms of 
general and public communication that deal with the practical 
question of how men can and want to live under the objective 
conditions of their ever-expanding power of control. Our 
problem can then be stated as one of the relation of 
technology to democ r acy: how can the power of technical 
cont r ol be br ought within the range of consensus of acting and 
t r ansacting citizens? (126] 
Haber mas rejects two views of t his r elationship. Firstly, he rejects 
Mar x' s view that scientific- technical pr ogress is the "motor " that wi ll 
drive an automatic tr ans i t i on t o a t ruly democratic institutional 
framework. Mar x, he argues , had erroneously equated the practical i nsight 
of a political public with successful technical cont r ol of the pr oduct i on 
of use values . [127] He had ther e f ore as s umed that an i ncr ease in 
scientific- technical cont r ol would automat i cally guar antee soc i al 
emancipat i on. He was wrong: 
[ 124 ]Ibid., p. 106. 
"i 
I 
) 
[ 125 ]Ibid., pp. 50-61; for fir s t publication details, Habermas 1968a, p. 169. 
[126]TRS, p. 57. 
[ 127libid., pp. 57f. "Use value" is a term in Marxian economics denoting the 
utility of an object of manufacture; it is contrasted with "exchange 
value", which is determined by the amount of labour incorporated in 
the object (Mclellan 1980, pp. 890 . 
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Marx did not reckon with the possible emergence at every level 
of a discrepancy between scientific control of the material 
conditions of life and a democratic decision-making process. This is the philosophical reason why socialists never 
anticipated the authoritarian welfare state, where social 
wealth is relatively guaranteed while political f reedom is 
excluded. [ 128] 
Secondly Habermas also rejects the thesis that technical development is 
completely autonomous: that it generates its own goals and applications 
entirely by itself. This is to ignore the fact that both the pace and the 
direction of technical development are currently largely dependent upon 
state investment. This shows that it is controllable. Moreover, 
the assertion that politically consequential decisions are 
reduced to carrying out the immanent exigencies of disposable techniques and that therefore they can no longer be made the 
theme of practical considerations, serves in the end merely to 
conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and prescientific decisions. [129] 
Technological advance is in fact being c9ntrolled in the interests of 
powerful groups in society, although this control generally remains 
concealed. [130] 
Habermas thus concludes that 'as little as we can accept the optimistic 
convergence of technology and democracy, the pessimistic assertion that 
technology excludes democracy is just as untenable'. [131] Both of these 
extremes breach the basic di stinc tion between instrumental and 
communicative action. ~oth deny the latter autonomy from the former. What 
is needed is the realization that technological advance must be taken in 
hand. Its direction and pace of growth, and its applications, must be made 
the subject of public discussion and political will-formation. [132] Human 
social destiny must be brought under control -
[ 128] TRS, p. 58. 
[ 129 ]Ibid., p. 59. 
not\ technocratically, 
I 
'i ) 
but 
[130]0n concealment as a feature of the operation of ideology, West 1985b, p. 430. 
[131]TRS, p. 60. 
[ 132]Ibid. 
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politically in the old (Greek) sense. (133] Only such discussion can hope 
to effect ' the rationalization of the power structure'; ( 134] Onl y such 
political control, resulting from effective public discussion, can defuse 
'the irrationality of domination, which today has become a collecti ve 
peril to life' itself. [ 135] 
2.3 The place of social labour in the human project 
Habermas has also consider ed at length the Marxian thesis that hu~an 
history is best characterized as a series of different modes of 
production. [ 136 J I therefore turn, for the rest of this chapter, to a 
consideration of Habermas' "reconstruction" of Marx's historical 
materialism. [ 137] 
Within the Marxist tradition, as I have indicated, social labour 
occupies a central position as the key explanatory category for the 
elucidation both of the workings of society and of the process of social 
evolution. In Habermas' opinion this centrality amounts to 'the reduction 
of the self-generative act of the human species to labor' . [138] His 
reconstruction recognizes social labour as one of the essential featu r es 
of human society, while denying it the supremacy that Marx afforded it. 
This down-grading of the importance of social labour at the level of 
social theory, corresponds to the stress . on the importance of 
communicative action over agai nst instrumental action at the level of 
action theory. [139] 
I shall examine three settings of Habermas' reconstruction. In the next 
chapter it ap~ears in Habermas' 198 1 work in the form of the " system and 
lifeworld" model of society. [ 140] Here I shall give an account of 
[133Jibid., p. 61. 
[134]Ibid. 
[ 135 ]Ibid. 
[136JCES, p. 138 • . 
l 
I 
[ 137 ]For which concept in Marx, McLellan 1980, pp. 134-149. 
[ 138 ]KHI, p. 42; st r ess r emoved. 
[ 139 ]See fu r the r 4.2 below. 
[140]See 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
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Habermas' earlier formulations, firstly in Knowledge and Human Interests, 
and secondly in the 1975 essay 'Toward a Reconstruction of Historical 
Materialism'. [ 141] 
2.3.1 MarI and Freud in Knowledge and Human Interests 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas attempts to correct what he 
sees as the Marxian over-emphasis on social labour with insights drawn 
from Freud. I shall start by outlining Habermas' exegesis and critique of 
Marx. 
A: MARX 
Marx, says Habermas, [142] achieved a synthesis of themes from German 
idealism and Feuerbachian materialism. He had appropriated the stress on 
activity of the Kantian philosophy, the idea that the subject constitutes 
the world rather than merely passively experiencing it. But he had, as a 
materialist, [ 143] understood the subject of this constitution as 'the 
concrete human species' rather than 'transcendental consciousness in 
general', and the world constitution as material transformation of the 
physical world in labour rather than the mental construction of the world 
of perception. [144] Ma~x saw this labour process as changing not only the 
external nature that is worked upon, but also the nature of the labouring 
subjects themselves. [145] Because the human species is distinguished by 
'the reproductive form of social labor', it lacks any 'invariant natural or 
transcendental structure': instead it is characterized only by 'a mechanism 
of humanization'. [146) As the forces of production increase, transforming 
the world in proportion to 'their power of technical control', so too 'the 
identity of [the] societal subjects' 
'designates the mechanism of the 
changes~ [147\] Thus social labour 
evolution I f the species in 
I 
-; 
) [141]CES, pp. 130-177; Habermas 1976a, pp. 144-199. [142]Compare 1.4 above. 
[ 143]Compare KHI , p. 25. 
[ 144]Ibid., p. 27; compare p. 31. 
[ 145 ]Ibid., p. 29. 
[ 146 ]Ibid. 
'[ 147]Ibid., p. 36. 
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history'. [148] 
This model, Habermas argues, preserves valid elements from both Kant 
and Hegel. With Kant and against Hegel it denies the 'philosophy of 
identity' of mind and nature. [149] For Marx, the only 'unity of man with 
nature' available is the one that 'has always existed in industry'. [ 150] 
Certainly, social labour mediates external and subjective nature, but the 
unity brought about by the activity of a subject 
remains in some measure imposed on nature by the subject •••• 
The unity of the social subject and nature that comes into 
being 'in industry' cannot eradicate the autonomy of nature 
and the remainder of complete otherness that is lodged in its 
facticity •••• objectified nature retains both independence and 
externality in relation to the subject that controls it. [151] 
This 'materialist concept of synthesis' retains from Kant 'the fixed 
framework within which the subject forms a substance that it encounters', 
though whereas for Kant this formation was a feature of the 
'transcendental consciousness', for Marx it is a feature of 'the human 
species as a species of tool-making animals'. [ 152] The relation of the 
species to its natural environment is defined by the 'behavioral system of 
instrumental action', which is an invariant feature of human nature (in a 
Kan~ian transcendental sense) because labour processes are the 'perpetual 
natural necessity of human life •••• equally binding on all subjects that 
keep alive through labor'. [153] With Hegel and against Kant, however, the 
identity of social subjects alters over time - there is a history of the 
species. Again, this is materialistically interpreted: 
The identity of societal subjects ••• alters with the scope of 
their power of t echnical 
fundamentally un-Kantian 
reshaped and civilized in 
subjects themselves alter 
[ 148 ]Ibid., p. 29. 
[149 ]Ibid., p. 25 . 
[ 150 ]Ibid., p. 32; quoting Marx. 
[ 151 ]Ibid., pp. 32f. 
[ 152]Ibid., p. 35. 
[ 153Jibid. 
control. This point of view is 
••. • both nature, which has been 
labor processes , and the laboring 
in relation to th, development of 
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productive forces. [154] 
However, Habermas insists that Marx was confused about the relative 
status of social labour and other activities in the human self-formative 
process. While in his empirical studies on economics 'Marx [in fact] 
compr ehends the history of the species under the categories of material 
activity and the critical abolition of ideologies, of instrumental action 
and revolutionary practice, of labor and reflection', his 
self-understanding as to what he was doing involved the reduction of the 
whole of human evolution to the categories of social labour. [155] Marx 
needs to be played off against himself. 
A good example of Marx's tendency towards this economic reductionism, 
suggests Habermas, is to be found in the Grundrisse. [156] Here there is a 
model 
according to which the history of the species is linked to an 
automatic transposition of natural science and technology 
into a self-consciousness of the social subject •••• According 
to this construction the history of transcendental 
consciousness would be no more than the residue of the history 
of technology. [157] 
According to this model, in time the progress of science and technology 
will automatically eliminate, firstly the need for human beings to 
participate directly in the productive process ~tall, secondly production 
based on exchange value rather than use value, and thirdly the 'scantiness 
and antagonism' of the material process of production. [158] 
Automatically, that is, 
the tr ansformat ion of the labor process into a scientific 
process ••• [bri ngs] man's ' material exchange' wi th nature under 
the cont r ol of a human species totally ~manc ~ ated from labor. 
A science of man developed from th i s point o/ view would have 
[ 154 ]Ibid., p. 36. 
[ 155 ]Ibid., p. 42 
I 
[156]Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie (Rohentwurf) , being 
the contents of some unpubl ished notebooks of 1857/8, that formed the 
rough draft for the later Capital. See McLellan 1971, pp. 1-15. 
[157]KHI, p. 48. 
[ 158 ]Ibid., pp. 48-50: compare Marx 197 3, pp. 704-706. 
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to construct the history of the species as a synthesis through 
social labor - and only through labor. [159] 
Elsewhere, however, Marx himself denied this simplistic model, arguing 
t hat 
the self-constitution of the species takes place not only in 
the context of men's instrumental action upon nature but 
simultaneously in the dimension of power relations that 
regulate men's interaction among themselves. [160] 
The critique of ideology, and revolutionary practice, have an independent 
and indispensable part to play in the transformation of the institutional 
frameworks that embody power relations. [161] For 
the most progressive scienti zation of production could not 
lead to the emancipation of a self-conscious subject that 
knows and regulates the social life process. [162] 
Habermas is convinced, against the "first" Marx, not only that social 
evolution irreducibly involves development at two levels - that of the 
forces of production, and that of the social structures of society - but 
also that the latter is autonomous from the former, and pursues its own 
"logic". 
B: FREUD 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas uses the work of Freud to 
correct the deficiencies that he detects in Marx. This involves him in a 
( much criticized) parallelism between the ind i victual , subject ive 
emancipation involved in psychoanalysis and 
involved in Marxian social transformation. 
[ 159]KHI, p. 50. 
[ 1 60 ]Ibid., p. 51 
[161]Ibid., pp. 42, 51f. 
· [ 162 ]Ibid., p. 52 
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From Freud, Habermas draws t wo supplementary definitions of the human 
to counterbalance Marx's definition centred upon social labour: that 'men 
distinguished themselves from animals when they began to produce their 
means of subsistence'. [163] Firstly, the human species is distinguished 
f rom other animals by the possession of speech and consciousness, [164] by 
which 'adaptive behavior [is] traniformed into instrumental action', and 
'the heritage of man's natural history [ is] articulated in the form of 
interpreted needs'. [ 165 J Secondly, Freud also defines human society in 
terms of a certain social structure - the family: 
Men distinguished themselves from animals when they succeeded 
in inventing an agency of socialization for their 
biologically endangered offspring subject to extended 
childhood dependency •••• The two-stage development of human 
sexuality .•• and the role of aggression in the establishment 
of the super-ego make man's basic problem not the organization 
of labor but the evolution of institutions that permanently 
solve the conflict between surplus impulses and the 
constraint of reality. [166) 
For Freud it is not the transformation of adaptive behaviour into 
instrumental action, but the transformation of instinct-governed 
behaviour into communicative action, that is the key to 
hominization. [167] 
Habermas at this point picks up the Marcusian critique of Freud. [168) 
Man lives under the constraints of external and internal nature which 
limit his freedom. Inte rnal natu r e defines the l evel of his needs/desires 
independently of the level of scientific/technical development , and , 
therefore, of the ability of man to wrest from external nature the 
wherewitha l to _satisfy these needs. The short-fall in needs-satisfaction 
necessitates the formation of institutions that referee the resultant 
conflict. As 
creates the 
the system of social labour develo~s, ho\ ever , (so Marcuse) it 
objective possibility of r elaxing the ry epressiveness of the 
I 
[ 163 ]KHI, p. 282; compare Marx 1977, p. 160. 
[164]KHI, p. 238. 
[ 165]Ibid., p. 239; stress removed. 
[ 166 ]Ibid., pp. 282f. 
[ 167 .J Ibid., p. 282. 
[168]Compare 1.4 above. 
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institutional framework, whose only rationale is the needs-gratification 
shortfall. [169] However, Habermas remains rather closer to Marx at this 
point than Marcuse had done. The achievement of this relaxation, according 
to Haber mas, is the work of the critique of ideology, of 
"reflection". [170] And the indispensable contribution of Marx here was to 
see that the critique of ideology must also involve a critique of the 
class structure of society: 
The institutional framework does not subject all members of 
society to the same repressions •••• If production attains the 
level of producing goods over and above elementary needs, the 
problem arises of distributing the surplus product created by 
labor. This problem is solved by the formation of social 
classes, which participate to varying degrees in the burdens 
of production and in social rewards. With the cleavage of the 
social system into classes that are made permanent by the 
institutional framework, the social subject loses its unity: 
'To regard society as one single subject is ••• to regard it 
falsely - speculatively'. [171] 
As the forces of production increase, therefore, critical reflection must 
examine not only the general level of repression implied by the 
institutional framework, but also its asymmetry. The aim must be a 
replacement of the affective basis of obedience to civilization by a 
rational one, [ 172] that is, 'an organization of social relations according 
to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence 
be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from 
domination'. [ 173 J This would imply an equality in the level of the 
gratification of needs, and thus an abolition of the class structure. 
The self-constitution of the human species, therefore, is not to be 
limited, as Marx tended to imply, to the system of social labour. Instead 
it must 'combine both self-generation through productive activity and 
self-formation through critical-revolutionary ac ivity'. [174] Whereas 
[ 169 ]Ibid., p. 283. 
[ 170 ]Ibid. 
[ 171 ]Ibid., p. 54, quoting Marx. 
[ 172] Ibid., p. 283. 
[173Jlbid., p. 284; see further 3.3.3 below. 
[ 174 ]Ibid., p. 55. 
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the former can stimulate the latter, it can neither replace nor determine 
it. [175) 
2.3.2 The reconstruction of historical materialism 
In 'Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', Habermas seems 
to have effectively abandoned the parallel between Freudian 
psychoanalysis and social emancipation, preferring the (also much 
criticized) parallel of phylogenesis with an ontogenesis borrowed from 
Piagettian developmental psychology. He has also tidied up his account in 
two significant ways. Firstly he has linked together the two Freudian 
insights as to the importance of language and family structure in the 
constitution of human society. And secondly, he has clarified the 
relationship between the developments in the spheres of instrumental and 
communicative action. In this essay he considers both the origins and 
definition of, and the subsequent development of, human society. I shall 
consider each in turn. 
A: THE DEFINITION OF HUMAN SOCIETY 
Habermas begins once again by rejecting as inadequate Marx's 
characterization of man as an economic producer. Although for Marx 
'production' includes 'not only the instrumental actions of a single 
indi victual, but also the social cooperation of different 
indi victuals', [ 176 J this is still only a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of human society. Such economic production, it seems, is also 
exhibited by the hominids, whose adult males 
formed hunting bands, which (a) made use of weapons and tools (technology), (b) cooperated th r ough a divf sion of labor (cooperative or ganization) , and (c) distri,uted the prey 
within the collective (rules of distribution). / [177) 
I 
"'i Yet they were not yet fully human. Thus while 'tJhe Marxian concept of 
[175Jibid., p. 61. 
[ 17o]CES, pp. 131f. 
· [ 177 ]Ibid., p. 134 
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social labor is suitable for delimiting the mode of life of the hominids 
from that of the primates', it does not capture 'the specifically human 
reproduction of life'. [ 178] 
The basis of distinctively human social life, Habermas argues, is to be 
found in the area of interaction r ather than of economic production: in 
the form of the social structure and the means of its establishment and 
reproduction. In this respect the hominids occupy an intermediate 
position. I have extracted a comparison of the three forms of social life 
that Habermas considers into the following table: [179] 
Table 3: Forms of social life 
~ anthropoid hominids man apes s 
mechanism of organic organic and cultural only 
development cultural 
social no yes yes 
labour? 
communication gestures protolanguage language 
of signal 
calls 
social one separate male familiarized 
structure dimensional and female male, kinship 
rank subsystems system 
-
ordering 
As in Knowledge and Human Interests, the key chan~e in social structure 
I that Habermas locates is the emergence of the family. This, he suggests, ~ 
J emerged as a response to a "system problem" set up by the division into 
male and female subsystems at the previous hominid stage. That stage had 
[ 178 ]Ibid., p. 135. 
[ 179] Compare CES, pp. 133-138. 
66 
11 
t 
I I 
I 1 1 
I 
I Ii 
I 
-failed to institutionalize successfully 
males and females of the species: 
economic exchange between the 
The male society of the hunting band became independent of the plant-gathering females and the young, both of whom remained behind during hunting expeditions. With this differentiation, linked to the division of labor, there arose a new need for integration, namely, the need for a controlled exchange between the two subsystems. [180] 
This system problem was solved by the familiarization of the male, which 
permitted the adult male member to link - via the father role 
- a status in the male system of the hunting band with a status in the female and child system, and thus (1) integrate functions of social labor with functions of nurture of the young, and, moreover, (2) coordinate functions of male hunting with those of female gathering. We can speak of the reproduction of human life, with homo sapiens, only when the economy of the hunt is supplemented by a familial social structure. [181] 
This change in social structure, Habermas argues, was internally linked 
to a development in language. In the new structure, the same individual 
needed to occupy different status positions, and perform different social 
roles, in different subsystems (the family, the hunt). Such 'social role 
systems' were based, not as previously on the occupant's capacity to 
threaten, but upon 'the intersubjective recognition of normed expectations 
of behavior'. [182] Yet this required three things: firstly the ability to 
. ' exchange the perspective of the participant for that of the 
observer', [ 183] secondly 'a temporal horizon that extends beyond the immediately actu?l consequences of action ', [184) and thirdly social roles 
sanctioned (initially) by a concept of the holy. [185) And these in turn 
required the full development of language. [186] 
[ 180 ]Ibid., p. 135. 
[181]Ibid., pp. 135f. 
[182]Ibid., p. 136. 
[ 183 ]Ibid. 
[184]Ibid., p. 137. 
[185Jibid., pp. 137; 226f, note 16. 
) 
; 
[ 186 JCES, p. 137. These points are expanded at length in TKH2, pp. 7-169. 
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Habermas concludes that while 'the concept of social labor is 
fundamental, because the evolutionary achievement of socially organized 
labor and distribution obviously precedes the emergence of developed 
linguistic communication, and this in turn precedes the development of 
social role systems', [ 187] nevertheless 'the specifically human mode of 
life ••• can be adequately described only if we combine the concept of 
social labor with that of the familial principle of organization'. [188] 
Thus 'production and socialization, social labor and care for the young, 
are equally important for the reproduction of the species' . [ 189] The 
hegemony of "production" in Marxist thought is to be resisted. 
B: THE PLACE OF PRODUCTION IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION 
In the later parts of the essay, Habermas returns to a consideration of 
the place of social labour in social evolution. Here he aims to 
reconstruct historical materialism as it was codified in Joseph Stalin's 
1938 essay 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism'. [190] His account of 
this 'orthodox version' of Marxist thought [ 191] is as follows. 
The key to the reconstruction of the history of the human species is 
provided by the concept of the "mode of production". [192] Each stage of 
society is most adequately characterized by one of five such modes: [193] 
the primitive communal mode of bands and tribes prior to civilization, the 
ancient mode based on slave-holding, the feudal mode, the capitalist mode, 
and finally the socialist mode. [194] In each case the mode of production 
may be resolved into two components: 
( 1) the forces of production ( the labour power of the producers, 
[ 187] CES, p. 137. 
[ 188 ]Ibid. 
[ 189 ]Ibid., p. 138. 
"i 
J 
) 
[190]CES, pp. 130f; 226, note 3; Stalin 1973, pp. 300-333. [191]CES, p. 139. 
[192]Ibid., p. 138. 
[193]With the possible addition of a sixth, 'an Asiatic mode of production' (Ibid., p. 139). 
[194]Ibid., p. 139. 
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enhanced by technically useful knowledge leading to technologies of 
production, and by organizational knowledge effectively coordinating 
the first two) which determine the degree of possible control over 
natural processes; [195] and 
(2) the relations of production, institutions and social mechanisms 
which regulate access to the means of production, and hence control 
the distribution of socially produced wealth. (196] 
In the course of world history, these five modes of production follow each 
other in a sequence which is 'unilinear, necessary, uninterrupted and 
progressive'. [197] In this evolutionary process, which can be seen as the 
'development of a macrosubject', [198] it is the forces of production that 
provide the motive-power for the whole. Advances in the forces of 
production lead inevitably to changes in the relations 
production: [199] 
The handmill produces a society of feudal lords, the steam 
mill a society of industrial capitalists. [200] 
of 
The economic "base" as a whole supports a legal and political 
"superstructure", and determines the way in which people think: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations of production appropriate to a 
given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of 
social consciousness. The mode of production of material life 
conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness. [201] 
[ 195] Ibid., p. 138. 
[ 196 ]Ibid., pp. 138f. · 
[ 197 ]Ibid., p. 139. 
[ 198]Ibid. 
[199Jlbid., pp. 144f. 
[200]Ibid., p. 139; compare Stalin 1973, p. 328. 
) 
[201 ]CES, pp. 142f, quoting Marx; compare Marx 1977, p. 389. 
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Thus the only irreducibly autonomous feature of social evolution, 
according to orthodox Marxism, is the development of the material forces 
of production. 
Habermas makes several quite profound changes to this model. Listed 
briefly, they include the following: · 
(1) The abandonment of the "species subject". Specific societies and 
individuals are the bearers of social evolution. [202] 
(2) Separation of the logic from the dynamics of development, which 
allows him to retain a directional arrow of evolutionary development, 
whilst jettisoning the claim to 'unilinearity 
continuity ••• [and] irreversibility'. (203] 
necessity 
(3) Rejection of the idea that the base/superstructure model offers an 
'ontological' interpretation of society, for the weaker claim that the 
economic structures assume 'the leading role' in social 
evolution. (204] 
(4) Rejection of the idea that the 'basic domain' of society always 
coincides with the economic system, for the idea that this is only 
true for capitalist societies. (205] 
(5) Rejection of the restriction of autonomous learning mechanisms to 
the sphere of technically useful knowledge. (206] 
Positively, Habermas' new schema runs roughly as follows. There is 
indeed an 'endogenous learning mechanism' that results in the spontaneous 
growth of technically and organizationally useful knowledge - knowledge 
that can be used in the forces of production. (207] Pace orthodox Marxism, 
however, no profound 
implementation of new 
[ 202] CES, p. 140. 
( 203] Ibid. 
[204]Ibid., p. 143. 
[205]Ibid., p. 144. 
[ 206.]Ibid., p. 148. 
[207]Ibid., p. 145. 
social development can occur without the prior 
forms of social integration. D1spite a few examples 
I 
10 
'i 
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to the contrary, 'the great endogenous, evolutionary advances that led to 
the first civilizations or to the rise of European capitalism were not 
conditioned but followed by significant development of productive 
forces'. [208] New technical knowledge 'can be implemented to develop the 
forces of production only when the evolutionary step to a new 
institutional framework and a new form of social integration has been 
taken'. [209] 
Moreover the development of new forms of social integration also 
depends upon a learning mechanism. This mechanism yields a different, 
moral-practical sort of knowledge: 
the species learns not only in the dimension of technically 
useful knowledge decisive for the development of productive 
forces but also in the dimension of moral-practical 
consciousness decisive for structures of interaction. The 
rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to 
changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in doing so they follow their own logic. [210] 
The development of technical knowledge, that is, can precipitate "system 
problems", [211] but cannot on its own determine their solution. Thus in 
the final analysis, it is 'learning processes in the domain of 
moral-practical consciousness that function as pacemakers' [212] in 
social evolution, not the productive forces as in orthodox Marxism. This 
new moral-practical knowledge is, at transitional periods in social 
evolution, institutionalized in a new 'principle of organization', which in 
turn means 
the establishment of a new level of social integration. This 
in turn makes it possible to implement available (or to produce new) technical-organizational knowledge; it makes 
possible, that is, an increase in productive forces and an 
expansion of system complexity. [213] 
[ 208]Ibid., pp. 146. 
[209]Ibid., p. 147. 
[210]Ibid., p. 148. 
) 
[211]0n the concept of crises induced by system problems, LC, pp. 1-31 and pass i m. 
[2 12]Ibid., pp. 160. 
[2 l 3Jibid. 
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Habermas' split of the dynamics and logic of development (214] is 
crucial to his case. It allows him to jettison too close a relationship to 
the philosophy of history or Darwinian evolution, (215] while at the same 
time retaining a genuine concept of "progress" as opposed to mere "change" 
in society. (216) Habermas maintains that such progress occurs both in the 
realm of the forces of production, and in the social framework of society. 
To support his case here, Habermas makes free use of the developmental 
psychology of Jean Piaget and the (Piagettian) theory of moral development 
of Lawrence Kohlberg: 
The genetic structuralism worked out by Piaget, which 
investigates the developmental logic behind the process in 
which structures are formed, builds a bridge to historical 
materialism it offers the possibility of bringing 
different modes of production under abstract 
developmental-logical viewpoints. [217] 
This applies to technology, whose history may be modelled upon 'the 
ontogenetically analyzed stages of cognitive development, so that the 
logic of the development of productive forces becomes visible'. (218] And 
in the moral-practical realm also, Habermas links the organizational 
principles of societies with the stages of individual moral development 
advocated by Kohlberg. (219] Advances in both realms, Habermas argues , 
follow a developmental logic that is rationally reconstructible; (220) 
that is, they can be seen as part of a 'cumulative learning process' (221] 
that is independent of the actual cour se of development of real societies: 
Progress in these two dimensions is measured against the two 
universal validity claims we also use to measure the progress 
of empir:ical knowledge and of moral-practical insight, namely, 
the truth of propositions and the rightness of norms. I would 
like, therefore, to defend the thesis that the criteria of 
______ :::~:~_:::::::s singled out by historical maierialism as the 
I [214]Ibid., p. 140. 
[215]Compare TCA1, pp. 143-156. 
[216]Compare CES, p. 141. 
[217] CES, p. 169. 
[218]Ibid. Compare p. 149. 
'i 
J 
[219Jibid., pp. 154-158. Compare ibid. pp. 77-82; Habermas 1983, pp. 127-206. [220]Ibid., pp. 149, 153. 
· [221]Ibid., p. 163. 
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development of productive forces and the maturity of forms of social intercourse can be systematically justified. [222] 
Habermas is thus able to defend some instances of social, intellectual, 
and technical change as "progress" as well as mere "change". In particular, 
as we shall see, he is able to insist that Enlightenment thought, and the 
social institutions and productive technologies of modernity allied to it, 
is more rational than primitive, mythical thought: is in fact, universally 
valid. Modernity for Habermas is an unfinished project, [223] not a wrong 
turning or a merely western phenomenon. Habermas' reconstruction of 
historical materialism is thus predicated upon a more positive attitude to 
the Enlightenment than that of Ho rkheimer and Adorno. 
Both this last point, and Habermas' models of social evolution, 
rationality, and modernity are further discussed in the next chapter; for 
they are key concerns of his definitive work: the 1981 Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns. 
[222]Ibid., p. 142. 
[223]Habermas 1981c, p. 444; 1985a, p. 7. 
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3. WORK IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
3. 1 Introduction 
Habermas' 1981 Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns [1] is an ambitious 
two volume work that attempts a critical overview of a wide variety of 
sociological traditions, past and present, with a view to the construction 
of a model of "modernity". [2] This involves a partial reconciliation of 
the paradigms of Parsonian functionalism, hermeneutics, symbolic 
interactionism, and Marxism, so as to produce a reconstructed critical 
theory of society more adequate to its object realm than the critical 
theory of the old Fr ankfurt School theorists . 
The model of modernity is constructed with critical intent. In an 
introduction, [ 3] Habermas identifies two attitudes to the cluster of 
crises that have afflicted the western democracies since the end of the 
1960 1s. The first, the ' neoconservative', [4] is to hold at all costs to the 
capitalist programme of economic and social modern i zation, giving the 
highest priority of all to economic growth. Refuge is sought from the 
socially disintegrative side effects of this growth in a rhetorical 
reaffirmation of now defunct nineteenth century values , whose basis has 
been e r oded irreversibly by capitalism. The second, the 
[1] Volume 1 is translated as The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 
1: Reason and the Rationalization of . Society [TCA 1 ] . Volume 2, 
s ubtitled Zur Kr i t ik der funktionalistischen Ve rnu nf t [TKH2] , is as 
yet untranslated. See Be rger 1983 ; Gripp 1984, pp. 72-106, especially 
pp. 105f; J . Thompson 1984, pp. 279- 302; Gi ddens 1985a; Rode r ick 1986, 
pp. 106-1 36. Ma ny of the l ead ing concepts o fl t he . work a r e pr ecise l y 
and c l early e l ucid at ed by Habermas himsel f in Habe rmas 198 4a, pp. 
571-60 6. 
[2] Habe rmas' name for the societies and culture of the modern western 
democr ac ies . 
[3] TCA1, pp. xxxix-xlii. 
[ 4] Ibid., p. xli. Different types of conservative response are 
distinguished in MPM, pp. 13f. 
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'antimodernist', [5] replies to this with a critique of growth, that is directed against the modern economic, administrative and military systems, in a sweeping condemnation of them as a whole. Habermas rejects both of these extremes. The antimodernist rejection in particular, although appealing, fails to make a crucial distinction: that it is possible to 
restrict the gro~th of 'monetary-administrative complexity' without 
surrendering 'modern forms of life'. [6] 
Habermas looks to Max Weber to provide his leaping-off point: that 
modern societies are more rational than traditional societies, yet that this modernity al so involves unfortunate side-effects or pathologies. Habermas holds fast to this view, rejecting both: 
( 1) the post-structuralist relativism [7] that would see no useful 
sense in which modern societies could be said to be more rational than 
other ones, and 
(2) the essential optimism of Parsonian functionalism, that fails to 
see the very real pathology striking at the heart of modernity as now 
constituted. 
Habermas adapts from Weber an account of the rationality of modern 
societies, while looking to Marx for an account of their dynamics. This separation of dynamics and structure (compare the separation of logic and dynamics in 2.3 above) is reflected in his model of modern societies as 
"system and lifeworld" , [8] which to some extent continues, on the level of 
a theory of society, Habermas ' dichotomy between communicative action and purposive-rational action on the level of action theory. [9] 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns is a rambling work that explores 
many by-ways in the setting-forth of its thesis. Some \ f these, such as the details of Habermas' analyses of Durkheim and Me~d [1 1 ] and Parsons, [11] 
I 
7 [5] TCA1 , p. xli. 
[ 6) Ibid., p. xlii. 
[7] Habermas 1985a , pp. 191-312 and passim; Dews 1986, pp. 3-5. [8) TKH2, pp. 171-293; compare LC, pp. 1-8. [ 9] RC, p. 268. 
[ 10] TKH2, pp. 9-1 69. 
[ 11] . Ibid., pp. 297-443. 
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and the complexities of Habermas' theory of language, (12] can safely be 
left on one side with a simple appropriation of the results of the 
discussion. But to understand Haber mas' view of the significance of work in 
society, it is necessary to have an overview of the argument of the book as 
a whole. This necessitates some account of Habermas' theories of 
rationality, action, and social integration as here set forth, as well as a 
direct discussion of the topic of social labour itself. 
As is the case with chapter 2 above, this chapter is almost entirely 
exegetical in nature. Aspects of Habermas' argument are considered 
critically in chapter 4. 
3.2 Max Weber and rationalization 
Habermas starts from the work of Max Weber [ 13] because, among 'the 
classical figures of sociology', Weber was 
the only one 
philosophy of 
who broke with both the 
history and the basic 
premises of 
assumptions 
the 
of 
evolutionism and who nonetheless wanted to conceive of the 
modernization of old-European society as the result of a 
universal-historical process of rationalization. [14] 
That is, eschewing the models of Hegel and Darwin alike, Weber nevertheless 
believed: 
(1) that the emergence of modern societies has a universal 
significance that cannot be captured within the paradigm of an extreme 
cultural relativism, and 
(2) that this significance lies in the embodiment of an increase in 
r ationality. 
WebeG ~reoveG had linked together in his in~stig~tions of Occidental 
I rationalism questions of rational action , the rational conduct of life, 
'i 
[ 12] TCA 1, pp. 288-328. 
[ 13] TCA1, pp. 143-271. 
[14] Ibid., p. 143. 
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and the rationalization of worldviews. [15] Both of these emphases 
Habermas here makes his own. The entire two volume work can be seen as a 
sustained attempt to reconstruct them on a sounder basis: to take up once 
again I in an empirical manner but without the empiricist constrictions' 
the question of 'how the emergence and development of modern societies can be conceived as a process of rationalization'. [ 16] In a third way, too, 
Haber mas finds Weber' s approach persuasive. Weber was aware of the 
intensely ambiguous nature of modernization - of the losses as well as the gains involved - in a way that more optimistic sociologies (such as that 
of Talcott Parsons) are not. 
3.2.1 The process of rationalization 
The key concept in Weber's work, at least as far as Habermas is 
concerned, [17] is "rationalization". Habermas is concerned both to 
elucidate and reconstruct Weber's term. 
The concept of rationalization in Weber's work, Habermas notes, is 
complex, covering areas of life as di verse as modern natural science, harmonious music, modern state administration, rational bookkeeping and 
the capitalist economic ethic. [ 18] Along with Parsons, Habermas 
classifies these manifestations of rationalism into three groups , 
according to whether the sphere of life affected is: 
(1) Society (differentiation of capitalist economy, modern state, and 
formal law which organizes them internally and in their mutual 
interactions), 
(2) Culture (differentiation of modern science and technology, 
principled ethics, and autonomous art as autonomous sphe r es each 
developing according to their own internal 
(15] Ibid.,p.7. 
[16] Ibid., p. 155. 
i 
[17] Habermas' Weber is to some extent an idiosyncratic construction. The Weber interested in conflict and power in society is largely ignored for the Weber of progressive rationalization (Giddens 1984, p. xxxvi). [ 18] . TCA 1, p. 157. 
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(3) Personalit y ( the methodical conduct of li f e) . (19] 
In gene r al, Habermas accepts with Weber the inevitability of these 
differ entiations in society and culture that have accompanied the 
tr ans it ion to modernity in the west. He believes that any t r uly modern 
society must have both an economy and a state that have become 
semi- autonomous f r om the "lifeworld " (20] of everyday life operating 
according to their respective criteria of purposive rationality; 
constituting, that is, 'subsystems of purposive-rational action' . [21] 
There is no possibility either of a withering of the state or of a 
collapse of the economy back into the lifeworld as Marx had predicted. 
Moreover , the distinctions that came to be drawn at the Enlightenment 
between science , ethics and art are real distinctions that can be 
abandoned only at the cost of a regression of the species to an earlier 
and less rational intellectual level, (22] corresponding as they do to the 
three "worlds" in which the human being lives, i .e. the objective, social 
and subjective worlds respectively. [ 23] Thus natural science, which 
corresponds to the objective world, is characterized by a methodological 
objectivation of nature, coming into existence through a conjunction of 
scholastically trained discursive thought , mathematics, an instrumental 
attitude to nature, and an experimental treatment of it. (24] This is to be 
distingu ished carefully from a rationalized ethics, concerned exclusively 
with t he social world of interpersonal relations, an ethics that is based 
upon pr inciples instead of upon tradition, and t hat is uni versalistic, 
superseding the separation between in-group and out-group morality. (25] 
And both a r e in turn to be disti nguished from autonomous art , art that has 
broken f r ee f r om its context in t he r eli gious cult t o become 'a cos mos of 
more and more conscious ly gr asped independent values which exist in t heir 
[ 19] Ibid., pp. 158-164. ) 
(20] For which term, 3.5.2 be low. Lebenswelt i s ai t ernat i vely rend er ed 
" l ifeworld" or " l i fe-wor l d" by diffe r ent tr anilat or s . For the Habermas/Weber characterization of economy and s t ate, TCA 1, p. 158. ( 21 ] TCA1, p. 243. Compar e TRS, pp. 93f. 
(22] Compar e TCA1, pp. 43-74. 
(23) Ibid., pp. 52, 75-84, 308. 
(24] Ibid., pp. 159. 
(25] Ibid., p. 162. 
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own right', [26] concerned with the expression of the subjective world of 
internal nature. [27] These three 'cultural value spheres', concerned with 
different abstract standards of value (truth, normative rightness, and 
beauty/authenticity), [28] are seen as resulting from the rationalization 
of religious worldviews, in which they had previously been confused. [29] 
The separation of the problems with which each deals constitutes an 
indispensable step forward in human history of world-historical 
significance. 
3.2.2 The paradoxes of rationalization 
Habermas is less convinced, however, about Weber's account of the 
dynamics of social change, which he had placed at the door of the 
protestant ethic of the calling rooted in the personalities of the early 
capitalist entrepreneurs (the "methodical conduct of life"). [30] 
Agreeing with Weber on the need for the institutional and motivational 
anchoring of purposive-rational economic orientations, [31] he 
nevertheless wants to follow Marx in attributing to the growth in the 
forces of production the ultimate dynamic of social change. (32] Moreover, 
while applauding Weber's recognition of the loss of meaning and freedom in 
modern society ( the "paradoxes of rationalization"), he rejects both 
Weber's exact diagnosis of the problem and his pessimistic prognosis 
concerning the necessary future of life in the modern world. In both cases 
Habermas traces Weber's error to a misunderstanding of the nature of 
rationality. 
Weber had firstly argued, says Habermas, that rationalization 
necessarily involves a loss of meaning. The very 'differentiation of 
autonomous cultural spheres of value' 
rationalization of symbol systems' under the 
[26] Ibid., p. 160, quoting Weber. 
[27) Ibid., p. 161. 
[28) Ibid., p. 244. 
(29] Ibid., pp. 47-53. 
(30) Ibid., 166-168, 215-233. 
(31] Ibid., p. 219 • 
[32] . Sections 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
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that made possible 'a 
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of value 
( i.e. truth, normative rightness, and beauty /authenticity), had also 
resulted in the disintegration of 'the meaning-giving unity of 
metaphysical-religious worldviews'. [33] This had set up the problem of 
the 'unity of the lifeworld', burdening the capacity of the personality 
system for integration. [34] This amounted to 'a new polytheism, in which 
the struggle among the gods takes on the depersonified, objectified form 
of an antagonism among irreducible orders of value and life', such that 
'the rationalized world has become meaningless'. (35] Reason, fallen apart 
into irreconcilable moments, could no longer integrate the life of "the 
rational animal". Secondly, according to Weber rationalization inevitably 
involves a loss of freedom, due to the concomitant growth in subsystems of 
purposive-rational action. [36] Bureaucratic state and economy, organized 
according to their own (purposive-rational) imperatives, come to stand 
over against individual actors, and encroach more and more upon their 
freedom of action: 
the vast and mighty cosmos of the modern economic order, which is bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production determines, with irresistible force, the lifestyles of all the individuals who are born into this 
mechanism. [37 J 
Material goods gain 'an increasing and finally an inexorable power over 
the lives of men', such that concern with them eventually becomes 'an iron 
cage'. [38] The individual, imprisoned inside a totally ordered society, is 
pushed back to a desperate attempt to establish a unity - which can no 
longer exist in the order of society - 'in the privacy of his own 
biography, with the courage of despair, the absurd hope of one who is 
beyond all hope'. [ 39 J In other words, the natural correlate of 
modernization and its utilitarianism is existentialism. 
) 
'i [33] TCA 1, p. 244. / 
(34] Ibid., p. 245. 
[35] Ibid., p. 246. 
[36] Ibid., p. 244. 
[37] Ibid., pp. 247f, quoting Weber. 
(38] +bid., p. 248, quoting Weber. 
[391 Ibid., p. 247. 
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In Habermas' view, all of this involves an unwarranted restriction in 
the concept of rationality. The correction of this defect compels a 
revaluation both of the nature of the problems that face modernity and of 
the possibility of their solution. His fundamental complaint is that Weber 
restricted the concept of rationality to its purposive component, 
eliminating a priori the possibility of ethical and aesthetic 
rationalization. The first of these omissions is particularly important, 
and shows Weber to have been in the grip of the 'positivism' of his day, 
according to which 'ethical value judgements express purely subjective 
attitudes and are not capable of being grounded in any intersubjectively 
binding way'. (40] The logic of Weber's account of the separation of value 
spheres, says Habermas, suggests rather that 'ethical rationalization 
would continue ••• according to the inner logic of a practical reason set 
off from descriptive claims and expressive tasks'. (41] Weber had assumed 
wrongly that 'a moral consciousness guided by principles can survive only 
in a religious context'. (42] And Habermas looks forward to an autonomous, 
rational ethic that retains the best insights of Christian ethics but is 
freed from its religious basis: to 'a form of the religious ethic of 
brotherliness secularized at the same level as modern science and 
autonomous art, a communicative ethic detached from its foundation in 
salvation religion'. [43] 
This change in turn compels a revaluation of 'the Protestant ethic'. 
Weber had. seen clearly enough that 'the ascetic ethic of vo6ation' of the 
early Protestant sects, with its 'egocentric foreshortening, particularism 
of grace, and conformity to the unbrotherliness of the capitalist economy' 
had in some sense been a regression behind the levels of brotherliness 
already achieved in Christianity. (44] But his restricted concept of 
rationality had kept him from the insight that such an ethic of 
brotherliness could actually be more rational t~an t ~e Protestant ethic. 
In fact however, in Habermas' view, 'the Protestant ethi~ is by no means the 
I 
--------------------
(40] Ibid., p. 231. 
[ 41 ] Ibid., p. 230. 
(42] Ibid., p. 299. 
(43] ~ .. p. 242. 
[441 Ibid., p. 228. 
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rational ethic that retains the best insights of Christian ethics but is 
freed from its religious basis: to 'a form of the religious ethic of 
brotherliness secularized at the same level as modern science and 
autonomous art, a communicative ethic detached from its foundation in 
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Weber had seen clearly enough that ' the ascetic ethic of vocation' of the 
early Protestant sects, with its 'egocentric foreshortening , pa r ticularism 
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I n fact however, in Habe r mas' view, ' the Pr otestant ethip is by no means t he 
I 
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[ 40] I bi d., p. 231 . 
[41] I bid., p. 230. 
[42] Ibid., p. 299. 
(43] Ibid., p. 242. 
(44] Ibid., p. 228. 
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exemplary embodiment of the moral consciousness ••• but a distorted, highly 
irrational one'. (45] 
Thus Habermas rejects both of Weber's theses: that of the inevitable 
loss of meaning and that of the inevitable loss of freedom in the modern , 
rationalized world. The problems of modernity, he argues, in fact follow 
from a selective rationalization that institutionalizes purposive 
rationality at the expense of moral-practical and expressive-aesthetic 
rationality. [46] Firstly it is wrong to speak, as Weber does, of the 
"paradoxes" of rationalization, if that means locating the seeds of 
destruction of the rationalized world in the very differentiation of 
independent cultural value spheres that made rationalization possible in 
the first place. Although indeed 'the immediate unity of the true, the good, 
and the perfect, which is suggested by religious and metaphysical basic 
concepts' has fallen apart in the modern world, [47] it is going too far to 
see the necessary result of this as a struggle between the forms of 
autonomous reason leading to meaninglessness. Rather, 'the unity of 
rationality in the multiplicity of value spheres rationalized according 
to their inner logics' may now be secured 'at the formal level of the 
argumentative redemption of validity claims'. [48) In other words, in each 
of science, ethics, and art it is possible to discuss questions of validity 
in what is, at a formal level, essentially the same way: by the adducing and 
discursive testing of reasons. [49] There remains a common 'procedural 
rationality after all substantial concepts of reason have been critically 
dissolved' . [50] It follows that the concept of the "meaning" of life can 
be r etai ned. At worst, all that i s required of individuals is the ability 
to switch their 'action orientations' as they take up different roles in 
-------------------- I 
[ 45) Ibid., pp. 231 f ; compare TKH2, p. 450. \ 
[46] Compare TKH2, p. 451: cognitive-instrumental ~~tionality 
from the economy and the state i nto the communicatively 
areas, taking precedence there over the 7 other two 
rationality. See 3.6 below. 
[47) TCA 1, pp. 248f. 
[ 48] Ibid., p. 249. 
[49] Ibid., pp. 8-42. 
penetrates 
structured 
sor ts of 
[ 50] Ibid., p. 249 , my stress; compare TKH2, p. 451. This is underpinned by 
the reference of communicative action to all three areas ( see 3.3 
below). 
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everyday life. [ 51] 
Secondly, Weber's "loss of freedom" thesis had also arisen because of 
his narrowing of the concept of rationality, in this case specifically 
because he ignored the ethical dimension i n societal rationalization. 
Weber had seen, in the transition to the modern legal system, a separation 
of law from ethics and its subsumption under cognitive-instrumental 
r ationality as 'an organizational means without moral-practical 
substance'. [52] So for Weber the idea of the ethical rationalization of 
law had become impossible: [53] the embodiment of moral-practical 
rationality had actually become irrational. [54] Habermas rejects this. He 
maintains that a truly rational law is to be 'correlated with the 
normative sphere of value' and 'rationalized under the abstract value 
standard of normative rightness'. [55] Thus law need not be felt as an 
alien force restricting human freedom from the outside as a result of the 
imperatives generated by its own internal systematization. 
Habermas does recognize the general loss of f r eedom that results from 
the encroachment of bureaucratic and economic imperatives upon the lives 
of individuals in the modern world. But he sees the possibility of a 
modernized world involving a compromise between these imperatives and 
those of a rationalized lifeworld, such that the descent into the Weberian 
iron cage is avoided. This possibility is examined in sections 3.5 and 3.6 
below. Firstly, however, it is necessary to explori Habermas ' basis for a 
broader concept of r ationality than that of Weber: a basis to be found in 
the paradigm of communicative actio n. 
) 
7 
(51] TCA 1, p. 250. 
[52] Ibid., p. 242; compare pp. 162f, 243. 
[53] Compare TCA 1, pp. 269 f. 
[54] Ibid., p. 267. 
[55] Ibid., p. 260. 
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3.3 The paradigm of communicative action 
Habermas traces Weber's restricted notion of rationality back to the 
very basis of his action theory. According to Weber, human action is to be 
distinguished from mere observable behaviour 'insofar as the actor 
attaches a subjective meaning to it'. [56] But this is to base the notion 
of action in the consciousness of the actor, a part of what Habermas 
rejects as "the philosophy of consciousness". [57] The problem with this 
starting point is simply stated: consciousness is a property of a single 
individual. It is, in Habermas' terms, a "monological" concept, [58] and 
theories of action and rationality based upon it are unable to break out 
from their monological starting point. Thus it is that: 
1) Weber's action theory generates a model of society consisting of 
interpersonal relationships between strategically acting subjects 
attempting to manipulate each other purposive-rationally for their 
own ends, and 
2) Weber's theory of rationality is limited to the purposive-rational 
dimension. 
In order to overcome the shortcomings in both action and rationality 
theories, Habermas proposes a paradigm shift from a basis in consciousness 
to a basis in language. [59] This results in a shift: 
1) in action theory, from the paradigm of teleological or 
purposive-rational action to that of communicative action, (60) and 
2) in rationality theory from the paradigm of purposive rationality to 
that of com~unicative rationality. [61) 
[ 56] TCA 1, p. 279; compare M. Weber 1978, p. 4. 
[ 57] TCA 1, p. 390. 
[ 58] Ibid., p. 280. 
[ 59] Ibid., p. 390. 
[60) Ibid., p. 339. 
[61] Ibid., p. 10; compare pp. 335, 397f. 
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3.3. 1 Habermas' appropriation of Head and Durkheim 
In chapter 5, [62] Habermas sets out this paradigm change in the 
context of extensive reconstructive critiques of the social psychologist 
George Herbert Mead and the sociologist Emil Durkheim. 
Habermas finds Mead a useful starting point [63] because, in studying 
how speech is used to coordinate the purposive-rational actions of 
subjects, he did not start from the individual actor as did Weber. Instead 
he started from the interaction between two actors, [ 64] seeing the 
origins of symbolic interaction in the internalization of the objective 
meaning [65] available in interactions mediated by gestures. [66] The 
objective basis from which subjective meaning arises is thus not (as in 
Weber) the consciousness of the individual, but the relation between two 
individuals. [67] Subjectivity forms in the context of intersubjectivity, 
and it is language rather than consciousness that is the key to 
understanding both rationality and rational action. 
Habermas then looks to Durkheim to develop this insight 
phylogenetically [68] into a concept of communicative rationality. 
Durkheim was correct, he argues, to locate in the sacred the root of both 
morality and language. [69] Thus the breakdown in the integrating power of 
the sacred during the transition to modernity has had the character of a 
"linguistification of the sacred". [70] The unity of the collective based 
upon the sacred legitimation of a general will is transformed into the 
unity of a 'communication society', [71] as the function of social 
integration passes from a pre-existent, 
[62] TKH2, pp. 7-169. 
Especially Mind, Self, and Society (Mead 1967). 
TKH2, p. 13. 
ritually secured, 
) [63] [64] 
[65] That is, meaning that is available to a (thir9 person) scientific observer (TKH2, p. 18). Compare TKH2, pp. 179f. [66] For example in a conflict between two dogs (TKH2, p. 17). [67] Ibid., pp. 18f. 
[68] Ibid., pp. 71 f, 74. 
[69] Ibid., pp. 73f, 83. 
[70] Ibid., pp. 118-169. 
[71 J Ibid., p. 126. 
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value- consensus [72] to a consensus achieved co-operatively as a result 
of discussion in 'the political public sphere' . [73] 
In this process, the role of language is vital. It is because the use of 
language unavoidably involves the raising of "criticizable validity 
claims" which demand a yes/no response, that the possibility of dissent is 
introduced into society, and social integration must progressively switch 
from pre-existent to communicatively achieved consensus. [74] And this 
amounts to an increase in the "communicative rationality" of society: 
The rationality-potential of understanding-oriented action 
can be released, and be transformed into the rationalization 
of the lifeworlds of social groups, in the measure that speech fulfills the functions of understanding, action-coordination, 
and the sociation of individuals, and thereby becomes a medium 
through which cultural reproduction, social integration and 
socialization take place. [75] 
As this happens, and the sacred is linguistified, speech ceases to be 
'freewheeling' [76] and fulfils its 1telos1• [77] 
3.3.2 The concept of communicative action 
In chapte r 3, Habermas expounds systematically his concept of 
communicative action. The proposed relationship between communicative 
action and instrumental action [78] will be examined critically in 4.2 
below. 
Unlike instrumental (or strategic) action , Habermas says, 'I shall speak 
of communicative action whenever the actions of agents involved are 
coordinated not _ through egocentric calculations of success but through 
[72] Ibid., pp. 118f. ) 
[73] Ibid., p. 125. Habermas' early work Strukturwand~~ der Offentlichkeit dea l s with the history of the formation and dissolution of this political public sphere (Habermas 1962; compare 1974c). [74] TKH2, pp. 113, 135f. 
[ 75] Ibid., p. 132. 
[76] Ibid., p. 133; referring to Wittgenstein. 
[ 77] 1'.CA 1, p. 287. 
[78] See 2.1, 2.2 above. 
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acts of reaching understanding'. [ 79] Thus, in communicative action, 
'action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual 
successes; they pursue their own individual goals under the condition that 
they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation 
definitions'. [80] 
'Reaching understanding' [81] in this context 'is considered to be a 
process of reaching agreement [82] among speaking and acting 
subjects', [ 83] an agreement that 'meets the conditions of rationally 
motivated assent to the content of an utterance' and 'cannot be imposed by 
either party'. [84) 'Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human 
speech'. It is only by reference to the model of speech (pace Weber) that 
we can discern what "understanding" means at all. 'The concepts of speech 
and understanding reciprocally interpret one another'. [85] 
Now, although these communicative acts of reaching understanding are a 
mechanism for linking 'the teleologically structured plans of action of 
different participants ••• into an interaction complex', they 'cannot 
themselves be reduced to teleological actions'. [ 86] Speech may be used 
teleologically, as in strategic action, where 'one subject inconspicuously 
harnesses another for his own purposes ••• by manipulati vely employing 
linguistic means and thereby instrumentalizes him for his own 
success'. [87] Yet 'the use of language with an orientation to reaching 
understanding is the original mode of language use', upon which the 
instrumental use of language is 'parasitic'. [88] Upon reflection, this is 
obviously so, because 'if the hearer failed to understand what the speaker 
was saying, a strategically acting speaker would not be able to bring the 
[79] TCA 1, pp. 285f. 
[80] Ibid., p. 286; my stress. ) 
[81] Verstandigung (Habermas 1981 a, p. 386). (82] Einigung (ibid). 
[83] TCA 1, pp. 286f. 
[84] Ibid., p. 287 . 
[85) Ibid. 
(86] Ibid., p. 288. 
(87] Ipid. 
[88] Ibid. 
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hearer, by means of communicative acts, to behave in the desired way'. [89] 
Thus "acts of communication" and "communicative action" are to be 
distinguished. [90] 
The notion of communicative action is also connected in Habermas' 
thought with the three worlds introduced in 3.2.1 above, and the 
corresponding validity spheres of truth, normative rightness, and 
beauty/authenticity. [91] Indeed, 
in coming to an understanding about something with one 
another and thus making themselves understandable, actors 
cannot avoid embedding their speech acts in precisely three 
world-relations and claiming validity for them under these 
aspects. [ 92] 
It is in fact precisely by facilitating the reaching of agreement about 
items in these three worlds that language achieves its socially 
integrative function. [ 93] Thus it is that the notion of communicative 
rationality, connected as it is with the paradigm of communicative action, 
entails notions of rationality and rational action broader than those that 
Weber allowed for. [94] 
3.3.3 Excursus: the ideal speech situation 
In chapter 2 above, I noted that Habermas is hostile to the extension of 
technical control into the realm of social interaction, his ideal being 
rather action in accordance with norms that have been decided upon after 
'public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination'. [95] Only such 
norms, he argues, can be a 'rational' basis for civilization. [96] In 3.3 so 
far we have seen these ideas developed. The linguistification of the 
sacred involves a move towards a society based on norms that are the 
--------------------
[ 89 J Ibid., p. 293. 
[90] Ibid., p. 295. 
[ 91] Ibid., p. 307. 
[92] Ibid., p. 308. 
[93] Ibid., p. 305. 
[94] Ibid., p. 335. 
[95] TRS, p. 118, quoted 
section 2.3. 1 :B. 
[96] KHI, p. 283, quoted 
l 
J 
\ 
I 
in section 2.2.2:B. Compare KHI, p. 284, quoted in 
in section 2.3.1 :B. 
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subject of a communicatively-achieved consensus: a society thereby 
embodying a greater degree of communicative rationality. [97] This 
involves the reaching of rationally motivated (i.e. unforced) definitions 
of items in the social world. And in this the rationality of speech is 
r eleased to fulfill its telos. [98] Implicit in all of these formulations 
is Habermas' concept of an "ideal speech situation", a notion explicated definitively in the 1970's, and which he still defends in Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns. (99] 
Habermas believes that truly rational ethical norms are those that 
'express ••• an interest common to all those affected and thus ••• deserve 
general recognition' being 'capable in principle of meeting with the 
rationally motivated approval of everyone affected'. [100] But, he argues, 
such norms are precisely those that would be arrived at by a discussion 
that took place under special conditions: a discussion to which all 
interested parties were allowed equal access, and in which all force 
except 'the force of the better argument' was excluded. [101] Because under 
these conditions speech would be unhindered in reaching its telos of 
unforced, rational agreement, he calls this (counterfactual) situation the 
"ideal speech situation". In most if not all actual discussions, however, 
the operation of force prevents the reaching of such a true consensus. This force can arise 'from within the process of reaching understanding 
itself', or can influence it 'from the outside'. [ 102] In either case it 
results in a distortion of the agreement reached, rendering it a forced or 
false consensus. Norms so arrived at are ideologically distorted; they 
present sectional interests under the guise of apparently general 
~;;;-;~;~-:::::~---- \ [98] 3.3.2 above. 
1 [99] TCA1, p. 25. Habermas here (p. 41 0, note 25) ref~rs to the 1972 essay 'Wahrheitstheorien', reprinted in Habermas 198'4a, pp. 127-183. For elucidation of the concept , McCarthy 1984, pp. 304- 333; J. Thompson 1984, pp. 264-267, 271-273. 
[100]TCA1, p. 19. 
[101]TCA1, p. 25; compare p. 19. This implies the application of 'general symmetry conditions' (TCA 1, p. 25 ), usefully summarized in J. Thompson 1984, p. 266. 
[102]TCA1, p. 25. 
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interests. [103] 
Habermas proposes to escape from "decisionism" (groundlessness) in 
ethics by basing his general ethical principle of equality upon the 
logical structure of linguistic communication. In this respect, the ideal 
speech situation is set within a more general programme of "universal 
pragmatics" [104] - Habermas claims that the ideal speech situation is an 
unavoidable (although generally counterfactual) supposition reciprocally 
made in discourse. [105] Whether or not this aspect of his work is viable, 
and it has come under strong attack, [106] the notion of the ideal speech 
situation does serve to highlight the importance of 'the critical 
abolition of ideologies'. [107] It encourages us to recognize that 
language may be 'a medium of domination and social power', [108] at the 
same time as being constitutive of social life as such, and the vehicle of 
tradition. In chapters 5 and 6 below, I shall be examining in this light 
the use made of categories such as "creation" in theological discourse. 
3.4 Max Weber and western Marxism 
In chapter 4 of Theorie des kommunikati ven Handelns [ 109 J Habermas 
provides an analysis of the work of Luktcs, Horkheimer and Adorno, writers 
in the "western Marxist" tradition who had adopted many of the insights of 
Max Weber. I Lukacs, in History and Class Consciousness, had combined 
insights drawn from Weber and · Marx to characterize the paradoxes of 
modernity in terms of the phenomenon of "reification", [110] while 
[103]Compare 2.2.2:C above for an example of this in operation. For an account and critique of Habermas' view of "ide~ogy", Gi.ddens 1979, pp. 174-178. For Giddens' own account (essentiall similar to that of Habermas), ibid., pp. 186-196; compare West 1985b, p. 429f. [104]Sumrnarized ~J. Thompson 1984, pp. 255-278 (pp. 336f, note 1 lists te relevant bibliography); compare TCA 1, pp. 288-331. [ 105 ]Habermas 1984a, p. 180. 
[106]Even from writers as sympathetic as Thompson (J. Thompson 1984, pp. 267-275 ). 
[ 107 ]KHI, p. 42. 
[ 108]Habermas 1977, p. 360. 
[ 109]TCA 1, pp. 339-399. 
[110]Lukclcs 1971, pp. 83-110 (cited in 1.4.4 above). 
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Horkheimer in Eclipse of Reason [111] and Horkheimer and Adorno in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment [ 112] had developed this in turn into a 
critique of instrumental reason with the same intent. Habermas argues that 
these writers adopted into their work the key deficiency located above in 
the work of Max Weber: a deficient concept of rationality based upon the 
'philosophy of consciousness'. [113] Analysis of their shortcomings 
illustrates the need for a reformulation of the reification concept [114] 
in terms of the "system and lifeworld" model introduced later. [115] It 
also underlines the need for a shift to the paradigm of communicative 
action in social theory, a shift embodied in the lifeworld half of 
Habermas' model. 
3.4.1 LukJcs and rei:fication 
Habermas points to something corresponding to Weber's 'dialectic of 
societal rationalization' in the writings of Marx, in the form of 'the 
dialectic of living and dead labor'. [116] In the historical passages of 
Capital, he says, Marx 'traces the contradictory process of societal 
rationalization' by showing the effect of the capitalist accumulation 
/ process oriented to exchange value upon the producers. [117] Lukacs took 
this up, and used it in History and Class Consciousness as the basis for an 
elucidation of the Weberian rationalization phenomena via the concept of 
reification. 
I . 
Lukacs traced the negative aspects of modernization to the capitalist 
mode of production, based on wage labour, which necessitates the 
transformation of human functions into commodities. [118] As the labour 
power of the producers becomes a commodity - a "thing" that is sold on the 
market - there results a split between the worker's labour power and his 
[ 111 ]Horkheimer 1974, especially pp. 3-57. 
[ 112]Horkheimer and Adorno 1979; see 1.4.6 above. 
[113]TCA1, p. 386. 
[114]Ibid., pp. 398f. 
[ 115 ]See sections 3.5, 3.6 below. 
[116]TCA1, p. 343. 
[ 117]Ibid. 
[118]Ibid., p. 356 
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personality. [119] Interactive relations in the sphere of social labour 
cease to be regulated by norms, and actors adopt an objectivating attitude 
to each other and to themselves, treating both as manipulable 
objects. [ 120] This is "reification". Social relations are transformed 
into purely instrumental ones. [121] 
Whereas for Weber this change in the sphere of social labour was only 
I' one example of a more general process of rationalization, for Lukacs it is 
causally basic. Because the wage-labourer relies upon the market for his 
entire existence, this reification works out from the sphere of social 
labour to affect his consciousness and all of his social 
relationships. [122] The result is a totally reified life. Thus 'in the 
structure of the commodity relation can be found the model of all the 
forms of objectivity in bourgeois society, together with all the forms of 
subjectivity corresponding to them'. [123] As Luka"cs himself puts it, the 
commodity becomes 'the universal category of society as a whole'. [124] The 
economic system of social labour is directly and causally responsible for 
the production of reified forms of life. [125] 
In the second volume of Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Habermas 
gradually develops a critique of Luka"cs' reification thesis. [126] On one 
/ point he agrees with Lukacs: that the problems associated with capitalist 
society are not borne alone by those at the bottom of the class structure 
but. affect the whole of society. [ 127] Nevertheless he rejects both / Lukacs' exposition of reification in terms of the philosophy of 
[119]Ibid., p. 357. 
[ 120 ]Ibid., pp. 357f. 
[121]Ibid., p. 358. 
[ 122]Ibid., p. 356. 
[ 123 ]Ibid., p. 355, quoting 
--~ [124]Lukacs 1971, p. 86. 
[ 125 ]TCA 1, p. 356. 
Luk£cs (printing error 
7 
/ [126]In chapter 4 (volume 1) he concentrates instead upon Lukacs' adoption of the Hegelian philosophical framework. This, he argues, was responsible for the 'enthronement of proletarian class consciousness' (reinterpreted as coinciding with the views of the Party) as 'the subject-object of history as a whole', the consequences of which were 
' unveiled in the Stalinist terror' ( TCA 1, p. 364) . [127]For which 3.6 below. 
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consciousness, and his "economism" that traces all of the reification phenomena of capitalist society directly to the effects of the economic system. Reification, he argues, arises not from the hegemony of instrumental reason, but from the activity of functionalist reason. [128] The details of Habermas' alternative, an alternative that significantly decentres the structural importance of social labour in society as a whole, is expanded in 3.6 below. [ 129] 
3.4.2 Horkheimer and Adorno on instrumental reason 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, says Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno generalized in three steps the concept of reification that they derived I from Lukacs, and in so doing demonstrated the inadequacy of the concept of rationality that they inherited from Weber. 
Firstly, instead of deriving the structures of reified consciousness , from the commodity form of labour power (so Lukacs), they regarded the former ("subjective reason" and "identifying thought") as fundamental, and the abstraction of exchange as only the historical form in which 
"identifying thought" develops its world-historical significance. This, Habermas comments, is an "'idealist" retranslation of the concept of reification into the context of the philosophy of consciousness'. [ 130] Secondly, the concept of reification was extended to cover technical relations with external nature. Thus, says Habermas, they 'anchor[ed] the mechanism that produces the reification of consciousness in the anthropological foundations of the history of ••• a species that has to 
[128]TCA1, pp. 398f. 
I [ 129 ]In the context of the critique of Lukacs, Habermas proposes to replace Lukics' "form of objectivity" (Gegen tandlichkeitsform), related directly to economics, with a "form of understanding" (Verstandigungsform) that is characteristic of particular stages of social evolution, and which prejudices the forms of understanding that can occur within it. This concept replaces the conditions of the possibility of possible experience (so Luk~cs) by the formal properties of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding. The "form of understanding" is a compromise between the general structures of understanding-oriented action, and the systemic forces of the reproduction of society that cannot be made thematic within the lifeworld (TKH2, pp. 278f) . The concept of "for m of understanding" i .s elucidated and illustrated in TKH2, pp. 279-293. [l30]TCA1, p. 378. 
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reproduce itself through labor'. [131] Reification ceases to be a phenomenon introduced by capitalism: it has been present as a 
contradiction in human life from the beginning. And thirdly, following 
from this, 'they reduce[d] the control of external nature, the command over 
human beings, and the repression of one's own internal nature to a common 
denominator, under the name of "domination"', thus implying that 'the same 
structure of excercising force' reigns in all three instances, [132] and 
that 'domination of nature involves domination of man'. [133] 
Thus, Habermas comments, Horkheimer and Adorno detached the concept of 
reification 'not only from the special historical context of the rise of 
the capitalist economic system but [also] from the dimension of interhuman 
relations al together'. They generalized it temporally ( over the whole 
history of the species) and substantively ('the same logic of domination is imputed to both cognition in the service of self-preservation and the 
repression of instinctual nature'). [134] The paradoxes of modernity were 
explained in terms of the career of imstrumental reason: 'victories over 
outer nature are paid for with defeats of inner nature'. [ 135] Every 
advance is accompanied by 'the stamp of irrationality' - the reason which 
enthrones self-preservation as an absolute end leads to the paradoxical destruction of the very subject it seeks to preserve. [136] 
Habermas once again rejects the deficient concept of rationality 
assumed here. Horkheimer and Adorno, he says, had rightly objected to the 
restriction of subject-object relations implied in logical positivism, a 
restriction to representation as theoretical control, and action as 
practical technical control. [137] However, short of a retreat to 
pre-Kantian met-aphysical thought, they had no way of expanding 
subject-object relations to express adequately the deformation of life 
[ 131 ]Ibid., p. 379. 
[ 132]Ibid. 
[ 133 ]Ibid., quoting Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason. [134]TCA1, p. 379. 
[ 135 J Ibid., p. 380. 
[ 136]Ibid. 
[ 137 ]Ibid., p. 387. 
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that instrumental reason involves. [138] And they were thus reduced to the 
paradoxically non-conceptual concept of "mimesis" to say what could not 
now be said. [139] 
Rejecting alike this reduced concept of instrumental reason, and a 
nee-Thomism oriented to tradition, [140] Horkheimer in Eclipse of Reason 
retreated to an undifferentiated concept of 'objective reason', that 
'conceived of the human world as part of a cosmological order', (141] and 
thus entertained ideas of reconciliation with it - a reconciliation 
including 'the interaction of human beings with nature, with animals, 
plants, and minerals'. [ 142] Yet as a result of its formulation as the 
obverse of an instrumental reason associated with "identifying thought", 
objective reason remained unspecifiable; for to specify it would be to 
attempt to grasp it with the very identifying thought that it was supposed 
to supplant. [143] 'At most', Habermas comments, 'we can circle around this 
idea, drawing on images from Judaeo-Christian mysticism': [144] we cannot 
define it. The unspecified concept with which Horkheimer indicates the 
nature of this objective reason, a reason that allows 'a universal 
reconciliation, an emancipation of man through the resurrection of nature', 
is 'mimesis', [ 145] involving 'the organic accomodation to the other' and 
'an exchange of the subject with nature that is free of violence'. [ 146] 
Thus it was that Adorno, in Asthetische Theorie, [147] 'surrender[ed] all 
cognitive competence to art, in which the mimetic capacity gains objective 
shape'. [148] Truth escapes theory and takes refuge in autonomous art, safe 
from the model of the natural sciences. (149] 
[138]Ibid ., pp. 388f. 
[ 139Jibid., pp. 384f. 
[140]Ibid., p. 374. 
[ 141 ]Ibid., p. 346. 
[ 142 ]Ibid., p. 381. 
[143]Ibid., pp. 382,384. 
[ 144 ]Ibid., p. 383. 
[ 145 ]Ibid., p. 382. 
[ 146]Ibid., p. 453, note 52. 
[ 147 ]Adorno 1 ~4-. 
[ 148 ]TCA 1, p. 384. 
[149]0n Habermas' aesthetics, 4.4 below. 
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Habermas does not accept this move, by which , he says, 'philosophical 
thi nking intentionally retrogresses to gesticulation', [ 150] and thus 
falls back behind the level of language. Philosophy here renounces its 
necessary goal of theoretical knowledge: [ 151] 'the critique of 
inst r umental reason conceptualized as negative dialectics renounces its 
theoretical claim while operating with the means of theory' . [ 152] The 
solution t o this aporia, a solution not available to Horkheimer and Adorno, 
is of course a move from the paradigm of instrumental reason, not back to 
Hor kheimer's undifferentiated objective reason, but to a communicative 
reason with its formal unity in substantial differentiation. Such is the 
concept of reason that is carried forward into the "lifeworld" half of 
Habermas' "system and lifeworld" explanatory model. 
3.5 System and Lifeworld 
In chapter 6 of Theorie des kommunikati ven Handelns, [ 153 J Habermas 
sets out his model of society as both system and lifeworld. This involves a 
partial reconciliation between the viewpoints of Parsonian functionalism 
and the "interpr etative" sociologies. 
3.5. 1 Social and s ystem i ntegration 
Habermas distinguishes between between two complementary and 
irreducible fo rms of "integr ation" i n society: ways in which society is 
held together into a moderately coherent whole . The first is social 
integration, whose vehicle is the action- orientations of actors, and is 
med i a t ed by communicative act i on. The second i s system i ntegration , which 
occur s via the integr ation of the unintended consequences of actions 
"behind the backs" of the acto r s . Whe r eas the first l nvol ves orientation 
to nor ms, the second is independent of t hem, invr l vi ng instead t he 
mediation of non-linguistic "steeri ng media ". The diassical e xample of 
s ystem i ntegr a tion i s the i ntegr at ive e ff ec t of the capitalist ma rket 
[ 150]TCA 1, p. 385 . 
[ 151 ]Ibid. 
[ 152 ]Ibid., p. 387 ; compare Adorno 1973 , p. 8 and passim. [153]TKH2, pp. 171-293. 
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system, [154] which, by means of the steering medium of money, coordinates 
the activities of group members apparently by accident , while each of them 
remains consciously orientated to his/her own egocentric interests. 
To this division in types of integr ation, Habe rmas argues, correspond 
two concepts of society itself: (155] ' 
(1) as the lifeworld of a social group, which can be analyzed 
adequately only from the internal perspective of a participant, and 
(2) as a set of functionally integrated systems, which can be analysed 
adequately only from the perspective of the third person observer. 
Neither set of concepts nor integrative mechanisms, he holds, is 
sufficient to represent society as a whole. Society must be conceptualized 
as both system and lifeworld, (156] and social evolution involves both a 
rationalization of the lifeworld, and an increase in the complexity of the 
social systems. (157] Habermas' intention is thus to transcend the 
di vision between action and systems theory, 'to grasp societies as 
systemically stabilized action-connections of socially integrated 
groups' , ( 158] because a sufficiently complex metatheoretical framework 
cannot be developed inside either paradigm alone. [159] 
3.5.2 Society as lifeworld 
Habermas , distancing himself from the views of Husserl who oper ated 
with the "philosophy of consciousness", [160] defines the lifeworld as 'a 
r eservoir of obvious or undoubted convictions that the communication 
participants can use for cooperative interpretation processes •••• a 
culturally handed-on and verbally organized store of interpretation 
patterns'. ( 161 J It is also 
( 154 ]Ibid., p. 226. 
[155Jibid., p. 179. 
[ 156 ]Ibid., p. 180. 
[ 157 ]Ibid. 
(158Jibid., p. 301. 
[ 159]_lbid., p. 303. 
[160]Ibid., p. 189. 
[ 161 ]Ibid. 
) 
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the transcendental place where speaker and hearer meet; where t hey can reciprocally raise the claim t hat their expressions " fit" the world (the objective, the social or the subjective world), and where thay can criticize and r atify these validity claims, disagree and achieve ag r eement. [ 162] 
As an actor passes from one situation to another , different elements of this unquestioned background of the lifeworld will be thematized and problematized. [163] The lifeworld itself, however, is the "place" from which new situations emerge, [164] and 
the communicative actor can as little take up an extr a- mundane position over-against it as over-against speech as the medium of unde r stand i ng pr ocesses through which the lifeworld is preserved . [165] 
Actors move inside the lifeworld: [ 166] situations may change, but the boundary of the lifeworld may not be transcended. [167] 
The lifeworld , Habermas continues, has three symbolic structural 
components: 
( 1) culture: the knowledge drawn on in interpretation, 
(2) society: the legitimate order in reference to which members 
regulate their activities, and 
(3) personality: the competences that an actor has at his disposal for i nter preta t ive proce s s es, and whereby he maintains his own identity. [ 168] 
He thus r ejects the narrowing of the concept to only one of these e lements , as in the soc icrlogies o f (respectively ) Schutz ( a 'cultural i s ti cally 
r estricted lifewor ld concept ' ) , [ 169) Par sons (the lifeworld as a 
[ 162 ]Ib i d., p. 192. 
[ 163]Compare TKH2, pp. 
[ 164Jibid., p. 191 . 
[ 165 ]Ibi d. 
[ 166 ]Ibid., p. 192. 
[167Jibid., p. 201 . 
[ 168 ]Ibid., p. 209. 
[ 169]Ibid., p. 210. 
J88f. 
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'societal communit y') , [170] and Mead (where ' the theory of society shrinks 
t o social psychology'). [171] 
But the lifeworld also has a material substrate (the human organism) , 
and the rep r oduction of these three symbolic components in communicative 
action is to be clearly distinguished from the maintenance of this 
material substrate , which occurs via goal-oriented intervention in the 
material world (instrumental action). [172] Thus the continued existence 
of the lifeworld depends upon both symbolic and material 
reproduction. [ 173] Disturbances in the former lead to loss of meaning, 
anomie, and psychopathologies . (174] Disturbances in the latter lead 
ultimately to the death of the organisms themselves. 
The rationalization of the lifeworld, [ 175 J Habermas continues , is 
exhibited in its structural differentiation , in the separation of form 
from content, and in the becoming reflexive of symbolic 
reproduction. (176] Pace the ' counte r -enlightenment' movement, represented 
by authors such as Gehlen, Heidegger and the French 
post-structuralists, [ 177 J the pathologies of modernity are not to be 
traced to this r ationalization as such: (178] Habermas claims that his 
model of society allows him to escape the "di alect i c of enl i ghtenment " 
presented by Weber , Hor kheimer and Adorno. 
Valid as this lifeworld approach to society i s , says Habe rmas , it is 
inadequate on its own. Soc i olog ies t ha t restrict themselves to this 
[ 170]Ibid., pp. 211 f. 
[ 171 ]Ibid., p. 212; stress removed. 
[ 172 ]Ibid., p. 209 ; see 3.6.5 be l ow. 
[ 173 Jibid., pp. 209 f. 
[ 174Jibid., pp. 213, 215. 
[ 175 ]Compar e 3.3 above. 
[176 JTKH2, pp. 219-221. 
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[177]For an analysis of a variety of these theorists, and their relation 
.to the proj ect of "modernity", Habermas 1985a passim. 
[ 17 8 ]TKH2, p. 222. 
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perspective [179] succumb to a 'hermeneutic idealism' (180] that ignores 
both the reproduction of the material substrate of the lifeworld, and the 
developmental dynamics of social evolution. The complementary paradigm of 
society as system is also needed. Habermas' stated guidelines here are very 
similar to those set out in his earlier reconstruction of historical 
materialism: 
On the one hand the dynamic of [social] development is steered by imperatives that result from the problems of securing 
existence - of the material reproduction of the lifeworld; yet 
this social development, on the other hand, makes use of 
structural possibilities that are underlain by structural limitations that alter systematically with the 
rationalization of the lifeworld in connection with 
corresponding learning processes. (181] 
3.5.3 Society as system 
Sociologies based exclusively on a lifeworld approach, says Haberrnas, 
necessarily operate with the fictions of the complete autonomy of actors, 
the independence of culture from outside influences, and the transparency 
of communication. [ 182 J But this is to ignore the effect of outside 
influences upon the socio-cultural lifeworld, influences that must be 
taken into account if society is to be adequately understood. These 
influences are 'not available to the intuitive knowledge of the 
participants', [183] and must instead be examined from the standpoint of a 
third person observer. [ 184] To adopt such a view of society, says 
Habermas, is to view it as a system. [185] And to study society in this way 
is to trace the unintended and counterintuitive connections that 
~~;~;~:::~:::-:::~:~es symbolic interactionism, ·ethnoLethodology, and the 
"hermeneutics" approach under this heading, i1s 'variants of an interpretative sociology that generally do not get beyond the reformulation of a more or less trivial everyda7y knowledge' ( ibid. p. 223 ). 
[ 180]Ibid. 
[ 181 J Ibid. Compare 2.3.2:B above. 
[182]Ibid., pp. 224f. 
[183]Ibid., pp. 223f. 
[ 184 ]Ibid., p. 227. 
[ 185] Ibid. 
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coordinate actors "behind their backs" via the functional connection of 
the results of actions. [186] Thus Weber was wrong to see organizational 
competence as purposive-rational action "writ large", [ 187] and still 
accessible to the actors in a lifeworld perspective. Rather there is a 
complete disconnection from the rationality (even the purposive 
rationality) of the participant [ 188] in favour of a systemic 
rationality. [189] 
Viewed as a system, society is seen as 
a special case of living systems [which] are to be understood 
as open systems maintaining their existence over against an 
unstable and complex environment through exchange processes 
across their boundaries. All system elements fulfil functions 
in respect of system maintenance. [190] 
The aim of a system is simply to maintain itself - maintain the status quo 
- not to achieve some other ultimately meaningful goal or objective. Its 
rationality - "systemic rationality" - is a measure of how efficiently it 
achieves this purpose: in Habermas' terms how high its 'steering capacity' 
is. [191] Systemic evolution therefore relates to the increase in steering 
capacity [192] 
complexity. 
which generally involves an increase in system 
Habermas maintains that all the evolutionary stages of human society 
can, and indeed must, be represented as both system and lifeworld. Within 
this paradigm he understands social evolution as a triple process of 
differentiation: 
System and lifeworld are differentiated in that the 
complexity· of the first and the rationality of the second 
increases ••• [moreover J each is differentiated at the same 
time from the other. [193] 
[186]Ibid., p. 226. 
[ 187 ]Ibid., p. 453. 
[ 188 ]Ibid., pp. 240, 454. 
[ 189 ]Ibid., p. 454. 
[ 190 ]Ibid., p. 227. 
[ 191 J Ibid., p. 240; compare LC, p. 14. 
[ 192]TKH2, p. 228. 
[ 193 ]Ibid., p. 230. 
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From a systems-theoretic perspective, the evolution f r om tribal to modern 
society [194] can be presented thus. The lifeworld is at first coextensive 
with a little-differentiated social system, and 'all interactions whi ch 
are structurally possible in such a society are played out in the context 
of a communally experienced lifeworld' . [ 195] During social evolution, 
however, the lifeworld .is reduced to one subsystem among many. System 
mechanisms free themselves from the structures of social integration to 
set up norm-free subsystems like the economy and the state. With repect to 
these 'formally organized action systems, steered by exchange and power' , 
the participants behave as to a piece of naturalized [196] 
reality - in the subsystems of purposive-rational action, 
society coagulates into a second nature. [197) 
Of course, even before the emergence of these subsystems, actors always 
could abandon understanding-oriented action for strategic action, and thus 
reify normative contexts into something in the objective world. But in 
modern societies 
there arise spheres of organizationally-formed and 
media-steered social relations which no longer admit at all 
norm-conforming attitudes and identity-forming soc i al par ticipation, expelling them to the periphery. [198) 
In modern society, these subsystems take on a life of their own, and are no 
longer subject to the control of the lifeworld. 
3.5.11 System and dynamics 
It is to the~e subsystems of purposive-rational action, and especially 
( as in Marx) to the economy, [ 199 J that Habermas looks for the dynamic 
dr i ving social evolution: 
[194]Sketched in TKH2, pp. 233- 257. 
[ 195Jibid., p. 234; stress removed. 
[ 196]Naturwuchsiger. 
[ 197 ]TKH2, p. 231. 
[ 198]Ibid. My stress. 
) 
; 
[199]Although on one occasion he hints at a more major role for warfare (ibid., p. 288). 
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The stimulus for a differentation 
to be found above all in 
reproduction. [200] 
of the social structure is 
the sphere of material 
The task of coordinated intervention in the objective world to maintain 
the material substrate of the lifeworld by the production and distribution 
of goods, demands a cooperation that can be more or less economically and 
effectively mastered. Complex skills of different actors must be 
coordinated efficiently. Thus 
insofar as thrift of expenditure and the operational level of 
the use of resources serve as an intuitive measure for the 
successful solution of such tasks, there results a stimulus 
towards the functional specialization of activities and a 
corresponding differentiation of products. [201] 
In other words, there arises pressure towards the division of labour. 
The institutional form that social relationships may take within 
society affects the efficiency of these economic interventions in the 
objective world. Each stage in social evolution involves a distinctive 
institutionalization of organizational power and exchange 
relations, [202] and in the progression from 'tribal society', through 
'politically stratified class society', to the current 'economically 
constituted class society', [203] there is at each stage scope for 
increased system complexity and therefore efficiency. [204] Thus the 
ceritralized state of politically stratified class societies allowed 
greater system complexity [205] than the institutionalized hierarchies of 
tribal societies that they replaced, [206] and in the split up of the 
steering functions of this state among military, judicial, and economic 
components that occured at the transition to capitalist ( economically 
constituted class) society, [207] we see a further increase in system 
[200]Ibid., p. 239, 
[201 ]Ibid. 
[202]Ibid. 
[203]Compare TKH2, p. 249. 
[204]Ibid., p. 247. 
) 
7 
[205]With its centralized administration, tax system etc. 
[ 206 ]TKH2, p. 254. 
[207 ]Ibid., pp. 255-257. 
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complexity and therefore in efficiency as well. 
Habermas thus transposes his 1975 thesis concerning the relationship 
between moral-practical and technical progress [208] into the terms of 
his system and lifeworld model, producing a new version of his continuing 
project to reconstruct historical materialism. His 1975 thesis had 
identified developments in the moral-practical dimension as the pacemaker 
of social evolution. Similarly, here he denies that 
the structures of the lifeworld vary in dependency upon the 
complexity-stage of the system. Rather the opposite is true: 
complexity-stages are dependent upon the structural 
differentiation of the lifeworld •••• which corresponds to ••• a 
communicative rationalization. [209] 
The level of possible systemic complexity, and hence, crucially, economic 
efficiency, is indeed raised when new system mechanisms are introduced. 
But these mechanisms must themselves be anchored in the lifeworld - they 
must be institutionalized. [21 OJ These "base" institutions ( in series, 
'status', 'official office', and 'bourgeois private law') 
form a series of evolutionary innovations which can only 
arise under the condition that the lifeworld has become 
sufficiently rationalized, specifically that law and morality 
have reached a corresponding developmental stage. [211] 
The sequence of evolutionary events (and here compare his exegesis of 
Weber in 3.2 above) is thus as follows: 
in social evolution, higher integration levels cannot be 
established before legal institutions have been formed, in 
which a · moral consciousness of the conventional or 
postconventional stage is embodied. [212] 
[ 208 J See 2.3.2:B above. 
[209]TKH2, pp. 258f. 
[210]Ibid., p. 259. 
) 
[211 ]Ibid. Habermas draws on Eder here, who correlates Kohlberg's stages of 
moral consciousness with types of society ( ibid., p. 260). 
[212]Ibid., p. 261. Compare Habermas 1976a, pp. 9-48. 
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Modern societies embody post-conventional moral consciousness, (213] and 
the transitions to conventional and then post-conventional morality are 
necessary conditions for the formation of the institutional frameworks of 
political and economic class societies. (214] Or, as Habermas puts it: 
new planes of system-differentiation can first be set up when 
the rationalization of the lifeworld has reached a 
corresponding level. (215) 
System complexity and societal rationalization go hand in hand in social 
evolution, although they are mutually irreducible categories. 
3.5.5 Parsons and systems theory 
In this project to marry action and systems theory in a theory of 
society, Habermas claims Talcott Parsons as his forerunner. Parsons, he 
says, was 'the first to make fruitful a technically strong system concept 
for social theoretical considerations'. (216] He also considered the 
reconciliation of action and system theories to be the most important 
construction problem in need of solution in social theory. Parsons, 
however, had failed to achieve his stated aim of retaining both action and 
system aspects in his final model. 
The first part of chapter 7 of Theorie des kommunikati ven Handelns 
traces how Parsons fell short in this respect. E.ven in the early The 
Structure · of Social Action ( 1937 ), Habermas argues, action theory was 
subordinated to systems theory, which was accorded conceptual 
primacy; (217] and as Parsons' thought developed through Towards a General 
Theory of Action ( 1951) (218] to his later s ystems theory of 
society, (219] this subordination became more and more marked. Thus, for 
Parsons, society came to be conceptualized with the help of an 
[213JTKH2, p. 265. On the stages of ( especially pp. 78-81 ); Habermas 
[214]TKH2, pp. 266f. 
[215]Ibid., p. 267. 
[216]Ibid., p. 299. 
[217 ]Parsons 1968; TKH2, pp. 305- 322. 
[218]Parsons 1962; TKH2, pp. 322-338. 
[219 lTKH2, pp. 338-384. 
) 
moral consciousness, CES, pp. 69-94 J 1983a, pp. 127-206. · 
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all-embracing general systems theory, and the functional imperatives of 
the boundary-maintaining system gained undisputed primacy. [220] Even 
"culture", apparently quintessentially a symbolic domain inaccessible to 
this analysis, was drawn in to become a functional component of the social 
system. [221 J 
Thus Parsons, having abandoned the lifeworld perspective, came to 
conceive of action systems merely as special cases of living systems. 
Action systems could no longer act, they merely functioned. [222] And 
society became a self-steered system surviving in an environment, whose 
developmental level is directly proportional to the level of autonomy that 
it can claim as a whole over-against this environment . [223] Social 
integration was lost altogether, to be subsumed with system integration 
under the single category "integration". [224] 
Now, while Habermas disapproves of the all-embracing nature of Parsons' 
systems-functionalism, he does draw three important ideas from his work: 
(1) the intention of an adequate reconciliation of action and system 
concepts in social theory, 
(2) the idea of subsystems, as applied to subsystems of 
purposive-rational action like the economy and the state, and 
(3) the concept of "communications media" that facilitate internal 
and external exchange with respect to these subsystems. 
I shall examine Habermas' reconstruction of the Parsonian notion of 
communications media in the next subsection. 
[220]Ibid., pp. 338f. 
[221 ]Ibid., pp. 339f, 352. 
[222] Ibid., p. 352. 
[223]Ibid., pp. 357f. 
[ 224 ]Ibid., p. 361. 
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3.5.6 Conmunications Hedia 
Habermas initially introduces the concept of communications media by 
way of a reflection upon the consequences of the "linguistification of the 
sacred" and the "rationalization of the lifeworld". As the rationalization 
of the lifeworld increases, he says, there is a move away from coordination 
by pre-accepted traditional norms towards coordination by means of 
consensus achieved by the participants themselves in discussion. ( 225] 
This, however, increases both the expenditure of time and effort needed to 
attain effective coordination, and the risk of disagreement and 
dissent. (226] Communications media prevent the swamping of the 
coordination mechanisms of a rationalized society that threatens as a 
result of this increase. They are 'strain-relieving mechanisms', (227] 
which thereby permit the increase in system-complexity that is the 
prerequisite for a more efficient material reproduction of society. 
The later Parsons had used the concept of communications media as part 
of his systems theory of society. In his view the social system was 
di visible into four subsystems. To each he assigned a communications 
medium, whereby exchange occurred both within the subsystem and between 
that subsystem and the others that formed its "environment": (228] 
(225 ]See 3.3 abov e . 
[226 ]TKH2, pp. 268f, 393. 
[ 227 ] Ent l astungsmechani smen ( ibid ., p. 269 ) . 
... 
I 
) 
[ 228]Ib id., pp. 385f. The social subsystems are t abulated on p. 365; the place of t he social s ys tem in Pa r sons ' ove r al l systems scheme is tabul a t ed on pp. 360, 376. The " s ys t e m-environment exchange" model i s drawn directly from th a t of a bio l og i cal ce ll or organ i s m, which preserves its existence only by exchange of energy and materi als across its boundari es . 
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Table 4: Media and subsystems 
Subsystem 
economic system 
political system 
system of social integration 
system of maintenance 
of structural patterns 
Medium 
money 
power 
influence 
value commitment 
Thus, for example, money was the medium of exchange within the economy 
itself, between economy and state in the form of taxes, and between economy 
and private household in the form of wages. [229] Habermas, however, denies 
that the concept is so widely and uni vocally applicable. [230 J Parsons' 
"influence" and "value commitment", he argues, involve the "condensation" 
rather than the complete replacement of verbal understanding and 
consensus formation. [231] It is misleading to regard their operation as 
analogous to that of the true media of money and power that do actually 
replace speech in coordination rather than merely simplifying it. [232] 
For Habermas, money is the paradigm of a true communications medium. Its 
speech-replacing function can be recognized by comparing the modern 
process of commodity exchange with primitive barter. When money rather 
than direct barter is the medium of transaction, the process of agreement 
and exchange is vastly speeded up , yielding a greater flexibility and the 
possibility of much greater system complexity and efficiency. [233] 
However, the introduction of money also changes the nature of society 
at the same tinie as mak ing it mo r e efficient. Related as it is to use 
values, which have an empirically rather than a 
power, [ 234] it has a system-forming effect, 
[229]TKH2, p. 399. 
[ 230 ]Ibid., p. 386. 
[ 231 ]Ibid., pp. 273, 275 . 
[ 232 ]Ibid., p. 418. 
[ 23 3 ]Ibid., pp. 391- 396. 
[ 234]Ibid., pp. 397f. 
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Table 4: Media and subsystems 
Subsystem 
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political system 
system of social integration 
system of maintenance 
of structural patterns 
Medium 
money 
power 
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value commitment 
Thus, for example, money was the medium of exchange within the economy 
itself, between economy and state in the form of taxes, and between economy 
and private household in the form of wages. [229) Habermas, however, denies 
that the concept is so widely and uni vocally applicable. [230 J Parsons' 
"influence" and "value commitment", he argues, involve the "condensation" 
rather than the complete replacement of verbal understanding and 
consensus formation. [231] It is misleading to regard their operation as 
analogous to that of the true media of money and power that do actually 
replace speech in coordination rather than merely simplifying it . [232] 
For Habermas, money is the paradigm of a true communications medium. Its 
speech-replacing function can be recognized by comparing the modern 
process of commodity exchange with primitive barter . When money r ather 
than direct barter is the medium of transaction, the process of agreement 
and exchange is vastly speeded up, yielding a greater flexibility and the 
possibility of much greater system complexity and efficiency. [233] 
However, the introduction of money also changes the nature of society 
at the same tim-e as making it more efficient. Related as it is t o use 
values, which have an empirically rather than a 
power, [234] it has a system-forming effect, 
[ 229] TKH2, p. 399. 
[ 230 ]Ibid., p. 386. 
[ 231 ]Ibid., pp. 273, 275. 
[ 232 ]Ibid., p. 418. 
[233Jibid., pp. 391-396. 
[234]Ibid., pp. 397f. 
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externally. Internally, the differentiation of the (capitalist) economic 
subsystem via the medium of money abolished the pre-bourgeois normatively 
organized labour relations, in the process of the monetarization of the 
forces of production. [235 J While externally, as the economic subsystem 
exchanges with its "environments" (the state, the household) by the money 
medium, these environments are transformed too. [236] The adoption of the 
money-medium to facilitate exchange in society in fact yields not only 
"strain relief", but also a "technicization of the lifeworld". [237] It 
does indeed allow for the setting up of more complex networks of 
coordinated actions, but at the same time it dispenses with the need for 
the competent communicative participation that is the characteristic of 
social integration. [238] 
Habermas claims that "power" [239] is also, by analogy, a medium. Like 
money, it is symbolic, involving a claim-redemption structure. [240] It too 
standardizes responses into a binary form (obedience or disobedience), 
enhances efficiency of goal-attainment, implies an objectivating attitude 
to action situations, and generally renders interactions less complex and 
more automatic. [241] However, power is less clearly a "medium" than is 
money. It is less manipulable and quantifiable, and cannot be stored in a 
bank or circulated. [242] As requiring legitimation, it remains attached 
to the understanding and consensus of the participants in the lifeworld in 
a way that the money medium does not. Reasons are still involved in its 
exercise. Thus it is less clear in its system-forming effects, [243] and 
[ 235 ]Ibid., pp. 399f. 
[236]Ibid., p. 400. For example, as money becomes an intersystemic exchange 
medium, it forces the · reorganization of power, as the economy is 
withdrawn from the direct control of the st,te. Thus power is assimilated to money as a steering medium ( ibid., • 256 ). 
[237JTechnisierung der Lebenswelt (ibid., p. 273). 
-- I [238]Ibid., p. 394. See further 3.6 below. 
.. [239 ]By which he usually means an asymmetry of powier relations, rather than an abstract capacity to act or to achieve ends in general. Contrast Giddens' definition of power as referring to 'the transformati ve capacity of human action' (Giddens 1976, p. 110 ). [240]TKH2, p. 400. 
[241]Ibid., pp. 401f. 
[242]Ibid., p. 402. 
[24J]Ibid., p. 403. 
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less suitable for "st r ain r elief" in communication. [244) Neverless , power 
remai ns sufficiently medium-like, for Habermas to treat it as such i n his 
model of modernity, to which I now turn. 
3,6 Modern ity and its pathologies 
Throughout Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Habermas is concerned 
to reinterpret the Weberian rationalization paradox so as to produce a 
more adequate theoretical model of modern societies and their 
pathological aspects. Continually, he argues , sociologies have tended to 
resolve rather than to retain this paradox. The classics of political 
economy, for example, attempted to show that the system imperatives of the 
capitalist economy were in harmony with the basic norms of a free and just 
community: Marx was right in claiming that this is not so, because the 
economic system has the latent function of maintaining a class structure, 
and therefore social injustice. [245) Similarly, Parsonian 
systems-functionalism, by reducing the lifeworld to merely one of several 
subsystems of the social system, and thus making social and system 
integration achievements functionally equivalent, makes it impossible to 
conceptual i ze s ystem-complexity increases that occur at the cost of an 
attack upon a rationalized lifeworld, as involving in any sense a r eal 
cost. [ 246 J 
Wi t h hi s system and lifewor ld model , Haber mas claims t o be able t o 
reinject the Weberian paradox into Parsonian functionalism, while 
incor por ati ng at the same time essential insights from Marx's wo r k. His 
bas i c t hesis i s t ha t ' the rational ized lifewor l d f ac i li t a t es t he 
origination and gr owth of the very subsystems whose autonomous 
imperatives then hit back 
r esults in 'disturbances 
lifeworld'. [248] Pursuing 
[244 ]Ibid., p. 406. 
[ 2 45 ]TKH2, p. 276. 
des tructi vely at it' , [ 2147] and that this 
i n t he s ymbolic · rep1oduction of the 
different r at i onal i mperati ves , al t hough 
[ 246 ]Ibid., p. 277; compare pp. 346, 550-553, 
[247 ]Ibid., p. 277. 
[248]Ibid., p. 451 . 
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dynamically linked, the two pr ocesses of the r ationalization of the 
lifewor ld and the increase in complexity of media- steered subsys t ems 
collide in a contradictory and paradoxical manner. [249] 
Thus Habe r mas claims it is possible to 'take up aga i n the problem of 
rei f ication and refo r mulate it in · concepts of systemically induced 
lifeworld pathologies'. [250] 
3.6.1 The model of modernity 
Habermas pr esents his model of modern societies, [251] from a systems 
viewpoint, in a table which I have adapted below: [252] 
[ 249 ]Compare TKH2, pp. 553f. 
[ 250 ]Ibid., p. 293. 
~ 
} 
) 
[251 ]Essentially the western democracies, but see TKH2, pp. 563f. 
[252]Adapted from TKH2, p. 473; compare J. Thompson 1984, p. 292. See also LC, p. 5. 
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Table 5: The model of modernity 
Institutional Exchange Media-steered 
orders of the relations subsystems 
lifeworld 
( p 
.. worker 1 labour power role M ~ • wages 
private sphere economic system 
~ M 
consumer f goods and services 
role M 
• demand 
~ M • client taxes role ... p organizational 
results administrative 
public sphere system 
... 
p 
.... 
state political decisions 
citizen p 
• role mass loyalty 
In bourgeois society, the lifeworld reacts to the separation out of the 
economic and administati ve (state) subsystems by the formation of the 
soc i ally integrated private and public spheres. [253] The institutional 
cores of these are respectively: 
( 1) the nuclear family (which, from the system perspective of the 
economy, forms its "environment" as the private household), and 
I (2) the communications network, that facilitates t t e formation of both 
cultural and political public spheres (whic~, from the system 
perspective of the state, forms its envi r,onment r elevant to 
[ 253 ]TKH2, p. 471. 
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legitimation). [254] 
The economy interacts with the private sphere - and the state with the 
public sphere - by means of the communications media money and power (M 
and Pin the table respectively). This involves the abstractions of work 
to labour power, use values to demand preferences, and collective 
will-expressions to mass loyalty, so that they can be exchanged for wages, 
consumer goods and political leadership respectively. [255] From the 
perspective of the lifeworld, the establishment of the two subsystems, and 
the exchanges via the money and power media, involve the establishment of 
the four social roles in the table. To play a social role is to enter a 
formally (that is, purposive-rationally) organized action-sphere, and to 
be released from the perspective of the lifeworld. [256] This is 
experienced from the lifeworld perspective as a monetarization and 
bureaucratization of everyday life, and results in what Habermas calls a 
"mediatization" [257] of the lifeworld. 
On this basis, Habermas criticizes the "economistic" model of Marx, 
that was based upon the "theory of value" (see 3.6.3 below). 
3.6.2 The colonization of the lifeworld 
Habermas stresses that modern society inevitably embodies something of 
a compromise between: 
(1) system imperatives, which, by an increase in complexity, allow an 
i ncrease in the efficiency of the material production of the lifeworld 
and the "steering" of the social system as a whole, and 
(2) the imperatives of social integration, which are responsible for 
the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, i .e. cultural transmission, 
I 
socialization, and the formation of personal ident ) ty. (258] 
I 
~ 
J [254]Ibid., pp. 471f. Pace Parsons, the private and public spheres are not subsystems, and the state and economy do not act as "environments" for the public and private spheres ( ibid., pp. 472f) . 
(255 ]Ibid., pp. 475f. 
(256]}:bid., pp. 472-474. 
[257]M.ediatisierung (ibid., p. 452). 
[ 258 ]TKH2, pp. 341-34 3, 350. 
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He thus rejects Marx's thesis that the two sets of imperatives could be 
reunited under socialism. The separation of system and lifeworld, which 
occured at the emergence from tribal society, is reversible only at the 
cost of regression, and the goal of "reconciliation" is mere romanticism. 
Systemic rationality is as valid in its place - and as non-transcendable -
as the purposive rationality of modern science and technology. [259] 
However, Habermas draws a distinction between a healthy modernization 
process, characterized by the above "mediatization" of the lifeworld to 
some extent, and the pathological "colonization" of the lifeworld: a term 
which alludes to the imperialistic destruction of traditional third world 
cultures during the expansion of international capitalism: [260] 
The analysis of processes of modernization begins from the 
general assumption that a progressively rationalized 
lifeworld is both uncoupled from, and made dependent upon 
formally organized action-spheres, such as the economy and 
state administration, which are always becoming more complex. 
This dependence, stemming from the mediatization of the 
lifeworld through system imperatives, assumes the 
socio-pathological form of an inner colonization insofar as 
critical disequilibria in material reproduction ( that is, 
steering crises accessible to systems-theoretical analysis) 
can be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in the 
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" 
experienced identity-threatening crises or 
pathologies). [261] 
This requires some elucidation. 
A pathological "colonization" of the lifeworld arises, argues Habermas, 
when systemic imperatives penetrate into the areas where symbolic 
reproduction is indispensable. [262] As societies can be defined as 
'systemically stabilized action-connections of socially integrated 
groups', [263] this will tend to occur when the syste~ic stabilization of 
the material reproduction of the lifeworld ( i.e. th~ avoidance of the 
I 
[259]Compare TKH2, pp. 341f, 348-50, 458-461, 470. 
[ 260 J Ibid., p. 522. 
[261]Ibid., p. 452; compare J. Thompson 1984, p. 291. 
[262]lbid., p. 549. 
[263]Ibid., p. 301; see 3.5.1 above. 
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crises of the capitalist economic cycle) is achievable only at the expense 
of the erosion of social integration possibilities. [264] 
From his "compromise" position, Habermas can envisage two undesirable 
states of society: 
( 1) a society where social integration achieved by communicative 
action penetrates so far into the economic and administrative systems 
that these become chronically inefficient, leading to a descent into 
chaos and/or greatly reduced production of necessary material goods, 
and 
(2) a society where the reverse is the case: where the economic and 
administrative systems are efficient but form their own social 
structures which "tower over" [265] the lifeworld, leading to a 
radical loss of meaning and freedom. 
If the first case represents the logical result of the programmes of the 
protest movements, were these to be put completely into effect, [266] the 
second represents the actual state of the modern western societies at 
present. 
3.6.3 Marx and the theory of value 
In chapter 8 of Theorie des kommunikati ven Handelns, [ 267 J Habermas 
attempts to draw Marx's work within his system-lifeworld-pathology model. 
A: HABERMAS' EXEGESIS OF THE MARXIAN THEORY OF VALUE 
Marx, Habermas says, pursued two logically distinct lines of inquiry, 
which correspond to lifeworld and system approaches to society. In his 
economics he analyzed the workings of the capitalist economy as a system 
from an observer perspective, whereas in his histori~al analyses of the 
evils of proletarianization and class division, he purJued an analysis of 
[264]For the idea of the transfer of cr1s1s tendencies from one area of the social system to another, LC, pp. 45-94 and passim. 
[265 ]TKH2, p. 275. 
[266]See 3.6.7 below. 
[267 ]TKH2, pp. 445-593. 
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the lifeworld of the capitalist producers. (268] The combination of these t wo in Marx, he continues, through t he categories of alienated labour and the dual character of the commodity form, allowed the crucial exchange of labour power for circulating capital to be conceptualized both as a 
"steering-mechanism" of a self-regulating production process, and as a process of exploitation. (269] 
"Alienat,ed labour" thus becomes the place where the imperatives of 
social and system integration meet . Marx exposes the illusion that labour power can be reduced to a commodity like any other, by pointing out that it is not detachable f rom the workers themselves, and thus is fundamentally 
non-orientable to goals of saleability. It is irretrievably 
"subject-bound". (270] As action, labour belongs to the lifeworld of the producers, and is concerned with concrete actions and cooperative 
relations. But by abstraction into "abstract labour", it is transformed into a system-capacity of the capitalist business and economy, (271] a 
step amounting to alienation of the capacities of the producers from their lifeworld. In this, labour both becomes independent of the needs, 
competences, and social situation of the working indi victual, and as 
abstract labour power connected with exchange value, can now be seen as 
"human work" in general. (272] Marx elucidates this event of abstraction from reality as a reification of socially integrated relations: social 
relations are transformed into instr umental ones. (273] 
In Habermas' view, Marx is here attempting to provide a set of 
'translation rules' [ 274] ' by which systemic statements ( about anonymous 
value r elations) can be translated into histori cal statements ( about interactive relat1ons between social classes) '. ( 275] Thus system pr oblems (crises) can be projected on to the plane of 
[268]Ibid., p. 492. 
(269 ]Ibid. 
[270]Ibid., p. 493. 
(271 ]Ibid. 
[272]Ibid., pp. 493f. 
[273Jlbid., p. 494; compare Lukacs in 3.4.1 above. [274]Ibid., p. 495. 
[275Jibid., pp. 494f. 
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integration, and 
I 
connected with the dynamic of class strife, [276] once 'certain empirical 
hypotheses about (for example) the solidarity effect of cooperation forms 
enforced by the conditions of the manufacturing system' [277] are 
accepted. Thus Marx gained some critical leverage upon capitalist 
economics by linking it, via his translation rules, with the exploitation 
of the producers and the destruction of their lifeworlds. [278] Having 
started from the lifeworld of concrete labour, to pass secondarily to the 
economic utilization of abstract labour, he can also return to the 
lifeworld plane of action and class, to point out the costs of capitalist 
modernization: [279] 
The bilingualism of the theoretical representation gives the dialectical conceptuality, forced together in the Marxian system and action theory, its critical point. [280] 
B: CRITIQUE OF THE MARXIAN THEORY OF VALUE 
Although Habermas applauds Marx's attempt to work simultaneously upon 
both the system and the lifeworld levels, he finds fault with his way of 
combining the two conceptualities. 
Firstly, he argues, Marx remains too attached to the Hegelian 
logic. [281 J As a result, he conceptualized the capitalist system as 
'nothing more than the ghostly form of a class relationship that has been 
rendered anonymous and fetishized', such that the apparent autonomy of the 
systemic production processes has 'the character of bewitchment'. [282] 
This leads him to eliminate a priori the possibility that the capitalist 
economy and bureaucracy in themselves, rather than merely as a 
transitional sta-ge to a future resolution - might also represent a higher 
evolutionary stage than that which they replaced. Thus he 
the evolutionary value possessed by the media-stee1 ed 
I 
[276]Ibid., p. 495. 
[277Jibid., p. 496. 
[ 278 ]Compare TKH2, p. 497. 
[279Jibid., pp. 497f. 
[ 280 ]Ibid., p. 498. 
[281 ]Compare TKH2, p. 498. 
[ 282 ]Ibid., p. 499. 
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'underestimates 
subsystems', in 
I I 
terms of improved steering capacities, as well as of the destruction of 
the old feudal is tic class relations. [ 283 J Not surprisingly, therefore, 
his theory of revolution adopts a view of the merits of political action 
which is the opposite of that implied by systems-functionalism, [284] and 
deceives him into belief in 'a futuristic state' where 'the objective 
appearance of capital has melted away', and 'the lifeworld is given back 
its spontaneity'. [285] This is to be achieved by the revolutionary power 
of the industrial proletariat, who dismantle the institutional bases of 
the media (crucially private property) and thus force the collapse of the 
automatic system processes of economic growth back onto the 
lifeworld. [286] Thus, in Marx, "system" and "lifeworld" appear as the 
"realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom" respectively, with the 
socialist revolution freeing the latter from the former. [287] Deceived by 
the Hegelian concept of totality, Marx failed to see that in any modern 
society, with whatsoever class structure (or none), there must be a high 
level of structural differentiation. [288] 
Secondly, Marx 'lacks criteria for distinguishing between the 
disintegration of traditional life-forms and the reification of 
post-traditional lifeworlds'. [289] The concept of "alienation" remains 
ambiguous. Marx used it to criticize the lifestyle that arose with the 
proletarianization of artisans. But it is too blunt a tool to distinguish, 
in that destruction, between a reification of the lifeworld and its 
structural differentiation. [290) What is needed, and what the theory of 
value does not provide, is 'a concept of reification that would permit the 
identification of the syndrome of reification relative to each attained 
level of the rationalization of the lifeworld', [291 J because , 'at the 
post-traditional stage of life-forms, the pain of the separation out of 
[283]Ibid. 
[ 284 ]Ibid. 
[285 ]Ibid., p. 500. 
[286]Ibid. 
[287 ]Ibid. 
[ 288 ]Ibid., p. 501. 
[289 ]Ibid. 
[ 290] Ibid., p. 502. 
[291 ]Ibid. 
) 
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culture, society and personality counts ••• as a process of individuation 
and not of alienation'. (292] In a thoroughly rationalized lifeworld, the 
concept of reification points to the possibility not of a ' nostalgic, often 
romanticized, past of pre-modern life-forms', (293] but only to 'conditions 
of communicative sociation ' . (294 J Yet Marx lacks any concept of a 
rationalized lifeworld with which he could make this sort of 
distinction. (295] 
Thirdly, implicit in the idea of alienated labour, at least in the Paris 
Manuscripts, is a standard of non-alienated labour which accords with 
the expressivist model of that creative productivity in which 
the artist, in the fashioning of his work, at the same time develops his essential powers. [296] 
This concept Haberrnas traces to the Bildungsideal of Herder and the 
Romantics. He argues that it traps the idea of labour normatively in 
action concepts: capitalist labour becomes a deviation from "exemplary 
praxis", such that capitalist workers are robbed of the possibility of the 
development of their essential powers at the same time as they are robbed 
of their product. [297] To extrapolate from Habermas' statements a little, 
his model suggests two errors here: 
(1) a confusion of action concepts with system concepts ("production" 
being a system concept), and 
(2) on the level of action theory, a r omantic con fu sion of 
aesthetic- expressive and purposive-rational action. [298] 
Four thly, OIJCe we see modernization as involving not only a new 
formulation of class relations but also an increased level of system 
[292]Ibid., pp. 502f. 
[293Jibid., p. 503. Such as , in the sphere of industrial world of the artisan and peasant 
[ 294 ]Ibid., p. 503. 
(295 ]Ibid., p. 502. 
[296]Ibid., p. 501. 
[297Jibid., pp. 501, 503f. 
[298]See further 4.7 below. 
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social labour, the pre-
( ibid., p. 502). 
differentiation, the 'semantic question' about the translation between 
theoretical languages becomes an 'empirical question' about 'when the 
growth of the monetary-bureaucratic complex touches action spheres that 
are not transferable to systemic integrative mechanisms without 
pathological side effects'. [299] 
Lastly, Habermas criticizes Marx for having produced 'an 
economistically foreshortened interpretation of the development of 
capitalist societies'. [300] Even though the world of work is indeed the 
source of the dynamic of the class struggle, reification effects are to be 
traced to both the economic and the administrative subsystems. [301] It is 
thus a mistake to see the economy/state relation on a base/superstructure 
model, [302] a mistake which stops Marx's critique of political economy 
from generating a suitable explanatory model for late capitalism - or for 
bureaucratic state socialism. 
3.6.4 Marx and late capitalism 
Marx's "economistic" model, Habermas points out, cannot accomodate two 
features of the state as it is found in late capitalism, which distinguish 
it from the form of the state that Marx analysed in the nineteenth century. 
The first is its interventionist character vis-a-vis the economy and 
the lifeworld. The modern state intervenes in the economy to iron out the 
worst fluctuations of the capitalist crisis cycle. It also intervenes in 
the lifeworld, in the form of legal provisions (like unfair dismissal 
legislation), and monetary provisions (like welfare state benefits), to 
ease the destructive effect that the capitalist accumulation process has 
upon the producers. In modern capitalism the level of this intervention is, 
of course, kept within 
capitalist economy is 
limits , [303] such that ~he i\~ernal dynamic 
not subverted, and the basic cl ass structure 
I 
7 
[299 ]TKH2, p. 548; my stress. 
[ 300 ]Ibid., p. 504. 
[ 301 ]Ibid., p. 503. 
[ 302 ]Ibid., p. 504. 
of the 
is not 
[303]0therwise the system metamorphoses into bur eaucratic state socialism, where the state power becomes the primary steering medium (TKH2, p. 564). 
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destroyed. Class antagonism is "pacified" rather than removed, and crisis 
tendencies are still generated in the economic subsystem. But from he r e 
they are shifted onto the administrative subsystem, where they "present" 
as the overtaxing of bureaucratic planning capacity. [304] 
The second feature is the growth of mass democracy, that has evolved to 
provide the necessary legitimation to anchor the power medium of the state 
administration in the lifeworld. Apparently embodying political 
will-formation by democratic discussion and resultant consensus, in fact 
the input into the political system is mediatized to a large extent into 
mass loyalty. This is guaranteed partly by welfare state programmes, and 
partly by the selective exclusion of themes from public debate. The latter 
is achieved by restriction of access to the public sphere, and by 
manipulation of the information available to it. [305] 
Thus to "economistic" Marxist theory, late capitalism presents a 
paradox: it leaves the drive mechanism of social evolution intact while 
lessening overt class conflict. The class structure is shifted out of the 
lifeworld and into the system by state intervention, and the unequal 
pattern of social rewards is no longer obviously traceable to a class 
basis. [ 306] The alien element of the workplace is made subjectively 
bearable by its "humanization", and/or by monetary rewards and legal 
security, while there is a general (although still differentiated) 
increase in the standard of living such that occ~pational roles lose their 
proletarian reference. Thus , 
with the protection of the private sphere against the violent 
results of the system imperatives effective in the work-world, distribution conflicts lose their explosive force. [307] 
However, while impoverishment r elated to the ma erial reproduction of 
the lifeworld is reduced in late capitalism, thee increasingly appear 
[304]Ibid., pp. 505f, 510-512; compare LC, pp. 50-60. 
[ 305 ]TKH2, pp. 506-51 O. 
[306]Ibid., p. 512. 
[307]Ibid., p. 514. 
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class non-specific reification effects [308] that disturb the symbolic 
reproduction of the lifeworld, [309] as the welfare state penetrates into 
the lifeworld in its attempt to neutralize the side-effects of the 
economic dynamic. [310] Thus, as the autonomous economic system continues 
to grow in complexity and size, there is an increase in the flow of 
compensation through . the client and consumer roles, [311] and the 
expansion of the client role leads to problems precipitated by the 
"legalization" of communicatively structured action spheres. [312] 
In late capitalism, it is not the power of ideology [313] that keeps 
these systemic effects generally hidden, but a fragmentation of everyday 
consciousness and a cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld. This happens 
as science, morality, and art are not only separated out into autonomous 
disciplines, but also split off from the everyday communicative 
praxis [314] that they should serve. In other words, instead of a false 
consciousness modernity presents a fragmented and impoverished 
consciousness. And it is under these conditions that the colonization of 
the lifeworld becomes possible. [315] Faced with this situation, pace 
Lukics, progressive praxis should abandon the pursuit of 'the scattered 
traces of a revolutionary consciousness'. Instead it should investigate 
'the conditions for a recoup ling of the rationalized culture with an 
everyday communication based on vital traditions'. [316] 
[308]Albeit filtered through the pattern of social inequality (ibid., p. 513). Habermas claims that this 'class non-specific outworking of the 
reification of communicatively structured action spheres' (p. 448) is 
equivalent to ' the pathological secondary effects of a class 
structure which cannot be adequately grasped using action-
theoretical means alone' (pp. 449f). 
[ 309] Ibid., p. 513. ~ 
[310]The effects of this penetration were i nored by Marx, who 
concentrated exclusively on the worker role. hus Mar x limited his 
concept of alienation to :the alienated fact6ry work of the early 
stages of industrialization, which he general i zed to the proletarian lifeworld as a whole (TKH2, p. 513) . · 
[311]Ibid., pp. 515f~ 
[ 312 J See 3.6.6 below. 
[313]As in early capitalism with its ideology of "fair exchange ". 
[314]Kommunikative Alltagspr axis (TKH2, p. 520). 
[ 315] Ibid., pp. 520- 522. 
[ 316 ]Ibid., p. 522. 
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3.6.5 Allocation 
Habermas follows Parsons in distinguishing two key problems of social 
systems: "allocation" and "integration". [317] Allocation is concerned 
wi t h ' adaptive and goal - achieving functions, with the get ting, 
mobilization, distribution and effective use of scarce resources'. [ 318] 
The solution of these allocat i on pr oblems in the br oadest sense ser ves t he 
functional integration of action systems, whereas social integration is 
concerned with the maintenance and integration of cultural values. [319] 
Also with Parsons Habermas sees social systems as inevitably a compromise 
between the corresponding t wo sets of imper atives . [320] 
Habe r mas appears to equate "allocation problems" with the "material 
reproduction of the lifeworld", and this with "social labour": 
The lifeworld of a social group ••• stands via its material 
substrate in exchange with an environment, consisting of the 
ecology of outer nature, the organisms of the participants, 
and the structures of alien lifeworlds •••• With its material 
substrate the lifeworld stands under contingent conditions, 
which, from the perspective of its participants, appear as 
either l i mitations on the r ealization of action plans or as 
restrictions on self-steering. This substrate must be 
maintained by the use of scarce r esources through social 
labour; Parsons described the cor responding tasks as 
allocation pr oblems. [321] 
This - and only this - may be completel y given over to systemic mechanisms 
without patho l ogical consequences : the f unction of 'material r ep r oduct i on ' 
can 'so it appea r s ' be 'handed over pa i nlessly to media- steer ed action 
systems' . [322] 
Fr om an ac tion- theoretical viewpoint , this mater i al repr oduction i s 
i nternally connected wi t h purposive-ra t ional \i nt e rvention i n t he 
[ 317 ]Ibid., p. 341. 
[318]Ibid. 
[319Jibid. See 3.5.1 above. 
[ 320] Ibid., pp. 342, 350. 
[321 ]Ibid., pp. 347f. 
[322]Ibid., p. 549. 
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objective world. [ 323] However, as mentioned in 3.5 .3 above, at least for 
stages following the evolutionary separation of lifeworld and system, it 
is a mistake to think of this material reproduction as an intended result 
of social labour. As systemically analysable, it transcends the 
action-orientations of the labourers: 
The material reproduction of the lifeworld ••• [cannot] be 
represented as the intended result of collective social 
labour. It generally takes place as the fulfilment of latent functions that transcend the action orientations of the 
participants. Insofar as the aggregate effects of cooperative 
actions fulfill the imperative of the maintenance of the 
material subst r ate, these actions can be stabilized functionally - i.e. via the linking of functional results •••• These considerations ••• suggest a change of method and of 
conceptual perspective, namely an objectivating view of the lifeworld as system. Insofar as the material reproduction 
comes into view, it is connected, not with the symbolic 
structure of the lifeworld, but only with the processes of the 
exchange of the lifeworld with its environment, with which (according to our definitions) the existence of the material 
substrate is connected. In respect of these "metabolic 
processes" (Marx) it is possible to reify the lifeworld as a boundary-maintaining system, for which functional connections 
are relevant, which cannot be sufficiently opened up from the intuitive knowledge of lifeworldly contexts. Survival imperatives demand a functional integration of the lifeworld 
that calls for a counterintuitive analysis from the 
standpoint of an observer who objecti vates the lifeworld •••• functional integration amounts to a material reproduction of 
the lifeworld that can be conceived as system 
maintenance. [324] 
Thus it is legitimate to subsume social labour entirely under 
"production", in the sense of yielding a product, and to neglect the 
lifeworld/action perspective of the producers for a systemic/observer 
analysis that sees social labour as part of the economic subsystem. 
[ 323] Ibid., p. 348. 
I324Jibid., pp. 348f. 
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3.6.6 The wel:fare state 
What has just been said does not hold good, however, for cases connected 
to the medium of power and the administrative subsystem. These cannot be 
subsumed under system integration without cost, because social relations -
unlike relations with the natural world - are necessarily symbolic in 
character. 
In the sphere of power, Habermas holds that modernity must again be 
something of a compromise. A certain degree of bureaucratization is in 
fact a normal part of modernization, arising when ethics is replaced by 
law in action-coordination. [325 J However, the dynamic of the economic 
system, and the reactions of the administrative system that it calls forth 
in late capitalism, [326] produce an apparently unstoppable tendency 
towards more and more bureaucratization. And this leads to identity or 
orientation problems in the individual, [327] and legitimation problems in 
society. [ 328 J 
The key here is the ousting of aspects of rationality in the lifeworld. 
In capitalist modernization, 
cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates from 
spheres of economy and state into 
communicatively-structured life-spheres, and there 
precedence at the cost of moral-practical 
aesthetic-practical rationality. [329] 
the 
other, 
takes 
and 
This leads, as Weber had pointed out, to a split in the personality of the 
modern person: between a specialist-utilitarian lifestyle ('experts 
without spirit') , and an aesthetic-hedonistic lifestyle ('consumers 
without heart'). The same person, adopting both attitudes, is fragmented 
and loses the ability to make unified sense of his life history. [330] 
Ruled by cognitive-instrumental attitudes to ·self tnd others in the work 
I 
[325]Ibid., pp. 470f. 
[326]See 3.6.4 above. 
[327]TKH2, pp. 460f. 
[328]Compare LG, pp. 45-94. 
[ 329 ]TKH2, p. 451. 
[330]Ibid., p. 477, quoting Weber. 
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sphere, ethical obligation is here weak ened in favour of orientation to 
increasing income; and when not at work, the consumer is determined by 
expressive attitudes which are a compensation for an everyday theoretical 
and practical rationalism. [331] 
According to Habermas, it is not the loss of objective reason (due to a 
rationalization of the lifeworld), nor even the highly complex nature of 
modern society (the result of an ever-increasing system-complexity), that 
results in the overtaxing of the integrative power of the 
individual. [332] Two other factors are responsible: the elitist 
separation of expert cultures from everyday communicative praxis, and the 
penetration of system imperatives into the areas of cultural tradition, 
social integration, and education. [333] 
But it is precisely the latter, occuring with the expansion of the 
consumer and client roles, that is an inevitable consequence of the 
establishment of a successful welfare state. [334] The law here acts as a 
medium, [ 335 J leading to a monetarization and bureaucratization of the 
core spheres of the lifeworld: [336] 
To the extent that the welfare state proceeds via the 
pacification of the class conflicts immediately produced in 
the sphere of production, and casts a network of 
client-relations over private life-spheres, there appear ever 
more strongly the pathological effects of a legalization that 
is at the same time a bureaucratization and monetarization of 
~ore structures of the lifeworld. The paradoxical structure of 
this type of legalization consists therein: that the 
guaranteeing by the welfare state of the goal of social 
integration must equally serve the disintegration of 
precisely those life-relations which, abstracted by legal 
intervention from action-coordinating understanding 
mechanisms, are transferred to media like money and power •••• a 
crisis of social integration. [337] 
. \ 
[331 ]Ibid., p. 478. This orientation problem correspdnds to a legitimation problem in the public sphere, as ethics is ... ejected from politics, 
which becomes merely the use of legitimate po~er in struggle (ibid). 
[ 332] Ibid., p. 488. 
[333 ]Ibid. 
[ 334 ]Ibid., p. 523. 
[335Jibid., p. 539. 
[ 336 ]Ibid., p. 534. 
· [ 337Jibid., stress removed. 
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The attempt to stabilize the system leads paradoxically to the undermining 
of its very basis in the lifeworld. 
3.6. 7 Protest potential 
Habermas denies both that the · advance of this state of affairs is 
inexorable, [ 338 J and that we can conceptualize adequately the current 
rebellion against it as a "revolt of nature", as Horkheimer and Adorno had 
done. Rather, he sees at work in modern societies a set of 
countertendencies in which the rationalized lifeworld is resisting this 
colonization by system imperatives. [ 339 J This is not, in his view, the 
equivalent of Marxian class conflict. Rather, 'the protest potential now 
arises along other conflict lines, namely where we might expect it if we 
accept the thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld'. (340] Whereas 
overt class conflict occured over the issue of the distribution of wealth, 
new conflicts have arisen, not in areas of material production, and not 
subject to alleviation by compensations that conform to the system. They 
are bound 'not to distribution problems, but to questions of the grammar of 
forms of life'. (341 J They arise, that is, in areas of cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization, as a reaction against 
their reification, and are concerned with 'the quality of life, equality, 
individual self-realization, participation, and human rights'. (342] They 
cannot be headed off by the input of money or power - that is by welfare 
state compensations. (343] 
This 'protest potential' [344] Habermas sees embodied in the modern 
[338 ]On which question, compare TKH2, p. 462: 'Whether the bureaucratization-tendencies described by Weber could ever reach the 
stage described by Orwell, where all integraj'ion-mechanisms ••• are transferred to systemic mechanisms ••• witho t a transformation in 
anthropologically deep-seated structures •• that is an open question'. Such an '"administered world" was f6r Adorno the vision of the ultimate horror; yet for Luhmann it is reduced to a trivial 
I presupposition 1• 
[339Jibid., pp. 575f. 
[340 ]Ibid., p. 576. 
(341 ]Ibid. Pages 576-583 are translated as Habermas 1981e. 
[342]TKH2, pp. 576f. 
[343 ]Ibid., p. 576. 
[344 ]Ibid. 
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western societies in a motley collection of groups that manifest 
'sub-institutional, extra-parliamentary forms of protest', (345] and whose 
common bond is 'the critique of growth'. [346] Examples that Habermas lists 
include environmental groups, the peace movement, alternative movements ( squatters, communes), minority pre~sure groups ( e.g. homosexuals), various 
psychology/counselling based support groups, religious fundamentalism, the 
women's movement, and independence movements. [ 347] Habermas' position with 
repect to these groups (except the women's movement) [348] is ambiguous. 
On the one hand he recognizes that they are phenomena expressing 
resistance to a real pathology of modernity. Yet on the other, he is often 
far from happy with the exact form that the protest takes. Two examples 
relevant to my interests will suffice in closing. 
Firstly, with respect to problems addressed by the "Greens", he 
comments: 
The major industrial intervention in ecological balances, the utilization of non-renewable natural resources, and demographic development, indeed present the industrially developed societies with huge problems - yet these problems are largely abstract and require technical and economic solutions which must, in turn, be globally planned and implemented by administative means. [349) 
The real answer to ecological problems is thus more and better technical 
and bureaucratic control, not less: a reality frequently ignored by 
"Green" protesters. 
Secondly, he notes that the worker, consumer, client, and citizen roles 
come under attack in, for example, attacks on competitiveness in schools, 
on the monetarization of relations, or on the instrumentalization of 
professional labour. [350) 
[ 345]Ibid. 
[ 346 ]Ibid., p. 577. 
[ 347 ]Ibid., p. 578. 
Habermas holds \ 
I 
-; 
I 
that proposed 
[348]This is significant. Habermas sees that which in 5.2.1 I shall call 
"liberal" feminism as 'deeply rooted in the acknowledged universalist foundations of morality and legality' (ibid., p. 578). It aims, that is, to continue the Enlightenment project, rather than react against it. [ 3491TKH2, pp. 579f. 
[350]Ibid., pp. 581 f. 
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counter-institutions, such as a non-profit-orientated economy, or an 
expressive "politics of the first person", are the result of conceptual 
confusion. [351] They result from a failure to realize that even a 
non-pathological modernity must involve both the rationalization of the 11 
lifeworld and the increased complexity of systems. [352] 
[351 ]Ibid., p. 582. 
[ 352] Ibid., p. 583. 
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4. THEMES FROM HABERMAS' ACCOUNT CRITICALLY EXAMINED 
4.1 Introduction 
In section 1.3 above, I identified two key issues that underlie much of 
the discussion of this thesis: the problematic status of "control" in 
human life, and the degree of importance to be attached to work in the 
human enterprise as a whole. As we have now seen, Habermas adopts 
distinctive positions on both of these issues. In this chapter I shall 
attempt to evaluate some of the positions that he takes up. 
The question of "control" is discussed chiefly in 4.2 and 4.3 below, 
while the issue of the centrality of work underlies the discussion of 4.2, 
4.5 and 4.6. In 4.4 and 4. 7, pursuing one aspect of the problem of definition 
outlined in 1.2 above, I consider the relationship between art and work, 
and the notion of "creativity" as applied to human labour. 
4.2 Instrumental and communicative action: two types of action? 
Habermas' distinction between two different sorts of action - labour 
and interaction, or, in his later formulations, instrumental and 
communicative action [1] - is a crucial distinction that informs his work 
at many levels. These levels are usefully distinguished by McCarthy: 
At a 'quasi-transcendental' level, the theo~y of cognitive 
interests distinguishes the technical intere tin prediction 
and control of objectified processes from the practical 
interest in maintaining distortion-free comrrlunication. At a 
[1] For analysis and criticism of this distinction, J.Thompson 1981, pp. 
130-133; Giddens 1982a, pp. 100-116 (= Thompson and Held 1982, pp. 149-
161); Ruddenklau 1982, pp. 150-154 and passim; Gripp 1984, pp. 23-26; 
McCarthy 1984, pp. 16-40. For the distinction in Habermas' work, CES, 
pp. 40f, 117-120; ITP, p. 8; RC, pp. 263-269; TCA1, pp. 284-286; TP, pp. 
142-169; TRS, pp. 91-94. The distinction is presented as between 
instrumental and communicative action at PKHI, p. 363. 
130 
methodological level, a distinction is drawn between 
empirical-analytic inquiry and hermeneutic or critical 
inquiry. At the sociological level, subsystems of 
purposive-rational action are distinguished from the 
institutional framework in which they are embedded. And at the 
level of social evolution, the growth in productive forces and 
technological capacity is distinguished from the extension of 
interaction free from domination. [2] 
This distinction has come under heavy fire from Habermas' critics. I shall 
consider, as typical examples, the objections offered by Anthony Giddens 
and John Thompson. 
The distinction is introduced in two different contexts in Habermas' 
work of the late 1960's. Firstly, it appears in his reflections upon Marx's 
distinction between the forces and relations of production, considered in 
the light of Hegel's Jena lectures. [3] Secondly, it is also found in the 
context of Max Weber's distinction between purposive-rational and 
value-rational action. [4] Therein, according to Giddens, [5] lies the 
root of the ambiguous nature of the distinction. For it is not clear 
whether the distinction is supposed to be "analytical" (as in Weber) or 
"substantive" (as in Marx): [6] whether it is merely a matter of resolving 
aspects of a complex of human "praxis" that always (in Habermas' terms) 
has both instrumental and communicative aspects, or whether it reflects 
two sorts of action that can, at least in theory, be thought of as existing 
in their pure form. There is more than a suspicion in the minds of his 
interpreters that Habermas retreats to the more easily defensible 
"analytical" position when pressed, yet uses the distinction 
"substantively" in his social theory: that 'what is presented as a dwarf by 
daylight is working like a giant after dark'. [7] 
[2] 
[3] 
) 
McCarthy 1984, p. 23, my stress. 
'Labor and Interaction: Remarks upon Hegel's JEina Philosophy of Mind', TP, pp. 142-169. 
[4] TRS, pp. 90-94, 126 note 12. On Habermas' intellectual history, ASI, pp. 
150-153. 
[5] Giddens 1982a, p. 109. 
[6] This is Giddens' terminology (ibid., pp. 108f). For a critique of this 
use of the term "analytical", note 27 below. 
I7] Thompson 1981, p. 130; compare Giddens 1982a, p. 108. 
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In Giddens1 view, this sleight of hand is achieved by a play on the word 
"labour". Habermas, he says, misleadingly uses "labour" both 'as equivalent 
to an analytical element of action1 and also 'in the sense of "social 
labour"', and thus assimilates "forces of production" , "labour", and 
"purposive-rational action". Similarly, by using "interaction" as both an 
analytical element of, and a substantive type of, action, he assimilates 
"relations of production", "interaction", and "communicative action". [8] 
Thereby an essentially analytical distinction is imported into social 
theory, where it informs Habermas 1 reconstruction of historical 
materialism. 
This objection is not quite fair , I feel , although Habermas has 
certainly opened himself to it by a degree of terminological obscurity. 
Part of the problem lies in in the difference between the 1967/8 and the 
1981/2 usages of the terms "labour" and "interaction". [9] Whereas in the 
1968 work Arbei t is an alternative term for purposive-rational action 
(instrumental action plus rational choice), [10] in 1982 this usage of 
Arbeit is studiously avoided, the term being reserved for "social labour" 
in Marx's sense. [11] Moreover "interaction", which in 1968 was used as an 
alternative term for communicative action or symbolic interaction, [12] 
and opposed to strategic action, in 1982 loses this technical sense. It 
comes to mean instead any social dealings with other persons, [13] be they 
"communicative" or "strategic", [14] as opposed to instrumental action, 
which is now restricted to 'goal-orientated intervention in the physical 
[8] Giddens 1982a, pp. 108f. 
[9] Th i s terminological obscurity is compounded by the fact that Arbeit is tr anslated as "labour" in the Viertel translati on of the 1967 
essay 1Arbeit und Interaktion: Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenser 
"Philosophie des Geistes"' (Habermas 1968a,pp. 9-47; TP , pp. 142-169), 
and as "work" in the Shapiro translation 9f thl 1968 essay 'Technik 
und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie"' (Habermas 1968 , pp. 48-1 03; TRS, pp. 81-122), despite the fact that both essays cj· pea red in the same Ge rman volume. The translation of the crucial passage in TRS, p. 91 is 
unreliable; compare Habe rmas 1968a, p. 62. 1 
[10] TRS,pp.91f. 
[ 11] RC, pp. 267f; see 2.1 above. 
[12] TRS,p.92. 
[13] Compare M. Weber 1978, p. 4: 'Action is "social" insofar as its 
subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is 
. thereby oriented in its course.1 
[ 14] RC, p. 266. 
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world'. [15] At no time, however, does Habermas simply equate "forces of 
production" and "purposive-rational action" as Giddens claims. What he 
does claim is that the rationalization of systems of purposive-rational 
action leads to 'growth of productive forces; extension of power of 
technical control'. [16] The pair of concepts "productive forces" versus 
"productive relations", he says in a clarificatory note, lie at a different 
level of analysis from the concept-pair "purposive-rational action" 
versus "communicative action". Whereas the former refer to the level of 
society as a whole, the latter are action concepts referring to simple 
interactions. [ 17 J Nevertheless, the two levels of analysis are linked: 
there exists between productive forces and the type of 
purposive-rational action an analytically [18] explicable 
connection, inasmuch as the knowledge implemented in forces of 
production, embodied in technologies, organizations and 
competencies, is meant to improve the productivity of labour, 
in . general to improve the purposive-rational application of 
means in gaining control over nature and over co-operating 
human beings. [19] 
John Thompson, in Critical Hermeneutics, [20] sets out to demonstrate 
that the "substantive" distinction between communicative and instrumental 
action, the only one in his view adequate to underpin the role of the 
distinction in Habermas' social theory, is untenable. [21] Firstly, 
starting from an apparently paradigmatic instance of "pure" instrumental 
action - a chemical engineer following a technical rule to produce a 
product - he points out that the use of the rule by the chemist still 
exhibits normative, "dialogic", and conventional elements, elements that 
Habermas specifically excludes from the category of instrumental action. 
The following -of the the rule by the chemist involves communication, and 
is therefore in some sense dialogic; moreover he is constrained in his 
choice (of it rather than of some other rule to 
[ 15] Ibid., pp. 263f, my stress. 
[ 16 J TRS, p. 93; compare KHI, pp. 35-37. 
(17] RC, p. 267. 
[ 18 J Not Giddens' use of this term; see note 27 below. 
(19] RC,p.267. 
(20] J. Thompson 1981. 
(21] Ibid., pp. 130f. 
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the same effect), 
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by convention as well as by the force of reality. [22] Secondly, Thompson 
detects stra tegic elements in virtually all examples of social 
action, [23] and points out that 'everyday action is thoroughly infused 
with the pursuit of indi victual ends'. [24 J Thus on two counts he rejects 
Habermas' thesis that labour and interaction represent two distinct sorts 
of action. [25] 
It seems that Thompson has set up a false dichotomy, however. He assumes 
that Habermas' distinction could amount 'merely' to 'two tables of 
characteristics', unless it were possible to instantiate a 'pure instance' 
of one type of action without any admixture of the other. [26] Yet such an 
assumption is unjustifiable: Habermas neither claims nor needs to claim 
this in order to make his distinction sociologically significant. [27] A 
reading of Habermas that has him successfully steer ing a course between 
Thompson's Scylla and Charybdis is quite adequate to the contention that 
the two component elements in human praxis are rationalizable in different 
sorts of action system: in systems of social labour and in institutional 
frameworks respectively. And it is this contention - that social labour 
and institutional change are rationalizable according to different logics 
- that is crucial for Habermas' social theory. 
Thompson's second point, however , that all supposed instances of 
communicative action contain purposive-rational elements, does highlight 
[22] 
[23] 
[24] 
[25] 
Ibid., 
I bid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
pp. 131f. 
pp. 132f. 
p. 132. 
p. 1-33. 
[26] Ibid., p. 130, my stress . Haber mas does in fact cite one example of 
"pure " instrumental action: the working of machinery (TRS, p. 87; 
Habermas 197 1b, pp. 337-339). , * 
[27] Part of the confusion seems to have arise out of different 
understandings of the term "analytic". For Tho pson this term seems 
to imply the opposite of "substantive", used iq the Oxford Dictionary 
sense of 'expressing existence; having a sep-'arate and independent 
existence'. For Habermas however, in the context to which Thompson 
refers, the term is used as in its application in chemistry to refer 
to the splitting up of compounds: 'Nor do I deny that normally 
instrumental action is embedded in communicative action (productive 
activity is socially organized, in general). But I see no reason why 
we should not adequately analyze a complex, i.e. dissect it into its 
parts' (PKHI, p. 382, note 27, quoted in part in J. Thompson 1981, p. 130 ). 
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a further lack of clarity in Habermas' account of action concepts, 
concerning the level on which each of them is to be understood. 
It has often been far from clear, as Habermas himself admits, [28) 
whether his concept of communicative action applies to the process of 
reaching agreement/understanding itself, or to the actions that are 
subsequently governed by this agreement, or to both. His recent 
formulations explicitly reject the first in favour of the second or third 
of these options. They explain communicative action as a form of 
co-ordination of (purposive) actions, and deny the exclusive equation of 
communicative action with speech acts. [29) For example: 
Again: 
I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of 
agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric 
calculations of success but through acts of reaching 
understanding [whenever] action participants are not 
primarily oriented to their own indi victual successes; they 
pursue their individual goals under the condition that they 
can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common 
situation definitions. [30) 
in communicative action the interpretative accomplishments of 
actors and the corresponding communicative acts have the 
status of a mechanism for co-ordinating action which is 
shunted into the creation of consensus. The goal-directed 
actions that the actors perform in carrying out their 
linguistically co-ordinated plans exhibit , as do all actions, 
the structure of purposive activity. [31) 
This to some extent circumvents Thompson's objection - that all 
everyday action is infused with the pursuit of individual ends - by 
accepting it. It is not that pursuit, but the method of co-ordination of 
these pursuits between individual actors, that · is t~e crux. [32) However , 
this elucidation does indicate an asymmetry in t J e level of analysis 
[28) RC, pp. 264, 314 note 67; CES, p. 40. 
[29) RC, pp. 264f. 
~ 
} 
[30) TCA1, pp. 285f, second and third stresses mine. Compare Habermas 1984a, p. 602. 
[31) RC, p. 265 . 
[32 J Compare TCA 1, p. 285. 
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between instrumental and communicative action that Habermas fails to make 
sufficiently explicit, [33] an asymmetry that to some extent justifies the 
complaint that we are not here dealing with two types of action in a 
straightforward and equivalent sense. [ 34] There are two matters that 
require elucidation here. 
Firstly, in his 1981 /2 work, Habermas devotes most attention to the 
distinction between communicative action and strategic action, which he 
regards as two distinguishable types of interaction. [35] Each is 
characterized, he insists, by a different attitude of actors to other 
actors ('orientated to consensus' or 'strategic-objectivating'), [36] and 
by a different co-ordination mechanism (interpretative accomplishment of 
actors or "objective" mechanisms such as the market). [37] However, in the 
light of the above, it is clear that each sort of interaction is a complex 
entity. Communicative action, for example, involves both "communicative 
acts" and goal-directed action-units of individual actors. Instrumental 
action, on the other hand, is not such a complex entity, consisting only of 
instrumental action-units of intervention in the physical world. 
Instrumental action and communicative action are further combined in 
social labour. [38] We thus have a three-tier typology of action-concepts, 
with "instrumental action" and "communicative action" occupying different 
levels: 
[33] 
[34] 
[35] 
LEVEL 1 (level of basic action-units) : instrumental acts or action 
(goal-directed interventions in the material world) versus 
communicative acts (acts of reaching understanding with another actor 
about something in the material, social, or subjective "worlds"). [39] 
Thompson's diagrammatic representation of the relation between them is misleading in this repect (J. Thompson 
Giddens 1982a, p. 108. 
RC, p. 266. 
1981, 1· 140), 
I 
[36] Ibid. 
[37] Ibid., p. 265. 
[38] Ibid., p. 268; compare Habermas 1984a, p. 571. 
[ 39 J Habermas is not unaware that any human communicative act also involves a goal-directed intervention in the physical world, for 
example the vibrating of the air during talking. His point is merely that the communicative act itself is not reducible to the description 
· of any such intervention, and follows its own (communicative, dialogic) logic. 
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LEVEL 2 ( action at the level of individuals and their conscious 
orientations): strategic action versus communicative action. 
LEVEL 3 (action at the level of social groups or societies): social 
labour (material reproduction of the lifeworld) versus symbolic 
reproduction of the lifeworld or institutional framework. [40) 
The relationships between the action concepts across these levels remain, 
however, rather obscure. 
Secondly, Habermas also offers a further analysis of communicative 
action that is not immediately reconcilable with this schema. In 
accordance with his contention that linguistic expressions refer 
simultaneously to the objective, social, and subjective worlds, he 
maintains that communicative action may be resolved into components of 
action related to these three worlds: components that may be termed 
teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical respectively. [41 J This 
analysis is on a different level, he insists, from the distinction between 
strategic and communicative action. While the latter terms denote 'two 
genuine types of interaction', the former are 
the results of an idealising abstraction. The pure cases of 
constati ve speech actions, normatively regulated action and 
self-presentation each emerge from one of the three analytic 
viewpoints from which any communicative action must be 
simultaneously open to analysis. [42) 
The details of Habermas' distinctions in action concepts thus remain 
far from clear, and his terminology frequently misleading. However, I would 
like to defend _ the irreducibility of the distinction encoded (however 
inadequately) in Habermas' terminology of instrumental and communicative 
action, against the 
Giddens. Thompson's 
more monistic accounts 
definition of 'action 
_offerfd 
i tsef f, 
I 
7 
by Thompson and 
whereby agents 
[40) I shall consider the shortcomings of this particular dichotomy in 
sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
[41) TCA1, pp. 84-101; compare RC, pp. 265f. 
[ 42 J RC,p. 266. Even in this case, however, Habermas' use of the term 
"analytic" is not the one that Thompson suggests; see note 27 above. 
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participate and intervene in the social world', [43) and Giddens' 
definition of 'action or agency as the stream of actual or contemplated 
causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of 
events-in-the-world', [44] elide a crucial distinction. [45] Giddens' 
failure to distinguish clearly the logic of the use of "authoritative 
resources" from the logic of the use of "ailocati ve resources", his 
apparent assumption that the grammar of the words "power" and "domination" 
are the same in the two cases, [46] seems to suggest, as Habermas says, 
that 
speaking and acting subjects 'produce' their social 
life-context in a way similar to that in which they make 
products of instrumental action. [47) 
For all of its dangers of slipping into an unacceptable dualism, Habermas' 
account does have the virtue of underlining the distinction between these 
two processes. This in turn guards against a tendency that Giddens shares 
to some extent with Heidegger, Marcuse and the early Marx: a tendency to 
deny the neutrality of the exploitation of nature with respect to human 
interests. [48] This leads on to the subject matter of the next section. 
4.3 Habermas and the natural world 
Habermas' acceptance of instrumental rationality as embodying an 
appropriate human relationship to the natural world, and, relatedly, his 
view of the nature and legitimate scope of the natural sciences, [49) have 
been subjected to much criticism. Objections include the following: 
1 
[ 43] Thompson 1981, p. 144. 
· \ 
[44] Giddens 1976, p. 75, stress removed; compare Gidde1s 1979, p. 55 
[45] Thompson usefully challenges the analogy between language/text and 
action offered by Winch, Ricoeur and others, buit fails to elucidate 
either the differences between non-verbal action and speech, or the basis upon which distinctions in non-verbal action might be made ( Thompson 1981, pp. 140-144 ). 
[46] See, for example, Giddens 1984, pp. 257f. 
[ 47] RC, p. 268. 
[48] Giddens 1981, pp. 59f. 
[491 See 2.2 above. 
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(1) that the transcendental schema employed in Knowledge and Human 
Interests to locate the objectification of nature is untenable, 
(2) that to deny all value to nature independent of human valuation is 
psychologically inadequate as a basis from which to reform human 
practices so as to avert ecological catastrophe, 
(3) that a communicative ethic is defective in denying any intrinsic 
value to non-human nature, and 
(4) that ecology, or even biology in general, is a science that cannot 
be contained within the parameters of "Galilean" science, [50] and 
indicates the possibility of the "new science" of which Marcuse 
speaks. 
I shall consider each in turn, the first two only very briefly. 
Habermas' equivocation about the status of the proposed 
knowledge-constitutive interests [51] was noted in 2.2.1 above. Although 
most critical effort has been directed towards questioning the viability 
of the interest in emancipation, [52] the ambiguity surrounding the 
proposed interest in technical control of the environment has not gone 
unnoticed. As McCarthy comments: 
Habermas appears to be caught in a dilemma: either nature has 
the transcendental status of a constituted objectivity and 
cannot, therefore, be the ground of the constituting subject; 
or nature is the ground of subjectivity and cannot, therefore, 
be simply a constituted objectivity. [53] 
The attempt to elide, by way of evolutionary theory, the distinction 
between the Kantian thing-in-itself on the one hand, and the objective 
world constituted by transcendental consciousness on the other, seems 
doomed to failure. This criticism appears to be .well \ founded; but in any 
case in his recent work Habermas seems to have ab~ndoned the idea of 
I 
7 
[50] For this term, Whitebook 1979, p. 54 . 
[ 51] A category still retained in the 'Postscript' ( PKHI, p. 370), but later 
abandoned. 
[52] For example, Dallmayr 1974, pp. 22-40 , 349-368, 386-417. 
[53] McCarthy 1984, p. 111. For McCarthy's whole argument, ibid., pp. 110-
125. For Habermas' response, RC, pp. 242-245. 
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naturalistically grounded knowledge-constitutive interests ( and indeed 
the idea of epistemology in the classical sense altogether), replacing 
them with a schema of different "formal-pragmatic attitudes" linked with 
his theory of language. [54] 
Secondly, various writers have found Habermas' attitude to nature 
psychologically inadequate to the task of averting impending ecological 
catastrophe. Joel Whitebook, for example, doubts that 'the conflict between 
society and nature is going to be resolved without a major transformation 
in our social consciousness of the natural world - e.g., a renewed 
reverence for life' that transcends Habermas' 'anthropocentric framework'. 
However 'plausible and internally coherent' Habermas' position might be on 
a philosophical level, it remains inadequate 'at the level of social 
psychology'. [55] However, Whi tebook's proposed alternative seems to be 
beset by a major contradiction. He would have us desert our consciously 
anthropocentric viewpoint, precisely in order to pursue unconsciously the 
ultimate anthropocentric imperative - the survival of the human race 
itself! 
In the 1982 'A Reply to my Critics', [56] Habermas begins his answer to 
the third objection by adopting an uncompromising position that limits 
ethical considerations exclusively to relations between persons: 
Just as the transcendental-pragmatic theory of knowledge 
considers that the logic of the objectivating sciences binds 
the knowing subject to an attitude, from the perspective of 
which nature as an absolute purpose drops out, so too ethical 
universalism (likewise situated in the Kantian tradition) 
supposes that the norm-conformative attitude of morally 
acting subjects restricts their view to interpersonal 
relations here, too, nature-in- itself cannot become a 
theme. [57] 
From t his standpoint, the question of an ethical\ relationship with 
non-persons (animals, plants, rocks etc.) simply does not arise. Yet, 
[ 54] See 4.4 below. 
[55] Whitebook 1979, pp. 63f; compare RC, pp. 247f. 
[56] RC. 
[57] Ibid., p. 245. 
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Habermas continues, in response to attacks by Whitebook [58] and 
Ottmann, [59] does this not yield a blatant anthropocentrism that 
contradicts our intuition that an ethic of compassion is also 
required? [60] Should we not extend the category of "neighbour", beyond 
the (even only potential) participants in our communication community, to 
include all creatures that are affected by our actions and with whose 
suffering we can empathise? [6 1] 
In reply, Habermas does give a little ground, extending the category of 
"person" to include young children ( 'those who can be released into 
autonomy and responsibility') [62] and, more interestingly, the dead, with 
respect to whose sufferings an anamnetic compassion that transcends pure 
ethics is appropriate. [63] I will pursue his comments here in section 
6.5.3 below, in connection with the need for a constructive use of the 
category of self-sacrifice. Yet on the issue of the intrinsic value of 
animals (and hence also of plants and minerals) he remains adamant. As 
they cannot be imagined as even counterfactually belonging to our 
communication community, [64] they could only be accomodated under a 
paternalistic, naturalistic ethic. But such an ethic abandons the 
grounding of the idea of equality that is available in the concept of 
communicative action, [65] and is justifiable only by a r et r eat to 'the 
substantial reason of religious or metaphysical world-views', [66] 
world-views that represent a learning stage definitively transcended at 
the Enlightenment. Moreover, common sense indicates that once we admit 
empathy as appropriate with respect to some animals, the r e is no logical 
place to stop in extending our empathy to more and more alien r eaches of 
nature. Obviously at the plant level empathy clashes seriously with 'the 
[58] Whitebook 1979, pp. 52-64. 
[59] Ottmann 1982, pp. 87-92. 
[ 60] RC, p. 245. 
[61] Ibid., p. 248. 
[62] Ibid. 
[63] Ibid., pp. 246f~ 
[ 64 J Ibid., p. 247. 
[65] See 3.3 above. 
[66] RC, p. 248. 
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firmer imperatives of the self-preservation of the human race', [67] which 
demonstrates that the empathetic imperative cannot be carried to its 
logical conclusion. Thus (he seems to imply) it is better not to start at 
all; better to remain with an uncompromising anthropocentrism that sets no 
limits to an instrumentalism of nature in the service of human needs. 
Habermas' argument here is only partly convincing. The final reductio 
ad absurdum, in particular, does not work: is not ethics always 
conflictual, always a matter of compromise between opposed imperatives? 
While the judgement that (say) a mental defective ought to count as 
counterfactually part of our communication community, whereas a dolphin 
(say) should not, seems to be far more a matter of convention than Habermas 
imagines. [68] Moreover, if with Habermas we admit an anamnetic 
imagination as at least ethically relevant (even if in some sense 
transcending the realm of ethics as such), it is hard to see why other 
sorts of imagination - such as the 'imagined possibility of conversation' 
that Rorty would extend to animals [69] - should be ruled out. 
To be fair to Habermas, he does not completely rule out the possibility 
of a 'norm-conformative attitude to this domain of external nature'. [70] 
What he does deny is that such an attitude can 
yield any problems susceptible of being worked up cognitively 
••• stylised to questions of justice from the standpoint of 
normative validity •••• be carried out at the same level that 
Kant attained in his moralisation of social relations and 
Newton obtained in his objectivating knowledge of 
nature. [71] 
Such an approach to ethics he holds to be formally equivalent to the 
proposed "interpretative sciences", that aim at a non-objectifying 
approach to nature. This takes us to the last 
beginning of this section. 
-------------------- · 
[ 67] Ibid. 
[68] Compare Rorty 1980, pp. 190f. 
[ 69] Ibid., p. 190. 
[ 70] RC, p. 248, stress removed. 
[71 l Ibid., pp. 248f. See further 4.4 below. 
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The idea that ecology pr ovides an example of a "non-Galilean" science 
that falsifies Habermas' account of the natural sciences, the fourth 
objection, seems to be incorrect. John Keane presents an extreme case of 
this viewpoint, in his essay 'On Tools and Language: Habermas on Work and 
Interaction'. [72) 
Rejecting 'instrumental science' as 'ideological in that it 
simultaneously conceals and reveals the technical, monologic character of 
late capitalist society's understanding of external nature as a thing, a 
bitch to be cajoled, raped and whipped', Keane looks for a new paradigm of 
natural science , which 'in its very conceptual structure, seeks a 
non-repressive mastery of external nature'. [73 J Such a science would 
recognize that 
as human, social subjects we are also natural beings 
circumscribed by our participation in the natural world. As a 
social category, nature is, indeed, our inorganic body. To 
ravage external nature is therefore to repress and to jeopardize internal human nature. Commoner's four laws of 
ecology - 'Everything is connected with everything else,' 
'Nature knows best,' 'Everything must go somewhere' and 'There 
is no such thing as a free lunch' - fruitfully express the 
dialectic of nature and the realms of work and 
interaction. [74) 
This, continues Keane, 
implies that Habermas' uncritical evaluation of the analytic 
character of modern science must be countered via the 
development of at least one holistically-conceived science (ecology) which can grasp the dialectical operation of this 
humanized ecosystem. [75) 
However: 
This does not imply an abandonment of t he s~ientific and 
technological enterprise,.!!£!:.. a return to primi} ivism, merely 
[sic!] a radical alteration in the internal conceptual 
structure of natural science. It also implies a heightened 
I 
[72) Keane 1975, especially pp. 96-99; compare Whitebook 1979, pp. 55- 64 . 
[73) Keane 1975, p. 98, stress removed. On feminist rejections of the domination of nature, 5.2.1 below. 
[74) Keane 1975, p.99. 
[75 l Ibid. 
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awareness of the destructive impact of some forms of human 
technique and, conversely, the need for cooperation between 
humans and nature. Thereby the liberation of nature would 
begin to coincide with the liberation of human beings. [76] 
Taken at face value, there is . little to commend Keane's position. 
Firstly, although ecoltigy does indeed deal with complex and interrelated 
entities (ecosystems), it in no sense violates the canons of traditional 
natural science. Interconnectedness as such is not inaccessible to 
standard scientific, quantitative, analysis; neither does ecology demand 
the positing of a natural subject ('Nature knows best'). As Habermas 
comments: 
The awareness of ecological cycles, of biotypes, of 
human-environment systems has certainly brought forward new 
themes, new questions, perhaps even new disciplines. As far as 
I can tell, however, from the methodological point of view 
these ecologically inspired investigations move entirely 
within the inherited framework. (77] 
From which it follows that the answer to ecological problems is not 
communion with nature, or even some 'non-repressive mastery' of it ( an 
interesting conjunction of metaphors!), but better technical control of 
pollution, and of the use of scarce r esources. [78] Secondly, it is not 
clear why 'a radical alteration in the internal conceptual structure of 
natural science', namely to orientate it to 'cooperation between humans and 
nature', does not amount to 'an abandonment of the scientific and 
technological enterprise'. [79] What is the essence of science and 
technology that is to be retained through the transition? Presumably the 
study of nature. But it is the kind of study of nature that distinguishes 
science from (say) art, and it is the kind of study of nature that Keane 
proposes to change. To define natural science i~stea' as Habermas does, as 
permanently tied to the project of the predictior and control of an 
objectified nature, [80] seems eminently sensible. ' 
7 
[76] Ibid. 
(77] ASI, p. 177. 
[78] Compare TKH2, pp. 579f, considered in 3.6.7 above. 
(79] Keane 1975, p.99. 
[ 80] See 2.2. 1 :A above. 
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While denying the substance of Keane's object i ons, however, we can 
perhaps use his comments to introduce a development of Habermas' position 
that remains within his overall conceptual framework. A re-reading of the 
quotations from Keane above will show him using, for human-nature 
r elationships, terms whose primary reference is the social sphere: 
"ravage", "repress", "cooperation", "liberation". (81 J Such use of language 
is perfectly legitimate, provided we realize that the use is metaphorical: 
a 'speak[ing] of one thing in terms appropriate to another'. (82] Keane's 
error is to mistake metaphorical for literal description, to imagine that 
nature is our "body" in the same sense as our own bodies are. So long as we 
avoid this error , however, and realize that the same 'logic of domination' 
does not apply in the two cases, (83] such metaphorical use of language 
can be suggestive and creative, resulting in 'a new vision, the birth of a 
new understanding'. (84) For there is a sense in which, say, biological 
control of pests is a "cooperation" with nature, in a way that the use of 
escalating quantities of pesticides is not. It represents a "going with" 
rather than a "cutting against" the grain of the dynamics of ecosystems. 
The metaphorical use, with respect to nature, of terms such as 
"cooperation", may be heuristically usefu~ [85) moreover to speak of the 
"rape" of nature may be a graphic, and therefore motivationally powerful, 
way of questioning inappropriate approaches to the control of the 
biosphere. [86) "Inappropriate", that is, r ather than "wrong" in the sense 
that rape is wrong in the social sphere. 
I shall consider this matter further in 5.2 below. Meanwhile in the next 
section, which discusses Habermas' aesthetics, I shall point out a further 
complication in Habermas' schema: he finds room, in his recent 
fo rmulations, for the validity of an aesthetic attitude to external 
nature, to complement the objectifying attitude characteri stic of the 
[ 81] Compare 1.3.1 above. 
(82) Martin 1981, p. 55. 
[83) TCA1, p. 379. 
(84 J Martin 1981, p. 59. 
~ 
) 
) 
(85) Compare Whitebook's comments on the heuristic value of attributing purposiveness to nature, in the context of a discussion of Kant's 
third critique (Whitebook 1979, pp. 56f) . 
[86) Compare Lash 1982, p. 9. This may go some way to meeting Whitebook's 
charge of psychological inadequacy (see above). 
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natural sciences. 
4.4 Habermas and aesthetics: art and labour 
Habermas' view of the nature of modernity, as set out for example in the 
1980/81 essay 'Modernity versus Postmodernity' [87] in the context of a 
discussion of aesthetics, seems at first sight to imply a simple view, both 
of the nature of art, and of the distinction between art and labour. Max 
Weber, he writes, had 
characterized cultural modernity as the separation of the 
substantive reason expressed in religion and metaphysics into 
three autonomous spheres •••• science, morality and art. [ 88] 
As a result of this separation, problems had been 
rearranged so as to fall under specific aspects of validity: 
truth, normative rightness, authenticity and beauty. They 
could then be handled as questions of knowledge, or of justice 
and morality, or of taste. Scientific discourse, theories of 
morality, jurisprudence, the production and criticism of art, 
could in turn be institutionalized. Each domain of culture 
could be made to correspond to cultural professions, in which 
problems could be dealt with as the concern of special 
experts. [ 89] 
This professionalization served in turn to bring out 
the intrinsic structures of each of the three dimensions of 
culture. There appear the structures of 
cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and of 
aesthetic-expressive rationality, each of these under the 
control of specialists who seem more adept at being logical in 
these particular ways than other people are. [90] 
Correspondingly, the project of modernity initiate, 
I 
by the eighteenth 
[87] MPM. The text cited was delivered as a lecture in New York in March 1981. The German text (Habermas 1981c, pp. 444-464), was delivered as 
a lecture in September 1980, when Habermas was awarded the Theodor W. Adorno prize by the city of Frankfurt (MPM, p. 3). 
[ 88] MPM, p. 8 
[89] Ibid. 
[ 90] Ibid. 
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centu r y philosophers of the Enlightenment, [91] which Habermas insists 
should not be given up as a lost cause, [92] still consists partly in 
'effor ts to develop objective science, uni versal morality and law, and 
autonomous art, [each] according to their [own] inner logic'. [93] 
Such a commitment to the irreducibility of the Enlightenment 
distinction between science , ethics, and art, and the rationality and forms 
of action appropriate to each, seems to imply that work and art are clearly 
separable acti vites with separable goals: control of the environment 
directed to self-maintenance on the one hand, and self-expression of 
subjectivity on the other. Yet that Habermas' view is not quite this simple 
is indicated by two considerations. 
Firstly, Habermas also wants to retain what he sees as a second element 
in the Enlightenment project. Professionalization, he argues, has opened up 
a gap between the resultant three cultures of experts on the one hand 
(scientists, moralists/lawyers, and art critics), and the public at large 
on the other, impoverishing further a lifeworld already attenuated by the 
collapse of much of its traditional content. [94] Thus, to complete the 
Enlightenment pr oject, it is necessar y 
to release the cognitive potentials of each of these 
domains (95] to set them free from their esot eric forms -·· to 
utilize this accumulation of specialized culture for the 
enrichment of everyday life, that is to say, for the rational 
organization of everyday social life. [96] 
In this he takes up a mediating pos i t i on in the famous Adorno- Benjamin 
debate about the significance of modern ar t , insisting with Adorno that 
mode r n ar t must .i n some sense r emain "autonomous ", yet in the sp i rit of 
Benjamin looking for its reappr opriati on into the everyday cultu r e f r om 
[91] Ibid., p. 9 
[92] I bid., p. 11 
[93] Ibid., p. 9 
[94] Ibid., pp. 8f. 
[95] I.e. science, 
[96] MPM, p. 9. 
ethics/law, and art. 
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the transcendent isolation to which Adorno had assigned it. [97] Habermas 
insists that, irreducible as the projects of science, ethics, and art are, 
the cognitive gains of all three are to be made available for the everyday 
actions of actors in the lifeworld, which in appropriating them will 
become "rationalized" in all three dimensions simultaneously. Precisely 
what this means in practice is problematic, [ 98] and I shall return to 
this issue later. 
Secondly, there is considerable ambiguity exhibited in Habermas' 
writings, about the nature of art and aesthetic experience, and their 
possible relationship with the "third world" of subjectivity. Although in 
much of his systematic work Habermas has adopted a three-fold schema which 
owes much to Kant's three critiques, [99] the status of the third category 
in the schema, which corresponds to Kant' s Critique of Judgement, [ 100] has 
neither remained constant nor always been entirely clear. In the 1968 
Knowledge and Human Interests, for example, the place of art/aesthetics in 
the Kantian schema is taken by the critical social sciences and the 
interest in emancipation. One can perhaps detect here a transformation of 
the stress of Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin, [101] in different ways, upon 
art as a critical-emancipatory force in society. Yet it is the critique of 
ideology, rather than utopian artistic expression, that is to the fore in 
Habermas' account at this stage. [102] In his later work, however, 
aesthetics is drawn back into his systematic treatment which, in its 
three-fold science/ethics/aesthetics format, appears to be more 
[97] See Benjamin 1970, pp. 219-253; Adorno 1984. On this debate, Buck-Morss 
1977, pp. 122-184. For a brief account of Frankfurt School aesthetics, 
Held 1980, pp. 77-109. 
[98] On which Jay 1985, pp. 136f. 
[99] Habermas explicitly refers to this schema ,in th~ context of art in QC, p. 199. Compare RC, p. 235. / 
[100]Kant 1952. Corresponding to science is Kant's Cri~ique of Pure Reason (Kant 1933), and to ethics his Critique of Pr~ctical Reason (Kant 
1956). I 
[101]For Habermas on Adorno, Marcuse and Benjamin in this context, PPP, pp. 
99-109, 165-170, and 129-163 respectively. The last deals with all 
three thinkers. 
[102]Shierry Weber locates a tension in the work of the Frankfurt school 
as a whole between emphasis on aesthetic experience, and emphasis on 
rational self-reflection (S. Weber 1977; noted by Jay 1985, p. 125). 
Something of the same tension seems to appear in Habermas' oeuvre. 
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classically Kantian. 
In this later work, both the relationship of art to a proposed 
expressive "formal-pragmatic attitude" of the actor, and the nature of the 
object realm that is supposed to be "expressed" thereby, become rather 
unclear. Sometimes Habermas seems to be adopting a purely expressi vist 
aesthetic, in which art is concerned with the expression of the 
subjectivity of the artist. Thus he comments essentially approvingly about 
the mid-nineteenth century "aestheticist" conception of art as follows: 
The autonomy of the aesthetic sphere could then become a 
deliberate pr oject: the talented artist could lend authentic 
expression to those experiences he had in encounteri ng his 
own de-centr ed subjectivity, detached from the constraints of 
r outinized cognition and everyday action. [103] 
And this impression is reinforced both by his use of the terms 
"aesthetic-expressive rationality" [104] and "authenticity" [105] in this 
connection, and by his adoption in Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns of 
Goffman's "dramaturgical action" as representative of the third moment in 
forms of human action, alongside teleological and norm-regulated 
action. [106] Thus, in the context of a discussion about the use of reasons 
in aesthetic criticism, Habermas can write: 
In this context reasons have the peculiar function of 
bringing us to see a work or performance in such a way that it 
can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary 
experience, in general as the embodiment of a claim to 
authenticity. (107] 
However, at least t wo complications show that Habermas does not accept a 
simply expressi vist aesthetic, that he does not want 'to retract all 
criteria and to equate aesthetic 
subjective experiences'. (1 08] 
judgements with the expr ession of 
[103]MPM, p. 9; compare Habermas' 
aesthetics in QC, pp. 199-203. 
[ 104 ]For example, MPM, p. 8. 
[105]For example TCA 1, p. 20. 
[106]TCA1, pp. 85f, 90-94. 
[ 107 ]Ibid., p. 20, stress removed. 
[ 108]MPM, p. 1 O. 
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most recent clarifications upon 
Firstly, he insists upon a distinctive form of aesthetic-expressive 
rationality, that is not, as in the Knowledge and Human Interests treatment 
of Freud, simply concerned with establishing the truth of statements about 
subjective experiences. [109] Habermas maintains, in his latest comments 
about art, that 
there is an unmistakeable indicator for the fact that a 
certain type of 'knowing' is objectified in art works, albeit 
in a different way than in theoretical discourse or in legal 
or moral representations: these objecti vations of mind are 
also fallible and hence criticizable. [110] 
'Judgements of taste' are distinguishable from 'merely subjective 
preference'. They are connected to cri tici zable validity claims 
presupposing 'non-arbitrary standards for the judgement of art'. [ 111 J 
Works of art 'raise claims with regard to their unity' as well as with 
regard to 'their authenticity, and the success of their expressions'. [ 112] 
In this we may detect a shift towards a more objecti vist account of 
aesthetics. [113] 
Secondly, as mentioned in 4.3 above, Habermas relates art not only to 
the subjective world, but also to the objective world of external 
nature. [ 114 J This is summarily expressed in the following table. ( 115 J 
Note that the category "eroticism" occupies the slot where one might 
expect to find expressivist art: [116] 
[109]Thus in TCA1 Habermas retains both "therapeutic critique" (related 
to the KHI concept of emancipation) and "aes~hetic criticism" as 
separate categories of argumentation, at the tern orary expense of his 
3-fold schema (TCA1, pp. 23,410 note 18). 
[110]QC, p. 200. I 
(111]Ibid. 7 
[112Jibid., my stress. Compare TCA1, pp. 16f, 20, 23. 
[113]Compare Habermas' move away from the near-pragmatism of Knowledge and 
Human Interests towards a discourse theory of truth for scientific 
truth (2.2.1:B above). Similar tensions seem to result in both cases. 
[114]Also, perhaps, to the social world; compare TCA1, pp. 20,237. 
[ 115 ]Compare TCA 1, p. 238; RC, p. 249 . 
[116]Compare Habermas 1984c. 
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Table 6: Formal-pragmatic attitudes 
Worlds 
1 2 3 1 
Basic Objective Social Subjective Objective 
Attitudes 
3 Art 
Expressive 
Cognitive-instrumental 
1 rationality 
I 
Objectivating Science I Social 
Technology I Technologies 
J 
I 
2 Moral-practical 
Norm- rationality 
I 
conformative Law I Morality 
I 
, 
Aesthetic-practical 
3 rationality 
Expressive Eroticism I Art 
I 
In this context Habermas can comment that 
the discussion from Kant to Adorno concerning natural and 
artistic beauty could provide grounds for the thesis that the 
expressive attitude to external nature opens up a domain of 
experience that can be exploited for artistic 
production. (117] 
Elucidation - of Habermas' position on this point is available in the 
1972 essay 'Walter Benjamin: Consciousness- Raising or Rescuing 
Critique'. [ 11 8 J Here Haber mas seems to adopt . into\ his aesthetics that 
part of Benjamin's distinctive theory of langua~e which understands 
I language both as expressive of the subjective interiority of the speaker 
i and as an intimation of surrounding nature: 
[117]RC, p. 249. 
[118]PPP, pp. 129-163. For comment thereon, Jay 1985, pp. 128-131, Brewster 
and Buchner 1979. 
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Whatever is expressed in linguistic physiognomy or in 
expressive gestures generally is not a mere subjective state 
but, by way of this, the as-yet-uninterrupted connection of 
the human organism with surrounding nature; expressive 
movements are systematically linked with the qualities of the 
environment that evoke them. [119] 
As Jay succinctly comments: 
What makes this type of combined expression and mimesis so 
attractive to Benjamin is its priority to the break between 
subject and object ••• that Schillerian motif of 
reconciliation •••• Now, in general, Habermas was sceptical of 
precisely such claims to reconcile man and nature through a 
new, nondominating science •••• Yet, in this essay, he 
demonstrates a certain cautious approbation of the goal 
insofar as it is represented by art. [120] 
This is because Habermas sees art as interpreting the world in terms of 
areas of human needs that are unreplaceable, unsayable in other ways, and 
progressively squeezed out in the one-sided rationalization of the 
lifeworld of modernity - needs that are part of the "given" that puts the 
substance into any recognizably human form of rationalized practice, and 
whose fulfilment is necessary for happiness. [121] It is the job of art to 
interpret the world in the light of our needs, by way of 'an increased 
sensi ti vi ty to what remains unassimilated in the interpretative 
achievements of pragmatic, epistemic, and moral mastery of the demands and 
challenges of everyday situations'. [122] It effects this by adopting 
an openness to the expurgated elements of the unconscious, the 
fantastic, and the mad, the material and the bodily - thus to 
everything in our speechless contact with reality which is so 
fleeting, so contingent, so immediate, so individualized, 
simultaneously so far and so near that it escapes our normal 
categorical grasp. [123] 
[119]PPP, p. 147; compare Jay 1985, p. 130. 
[ 120]Jay 1985, p. 130, my stress. 
[ 121 ]Compare PPP, p. 156. 
[ 122]QC, p. 201. 
[ 123]Ibid. 
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This leads Habermas to a sur prising result in his latest work, which 
amounts to a partial backtracking on his earlier position. After the 
argument (above) about the importance of the release of aesthetic insights 
into the lifeworld, he writes as follows: 
[Art] then no longer affects ·only our evaluative language or 
only renews the interpretation of needs that color our 
perceptions; r ather, it reaches into our cognitive 
interpretations and no r mative expectations and transforms the 
totality in which these moments are related to each other •••• 
the mimetic powers sublimated in the work of art find 
resonance in the mimetic relations of a balanced and 
undistorted intersubjectivity of everyday life. [124] 
The 'validity claims' and 'truth potential ' associated with art and the 
aesthetic 
may not be connected to (or even identified with) just one of 
the three validity claims constitutive for communicative 
action, as I have been previously inclined to maintain. [125] 
The one-to-one relation which exists between the prescriptive 
validity of a norm and the normative validity claims raised in 
regulative speech acts is not a proper model for the relation 
between the potential for truth of works of art, and the 
transformed relations between self and world stimulated by 
aesthetic experience. [126] 
The aesthetic becomes a more fundamental category than Habermas was 
previously inclined to admit. 
These complications, i nt r oduced into Habermas' basic schema of 
validity-spheres and types of action, cast doubt upon the adequacy of the 
complete separation of art and labour that is implied by his systematic 
pronouncements. If the aesthet ic is not to be restrict ed to a sing le 
validity-sphere, but 'reaches into our cognitive i nt erpretations ' and 
' transfor ms the totality' of the human lifeworld, )127] 
I 
.. 
I 
then presumably 
[ 124 ]Ibid., p. 202. We may not e here a parallel with the aesthetics of the theologian Hans Ur s von Balthasar (van Balthasar 1982, pp. 17-1 27) . 
[ 125 ]This begins · to draw the sting of Burger's criticism, that Habermas 
neglects the structural differences between the spheres of science, 
morality, and art (Burger 1981, p. 20). 
[126]QC, p. 203 • 
. [ 127 ]Ibid., pp. 202f. 
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aesthetic categories have some place in any description of human labour 
that is adequate to all of its aspects as human labour. I shall discuss 
this further in 4.7 below. Nevertheless, Habermas' appropriation of the 
Enlightenment distinction between science, ethics, and art points to an 
important conclusion: however much social labour may involve artistic or 
expressive elements, in the sense implied by the early Marx, the 
rationalization of labour processes and art follow different internal 
logics, and are not necessarily parallel in their progression. In other 
words: the non-alienated labour of the early Marx, labour that is both 
fully expressive of the human essence, and also most efficient at 
providing the material necessities of existence, is to be rejected as a 
utopian dream on a par with the dream of a reconciliation with a 
resurrected nature. 
4.5 System and lifeworld: Habermas and functionalism 
Habermas, as we have seen in chapter 3 above, would readily concur with 
Anthony Giddens' statement concerning the need to overcome 'a dualism that 
is deeply entrenched in social theory, a division between objectivism and 
subjectivism', [128] a dualism represented on the one side of the divide by 
functionalism and on the other by the interpretative sociologies. 
Habermas' attempt to overcome this dualism is represented by his model of 
society as both system and lifeworld. [129] The ~ttempt has involved him 
in a qualified acceptance of many of the perspectives of functionalism, 
even while denying to sociological functionalism the degree of hegemony it 
enjoys in the work of Luhmann and Parsons. [130] This degree of acceptance 
of functionalist categories in Habermas' work in general, and in his 
"system and lifeworld" model in particular, has come under heavy fi r e from 
... 
-------------------- I 
[128]Giddens 1984, p. xx. 
[ 129]See 3.5 abov.e. 
) 
[130]For Habe rmas on Luhmann, Habermas 1979d; 1982a, pp. 369-502; 1985a, pp. 
426-445. On Parsons, Habermas 1982a, pp. 189-191; TKH2, pp. 297-443. 
Also on function alism see Habermas 1982a, pp. 183-203. For an account 
of Habermas' reception of functionalism up to 1978, McCarthy 1984, pp. 
213-232. 
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Giddens, [131] who regards the influence of functionalism in sociology as 
almost entirely pernicious. Three of Giddens' areas of criticism of 
Habermas' functionalism seem to be especially relevant: 
(1) that it takes insufficient note of the Marxian themes of class 
di vision, conflict, and power, 
(2) that it involves too close a modelling of social systems on 
biological systems, and 
(3) that it retains too many features of evolutionism. 
I shall consider each in turn, before briefly assessing their 
significance. 
The first concerns the limited place that Habermas' Parsonian reading 
of Weber allows to a key Marx~an theme: the importance of class division, 
conflict, and power within societies. [ 132] Habermas' reading of Weber 
concentrates instead upon the rationalization of values and social 
differentiation, which are portrayed as generalized processes of 
development. [133] 
The second concerns Habermas' overclose modelling of social systems 
upon biological systems, be those social systems societies as a whole, or 
subsystems within them such as the state and the economy. Volume 2 of 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns presents systems as discrete entities, 
with distinct "boundaries" across which information and materials are 
exchanged with an "environment", achieving self-maintenance by 
homeostasis, with an evolutionary tendency towards greater complexity and 
specialization, and with "needs " reflected in terminology such as "system 
imperatives". [134] For at least three reasons, Giddens finds this 
) 
[131]For specific attacks on Habermas in this res~ct, Giddens 1982a, pp. 
' 112-114; 1984, pp. xxxvif; 1985a, pp. 119f. For Giddens' criticisms of functionalism in general, Giddens 1977, pp. 96-129. Giddens' own 
attempt to overcome the dualism between types of social theory, in his "theory of structuration", is definitively described in Giddens 1984, pp. 1-40 and passim. 
[132]Giddens 1984, pp. xiv, xxxvi; compare 1985a, p. 119. 
[133]Giddens 1984, p. xxxvi. 
(134]See 3.5.3 above. 
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modelling of social systems upon biological systems misleading. 
Firstly, it erroneously implies that the entity "a society" can be as 
specifically and uncontroversially defined as is the case for a biological 
organism: [ 135] that a boundary can be located that demarcates clearly 
"inside" from "outside", "system" from "environment". Such an illusion is 
fostered to some extent by the comparatively recent phenomenon of the 
nation-state, with its clearly defined geographical boundaries. But such a 
picture is clearly untenable for earlier eras of history, where economy, 
polity, and cultural/religious systems were rarely coterminous in their 
extent, and often very vaguely defined. [ 136] Even in the modern world, 
such a model downplays the significance of inter-societal relationships 
that blur the clarity of definition of a "society". NATO in the political 
sphere, the EEC in the economic sphere, and Islamic fundamentalism in the 
cultural/religious sphere are obvious examples. This assumption of 
boundedness further encourages the idea that social evolution is mainly an 
"endogenous" affair, to do with the outworking of "learning processes" 
parallel to the learning processes undergone by the ind i victual human 
child. It downplays both the evolutionary importance of inter-societal 
relationships, and the degree of discontinuity in human history. Giddens' 
latest major work stresses the importance of the latter with respect to 
the emergence of the nation state. [ 137] The caesura imposed on the 
history of traditional third world societies by the global expansion of 
western civilization is a clear example of the former. 
Secondly, the causal explanatory power possessed by the concept of the 
"needs" of a system (for self-preservation etc.) is spurious. Reflection 
shows that there exists no mechanism whereby such "need s " may have causal 
influence - unless, of course, the needs are perceived by the actors 
themselves. But 
redundant. [138] 
in that case the concept of syrem 
This will be considered further bel w. 
I 
[135]Giddens 1984, pp. 163-168. 
needs is simply 
[136]Ancient China affords a good example (Giddens 1984, pp. 165-168). 
[137]Giddens 1985b. 
[ 138 ]Giddens 1977, pp. 109-112. 
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Thirdly, Giddens challenges the status and significance of the 
"unintended consequences" of which Haberrnas makes use in his account of 
system integration. [ 139] In conceptualizing society as a self-steered 
system, Haberrnas concentrates upon the unintended consequences of actions, 
which are enmeshed "behind the backs" of the actors involved. Giddens 
agrees that the concept of unintended consequences does indeed have a 
crucial role in social analysis, [140] but he argues that Haberrnas' use of 
it in a functionalist context is unfortunate. For this use ignores the 
operation of the "double hermeneutic" in the social sciences: the 
phenomenon ( for which there is, obviously, no parallel in the natural 
sciences) that the theoretical findings of sociologists can make their way 
into the consciousness of the lay actors themselves, and, by transforming 
unforeseen consequences into foreseen ones, lead to changes in the very 
phenomena that the sociologist studies. [141] This relexive process, that 
Habermas elsewhere explicitly recognizes, [142] makes very questionable 
the drawing of too close a parallel between social systems (including the 
subsystem of the capitalist economy) and the biological systems on which 
functionalists tend to model them. It ignores the fact that the components 
of the economic system are human actors. 
Returning now to my list at the beginning of this section, the third 
major area of criticism concerns Habermas' retention of certain of the 
evolutionary features of Marx's historical materialism, both in his 1975 
essay, [143] and in Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Specifically, the 
problem is Habermas' retention of a unitary dynamic (the increase in the 
forces of production) to account for the precipitation of all of the 
crucially important evolutionary crises that have occurred in human 
societies from the beginning up to the present day. Against this Giddens 
brings both empirical and philosophical considerations. 
[139]See 3.5.1 and 3.5.3 above. 
.,, 
I 
) 
[140]For Giddens' own use of the concept, Giddens 1984, pp. 8-14, 285-297. 
For the classical sociological analysis of this concept, in a broadly 
functionalist context, Merton 1963; 1968. 
[ 141 J Compare Giddens 197 6, p. 162. 
[142]TCA1, pp. 109f. 
[143]See 2.3.2 above. 
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Firstly, Giddens argues that any such schema forces history into a 
mould which is ill-fitting: (144] 
In explaining social change no single and sovereign mechanism 
can be specified; there are no keys that will unlock the 
mysteries of human social development, reducing them to a 
unitary formula, or that will account for the major 
transitions between societal types in such a way either. [145] 
Social change is less ordered, less susceptible to overall explanation, 
than Habermas imagines. [146] 
Secondly, the idea of a unitary dynamic is suspect philosophically, for 
a similar reason to the one raised against Habermas' use of unintended 
consequences: it ignores the fact that actors within societies are able to 
model themselves upon social changes known to them that have occurred 
elsewhere, and thus change the course of history: 
Human beings make their history in cognizance of that history, 
that is, as reflexive beings cognitively appropriating time 
rather than merely 'living' it •••• the reflexive nature of 
human social life subverts the explication of social change 
in terms of any simple and sovereign set of causal mechanisms. 
Getting to know what goes on 'in' history becomes not only an 
inherent part of what 'history' is but also a means of 
transforming 'history'. [ 147 J 
In this case too, a "unitary dynamic" theory seems to ignore the fact that 
social systems are made up of relexi ve human actors. 
Moving now to an assessment of Giddens' contribution, I think we must 
admit the essential validity of his criticisms of Habermas' evolutionism. 
This implies a point that is crucial in the context of this thesis: the 
need to distance ourselves from Marx's priority of labour in social 
evolution even further than Habermas has alr~ady ~one by his split of 
logic from dynamics. The implications of this will beJ further discussed in 
I the next section, and in chapters 5 and 6. However, the primary 
[ 144 ]Giddens 1984, p. 233. 
[ 145 ]Ibid., p. 24 3. 
"i 
I 
[146]Contrast, on theories of state formation, CES, pp. 158-160; Giddens 
. 1984, pp. 246-256. 
[147]Giddens 1984, p. 237. 
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philosophical challenge to Habermas concerns the status and usefulness of 
functionalist explanation - Giddens' second area of criticism - because 
this strikes at the heart of Habermas' whole model of modernity. 
Giddens' first and third points in this context concern the delineation 
of "systems" and. th~ effect of reflexivity. Although very important, these 
could be accomodated within an adapted form of Habermas' schema, by 
assuming that functionalist analysis is valid in the limit case of a 
clearly defined social system whose components (actors) were behaving 
non-reflexively. The fundamental challenge, however, is the second: that 
functionalist explanation tout court is spurious. If this is true, then 
even in a limit case it could contribute nothing to social analysis that 
was not also available in the action framework by the use of the 
categories of "unintended consequences" and "unacknowledged conditions of 
action". [148] 
There is considerable ambiguity in Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns 
itself over the status of the functionalist analysis which Habermas 
offers. [149] This can be illustrated with respect to his account of the 
economic system. Sometimes Habermas talks of the lifeworld of a social 
group being in exchange with its environment via its material substrate, 
this exchange being accessible to a conceptual perspective that reifies 
the lifeworld itself as a boundary-maintaining system. [ 150] Usually, 
however, he talks of the economic process as being the responsibility of a 
discrete subsystem of pu rposive-rational action ( the economic system), 
which is differentiated out of the lifeworld. It seems that Habermas 
equivocates about whether the system/lifeworld distinction is, in Giddens' 
terms, "methodological" or "substantive". [151] 
To assume the latter presents huge 
functionalist analysis, given that Habermas 
pr~blemst One problem with 
regards }t as a correlate of 
I 
] 
[148]For Giddens' alternative model, Giddens 1984, p. 5 figure 1. Giddens provides a table of "translations", for decoding functionalist theory into terms used in his own non-functionalist "theory of 
structuration", at Giddens 1977, p. 122. See also pp. 121-129. [149]Giddens 1985a, p. 119. 
[ 150]TKH2, pp. 347-349; see 3.6.5 above. 
[151]Giddens 1985a, p. 119. 
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the third person objectifying viewpoint characteristic of the natural 
sciences , i s its lack of theoretical status even in these disciplines. 
There have been recent attempts, for example by proponents of the famous 
"Anthropic Principle", to reinstate a teleological element in the natural 
sciences with real explanatory power. But these attempts have not been 
widely accepted. [152] Moreover teleological explanations in biology - on 
which, of course, functionalism originally based its model of a system -
are generally recognized to be at best illuminating explanatory fictions, 
accessible to reduction to non-teleological causal mechanisms. [153] Of 
course there~ phenomena inaccessible to such reductionist explanations, 
but these ar e pr ecisely those inter actions mediated by symbols: 
inter actions that Habe r mas subsumes under the category of lifeworld 
r ather than system. 
I conclude, therefore, both that there is some genuine ambiguity in 
Habermas' model at this point, and also that his model is only viable if 
seen in "methodological" rather than in "substantive" terms. Habermas' 
claim that systemic rationality is of a quite different conceptual order 
from instrumental rationality does not seem to be well founded. 
This in turn casts doubt upon the idea that social labour is an 
activity that can be adequately separated off from the lifeworld to be 
subsumed completely under system parameters. If, with Giddens, we refuse to 
abstrac.t from the reflexive nature of the human actors that are the 
components of the economic system, we will have to admit that human labour 
cannot be conceptualized adequately within a methodological f r amework 
that , of necessity, abst r acts from this feature of its object realm. 
) 
7 
[152]First articulated by Brandon Carter (Carter 1974) . See also Davies 
1980, pp. 142-161; McMullin 198 1. See Davies 1983, p. 244 for a list of 
secondary literature. 
· [ 153]See, for example, Dawkins 1976. 
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4.6 Modernity and its pathologies 
Habermas' model of modernity, as set out in Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns, is briefly summarized below as seven propositions: 
( 1) The progressive rationali.zation of the lifeworld leads to the 
growth of autonomous subsystems, specifically the capitalist economic 
system and the bureaucratic state. 
(2) In (unconscious) pursuit of greater and greater efficiency in the 
material reproduction of the lifeworld, the growth of the economic 
system tends to reproduce the class system as an unintended 
side-effect. 
(3) Incipient class conflict is headed off by state intervention (the 
welfare state) which compensates monetarily for the worst excesses of 
this side-effect; but only at the cost of a "mediatization" 
(bureaucratization and monetarization) of the lifeworld. 
(4) This affects the lifeworld of all members of society, but is felt 
most keenly by those lower down the class structure. 
(5) As (a) increase in productive efficiency is desirable, (b) 
reproduction of the class system is inevitable, and (c) pacification 
of class conflict is only possible at the expense of welfare state 
mediatization, it follows that modernity is inevitably a compromise 
between system (i.e. economic) and lifeworld imperatives. 
(6) The situation becomes critical when economic system crises force 
greater and greater mediatization in order to keep class conflict 
pacified; mediatization then passes over into a "colonization" that 
strikes at the core regions of the lifeworld. 
(7) The lifeworld reacts against this by throw~ng 
protest movements. These cannot be neutralized by 
~ 
up various sorts of 
monetary payments, 
because they concern not patterns of distribution of wealth, but the 
grammar of forms of life. 
This model takes up distinctive positions concerning (a) the importance of 
systems theory, (b) the importance of social labour in the dynamics of the 
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modern western societies, and (c) the class/conflict patterns typical of 
these societies. The last two points are inextricably linked, and I shall 
consider them together. 
Firstly, as regards the systems element in Habermas' work, doubt has 
been expressed in general in section 4.5 above. In this context I will make 
one further criticism of his position. Several features of modernity 
militate against the idea that the economy of any society (that is, any 
nation state) can be conceptualized adequately as a single system 
concerned exclusively with the material reproduction of the lifeworld. 
Such an idea is falsified by such empirical considerations as the 
importance of the "shadow" economy in modern states, [154] and the growth 
of transnational corporations with an accompanying degree of 
"disarticulation". [155] Moreover, in societies where approximately three 
quarters of wage earners are engaged in providing services, rather than in 
the manufacture of material goods, [156] it is no longer possible to 
accept the equation of "the economy" with "the material repoduction of the 
lifeworld" - an equation that Habermas is inclined to make, having in mind, 
no doubt, the paradigm of industrial manufacturing. This is all the more so 
because some of these services operate according to quite different 
rationality-criteria to those of manufacturing, a point stressed by Offe: 
In industrial capitalist societies"" scarcity and efficiency 
problems, which determine the rationality of the production of 
industrial commodities, are supplemented with problems of 
order and normalization which cannot be dealt with adequately 
by means of the technical and economic mastery of scarcity, 
but rather require a separate r ationality of service labour 
•••• [This involves] qualities like interactive competence, 
consciousness of responsibility, empathy, and acquired 
practical experience •••• This means, conversely, that while the 
sphere of (public and private) service labour is by no means 
\ [154]See Littler 1985, section 4: 'Working Outside ' the Official Economy' 
(pp. 245-276), especially Gershuny and Pahl 1985 therein, who 
distinguish between the formal, hiaden/underground, and 
household/communal economies. 
[155]The situation where a national economy consists of sectors that are juxtaposed rather than being highly integrated, some sectors being 
highly integrated in entities with centres of gravity in other nation 
states; an effect most pronounced in the third world, but noticeable 
to a degree also in the western democracies (Giddens 1982b, p. 158 ). 
· [ 156]0ffe 1985, p. 327, note 9. 
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'liberated' from the regime of formal, economic wage-based 
rationality, it becomes a separate but functionally necessary 
'foreign body' which is externally limited (but not internally 
structured) by that economic rationality •••• one can no longer 
talk of a basically unified type of rationality organizing 
and governing the whole of the work sphere. [157] 
Secondly, as regards the importance of social labour in the dynamics 
and conflict patterns of the modern western societies, [ 158] Habermas 
paradoxically seems to claim both too much and too little. On the one hand, 
the claim that the dynamics of social labour are responsible, however 
hiddenly, for the entire conflict pattern of these societies, seems 
implausible. Such a claim ignores the (at least partly) autonomous lines 
of conflict due to race and gender, [159] and the role of the nation state 
and its use of military power in international contexts. [160] Moreover it 
seems to share, with 'the classical trad:i,tions of bourgeois as well as 
Marxist sociology', the unfounded pres1,2pposition that 'labour is the 
fundamental social fact'. [161] As Gidden~ remarks: 
The fact that human beings must survive in the material 
environments in which they live tells us nothing about 
whether what they do in order to survive plays a dominant role 
in social transformation. [162] 
A tacit assumption to the contrary still seems to affect Habermas' latest 
work. [163] On the other hand, Habermas seems to have underestimated the 
high degree of conflict in the modern western societies that is still 
directly and overtly related to the functioning of the economic system in 
general, and patterns of the distribution of wealth in particular. This 
perhaps reflects the genesis of Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns in the 
West Ge rmany of the late 1970 1s. Certainly now, in the wake of r enewed 
[157Jibid., pp. 137-139. l [158]As opposed to its r ole in social evolution ai a whole, for which 4.5 
above. 
[159]Giddens 1982b, pp. 171-175. 
[160]Ibid., pp. 175-178. 
", 
I 
[161]0ffe 1985, p. 129. His essay 'Work: The Key Sociological Category?' (pp. 
129-150) is an attack on this assumption. 
[162]Giddens 1984, p. 243. 
[163]0ffe in fact reads Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns as a welcome 
break with this very assumption (Offe 1985, p. 148). 
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industrial unrest, inner city violence, and soaring unemployment in 
western Europe as a whole, the idea that the welfare state has effectively 
pacified all overt conflict over questions of distribution, and that 
present conflicts are inaccessible to monetary pacification, seems fairly 
implausible. That Habermas' protest movements are indeed interesting and 
important, that they are different from the old type of conflict over 
distribution, and that they are to be explained in terms of a threat to 
'grammars of forms of life' by monetarization and bureaucratization, seems 
plausible at least to some extent and in some cases. (164] Yet we must 
question both the thesis of the ultimate linkage of these new movements 
with the imperatives of the economic system, and the thesis that they have 
effectively eclipsed conflicts over distribution. 
4.7 Habermas, Marx, and human labour 
In a recent essay entitled 'Habermas and Marxism', [ 165] Agnes Heller 
has suggestively contrasted the views of Habermas and Marx on human 
labour. Heller locates the real centre of Marx's historical materialism in 
the lives of the proletariat. The dynamic of historical development 
according to Marx was, of course, to be found in the development of the 
forces of production; yet it was in the proletariat that 'the substance 
(work) becomes subject'. (166] This location of philosophy and history in 
real lives, she suggests, enabled Marx to grasp the tragedy of human 
progress: progress is contradictory and conditional because 'the producers 
carry progress on their shoulders, they suffer from the progress which 
they themselves create'. [ 167] Moreover, this concentration upon real 
lives led Marx to consider 'the sensuous, the needing, the feeling human 
being' [ 168] who suffers under capitalism, and to stress 'the 
1 
I 
) 
[164]But not all. The Peace Movement, for example, is presumably also a 
reaction to the international anarchy of nation-state violence 
(compare Giddens 1982b, p. 176). 
[165]Heller 1982. 
[ 166 ]Ibi d., p. 37. 
[ 167 ]Ibid. 
[ 168]Ibi d., p. 22. 
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anthropological meaning of work'. [169) Work is 'not concerned solely with 
the appropriation of outer nature', but is also implicated in 'the 
socialisation of our inner nature as well 1. [ 170] Indeed 'the same feelings 
- fear, anger, pleasure, disgust - are channelled, repressed and withheld 
in work as in interaction', and 'the need to "make sense" of our lives 
always includes the need for creativity one of the greatest joys 
attained by effort'. [ 171 J Thus the category of alienated labour is 
indispensable. 'Undistorted goal-rationality has been no less and no more 
present in human history than undistorted communication', and while it is 
true that 'every instance of human speech is a claim to rational 
communication', (so Habermas), it is also true that 
every instance of human work is a claim to goal-rational 
creativity. Accomplished human freedom means socialisation of 
our inner nature without repression, both in communication and 
creation. [ 172] 
After all, were not "creation" and "love" precisely the characteristics 
once attributed to God, a sure sign that they are our main needs? [173] 
Habermas however, continues Heller, in neglecting the early Marx, has 
also ignored the real flesh-and-blood human being: 
Habermasian man has ••• no body, no feelings; the 'structure of 
personality' is identified with cognition, language and 
interaction •••• one gets the impression that the good life 
consists solely of rational communication and that needs can 
be argued for without being felt. [174] 
Dropping the proletariat, and the concept of alienated labour with them, 
Habermas also loses, she argues, the sense of the tragedy of progress. 
Progress now amounts to an essentially disembodied "learning process" 
without the Marxian contradictions; progress is 
[ 169 ]Ibid., p. 34. 
[ 170 ]Ibid., p. 35. 
[ 171 ]Ibid. 
[ 172Jibid. 
~ 
I 
conditional, it is 
[173]Ibid., p. 36 . An astute theological point, albeit couched in terms of a 
Feuerbachian reductionism. 
[ 17 4 ]Ibid., p. 22. 
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absolute. [ 175] Moreover, 'by rejecting the paradigm of production he 
almost completely neglects the anthropological meaning of work'. [ 176] 
Defining goal-rational work exclusively as a matter of following 
technical rules, he reduces its significance to instrumental 
rationality. [ 177] Thus he misses t .he significance of the change in work 
patterns associated with the arrival of industrial capitalism. Here 
extreme division of labour means that 'production follows technical rules 
without any longer being goal-rational from the standpoint of the 
individual', [178] an individual who now does not understand the purpose 
of the whole process in which he or she is engaged as a part. Thus 'what is 
rational socially is no longer necessarily rational individually', [179] 
which contradicts the need for creativity mentioned above. This 
distinction between social and individual rationality, Heller concludes, 
allows us to evaluate the work process not only from the viewpoint of 
production (as Habermas does), but also from the viewpoint of the 
producers, and 'allows us to raise a question concerning the possible 
rehumanization of work in a future society'. [ 180] 
Heller's criticisms of Habermas are only partly convincing. Habermas' 
recent work in aesthetics dispels the idea that his human being is totally 
without feelings or needs, [ 181] and his concepts of anamnetic 
imagination [182] and the paradoxes of rationalization [183] both 
indicate that he is alive, at least in some degree, to the tragedy of 
progress. The interest in Heller's account lies elsewhere: 
(1) in her insistence that social labour is performed by people, and 
thus it matters not only what they make but also how they understand 
what they are making, thus resisting a reduction of the worker to the 
equivalent of a mindless machine-component, by adopting (in Habermas' 
[ 175 ]Ibid., pp. 37, 40. 
[176]Ibid., p. 34. 
[ 177 ]Ibid. 
[ 178Jlbid.,p. 35. 
[ 179 ]Ibid. 
[ 180 ]Ibid. 
[181]See 4.4 above; compare RC, p. 228. 
[ 182]See 4.3 above. 
[183]See 3.1, 3.2 above. 
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terms) a lifeworld perspective on labour, alongside a systems 
perspective, and 
(2) in stressing the need for a concept of human creativity in social 
labour. 
This concept of "creativity", however, is an extremely difficult one to 
frame adequately, and Habermas is able to launch an at least partially 
successful counter-attack against the use of the term in the early Marx, 
on which he assumes that Heller is dependent . 
Habermas traces Heller's stress on the anthropological significance of 
labour back through the early Marx to Schiller and Herder and 'the ideal of 
an individuality creatively realizing itself': the model of 'human 
expressivity'. [184] Following Taylor, [185] he then discerns two roots of 
this ideal: 
(1) 'the idealistic activistic reinterpretation of the Aristotelian 
concept of form - individuals can unfold their essence only through 
their own productive activity', [186] and 
(2) 'the mediation of Aristotelian and aesthetic concepts of form 
through the theory of reflection - the works in which subjectivity is 
externalized are the symbolic expression of both a creative process 
and a process of self-formation'. [187] 
The result is 'the prototypical status of aesthetic, genial productivity, 
which makes it possible to unite the autonomy of self-realisation with the 
spontaneity of self-development, and to remove from the objectivation of 
essential powe_rs the moment of coercion, of doing violence to external 
nature or one's own internal nature '. [188] The early Marx had then 
borrowed from Romanticism ( through Hegel) tbe expressi vist 
ideal of self-formation, transferred aesthetfc productivity 
to the practical working life of the species, donceived social 
labour as the collective self-realisation qr the producers, 
[184]RC, p. 224. 
[ 185 ]Taylor 1975, pp. 15f. 
[ 186]RC, p. 224. 
[187Jibid. 
[188Jibid. 
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and, against this backgr ound, represented the activity of the 
modern wage-labourer at once as alienated and as the modern 
emancipatory force. [189] 
Habermas brings several objections to this reading of the early Marx, 
which he sees Heller as defending. {190] The fundamental one is that this 
transfer of the ideal of self-formation from aesthetic production to 
social labour leads to a confused equation of "economic" with "creative" 
and "self-formative" categories. [191] This equation, he argues, has now 
been undermined empirically, both by the progressive departure of 
industrial labour from the model of the craftsman's activity, and by 'the 
trends towards shortening working time and towards a corresponding 
devaluation of the relevance of labour within the lifeworld'. [192] Thus 
'the production-aesthetic revaluation of industrial labour' has become 
'irrelevant'. [193] The whole problem of work-dissatisfaction shrinks to 
the dimensions of a demand for autonomy in the workplace, a demand which is 
related to 'the logic of practical discourse', not 'the logic of a labour 
practice which is supposed to be located somewhere between instrumental 
action and action orientated to reaching understanding'. [194] 
In the light of the discussion of this chapter, we may sum up this 
exchange as follows. Habermas is correct to insist upon the distinction 
between economic and aesthetic/self-formative categories, but not on their 
dualistic separation into work-time and leisure-time respectively. [195] 
The assumption that the human race must "ear n its living" 
aesthetic-productively is dubious , based as it is upon Hegelian 
presuppositions about the dialectical self- development of Geist in the 
[189]Ibid. 
[ 190 ]Ibid., p. 225. 
[191Jibid. 
[ 192]Ibid. 
[ 193 ]Ibid. 
[194]Ibid., p. 312, note 11. 
-; 
I 
\ 
I 
[195Jindeed, his insistence that there can be no 'logic of a labour 
practice ••• located somewhere between instrumental action and action 
orientated to reaching understanding' (Ibid), is undermined by his 
1985 clarifications on the relation of aesthetics to the rest of 
human life (see 4.4 above). 
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Phenomenology, presuppositions that themselves exhibit a doubtful 
I pedigree. However, Heller is correct to call attention to the Marx/Lukacs 
point that the form of social labour at least partly determines the 
structure of the rest of life too (the lifeworld in Habermas' terminology). 
Habermas attempts to consider social labour exclusively under system 
parameters - that is, under the category of efficiency - but this is 
inadequate, because the worker brings the lifeworld into work with him or 
her, and carries it out again formed or deformed by what has gone on in 
between. That a compromise is inevitable between the efficiency 
imperatives of social labour and aesthetic-expressive and moral-practical 
imperatives is true (pace Marx). But that this compromise should be 
achieved by a total compartmentalization of human existence into work 
(system) and leisure Oifeworld), as Habermas' systems theory implies, 
raises a valid distinction to the rank of an unacceptable dualism that 
threatens the very integrity of the human actor. Work and leisure cannot 
be thus separated, because they coinhere in the one agent, who must make 
sense of his or her single life history - a real human being. 
Neither writer, however, seems to have developed a credible concept of 
"creativity" to apply to social labour, one that transcends the defects in 
the expressi vist model that Marx inherited from the Romantics. This 
remains as a project to be tackled in chapter 6 below. 
) 
i 
169 
5. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THEM ES FROM RECENT THEOLOGIES OF WORK IN THE 
LIGHT OF THE THOUGHT OF HABERMAS 
5.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters of this thesis aim at the partial reconstruction 
of a theology of work in the light of the thought of Habermas. Chapter 5 is 
essentially critical. It subjects the findings of various recent 
theologies of work to scrutiny in the light of the categories and 
conclusions of Habermas, and the discussion of them in chapter 4. Chapter 6 
is essentially reconstructive. It attempts to elucidate the relevance of 
five central Christian symbols to a theology of work, in such a way as to 
avoid the pitfalls set out in chapter 5. 
Three preliminary points should be made. 
Firstly, to attempt to produce a "theology of work" at all is 
implicitly to deny that the proper scope of theology is restricted to a 
study of God and that part of human existence labelled "religious". [1] I 
will assume that Aquinas was right, on the contrary, to regard the proper 
scope of theology as including all things in the perspective of 'the truth 
they bear in the light of God'. [2] I will take this to imply that a 
theology of work rightly consists in an interpretation of the bearing of 
the major Christian symbols upon the human activity of work. 
But secondly, such a view of the scope of theology raises the question 
I 
of the appropriate relationship between theology a'\5 a discourse and 
discourses of the philosophical and soci al sciences ,lhat have occupied 
the 
the 
first four chapters of this thesis. What is the rt?ture of the "bearing" 
I 
that the Chri stian symbols have upon the activity of work? Clearly what 
[ 1 J Compare Kaufman 1972, pp. 17f. 
[2] . S.T. 1a.1,4 [Aquinas 1964, p. 17]; compa re Temple 1976, p. 38. 
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David Tracy characterizes as the "orthodox" position, where ~he cognitive 
claims of other modern disciplines and the value claims of the wider 
culture do not enter into the inner-theological circle except to suggest 
analogies for systematic reflection or to aid argumentation for strictly 
apologetic reflection' will not do; [3) but neither will a 'process of 
explanation [that J makes theology disappear into the perspective of a 
different discipline, for example philosophical anthropology, psychology 
or sociology'. [ 4 J Some middle way needs to be pursued that retains the 
integrity of both forms of discourse, but yet allows some interaction 
between them. What Tracy calls the revisionist model of theological 
method, one that owes a great deal to Paul Tillich's notion of 
correlation, [5] appears to allow such a process, and will be pursued in 
what follows. Theological method for Tracy is 
an interpretive enterprise that attempts to establish 
'mutually critical correlations' (in both theory and praxis) 
between interpretations of our contemporary situation and 
interpretations of the Christian tradition. [6] 
The traffic is two-way; theological method is a critical conversation, not 
a monologue. 
Thirdly, two disclaimers must be entered. In what follows I do not 
propose to construct a "critical theory of religion": Christianity as seen 
in a Habermasian framework [7] as opposed to a Platonic, Aristotelian, or 
Marxian framework. My project is much more limited - to the issue of work. 
Moreover, I make no attempt to present a comprehensive account of the 
history of the theology of work, even within the twentieth century. Many 
major figures, such as Emil Brunner, R.H. Tawney, and Reinhold Niebuhr, and 
groups of mate~ial like the official pronouncements of the Anglican and 
[3] 
[4) 
[5] 
[ 6) 
Tracy 1975, p. 25. . \ 
Pannenberg 1976, p. 300; compare Lash 1981, pp. 13 ~-168. 
Tracy (1975, p. 46) insists against Tillich tha t the. answers supplied by the human sciences must be taken seriously as well as the answe r s 
of the Christian message; that it is not enough to let 'the "method of 
correlation" ••• correlate the questions implied in the situation with t he answer s implied i n the message ' (Tillich 1978, p. 8). 
Tracy and Lash 1983, p. 88, quoti ng Schi llebeeckx; compar e Tracy 1975, p. 32. 
[7] For which see, fo r e xample , Peuke r t 1984; Siebert 1985. 
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Roman Catholic churches, are confined largely to the footnotes. The 
material for chapter 5 has been chosen for its potential to illustrate the 
main themes of Habermas' thought about work, rather than with an eye to 
completeness of coverage of the historical discussions. I maintain, 
however, that many of the most interesting writers and topics relevant to 
the theology of work have been brought under consideration within these 
parameters. 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 below pursue, in a theological context, the two 
fundamental issues that I identified in 1.3 above: the ambiguity of 
"control", and the centrality of work. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 offer 
reflections upon selected Marxian and right wing theologies of work. 
5.2 Theological rejections of the domination of nature 
In recent years the ecological and nuclear weapons issues have 
precipitated a new status quaestionis for theology, [8] forcing the topic 
of cosmology into the forefront of consideration, and the doctrine of 
creation out of the semi-retirement into which it had until recently 
slipped. [9] No theology that claims to be contextual can afford to 
neglect the questions that these issues pose 
either by limiting of belief in creation deistically to the 
original contingency of the uni verse; or by limiting it 
existentially to the personal contingency of human existence; 
or by cutting off church dogmatics so completely from the 
sciences that the two neither interfere with one another nor 
have anything to say to one another. (10] 
The question bf the appropriate relationship of human beings to nature 
must be posed theologically, as well as philosophically. 
) 
(8] Tracy and Lash 1983, p. 90; compare Cobb 1982, p. 111. 
[9] Moltmann 1985b, p. xi. 
(10] Moltmann 1979a, p. 115. The last is an allusion to Barth's stated 
position in Barth 1958, pp. ix-x, and is not an adequate 
representation of his overall position, as Moltrnann admits (Moltmann 
1979a, p. 189 note 3). 
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The above analysis, however, has alerted us to the danger of assuming 
that the same 'logic of domination' is involved in 'the control of external 
nature, the command over human beings, and the repression of one's own 
internal nature': of assuming that 'the same structure of exercising force' 
is involved in each case. [11] And while it may be true, as Tracy and Lash 
state, that 'all must now share a critique and suspicion of traditional 
scientific and theological understandings of the human right to 
"dominate" and exploit nature', [12] we will want to pay careful attention 
to the semantic content of terms such as "right", "dominate", and "exploit" 
when used in substantive arguments in this context. 
In section 4.3 above I suggested that the status of such terms, when 
applied to the human relationship to external nature, should be seen as 
metaphorical. Problems arise, I argued, when metaphor is taken for literal 
description, for then it is assumed that the same logic is operative in 
human-human and human-nature contexts. Tracy and Lash, in the essay just 
quoted, [13] perhaps stop just short of this error. [14] Other theological 
writers are not so reticent. I will consider two recent examples: one from 
a group of feminist theologians, and the other from the latest writings of 
Jurgen Moltmann. 
[ 11 J TCA 1, p. 379. Theologians frequently cite Marcuse approvingly in this 
connection (e.g. Miranda 1977a, p. xix), or allude to him (e.g. Boff 1985, pp. -5f, 159f note 2; this note inaccurately conflates the names Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer into 'T. Horkheimer' [sic! J ). Boff 
[12] 
[13] 
[14] 
here seems to accept the account of rationality found in Horkheimer 
and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (B~ff 1915, pp. 7f). 
Tracy and Lash 1983, p. 90. 
'Editorial Reflections', in Tracy and Lash 1983, p. 87-92. 
Although it is interesting to note the shades ~f meaning in the term 
"justice" implicit in the following, and to 'ask how the semantic 
content of the metaphor might be cashed in each case: 'The reality of impending ecological crisis is so clear that no serious concern with historical justice can long ignore it. The struggle for justice must 
also include the struggle for ecology - not only to secure justice for other creatures than the human but even to secure the most basic justice of all: a li vable environment for future generations of human 
· beings' ( ibid., p. 90 ). 
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5.2. 1 Feminist theologies 
Although by no means alone in this , feminist theologians such as Mary 
Daly, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Dorothee Soelle [15] frequently make 
the dubious assumption that the logic of the term "domination" is the same 
in God-human, in inter-human, and in human-nature contexts. In their case 
the assumption is linked both to a rejection of patriarchal domination, 
and to a rejection of belief in a transcendent God. This adds another 
dimension to the questioning of technical reason by the Frankfurt School 
that I have noted above. 
In the case of Mary Daly, the rejection of technical reason has emerged 
gradually during her shift from "liberal" to "romantic" feminism. [16] In 
her early (1968) The Church and the Second Sex, [17] she had a positive 
appreciation of the emancipatory potential of technology for women in 
society. Thus in this work of essentially "liberal" feminism, she 
emphasizes that 'the development of technology has made physical strength 
less and less important not only as a job-holding credential but also as a 
measure of personal worth', [18] and has potentially freed women from some 
of the burdens of maternity, (19] including unwanted maternity 
itself. [20] Here she argues that advances in technology have provided, 
for the first time in history, the wherewithal ( 'leisure, mobility, control 
of our environment' (sic! J) for women to challenge in practice the 
traditional gender-roles. [21 J However, in the move to a thoroughgoing 
"romantic" feminism in her later works, these i nsights are abandoned - as 
Habermas would say, the realization of the real gains involved in 
modernization is lost - and objectifying technical reason is condemned as 
[ 15] Soelle ' s work is consider ed in 5. 5. 1 below in a J fferent context. For 
her work i n t his context , Soelle and Cl oyes 1984.rpp. 103-1 13. 
[16] Ruether ( 1983, pp. 41 - 45) distinguishes usefully between liberal , 
Mar xist, and r omantic feminisms . Compa r e 3. 6.~ note 348 above for 
Habe r mas ' at titude to libe r al femi ni sm. 
[17] Dal y 1968. 
[ 18] Ibid., p. 7. 
[1 9] Ibid ., p. 108. 
[20 ] Ibid ., p. 91 . 
[21 J Ibid., pp. 152f. 
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an aspect of "rapism". [22] Along with men, and the Christian tradition 
tout court, technical reason and all its works come in for repeated, 
sweeping, and wholesale condemnation. The following extract illustrates 
well the questionable assumptions about the transferability of the logic 
of domination that she now makes: 
The senior and junior executives of the secular corporations 
that are the natural offspring and allies of Yahweh & Son are 
already programming [women] out of any significant role in 
the future. The gynocidal-and-therefore-genocidal mania of 
the patriarchs has already been transferred to The Holy 
Father Computer, who is heir to the papal throne of a secular 
Christendom that wills to devour the world. The Corporation of 
God the father has formed a merger with the Earthly Town 
Fathers •••• Together they have sent nocturnal emissions beyond 
the earth's atmosphere, bringing forth signs and wonders in 
the heavens •••• The Kingdom of Heaven, then, is at hand. Before 
it is too late, let it be said that Heaven is not a 
Kingdom. [23] 
Rosemary Radford Ruether is a more moderate writer than Daly. She 
refuses to anathematize the male half of the species, [24] and retains an 
attitude to the Christian tradition of critical reconstruction rather 
than wholesale condemnation. [25] Ruether rejects aspects of the romantic 
feminism of writers like Daly on the grounds that their implications are 
socially conservative: idealizing the allegedly more organic relationship 
to the earth of the oppressed classes of pre-industrial eras, they risk 
'coloniz[ing] the exploited people [26] anew by fashioning them into the 
rest and recreation spots for weary white males'. [27] She thus correctly 
points out that the concept of harmony with nature is susceptible to 
[22] Daly 1973, p. 178; compare Ruether 1983, pp. 
. \ 
263f. I 
[23] Daly 1973, pp. 184f. The condemnation of the mal~ becomes complete in 
Gyn/Ecology (Daly 1979), while Pure Lust (Daly 1984) is, if possible, 
even more extreme. 
[24] Ruether 1985, p. 51. 
[25] Ruether 1983, passim. 
[26] 'Wives, Indians and South Sea Islanders' (Ruether 1981, p. 66) . 
[27] Ibid. Compare Ruether 1983, p. 85. 
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ideological misuse. [28] 
Ruether 's rejection of technical reason is not clear cut, and her 
position on it seems to be finally contradictory. At times she offers a 
qualified acceptance of the fruits of technological advance, arguing that 
'the new earth must be one where people are reconciled with their labor, 
abolishing the alienation of the megamachine while inheriting its 
product i ve power to f r ee men for unalienated c r eativity ' . [29 J However, 
this apparently Marxian position concerning the potential of modern 
science and technology is heavily qualified by the main thrust of her 
argument, which is hostile to technical r eason . He r proposed model for 
human - nature r elat ions - 'the cultivation of the garden is where the 
powers of r ational consciousness come together with the harmonies of 
nature in partnership ' [30] - turns out to have all the features of the 
Marcusian "new science", [31] including the shortcomings that have been 
elucidated above. Thus her guiding phrase of 'converting our minds to the 
earth ' , [ 32 J while allegedly involving 'the more diffuse and relational 
logic of natural harmony ' , [33] as opposed to ' the dominant white Western 
male rationality ••• based on linear, dichotomized thought patterns that 
divide reality into dualisms', [ 34 J can at the concrete level be given 
little actual content. Her only concrete illustration, the rejection of 
the pr actice of pla nting c r ops in long st r aight rows as an example of this 
"linear logic", [35 ] seems singular l y unconvincing. 
Rueth~r also shares with Daly (albeit in less extreme form) a 
distinctively feminist view of the concept of God , [36] and of the 
[28] In this case , id eology ope rates by r a1s1ng a co nt i ngent 'pr oduct of 
socialization ' to ' the level of ete r nal cosmic a r chetypes ' (Rue the r 
1981, p. 66). Compa r e West 1985b, p. 431 . On "1"deology" in gene r al , Gidde ns 1979, pp. 165-1 97; Lash 1981 , pp. 125- 134 · J . Thompson 1984, pp. 
1-1 5 a nd pass i m; McLellan 1986. 
[ 29 ] Ruether 197 2, p. 125; compare 1975, p. 20 5. ' 
[ 30 J Rue the r 1972, p. 124. ~ 
I [ 31 J Compare Ruether 1983, pp. 88- 92. 
(32] I b id., p. 91. 
[33] Ibid. 
( 34 ] Ibid., p. 89. 
[ 35] Ibid., p. 90. 
[36] Compare also Soelle and Cloyes 1984, pp. 14-16. 
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essential source of all the forms of domination involved with human life . 
Christianity, she argues , is the result of an amalga mation of the unhelpful 
dua lisms f ound in Neo- Platonism (exaltation of the intellect over body), 
and apocalyptic Judaism (image of the male warrior God). These have 
combined to legitimate both the domination of the female by the male, and 
of nature by spirit. [37] Particularly in the west, a hierarchy of being 
has been set up: 
God - man - woman - nature 
Sexual domination, the domination of nature by mankind, and the domination 
of mankind by a transcendent God, are mutually reinforcing. [38] Gender 
relationships are "base" in this schema, to which the other relationships 
are related as "superstructure", [39] and the liberation of woman is the 
key step in the dismantling of the hierarchy as a whole. In the process, 
God becomes immanent "Godless" primal "Matrix" rather than 
transcendent male deity, [40] and the rationale for the domination of 
nature in science and technology is lost: 
An ecological-feminist theology of nature must rethink the 
whole western theological tradition of the hierarchical chain 
of being and command. This theology must question the 
hierarch y of human nature over nonhuman nature as a 
relationship of ontological and moral value •••• It must unmask 
the structur es of social domination, male over female, owner 
over worker that mediate this domination of nonhuman nature. 
Finally it must question the model of hierarchy that starts 
wi th non-material spirit (God) as the source of the chain of 
being and continues down to nonspiri tual "matter" as the 
bottom of the chain of being and the most inferior, valueless, 
[ 37 J Ruether 1972, p. 115. 
[38 ] 
[39] 
[ 40 J 
Ruethe r points out that in Hebrew the noun_ for i 'earth" is feminine , 
and ded uces that the "domination " of the ea th by men [sic J is 
another aspect of the same texture of sexism tha is found elsewhere. 
This explanation i s spuri ous, confusing the I distinction between 
grammatical gender and sex differences (Bar r 1961 , pp. 39f). In 
reality, 'the phenomenon of grammatical gender is logically haphazard 
in relation to the real distinctions between objects or to the 
distinctions thought to exist between them ' (ibid.). 
Ruether 1975, p. 204; compare 1983, pp. 72-75. 
Ruether 1983, pp. 68-71. Note, in the light of 2.2.2:A above, Ruether's 
approval of theological speculation in the Jewish Kabbalah and Jacob 
Boehme (ibid., p. 60 ). 
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and dominated point in the chain of command. [41] 
Three things about this model need to be challenged in the light of 
Habermas' work. Firstly and crucially, whether it is adequate to transfer 
the social terms "exploitation" and "domination" from the sphere of social 
relations to that of human-nature relationships in this simplistic way -
whether and to what extent such a metaphorical use of the terms is 
genuinely creative or rather misleading. Secondly, whether it is true that 
'the alienation of the masculine from the feminine is the primary sexual 
symbolism that sums up all these alienations' of 'the subjective self from 
the objective world', 'the individual ••• from the social community', and 
'the domination or rejection of nature by spirit'. [42] Put more 
forthrightly by Daly, whether it is true that ~exism [is] the basic model 
and source of all oppression', [43] ultimately responsible for war, racism 
and the evils of capitalism alike. [ 44 J And thirdly, whether the 
transcendence of God in the Christian tradition is necessarily or only 
contingently connected to the legitimation of hierarchical forms of 
social system. 
About the first point, I have said much critically already. About the 
second, we have seen in chapter 4 the doubtfulness of reducing all of the 
various aspects of human injustice to one dimension - be it economic, 
racial, or, as in this case, sexual. Daly, and to some extent Ruether, appear 
to .have accepted an over-simplified base/superstructure view of society 
from Marxian theory, and merely changed the base. [45] Prima facie it seems 
no more plausible that economic (or racial) injustices would 
automatically be eliminated in a society of total sexual equality, than 
that under soc~alism sexual injustice will automatically vanish. That the 
abolition of sexism would have any fundamental effect upon human-nature 
relationships is also questionable; certainly not 
[41] Ibid., p. 85. 
[42] Ruether 1972, pp. 115f. 
[43] Daly 1973, p. 190. 
[44] Ibid., p. 177. 
Habermas insists, 
[45] For Ruether's relationship to Marx and Engels on this point, 
including Engels on the origin of the family (Engels 1972), Ruether 
· 1975, pp. 162-185. 
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technology is a project of the human species as a whole [46) rather than 
only of (as is claimed in this in stance) the male half of it. Something 
more should be said about the third point, however, which transposes into 
another dimension the question of the relationship between different 
logics of control or domination. 
Much is made by various feminist ~heologians [47] of the fact that, in 
his Church Dogmatics, Karl Barth combined a theological defence of the 
traditional hierarchical gender-roles [48] with a strong emphasis on the 
transcendence of God. These writers stress the superiority of Paul 
Tillich's concept of God as immanent Being, which they applaud as 'the 
basis for a non-hierarchical view of reality'. [49] Thus Romero argues 
that Tillich's concept of Being captures 'the wholeness of r eality, gr asped 
in a unifying experience ••• of being at home in the world', and as 'creative 
Ground ••• reflects the mothering and nurturing aspects of reality' from 
which the Fall alienated us. [50] 
This rejection of the doctrine of transcendence fails to convince. It 
could equally well be argued, firstly that Barth's views on gender roles 
are contingently rather than necessarily related to his doctrine of God, 
and secondly that the theological point of the transcendence of God is 
precisely not the legitimation of human hierarchies, but their 
criticism. [51] Indeed it is true that the idea of a great chain of 
[46] TRS, p. 87. -
[47] E.g. Ruether 1972, pp. 122f; Romero 1974, pp. 322-328. 
[48] Barth 1961 , pp. 168-181 . l 
[49] Romero 1974, p. 329. 
[50] Ibid ., p. 332. 
[ 51] For an argument that Karl Barth's (non-hierarchical) socialism is an integral rather than an accidental part of h-;is whole theological 
position, Bentley 1982, pp. 60-78. Christian Duquoc argues, against 
the French "neo-pagans" whose view of God is similar to Ruether's, that it is not monotheism as such, but the absolutization of the 
historically particular, that leads to totalitarianism. In his view, 
the social and political implications of (at least a Christian, trini tarian) monotheism are liberati ve, al though monotheism has frequently been misused ideologically in the past (Duquoc 1985). 
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being [52] has in the past been used to bolster social domination. But in 
my opinion a true understanding of the transcendence of God tends to 
relativize social distinctions rather than to legitimate them, and is thus 
by implication critical rather than socially conservative. [53] Moreover, 
the reconceptualization of God as Being, or as 'the Godless who is primal 
Matrix, the ground of being-new being', [54] does not really deliver what 
Ruether claims for it - that it mediates the 'return Home: to learn the 
harmony, the peace, the justice of body, bodies in right relation to each 
other •••• in the community of earth', [55] the rediscovery of 'our roots in 
the earth, sky, and water'. [56] Ruether admits this implicitly in her 
rejection of a total romantic utopianism. Thus, for all talk of 'the 
integrity of the existing ecological community', of the need to become 
'servants of the survival and cultivation of nature', [57] and of the need 
to 'maximize the welfare of the whole', [58] she still admits that we need 
to alter nature 'for human use', [59] and that it is more a question of 
'humanity and nature recover [ing J their just balance'. [60 J Compromise, the 
category that Habermas insists is necessary between efficiency on the one 
hand, and other aspects of human life on the other, is implicitly accepted 
by Ruether. Her "at-home"-ness is qualified, despite rhetorical flourishes 
that suggest the contrary. [61] 
[52] Compare Lovejoy 1936. It is incorrect to assume (so Lovejoy and 
Ruether) that medieval theologians such as Aquinas took this chain as 
a material description of layers of reality. Their use of it is 
rather grammatical/formal. The God/creature difference is far 
greater for Aquinas than any of the differences between creatures. 
[53] Compare Gal 3:28: For Paul, the transcendent [sic] God had established 
an eschatological community in which there was 'neither male nor 
female', just as all other human distinct~ons l ad been relativized 
out of existence. 
[54] Ruether 1983, p. 85. 
1 [ 55] Ibid., p. 266. 
[56] Ibid., p. 259. 
[57] Ibid., p. 89. 
[58] Ibid., p. 91. 
[ 59] Ibid., p. 90. 
i 
(60] Ibid., p. 255. For this use of "justice", compare Tracy and Lash above . 
(61] E.g. Ruether 1983, p. 266. 
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5.2.2 Holtmann's theology of creation 
In Jurgen Mol tmann's 1985 God in Creation, [ 62] many of the same 
features appear. Moltmann writes, for example, that 'the modern mechanistic 
world picture' is 'a view of the world that is one-sidedly 
patriarchal'. [63] Moreover Earth's doctrine of the sovereignty of God is 
again rejected in favour of a model of immanence, in this case 'the primal, 
reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration of the trinitarian 
perichoresis' that 'all relationships which are analogous to God 
reflect' [64] - including human relationships with nature. Once again the 
logic of "domination" is assumed to be the same in many different 
contexts, and thus problems of human life and their solutions are readily 
conflated. A good example of this is the conflation of the logic of 
domination operative in Habermas' subjective and objective worlds: 
The alienation of the human being from his bodily existence 
must be viewed as the inner aspect of the external ecological 
crisis of modern industrial society •••• If human society is to 
find a home in the natural environment, the human soul must 
correspondingly find a home in the bodily existence of the 
human person. [65] 
Similarly, between Habermas' objective and social worlds: 
We shall not be able to achieve social justice without justice 
for the natural environment, and we shall not be able to 
achieve justice for nature without social justice. For the 
pattern of exploitation has dominated both human labour and 
the resources or 'wealth' of nature. [ 66 J 
As in the case of Ruether, Moltmann's attitude to work and technology also 
displays various tensions. This is most clearly brought out in his 
treatment of human "at-homeness" in nature. 
[62] 
) 
Moltmann 1985b (German 1985a); many of the ideas 
stated briefly in Moltmann 1979a, pp. 109-130, 7 
developed here are 
[ 63 J Moltmann 1985b, p. 320. Moltmann seems too prepared to cite Ruether's 
contentious account of the relationship of Christianity to the 
gender issue as authoritative (ibid. pp. 298, 357 note 5). 
[64] Ibid., p. 17; compare 1981, pp. 139-144. 
[65] Moltmann 1985b, pp. 48f. 
[ 66] Moltmann 1979a, p. 130; compare Tracy and Lash 1983, p. 90. 
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What we may call Moltmann's "official position" on this issue is drawn 
directly from Bloch. [67] There is a (not yet manifested) subject in 
nature, which corresponds to the human subject. [68] The appropriate human 
relationship to nature is therefore not one of objectifying control and 
use, as in the classical natural sciences and technology, but one of 
cooperation and communication: 
the systems of matter and life in the natural environment •••• 
possess a subjectivity of their own which is not 
objectifiable by the human subject. This means that knowledge 
through domination must be replaced by communicative 
knowledge: knowledge itself becomes a cognitive living 
relationship. [69] 
A recognition of this natural subject, and a consequential move to an 
'alliance technology' that accepts 'the co-productivity of nature as 
subject', [70] would lead to a replacement of 'our previous technology' 
which 'stands in the midst of nature like an army of occupation in enemy 
country, which knows nothing of the country's interior'. [71 J The result 
would be a pacification of the human relationship with nature, a coming 
home: 
we are using the phrase 'home country' [72 J to designate a 
network of social relationships without stresses and strains. 
I am 'at home' [73] where people know me, and where I find 
recognition without having to struggle for it •••• The home of 
[67] Moltmann 1985b, pp. 42-47. Compare 1.4.3 above. My criticisms here are 
not meant to denigrate the use made of Bloch in Moltmann's Theology 
of Hope (Moltmann 1967), which I regard as very fruitful. 
[ 68] Mol tmann 1985b, p. 42. 
[69] Ibid., p. 50. Moltmann here employs a dubious combination of systems 
theory (for criticism of which see 4.5 above) and philosophy to 
explicate Bloch's idea of the natural subject. By apparently equating 
indeterminacy in systems theory, and uncertaint~ at the particular 
level (as described by Heisenberg), with the noti n of freedom, he is 
able to argue that material systems exhibit fr edom and therefore 
subjectivity (ibid.). This appears to be a straightforward categorial 
mistake, as is the further idea that Heis-enberg's uncertainty 
principle implies a communicative relationship bf the physicist with 
nature in modern physics (Moltmann 1979a, p. 128). For this last 
mistake, compare H°aring 1981, pp. 177f. 
[70] Moltmann 1985b, p. 43. 
[71] Ibid ., quoting Bloch. 
(72] Heimat (Moltmann 1985a, p. 60). 
[73] Zu Hause (ibid . ). 
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the natural environment is just such a network of 
tranquilli zed social relationships. [74] 
This official picture of a state of pacified and idealized natural 
relationships, [75] however, is put in question both by Moltmann's 
application of the term "at home" in an ecological context, and by his 
treatment of the theme of work. Firstly, the mystical "at- homeness" of 
Bloch is mixed misleadingly with the (non-controversial) observation that 
the human being does not only have to work on nature. He also 
has to be able to dwell in nature •••• Human society must be 
adapted to the natural environment. That means that it must 
observe nature's capacity for regeneration and adjust itself 
to nature's cycles. [76] 
Secondly: 
The relationship of the human being to the natural 
environment is evidently determined by at least two concerns 
of a fundamental kind •••• the concern of work ••• [and] the 
interest of habitation. [77] 
Moltmann admits that these two basic human interests - firstly of 
"habitation", and secondly of 'work on nature so as to acquire food, and in 
order to build up the world\ in which 'man is the master, and nature his 
slave', - 'must be balanced out'. [78] Moreover, 'under the aspect of work', 
he admits, 'the human being can perceive nature in no other way than as the 
object that has to be worked on, and as raw material for his own 
purposes'. [79] Moltmann thus implicitly admits that a "non-pacified" 
relationship to nature is inevitably part of the human condition. 
Evidently, Moltrnann's attitude towards human work is confused. From 
Habermas' perspective, it seems plain that he swings violently between 
positions that are either too negative or 
[74] Moltmann 1985b, p. 46. 
too \ positive 
I 
~ 
I 
about the 
[ 75 J Compare the featur es of Isaiah 11, alluded to in Ruether 1983, p. 266. 
[ 76 J Moltmann 1985b, p. 46. 
[77] Ibid. The term "habitation" translates the German Wohnen (Moltmann 
1985a, p. 60 ). 
[78] Moltmann 1985b, pp. 46f, my stress. 
[79] Ibid., p. 45. 
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significance of work ~nd technology in human life; The result, while rich 
in rhetorical flourish, seems sparse in usable content. This impression of 
confusion is compounded further by statements in other contexts, where he 
maintains that work may have a creative and redemptive aspect in and of 
itself. I will consider this is 5.3.1 below. 
5.3 Theological overestimations of the importance of labour 
Examination of the contents pages of the works of many of the twentieth 
century's greatest theologians could easily lead one to conclude that work 
or labour is only of peripheral theological, or indeed anthropological, 
significance. [80] The topic is rarely touched on, for example, by Rahner 
or van Balthasar. [81] At the other extreme, however, theologians who under 
predominantly Marxian influence have come to appreciate the 
anthropological significance of labour, are inclined to attribute too much 
importance to it. They are too readily inclined to attach the 
interpretation of theological categories exclusively to this aspect of 
human existence. 
In what follows I shall consider three examples of this tendency 
towards 'the reduction of the self-generative act of the human species to 
labor'. [82] Two are Marxian in orientation: Pope John Paul II's Laborem 
Exercens and Jurgen Moltmann's 'The Right to Meaningful Work'. [83] The 
other, the creation theology of Michael Novak, [84] combines with its 
Parsonian orientation a transposition of the Protestant work ethic as 
described by Max Weber. 
[80] Kiss ( 1983, pp. 22-24) offers some statistics. 
[81 J Although see Rahner 1973, pp. 17-19. 
[ 82 J KHI, p. 42. See 4.5, 4.6 above. 
~ 
I 
\ 
I 
[83] Wojtyla 1984; Moltmann 1984, pp. 37-58. These two works are also discussed in West 1986a (appended). 
[84] Novak 1981; 1983. Novak 1982 is considered in 5. 4 below. 
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5.3.1 Holtmann: the meaning of work 
In the essay 'The Right to Meaningful Work', Jurgen Moltmann at first 
sight seems to be aware of the pitfall in question, and to avoid it. The 
Marxian concept of self-realization through work must be qualified, he 
says, because 'it threatens the young, the old, the handicapped, and the 
unemployed with nonexistence': [85] 
No one has to justify himself through work. No one has to 
demonstrate her right to existence through work! No one has to 
realize himself through work. Were that true, then the 
unemployed would have no rights and the handicapped no 
reality. [86] 
Moreover, in theological key, he echoes Karl Barth in stressing the 
limitation of the importance of work implied by the Sabbath: 
Work is thus meaningful not because it alone provides the 
meaning of life, but precisely because it is limited by the 
goal of rest and joy in existence. The Sabbath does not simply 
interrupt work. Rather, work is understood and defined through 
the Sabbath. [87] 
It is a heathen god, he argues, whb is 'actus purus, or pure activity', who 
'knows no Sabbath'. Such is the Hegelian Geist, but it should not be our 
pattern as Christians. [88] In the working out of his argument, however , 
Moltmann does not appear to carry these insights through adequately. 
Moltmann starts by noting the status of work in the ancient Greek 
society of Aristotle. [89] Here work and leisure were divided between 
different classes, r athe r than between work-day and re st-day in the one 
life-history. Work, 'the toil and burden of maintaining and reproducing 
life ', [90] was- the lot of the slave, who was disqualified thereby from 
full humanhood. Labour was 'not true life but onl y its precondition •••• 
[ 85] Moltmann 1984, p. 54. 
[86] Ibid. 
[87] Ibid., p. 41; compare Barth 
[88] Moltmann 1984, p. 51. 
[89] Ibid., pp. 38f. 
[90] Ibid., p. 38. 
~ 
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1961, pp. 47-72, especially pp. 50f. 
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necessary, to be sure, but not itself meaningful '. [91) True humanhood was 
(unjustly) available only to the leisured classes, whose bodily and 
spiritual dignity was not so impaired by labour as to render the pursuit 
of virtue impossible. [92 J Labour was thus to be avoided, if at all 
possible, because it was considered to be dehumanizing. 
Moltmann rejects this negative a~praisal of the significance of work, 
and with it the modern tendency to delegate 'vitally necessary and 
life-sustaining work to other people or to machines'. [93) In his opinion, 
the Christian tradition indicates that work is itself meaningful . Genesis 
2:15 shows that work is an essential part of the created nature of mankind. 
It is 'not work itself, but work after the fall' that has been subjected to 
futility . [94) Thus 'the deliverance of human beings from sin actually 
cannot lead also to deliverance from work, but only to a transformation of 
their work from curse to blessing'. [95) 
Moreover, human work can be correlated with the theological motifs of 
creation and redemption. Firstly, argues Moltmann, 'in and through their 
work in the world human beings can and should correspond to the creative 
activity of God', as is implied in the Sabbath commandment of Exodus 
20:9-11. [96) Work and rest are both commanded, and in both 
human beings, in their way, take part in the creative world 
process and in the joy of the Creator. In contrast to the 
ancient dichotomies, this makes work itself meaningful. [97) 
Secondly, because Isaiah 53, Philippians 2, and John 19 identify redemption 
as the 'pain and work of God', 
[91] 
[92] 
[93] 
[94 ] 
[95] 
[96) 
[97) 
[98) 
the word work gains a new meaning. It is filled to the highest 
degree wi-th theological content. Work becomes the embodiment 
of the doctrine of salvation. [98) 
Ibid. 
Ibid ., p. 39. 
Ibid., p. 40. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. Compare 
Ibid., p. 41. 
. Ibid., p. 42 • 
p. 51. 
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As we are to be of the same mind as Christ, it follows that the 
understanding of our own work is also to be transformed. [99] Not only the 
apostolic kopos of Paul, [100] but indeed 
all work in the world is thereby placed on the level of 
Philippians 2 and filled with the hope of the kingdom of God. 
Through faith work is not just relati vi zed or exorcized. 
Rather, it receives through faith a messianic meaning •••• What 
happens in work is nothing less than co-renunciation with 
Christ and hope for co-regency with him. [ 101] 
In brief: 
The reapplication of this theological meaning of work to 
human beings induces them, through work and self-giving, to 
participate in the lordship of Christ in the world and thereby 
to become co-workers in God's kingdom, which completes 
creation and renews heaven and earth. [ 102] 
The Calvinist overtones come through well in Moltmann's summary 
conclusions. In his or her work and through it, a person is 'on the promised 
road to the kingdom of freedom and human worth'; and 'work in the kingdom of 
God' is not a title to be reserved for 'missions and the diaconal ministry '. 
No, all work has an 'eschatological meaning' - and this includes society's 
'historical dealings with the natural world'. [ 103) 
I have criticized this article in some detail elsewhere on linguistic, 
sociological, and theological grounds. [ 104) I argue that Moltmann's use of 
biblical texts is suspect that his conclusions are too open to ideological misuse, and ~at his tendency to equate human "progress" with 
the estab li shment of the Kingdom of God is too pronounced. These matters 
will be discussed further in chapter 6. At this point I will merely note 
the suspiciously inflated importance that Moltmann attaches to human 
labour in both an anth ropological and a theological dimension. 
[ 99) Ibid., pp. 42f. 
[ 100]Ibid., p. 43. 
[ 101 ]Ibid., p. 44. 
[ 102]Ibid., p. 45. 
[ 103Jibid., p. 56. 
[104]West 1986a. 
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5. 3. 2 Novak: wealth c r eation 
There is some ambiguity su r rounding Moltmann ' s use of the word "work" 
in the article discussed in 5.3.1 , concerning the extent to which it is 
restricted to activity within the economic system. [105] No such ambiguity 
is displayed in the creation theology of Michael Novak , however , who 
wholehea r tedly embraces the economi.c as the realm within which human 
activity corresponds to divine creativity. 
For Novak, 'the human person is a creator and nowhere more so than at 
his daily economic tasks~ Made in the image of God, each has 'the vocation 
to work and to create'. (106] This creativity essentially consists in a 
high (and incr easing) rate of economic production, [107] aided and abetted 
by scientific and technological inno vation. [108] In this, says Novak, the 
person is 'sharing in the creativity of the Creator' and 'fulfill[ing] his 
vocation '. [109] And in fact it is man's ' capacities for self- reflection, 
invention and innovation [that] constitute in him imago Dei: the image of 
God the Creator'· [ 110 J 
What is true for the individual is true also for the modern business 
corporation, and for society as a whole. The modern business corporation is 
'a much despised incarnation of God's presence in this world' that reflects 
the r ole of the suffering servant in Deutero-Isaiah. [111] ' Its creativity 
makes available to mass markets the riches long hidden in creation. Its 
creativity mir ro r s God 's'· [ 112] Moreover a society in which personal 
economic creativity is released , such that the entire economy becomes 
c r eat i ve , is a soc i ety 'constructed ••• in the image of the Blessed Trinity, 
t he Crea t o r of all things , Lord of hi s t or y, Spi ri t brooding over dark 
c r eation '. [113] 
[105]See, fo r e xample , Moltma nn 198 4, p. 56. 
[ 106] Novak 1983, p. 36. 
[ 107]Ibid., p. 37. 
[ 108 ]Novak 1981, pp. 207f. 
[1 09 ]Novak 1983, p. 33. 
[110]Ibid. 
[111]Novak 1981 , p. 203. 
[ 112]Ibid., p. 208. 
[113]Novak 1983, p. 37. 
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I have commented upon this aspect of Novak's work, and on the use of the 
term "creativity" in general, elsewhere. [114] Here, apart from once again 
noting, this time with some irony, that Novak shares with Marx a tendency 
to reduce the essential dimension of human life to the economic, I will 
make two comments. The first comment is theological. Barth's pejorative 
comment, that in embracing the analogia entis and thus 'a general analogy 
of the world to God ••• Liberalism shows a basic readiness in almost every 
connexion to discover new analogies in the world', [ 115] seems to be 
singularly applicable here. This tendency of Novak will be examnied 
further in 5.4 below. The second comment looks back to section 3.3.3 above. 
We have in Novak's use of the terms "creation" and "creativity" an example 
of a "situation definition" of an item in the social world that appears to 
have ideological consequences. Carrying over positive overtones from 
divine creation into the economic sphere, it draws attention away from the 
unfortunate side-effects of the operation of the capitalist economic 
system, specifically the generation of the class system. [116] The result 
is that Novak legitimates the activities of the multinational 
corporations, and the structure of American society which is dependent 
upon them, to a quite unsatisfactory extent. 
5.3.3 John Paul II: work and action 
Pope John Paul II's Labo rem Exercens ( 117 J refuses this blatant and 
idolatrous legitimation of late capitalist society, being far more 
sympathetic than Novak to the strengths of the Marxist critique. ( 118 J 
Nevertheless, it does tend towards a similar 'reduction of the 
self-generative act of the human species to labor', [119] and a less than 
cautious interpretation of work in theological categories. Of course, as 
noted in 1.2.2 above, there is again some ambiguity as to the definition of 
[114]West 1986c, appended. 
[115]Barth 1957, p. 232. 
[ 116 ]See 2.3. 1 :B and 3.6 above. 
) 
[117]Wojtyla 1984. See Houck and Williams 1983; McGovern 1983/4; Preston 1983; Traffers 1983; Volf 1984; Walsh and Davies 1984, pp. xviii, 271 -274. 
[ 118 ]See for example Wojtyla 1984, pp. 22f, 29- 32. 
[119]KHI, p. 42. 
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work, and John Paul II (hereinafter Wojtyla) seems at times to equate it 
with human action: 
The word 'work' means everything that man accomplishes, 
whatever its nature or attendant circumstances. [120] 
However, once again social labour within the economic system is primarily 
in view, as evidenced for example in bis treatment of the role of mothers 
in society. [ 121 J The worker is primarily the worker of Marxian theory, and 
perhaps quintessentially the worker extracting raw materials from the 
earth by physical labour [122] - the one who thereby fulfils the divine 
mandate to dominate the earth. [123] 
Wojtyla 1s understanding of the centrality of work can be traced to two 
sources: the first Marxism, the second his "personalist" philosophy, as set 
out in his early The Acting Person. [124] The latter affects his 
philosophy of work by way of an unfortunate equation of the concepts of 
"action" and "work", implicit in the definition of work quoted above, and 
in need of criticism in the light of Habermas' action theory. Thus, whereas 
in The Acting Person the person is characterized chiefly by actions [125] 
through which the person realizes or creates himself, [ 126] in Laborem 
Exercens man alone works, and 'in working fulfils his life on earth': [ 127] 
through it he not only transforms nature, adapting it to his 
needs, but also achieves his own fulfilment as a human being 
and, indeed, in a sense becomes 'more fully human'. [ 128] 
[ 120]Wojtyla 1984, p. 1. 
[121]Ibid., pp. 41f. 
[ 122 ]Graphically portrayed in his poem 'The Quarry' (Wojtyla 1982, pp. 79-
88 ). 
[123]Lash notes· the '"machismo" at the centre of John Paul II's vision of 
man and his work' (Lash 1982, p. 8 ). A recurrent theme of the 
encyclical is that man's vocation is to dominate the earth (e.g. 
Wojtyla 1984, p. 7 ), a theme based upon Gene!is 1 :28. The papal 
exegesis and hermeneutics is unsatisfactor'y at his point (Hauerwas 
1983, pp. 44-46 ), although the move away from natu al law arguments to 
a basis in biblical texts is itself interestingly innovative in the 
genre of papal social encyclicals (Walsh and Dav:ies 1984, pp. xvi iif). 
I [124]Wojtyla 1979. 
[125]Ibid., p. 11. 
[ 126]Ibid., p. 98. 
[ 127]Wojtyla 1984, p. 1. 
[ 128]Ibid., p. 18, stress removed. 
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This equation of action and work leads to an overestimation of the 
significance of work in the sense of what goes on within the economic 
system - work which is then interpreted in theological categories. Work 
becomes God's first and foremost intention with regard to man. [129] By 
means of it man can enter into God's salvific plan for man and the 
world. [130] As God is both Creator and Redeemer, man not only 'shares by 
his labour in the work of the Creator, in a certain sense continuing to 
complete and perfect that work', [131] but also 'by enduring the toil of 
work in union with Christ nailed to a Cross for our sake ••• in a way 
collaborates with the Son of God in the redemption of mankind'. [132] In 
sum, in work men [133] are 'contributing by their personal industry to the 
fulfilment in history of the divine plan'. [134] Man should 'recognize the 
place that his work has not only in earthly progress but also in the 
growth of the Kingdom of God'. [135] 
We may leave as an open question until the next chapter whether, and to 
what extent, any aspects of human action might be analogically 
correspondent to the divine action. Here I will simply point out that the 
bifurcation in the concept of action established by Habermas [136] is a 
powerful critical tool for use against this sort of theological 
overestimation of the significance of labour. Wojtyla, lacking this 
conceptual tool, is obliged to make a double error. Firstly, considering 
work as primarily self-formative, he detaches its significance too much 
from its results. Thus work is to be evaluated 'independently of [its J 
objective content', [137] which in this context means independently of its 
[129Jibid. 
[ 130]Ibid., p. 51. 
[ 131 ]Ibid., pp. 51f, stress removed. 
[ 132Jibid., p. 57. ~ 
[133]The implicit sexism of Wojtyla's view of ' work is made explicit at 
Wojtyla 1984, pp. 41f, and noted by Lash (198 , p. 8). In Wojtyla's 
view, a woman's 'nature' fits her for family life, which is where her 
'true advancement' is to be found (Wojtyla 1984-~ p. 42 ). Hebblethwaite 
detects extenuating circumstances for this 1doubtful view in the 
Polish situation from which Wojtyla originates (Hebblethwaite 1982, 
p. 122). For Wojtyla's attitude to women in general, ibid., pp. 115-127. 
[ 134 ]Woj ty la 1984, p. 53, quoting Gau di um et Spes. 
[ 135]Wojtyla 1984, p. 58, stress removed. 
[ 136]See 4.2 above. 
[ 137]Wojtyla 1984, p. 11. 
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product. "Work" is detached from what Weber and Habermas distinguish as 
the category of purposive-rational action: 
every kind of work is to be appraised according to the dignity 
proper to the subject of it ... the result for which he strives 
is of no definitive and final significance in itself'. [ 138] 
Then secondly "work", coming to embrace all that is of value in "the active 
life", [ 139 J is in consequence overinterpreted theologically. Wojtyla 's 
theology of work is thus flawed by a basic category mistake. 
Further, Wojtyla's position on the importance of labour is (perhaps 
inevitably) combined with an undue optimism concerning its results. Indeed 
he recognizes that social labour can be dehumanizing, [140] but he shows 
little positive awareness of the deeply ambiguous nature of the 
achievements of modern technology, and of the processes of economic 
development and expansion. [ 141] As a consequence, his theology tacitly 
assumes that work largely escapes the effects of the fall. The effect of 
sin, he says, is merely to make the execution of work toilsome, rather than 
rendering its results ambiguous or evil. [ 142] Work becomes, like the 
Spirit, an active agent of the new order proleptically present in this age. 
All of which needs to be confronted with the ambiguity of modernity, 
captured in Weber's paradoxes of rationalization and reinterpreted in 
Habermas ' model of modernity, [143] and with Habermas' analysis of the 
ideological overtones associated with the idea of technical progress in 
the mod~rn western societies. [144] 
Once again, I have offered further criticisms of this theology of work 
elsewhere. [145] 
[138Jibid ., p. 12, stress removed. 
[139]Barth's term (Barth 1961, pp. 470-564). 
[ 140 ]E.g. Wojty la 1984, p. 19. 
; 
) 
[ 141 ]See, for example, the optimistic tone of Wojtyla 1984, p. 9. 
[ 142]Ibid., pp. 56f. 
[143]See 3.1 and 3 passim above . 
[ 144 ]See 2. 2.2:C above . 
[ 145 ]West 1986a, appended. 
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5.3.4 Conclusion 
Section 5.3 has been an almost entirely critical exercise. It has found 
the works of Moltmann, Novak, and Wojtyla seriously lacking. Nevertheless, 
although these writers collectively fail to connect the theological 
motifs of creation, sabbath, cross, kingdom and vocation to human work in a 
convincing manner, in my opinion they are right to have made the attempt. 
For if a "theology of work" consists in an attempted exposition of work as 
seen 'in the light of God', [146] then it will have to relate work in some 
way (even if only negatively) to these concepts. In chapter 6 I will take 
up these motifs again, and attempt to examine human work in their light, 
avoiding some of the pitfalls outlined above. 
Meanwhile, in the rest of this chapter, I will bring the thought of 
Habermas to bear upon theologies of work that are organized around a 
single question: capitalism or socialism? 
5.4 The theological defence of capitalism 
If people decide that the gospel message has nothing to say 
about such a critical human issue as the 
capitalism and socialism, then its 
[Segundo] [147] 
choice between 
value is nil. 
In the introduction to Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, as we saw in 
3.1 above, Habermas described two predominant reactions to the troubles of 
the western democracies since the 1960's - the "neoconservative" and the 
"antimodernist". [148] Just as the antimodernist reaction has been 
expressed theo1ogically in the writings of authors such as Daly, Ruether 
and Moltmann, [149] so also the neoconservative reaction has found 
I expression in several recent theological defences )of capitalism. These 
defences, as Habermas notes concerning their secular counterparts, involve 
I 
a determination 'to hold at any price to the .papitalist pattern of 
I 
[ 146]Aquinas 1964, p. 17. 
[ 147 ]Segundo 1980, p. 245. 
[148]TCA1 , pp. xlif. 
[ 149]See 5.2 above. 
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economic and social modernization', giving 'highest priority to ••• economic 
growth' while 'seek[ing] refuge from the socially disintegrative side 
effects of this growth' in a rhetorical reaffirmation of now defunct 
nineteenth century values, values whose basis has been irreversibly eroded 
by capitalism. [ 150] 
Two book- length examples of this theological genre are Robert Benne's 
The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism, and Michael Novak's The Spirit of 
Democratic Capitalism. [151] The two books differ both in tenor and in 
theological method, Novak being the more strident, the less critical of 
American society, and the more inclined to utilize theological categories 
directly in support of his case. [ 152] But the case they present is 
recognizably the same. [ 153] I shall briefly present this common case, 
before noting their methodological differences, and offering some 
criticisms in the light of Habermas' work. 
5.4.1 The Novak-Benne case 
The key plank in the Novak-Benne platform is the "difference principle" 
as articulated by John Rawls: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. [154] 
[150]TCA1, p. xli. 
[151]Benne 1981; Novak 1982. Both are reviewed in Dombrowski 1984. Compare 
the approach of the essays in D. Anderson 1984. 
[ 152]Compare 5.3.2 above for Novak's use of the category "creation", for 
which see also Novak 1982, p. 246. 
[153]This case, transposed into theological key, is also recognizably the 
same as that of F.A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdo (Hayek 1944; compare 
Hayek 1967; 1978; 1973-79 ), and Milton Friedman 's Capitalism and 
Freedom (Friedman 1962; compare Friedman and friedman 1980), on which 
they are at least partially dependent (Benne /1981, pp. 106f, 146, 224; 
Novak 1982, pp. 89, 94, 122, 160, 205f). Friedman 1970 presents in nuce 
the monetarist economic theory upon whi ch Friedman's social theory is 
based. 
[154]Rawls 1973, p. 83. This dependence is explicit in Benne (1981, p. 55), 
and implicit in Novak's condemnation of socialism as highmindedness ( Novak 1982, pp. 196-214 ). Benne 1981, pp. 49-68 forms a useful 
introduction to Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1973). 
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The essence of their case is that democratic capitalism, [155] according 
to these criteria, is both better for the least advantaged, and fairer for 
all, than the only "live" alternative - the various forms of socialism. 
Thus it is democratic capitalism, rather than socialism, that is to be 
positively related to the teachings of the Christian faith. 
The problem with socialism, according to Novak and Benne, is that 
although it intends well - true freedom and equality for all - its results 
are unfortunate. [156] Firstly, because it embodies a misunderstanding of 
the importance of the profit motive in the economic sphere, socialist 
economies are generally less efficient than capitalist ones. Thus, despite 
socialism's stress on the distribution of wealth, its lower production 
means that it has less goods to distribute, and the poor are ultimately 
rendered worse off. [157] Secondly, the hegemony of the political over the 
economic system under socialism involves a drastic loss of the personal 
freedom that is one essential (if not the essential) dimension of 
authentic human existence. [ 158] Freedom, understood as the possibility 
for as wide a range of individual choices as possible, [ 159] is thus 
compromised in two ways under socialism: directly by state control, and 
indirectly by loss of purchasing power. 
The best possible social system, in contrast, is the pluralist system of 
the democratic capitalist societies. Here the economic, political, and 
[155]Benne ascribes the origin of this term to Novak (Benne 1981, p. x). It 
is to be distinguished from both laissez-faire capitalism on the one hand and democratic socialism on the other, and is in essence descriptive of the modern American social system (Benne 1981, p. x; 
Novak 198~, p. 367) or, more cynically, of an idealized abstraction from it. Habermas' Spatkapitalismus is a rather broader category, as 3.6 above makes clear. Note that Wogaman, who usefully compares five 
systems of political economy from a Christian )perspective, subsumes the American system under 'Laissez Faire . Capi alism' (Wogaman 1977, 
pp. 77-97 ). 
[156]See for example Novak 1982, pp. 198f. The pos'ition is implicit in Benne's handling of the theme of efficiency ~Benne 1981, pp. 69-72, 126-136). I 
[157]See, for example, Novak 1982, pp. 122- 126, 218; compare Benne 1981, p. 131. 
[158]See, for example, Novak 1982, pp. 144, 201; compare Benne 1981, pp. 28, 143. Benne follows Niebuhr, who states that 'the essence of man is his 
freedom' (Niebuhr 1941, p. 18). 
[159Jimplicit in Benne 1981, pp. 134f. 
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cultural subsystems are separated, and form independent power centres that 
balance each other out, avoiding undue hegemony of any one individual or 
gr oup. [160] Here the economic system is forced to pursue the dictates of 
its own "economizing logic", and thus yield maximum efficiency and 
growth. [ 161 J Here indi victual freedom is guaranteed. And here suitable 
corrective measures can ensure that most people have a roughly equal 
chance of the upward social mobility that defines success. [162] This fair 
equality of opportunity is the key element in justice (so Rawls above), 
which is in turn the implication of a socially incarnated Christian 
agape. [ 163] Special consideration may need to be given to groups that 
have in effect fallen out of this fair social system. Agape demands that 
they at least be brought up to the starting post alongside everyone 
else, [164] and this may be true on an international as well as an 
intranational level. [165] But the system in itself is acceptable. 
It follows that the Marxist analysis of the capitalist social system is 
to be rejected. [166] Far from entrepreneurs being the cause of poverty, 
their activities are the key element in its solution. [ 167 J And this 
applies on an international as well as on an intranational level. It is not 
true that first world wealth, and the activities of the multinational 
corporations, are the cause of third world poverty, as their Marxist 
critics suggest. [168] In fact they are benevolent in their effects on the 
third world, raising per capita income, and therefore the quality of life, 
in . these regions. [169] In essence, what is good for General Electric is 
good, not only for the country, but also for the Nicaraguan peasant as well 
- at least in the long run. [ 170] It also follows that opposition to 
[160]Ibid., pp. 75, 136. 
[161]Ibid., pp. 126-129, 209; compare Novak 1982, pp. 
[162]Benne 1981, pp. 126, 148, 239-245. 
[ 163 ]Ibid., p. 44. 
[ 164 ]Ibid., pp. 239-245. 
[ 165Jibid., pp. 204-208. 
[166]Novak 1982, pp. 189-195, and passim. 
[167Jibid., pp. 13, 16f, and passim. 
T I 
-. 
I 
[168]Benne 1981, pp. 194-198; Novak 1982, pp. 225-236, 272-286. 
[169]Compare Benne 1981 , pp. 71f. 
[170]Compare Novak 1982, p. 292; Benne 1981, p. 133. Pejorative comments on 
· Nicaragua may be found in Novak 1982, pp. 225, 233, 286, 313. 
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economic gr owth on almost any grounds is misguided. [171] It is economic 
growth that will ultimately aid the poor and oppressed of the world, not 
interventionist programmes of redistribution. Economic growth thus 
becomes an implicate of _Christian agape; and as this growth is best 
attained by the democratic capitalist system, t hat system is itself to be 
positively related to the principles of Christianity. 
However, the democratic capitalist system, despite its success, is 
currently under serious threat from an adversarial culture. [ 172 J This 
cultural phenomenon is spearheaded by a New Class of left-wing academics , 
who have a vested interest in government interven tionism, [173] and who 
fail to appreciate the dynamics (and therefore the virtues) of the 
capitalist economic system. [174] The rise of this class, as also the rise 
of a hedonistic consumerism, [175] is the result of what we might (mindful 
of Horkheimer and Adorno) term a "dialectic of capitalization": it is an 
inevitable result of the functioning of the system, which tends to 
undermine the system at its very foundations. [176] The arguments of the 
New Class must be exposed by ideology-critique, and the people immunized 
against them by education in the virtues of capitalism. This is the task 
that Novak and Benne have set themselves. [177] The advent of the new 
hedonistic consumerism demonstrates the urgent need for a return to the 
Protestant work ethic, that viewed work as a divinely ordained duty. [178] 
5.ll.2 Theological method and critique 
While this central case is common to Benne and Novak, the t wo writers 
underpin it theologically in quite differ ent ways. 
Benne proceeds by reducing the implications of the Christian tradition 
\ [171]Benne 1981, pp. 70-72, 187-208; Novak 1982, pp. 1'5f, 38-40, 263-265. 
[172] Benne 1981, pp. 1-16, 250-255; Novak 1982, pp. l:99-20 1. 
I . [173]Benne 1981, pp. 7, 255f. 
[ 17 4 ]Ibid., p. 3. 
[ 175Jibid., pp. 250-252. 
[ 176Jibid., pp. 254f. 
[177]Novak 1982, pp. 19, 333f; Benne 1981, pp. 1-18. 
[ 178]Benne p. 258; Novak 1982, p. 40. 
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While this central case is common to Benne and Novak, the two writers 
underpin it theologically in quite diffe r ent ways . 
Benne proceeds by reducing the implications of the Christian tradition 
l [ 171 JBenne 1981, pp. 70-72, 187-208; Novak 1982, pp. 15f, 38-40, 263-265. 
[172]Benne 1981, pp. 1-16, 250-255; Novak 1982, pp. 119-201. 
[ 173]Benne 1981, pp. 7, 255f. 
[ 174Jibid., p. 3. 
[ 175Jibid., pp. 250-252. 
[ 176Jibid., pp. 254f. 
[177]Novak 1982, pp. 19, 333f; Benne 1981 , pp. 1-18. 
[ 178 J Benne p. 258; Novak 1982, p. 40. 
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to two guiding principles, agape [ 179] and freedom, [180] which he then 
applies to social theory by means of the mediating category of Rawlsian 
justice. [181 J Both principles are drawn from the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, [182] whose Moral Man and Immoral Society also substantiates the 
claim that a pluralist society is needed to counteract the endemic effects 
of the wil l-to-power in human groups. [183] Agape in its autonomous form -
that is, apart from its transformation into justice - survives only in the 
injuction to seek and save the lost. [184] This is taken to imply the need 
to bring the marginalized back into participation in the economic system, 
which participation constitutes the key aspect of full membership of the 
social community. [185] 
Novak's method is quite different. He proceeds by drawing analogies 
between several key theological categories on the one hand, and aspects of 
democratic capitalist societies on the other. We have seen in 5.3 above how 
he uses the doctrine of creation in this way. In his 1982 work he extends 
this procedure to include the following: 
(1) The doctrine of the importance of results as opposed to intentions 
is raised to the level of an absolute principle by its correlation 
with the doctrine of di vine providence. The God of democratic 
capitalism, he argues, is not the Nous of the ancients, 'the 
all-knowing and all-seeing God of harmony ••• the God of geometry'. An 
adequate political economy must rather imitate the Providence of 
[179]Benne 1981, pp. 36-47. 
[180]Ibid., pp. 28f. 
[181]Benne 1981, pp. 49- 68. Benne (e.g. p. 242) is also critical of some of 
Rawls' points, generally from a more right wing perspective. For a 
more penetrating critique of Rawls, Grant 1985, pp. 13-47 (reviewed in 
West 1986d, appended). Benne's method is close to the "middle axiom" 
method in Christian social ethics, pur.sued 1y William Temple and 
Ronald Preston. Compare Temple 1927, pp. 9-18; 1 76, pp. 67-77; Preston 
1981, pp. 37-44. Benne calls middle axioms (P eston's term) "middle 
principles" (Benne 1981, p. 46), or "intermediate principles" (ibid., p. 41). ; 
--
[ 182 ]The principle of freedom from volume 1 of Niebuhr's The Nature and 
Destiny of Man (Niebuhr 1941, see pp. 14-18), that of agape from An 
Interpretation of Christian Ethics (Niebuhr 1936 ). 
[183]Niebuhr 1942, pp. xif, and passim; Benne 1981, pp. 31-34, 125. 
[184]Benne 1981, pp. 36, 231. 
[ 185Jibid., pp. 230-239, especially p. 231. 
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Aquinas, that is characterized by practical rather than theoretical 
wisdom. This (the true) God is 'Lord of the absurd, the 
idiosyncratic, the slip of the tongue'. He respects 'a world of 
concrete contingencies, secondary causes, liberties, and sin'. [186] 
Thus, a political economy whose operation truly reflects the action 
of God cannot operate accor<;iing to an all-knowing plan, as does 
socialism. Its operation will be counter-intuitive. 
(2) The doctrine of original sin indicates that capitalism's attempt to 
progress via the effects of unintended consequences is more 
Christian than socialism's intentionalist approach to social issues. 
Socialism (unwisely) meets the sin of selfishness head on, and fails 
to eradicate it. Democratic capitalism, however, 'regards sin as 
rooted in the free personality, beyond the reach of any system, an 
ineradicable given'· Instead it uses 'the workings of unintended 
consequences' in the economy as 'a way to defeat sin - a way to 
transform its energy into creative use (and thus to take on Satan 
the best revenge)'. [ 187] 
( 3) The doctrine of the transcendence of God is taken to imply the 
necessity for a pluralist social system, with a relatively 
autonomous economy. Only such a society, Novak claims, witnesses to 
the transcendence of God by refusing to endorse any particular 
vision of social order. Out of reverence for God himself, the bearing 
of Christian symbols must be restricted to the moral-cultural 
systeL They should not be allowed to invade the spheres of the 
polity and the economy. [188] 
(4) The form of community embodied in democratic capitalism 'a 
political economy differentiated and yet one' [189] is a 
reflection of the relationship between the members of the divine 
Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity , impl~es the rejection of 
socialism as well as of a rampant individualishn. The former yields a 
I 
[186]Novak 1982, p. 96. 
[ 187]Ibid., p. 82; compare pp. 349-351. 
[ 188]Ibid., pp. 67-70, 351-353. 
[ 189 ]Ibid., p. 339. 
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collective rather than a true community, a collective in which 
individuality is lost and true community becomes impossible. [190] 
(5) The doctrine of the Incarnation demonstrates that 'God [does] not 
overpower history but respect[s] its constraints'. It teaches us to 
'face facts' and 'train ourselves to realism'. [191] All traces of 
utopian hope must be rejecte~. 'The point of the Incarnation is to 
respect the world as it is ••• and to disbelieve any promises that 
the world is now or ever will be transformed into the City of God. If 
Jesus could not effect that, how shall we?' ( 192] Indeed, 'the single 
greatest temptation for Christians is to imagine that the salvation 
won by Jesus has altered the human condition'. [ 193] 
There is so much to disagree with here that one is spoilt for choice. I 
will limit myself to four comments. Firstly and crucially, Novak's 
analogical method leads him to legitimate the structure and functioning of 
contemporary American society much more strongly than does Benne. [194] An 
obvious problem with his work is thus its inevitably ideological 
consequences: it serves to legitimate the status quo, including the 
contingent undesirable features that are built into it. [195] Christianity 
here loses its critical edge. [ 196 J This is not unassociated, secondly, 
with the lack of any significant place in Novak's theology for the themes 
of the cross and resurrection. [197] I have argued elsewhere that, seen in 
[190Jibid., pp. 337-340. 
[ 191 ]Ibid., p. 340. 
[ 192]Ibid., p. 341. 
[193Jibid ., p. 343. 
[194]Benne is alive t o some of its shortcomings, (Benne 1981, p. 227), and 
simply suggests that it represents the most hopeful model to work on 
in the future democratic capitalism is, to be assessed as 
'ambiguously posi t ive' (ibid., p. 3; compare p. 1~). 
[ 195 ]Features to which, incidentally, Novak was f J lly alive before his 
recent political volte face (Novak 1969, pp. 17j 29). 
[ 196]See Barth 1957, pp. 75-79 for a pertinent afi d damning critique of 
a nalogy used i n this way. · 
[ 197]Novak's list of six doctrines that he cons i ders most important in a 
social context a r e : Tr inity, Incarnation, competition [sic!] , original 
sin, the separation of realms, and caritas (Novak 1982, pp. 337-358) . 
Cross and resurrection are ment ioned on page 257 as the star t ing 
point for Moltmann's theology, a theology that Novak attacks 
vi gor ous ly ( i bid., pp. 255- 271 ). 
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their social setting, these symbols are both critical of current social 
practices and indicative of the posibility of social transformation. [198] 
Novak's omiss ion of them is a serious weakness in any theology of work that 
claims to be a Christian theology of work. [ 199] Thirdly, the use that 
No vak makes of the theme of tra nscendence seems to be at odds with his 
unde r standing of the implications of the Trinity : any doctrine of 
transcendence as extreme as Novak 's would seem to undercut the rest of his 
strongly analogical method. The last point also concerns transcendence. 
Allegedly this doctrine legi timates the democratic capita list social 
system, which, by freeing economy and polity from the hegemony o f the 
cultural system, ensures that no one vision of society is allowed to 
dominate . [200] But in effect, of course, this merely allows hegemony to 
the view of social order implicit in the dynamics of late capitalism. 
Novak fails to see what Habermas makes explicit: that the capitalist 
political and cultural systems are formed, to some extent at least, in 
reaction to the dynamics of the economic system, which remains a chief 
powerhouse of social formation and social change. [201] 
Neither, however, is Benne's theological method adequate. Adopting a 
christocentric approach , he claims to derive his basic principle of agape 
from the story of Jesus. [202] Yet Benne reduces the implications of this 
story to the single applicable principle of agape, only at the cost of 
abstracting Jesus complet ely from his social and historical setting in 
first century Jewish society. This abstraction is shown strikingly in the 
following passage: 
Only the solitary per son or , in the case of Jesus, the One 
acting on behalf of All, can act in a purely agapistic manner. 
All other actions are qualified by the claims and 
counterclaims of social existence. [203] 
Benne's (docetic) Jesus is not a concrete, 
[198]West 1985b, p. 434. 
[ 199] Ibid., p. 428. 
[200]Novak 1982, pp. 67f. 
... 
I 
person as we a re, 
[201 ]See 4.5, 4.6 above. This remains true despite the qualifiers entered 
there. 
[202]Benne 1981, pp. 35-37, 40; compare Niebuhr 1936, pp. 47-71 . 
[203]Benne 1981, p. 40. 
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otherwise his actions too would be 'qualified by the claims and 
counterclaims of social existence' - as of course in reality they 
were. [204] Correspondingly, his challenge to the power structures of 
first century society, a challenge implied in his death and resurrection 
when read in their social setting, [205] is lost. From this follows easily 
the collapse of agape into a Rawlsian concept of justice [206] that, for 
all its superiority to the justice of classical political economy, is 
still essentially individualistic, embodying the social contract myth of 
the pre-formed, asocial indi victual. [207 J 
5.4.3 Critique of' the Novak-Benne case 
There are many useful points to be gleaned from the work of Novak and 
Benne: the irreducible importance of efficiency in economic life, the need 
to consider production as well as distribution in social theory, the 
all-pervasive social significance of power, and the significance of 
consequences as well as intentions. These points have already emerged in 
the discussion in chapters 1-4 above. [208] However, a reading of Habermas 
suggests several shortcomings in the Novak-Benne account whi ch seriously 
vitiate the credibility of its overall case concerning the ethical and 
theological legitimacy of democratic capitalism. Two obvious ones are 
their tendency to assume that (economic) system imperatives are in harmony 
with the norms of a free and just community, and their espousal of a 
conservative achievement-ideology which legitimates the linkage of wealth 
and status to effort and achievement in the productive process. [209] I 
shall consider some of their other shortcomings under the broad headings 
of growth, system, and the Protestant work ethic. 
Firstly, as noted at the start of this section, the Novak-Benne case 
involves giving a high priority to growth [210] while taking insufficient 
[204]MacKinnon 1968, pp. 91, 103. ~ I 
) 
[205]See further my argument in West 1985b, pp. 432-434. 
[206]Benne 1981, pp. 43-47. 
[207]Ibid., pp. 52-54; compare Rawls 1973, pp. 118-175. 
[208 ]See~ respectively, 4. 7, 2.3.2, 4.5, 3.5 above. 
[209]See, repectively, 3.6, 2.2.2:C above . 
[210]For example, Benne 1981, pp. 70-72. 
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note of its unfortunate side effects. It is not just that environmental 
problems are taken insufficiently seriously, although this is true. [211) 
Neither is it just that Novak and Benne subscribe to the position attacked 
persuasively in Habermas' 'Technology and Science as "Ideology"', [212) 
although this is also true. It is rather that these writers seem not to be 
sufficiently aware of the ambiguous ·nature of the modernity that has been 
generated by, among other things, the growth of the capitalist economic 
machine. [213) With a tacit reduction of the quality of life to the 
availablity of (individualistically conceived) choices, [214) which are 
in turn related too simply to the measure of per capita income, [215) 
Novak and Benne are left with no measure of the costs involved in 
modernization [216) for example, the losses involved when a 
multinational corporation is responsible for the breakup of a tribal 
society in the third world at the same time as raising the per capita 
income of its members. [217) Similarly, they are unable to grasp the 
significance of the protest movements in late capitalist societies, 
movements that are related, not to the issue of income or the choices that 
it brings, but to questions of "the grammar of forms of life". [218) As in 
section 5.3 above, we seem to have here yet another variant of a threatened 
'reduction of the self-generative act of the human species to labor', [219) 
a reduction which, despite its insistence upon the importance of an 
[211 ]Ibid., pp. 187-194. 
[212 ]See 2.2.2:C above: the view that the direction of the development of 
social systems is inexorably determined by the logic of scientific 
and technological progress, and thus falls outside of the scope of 
rational human agreement and control - and the correlative that 
politics is to be reduced to periodic plebiscites to decide who shall 
be entrusted with the job of promoting this progress, ceasing to have 
any influence on the direction that it takes. 
[213]For which, 3.6 above. See, however, Benne 1981 , pp. 128f. Novak (1982, p. 
47) rejects Weber's "iron cage" view. 
[214]Benne 1981, p. 70; compare Novak 1982, p. 102. \ 
[ 215 ]For example, Novak argues that the lot of t~e black American is 
acceptable because he is 'ri cher and better educated than any other 
blacks in the world' (Novak 1982, p. 219 ). 
[ 216 ]See 3.6 above on Parsons. 7 
[217 ]See 3.6.3 above. Benne dismisses 'traditional ' societies as 
characterized most importantly by 'stagnant, subsistence economies'. 
Escape from these in his view far outweighs the pain of the rupture 
of traditional communities (Benne 1981 , pp. 126f). 
[218]See 3. 6.7 above . 
[219 ]KHI, p. 42. 
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autonomous cultural system, [220] underplays the significance of a 
communicative rationality that is non-r educible to instrumental 
rationality. [221) 
Secondly, despite their welcome insistence upon the social significance 
of power, it is clear that Novak and Benne operate with a view of the 
social system that is essentially Parsonian, and as a consequence 
underplay the significance of class conflict in social evolution and 
formation. [222) There is a lack of appreciation that late capitalism 
represents a welfare state compromise that has pacified r athe r than 
excised class conflict. [223] As a result, while conflicts of interests 
between the political, economic, and cultural spheres are recognized, there 
is little recognition of a genuine conflict of interests within the 
economic system itself. [224] Injustice in the economic sphere is held to 
be eliminated once all are given fair equality of opportunity to compete 
in the labour market. [225] And the roles of entrepreneur, investor, and 
worker are seen as functionally complementary, as are the roles played by 
the various organs in a biological organism. [226] Novak and Benne here 
fall into the trap of 'regarding society as one single subject', that is, of 
regarding it 'falsely - speculatively'. [227] 
Thirdly and finally, there appears to be a genuine inconsistency in the 
Novak-Benne position concerning the role of the Protestant work ethic. 
What we may call their official position is that the economic system 
functions most effectively wh e n individual actors are orientated 
consciously to their own self-interest. [228] This orientation to 
[220]E.g. Benne 1981, pp. 247f. 
[221 ]See 3.3 above. 
[222]Compare 3.6, 4.5, 4.6 above . 
[223]See 3.6.4 above. \ 
[224]There seems to be some inconsistency between admitting the reality of 
class interest for the Ne~ Class, but denying its significance fo r 
other groups, e.g. i ndustrial workers. It is ' therefore interesting 
that Benne sets New Class interest up as a conflict between the 
cultural and economic subsystems (Benne 198 1, p. 7 ). 
[225Jibid., pp. 239-245. 
[226]This analogy is criticized in 4.5 above. 
[227]KHI, p. 54; see 2.3. 1 :B above. 
[228]E.g. Novak 1982, pp. 79, 82, 113-115. 
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[ 228 ]E.g. Novak 1982, pp. 79, 82, 113-115. 
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self-interest, they argue, being a result of original sin, cannot be 
transcended. [229] However their supplementary position is that the 
efficient functioning of the economic system is under serious threat from 
the spread of a consumerist hedonism; [230 J and that this not only must be, 
but can be, headed off by a retreat to the Protestant work ethic. [231] 
This involves a retreat from a doctrine of the efficacy of unintended 
consequences towards a Kantian ethic: work is to be regarded as a 
divinely-ordained duty. [232] Moreover it calls into question a key step 
in their rejection of socialism: the insistence that the human being en 
masse is too selfish to be capable of orientation to anything other than 
self-interest, even under the influence of divine grace. But if the worker 
can be orientated to the duty of seeking the glory of God in work rather 
than personal profit, he or she can presumably also be orientated to the 
interests of his or her fellow citizens and members of the world 
community. Benne and Novak are in danger of wanting to have their cake and 
eat it as well. 
5.5 Marxian theologies of work 
At the opposite end of the spectrum to Novak and Benne, various Marxian 
theologies of work have also recently appeared. [233] At least since Leo 
XIII's Rerum Novarum of 1891, [234] the effect of the Marxist critique on 
Christian social ethics has been apparent. This is clear from a reading of 
official Roman Catholic documents , [235] the work of Anglicans such as 
William Temple [236] and, in the present generation, Ronald Preston, [237] 
[229Jibid., pp. 82, 349-351. 
[230]Benne 1981, pp. 251f. 
[ 231 ]Ibid., pp. 254, 258. 
[ 232 ]Compare Novak 1982, p. 40. 
) 
7 
[233 ]For an earli er example of this genre, Chenu 1963. 
[234]George 1934, pp. 163-195. 
[235]Miranda 1977a, p. xiiif. See Walsh and Davies 1984 for the relevant 
documents from Mater et Magistr~ (1961) to Laborem Exercens (1981). 
[236]See especially Temple 1927; 1956. 
[237]See especially Preston 197~ 
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and the social ethics of Americans such as Reinhold Niebuhr. (238] We have 
seen, in 5.2 and 5.3 above, theologies that make some use of Marxian 
categories. Here I shall describe two theologies of work that may be 
described as thoroughly Marxian. In what follows I shall compare briefly 
some aspects of Latin American liberation theology with a "first world" 
Marxian theology of work: that of Dorothee Soelle. I shall suggest that 
their settings are not unrelated to the differences between them, and that 
this difference in setting and content can fruitfully be analysed with the 
help of Habermas' model of modernity. 
5.5.1 Soelle: the romantic Marx 
In her 1984 To Work and to Love: a theology of creation, (239] Dorothee 
Soelle combines a feminist perspective similar to that of Ruether (240] 
with a use of the categories of the early Marx. (241 J 'Several years ago', 
claims Soelle, 'I discovered the meaning of work'. This discovery involved 
a shift 
from a myopic, production-oriented perspective on work to a 
more human understanding of work. I discovered the meaning of 
work in its three essential dimensions: self-expression, 
social-relatedness, and reconciliation with nature. [ 242 J 
Each of these three essential dimensions is elucidated in a separate 
chapter of her book. (243] Here I am interested chiefly in her first 
dimension: wcirk as self-expression. 
According to Soelle, 'good work must ••• be understood as an end in 
[238]See especially Niebuhr 1936; 1942. An example is his awareness of the 
1 theme of class struggle in Niebuhr 1942, pp, xi vf\ 113f, etc. 
[239]Soelle and Cloyes 1984. The book originated in~ series of lectures, 
entitled 'Creation, Work, and Sexuality' and deAivered by Soelle in 1983, which have been rewritten jointly by Soelle and Cloyes (ibid., p. ix). 7 
--
[240]See, for example, Soelle and Cloyes 1984, p. 14, which links 
transcendence, patriarchy, and the maleness of theologians. 
[241]Soelle quotes a long section of the 1844 MSS on page 95 as exemplary 
for her position. 
[242]Soelle and Cloyes 1984, p. 83. 
[243]Ibid., pp. 83-113. 
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itself and not just as a means to get something else', (244) and in fact 
'responsibility and self-realization are of greater value and importance 
than the commodities produced'. (245) 'We humans have an undeniable need 
for self-expression', she continues, and 'labor, in its subjective 
dimension, is a way to fulfill this need'· [246] Thus: 
In understanding what good work means and what it does to the 
worker, the paradigm of the artist is most relevant •••• Art, 
like all good work, enables us to release the power of our 
imaginations and to become persons as we use this power ••• the 
worker-artist collaborates with God in creating, and she or he 
experiences this labor, praxis, self-activity as pleasure and 
enjoyment. [247] 
Clearly what we have here is almost the polar opposite to the 
theologies of work of Novak and Benne. What is perhaps most striking is 
that Soelle manages to describe "the meaning of work" without considering 
that the product is in any way essential to the process. As a consequence 
she blurs the distinction between work on the one hand, and art or play on 
the other, a distinction investigated and defended in 4.4 above. There I 
defended Habermas' implicit insistence, encoded in his maintenance of an 
internal link between purposive-rational action and social labour, that 
work is defined over-against these other activities by its orientation to 
the need to maintain human life by gaining a product. Elsewhere, of course, 
Soelle does admit that production is necessary: 'We must produce in order 
to · survive'. (248] Yet this aspect of production is not related to her 
theoretical stance upon "the meaning" of work, and Soelle displays 
remarkably little interest in production-for-survival in itself, as apart 
from its social and expressive dimensions. Clearly, there is here a 
confusion of economic with creative and self-formative categories, based 
on a romantic 
[ 244 ]Ibid., p. 88. 
[245 ]Ibid., p. 90. 
confusion between aesthetic-expressive and 
\ 
I 
[246Jibid., p. 91. 'Subjective 
distinction between the 
(Wojtyla 1984, pp. 8-12). 
dimension' is an allusion to John Paul II's 
objective and subjective aspects of labour 
[247]Soelle and Cloyes 1984, p. 85. 
[ 248 ]Ibid., p. 95. 
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purposive-rational action [249] 
Also of interest in Soelle's account is her selective use of the 
Marxian categories. Although making much use of the early Marx, relatively 
absent is Marx's interest in class, and his motivation in respect of the 
sufferings of the proletariat. [ 250] To put it in Habermasian terms, 
Soelle's use of the Marxian category of alienated labour reads rather like 
a protest against the colonization of the lifeworld, reflecting the 
class-pacified condition of late capitalist society. [251] The issues she 
raises are related 'not to distribution problems, but to questions of the 
grammar of forms of life'. [252] Her claim to have found "the meaning" of 
work is thus to be viewed with due scepticism, given the obviously 
"situated" nature of her argument. 
This last point is of some imp9rtance, and I shall discuss it more fully 
in 6. 1 below. 
5.5.2 Liberation theologies: the Marx of the economics 
The South American liberation theologians as a group [253] lay much 
less stress upon this romantic/expressivist aspect of human labour, [254] 
and concentrate instead upon the issues of class and distribution. This 
clear difference from Soelle 's work can be accounted for by the quite 
different setting within which these theologies are produced: liberation 
theology arises out of reflection upon the plight of the poor in the 
countryside and slums of South America. This socio-economic setting bears 
perhaps as much resemblance to the classical capitalism of nineteenth 
century Europe as to twentieth century late capitalism (albeit that the 
situation is complicated by the role of the multinationals, the different 
form of the state, and so on). Here class conflict is by no means pacified 
) 
[249]See 3.6.3:B, 4.7 above. 
"'i [250]See 2.3, 3.6.3, 4.7 above . , 
[ 251 ]See 3.6, 4.6 above. 
[252]TKH2, p. 576; compare 3.6.7 above. 
[253]It is, of course, not correct to see these as a completely unified 
group, and some differences will be noted below. 
[254]Although the category "alienated labour" is still frequently used. 
. See, for example, Gutilrrez 1974, p. 295. 
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by the activities of a bureaucratic welfare state. [255] In such a 
situation, characterized by dire poverty afflicting large sections of the 
population, one is unlikely to think that the product of labour is 
unimportant: in fact justice in its distribution is the main point at 
issue. However, while this situation injects considerably more realism 
into liberation theology than is to be found in Soelle's rather 
implausible romanticism, [256] it is also responsible for its major 
weakness as considered in the light of Habermas' work. 
It is a moot point to what extent liberation theology may be said to 
present "a theology of work". Segundo, for example, explicitly rejects this 
as his intention: 
What is designated as 'liberation theology' does not purport 
to be merely one sector of theology, like the 'theology of 
work' or the 'theology of death'. Liberation is meant to 
designate and cover theology as a whole. [257] 
And indeed explicit references to the sort of exercise we have seen 
undertaken by Moltmann, Wojtyla et. al. are few and far between. [258] But 
in the broadest sense of the term we might see liberation theology in toto 
as "theology of work", in that the problematic for its central 
oppression-liberation axis is provided by an economistic analysis of 
society. 
Now, while it is not true to say that liberation theology represents 
merely a weakly Christianized Marxism, interested only in social and 
political liberation, [259] it does share with Marxism an insistence on 
the primacy of the economic dimension. At the point at which theology 
intersects with a critique of human society, oppression (and therefore 
liberation) is defined predominantly in the economic dimension, rather 
\ 
I [255]See 3.6.6, 3.6.7 above. 
-; [256]A romanticism which is, we may note, conspicuously absent from her 
earlier discussion of work in Soelle 1975, pp. 62-68. Compare Soelle 
1983. 
[257]Segundo 1980, p. 241 . 
I [258]But see, for example, Gutierrez 1974, pp. 158-160, 172-174. 
[259]See, for example , the statements in Gut i /rrez 1974, pp. 36f, 71f; 1980, 
pp. 28f. 
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than being a matter of (say) race, gender , or the use of military 
power. [260] The oppr essed are the poor; the agent of oppression is the 
economic system; [261 J and integral liberation will involve, if not 
exclusi vely consist in, the complete transformation of this economic 
s ys tem that results in poverty for the many: 
The lower classes of the populace, forced to live on the 
margins of society and oppressed since time immemorial ••• want 
to be the active subjects of their own history and to fo r ge a 
radically different society •••• the people must come to power 
if society is to be truly free and egalitarian. In such a 
soci ety private ownership of the means of production will be 
eli mina ted because it enables a few to e xpropriate the fruits 
of labor performed by the many [and] generates class 
di visions in society •••• In such a reordered society the 
social takeover of the means of production will be 
accompanied by a social takeover of the reins of political 
power that will ensure people's liberty . [262] 
The choice is stark, and is centred upon two opposed models of the economic 
system: capitalism (oppressive) or socialism (liberative) - a choice that 
Segundo can call a 'Crux Theologica'. [263] 
These writers need to be confronted with the first and fifth criticisms 
of Marx that Habermas offers in 3.6.3:B above. [264] These criticisms are 
not meant to detract from the usefulness of the Marxian critique of the 
generation of pove r ty in t he South American situation, a critique wielded 
to great effect by the liberation theologians. Yet they do suggest that 
caution be exercised in tying theological categories too closely to the 
concept of revolution as conceived in this Marxian model. [265] 
Firstly, these writers are both too negative about capitalism, and too 
positive about -the prognosis for a social revolution led spontaneously by 
[260]Compare 4.6 above. I 
I [261 ]Although Gutie'rrez identifies sin as ' t he ultimate root of all disruption of fri endsh ip and al l injustice and oppression' (1974, p. 37), it is not entirely clear how this insight is to be integ rated into his socio~economic analysis. 
[262]Guti6'rrez 1980, pp. 1f. 
[ 263 ]Segundo 1980, p. 240. 
[264]See that section for references to TKH2. 
[265]Contra, for example, Segundo 1980, pp. 245-249 and passim. 
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the people. On the one hand they neglect the fact that capitalism has been 
responsible for the destruction of the old feudalistic class relations 
that themselves represented oppression in another (directly political) 
dimension; and they ignore the fact that the capitalist system has the 
virtue of efficiency to offset against its pernicious side-effects, 
particularly the generation of the class structure. On the other hand, 
their implicit theory of revolution assumes (implausibly) that production, 
and necessary social organization in general, can continue efficiently 
when the systems of economy and state are taken over directly by "the 
people" - in Habermas' terms, under the conditions of a collapse of these 
systems back onto the lifeworld. Missing the fact that .§!!1_ modern society 
must inevitably be characterized by a high degree of structural 
differentiation - a differentiation that reduces simplistic talk of 
control by the people to the unacceptably vague - it wrongly presents the 
democratically-run socialist future simply as "freedom", opposed to 
present (capitalist) "necessity". 
Secondly, and not unrelatedly, this model's economistically 
foreshortened social analysis ignores reification effects that are 
traceable to the administrative rather than to the economic system. As a 
result, these writers are prevented from taking seriously the lessons to 
be learnt, both from the evolution of the welfare state of late capitalism, 
and from the nature of the bureaucratic socialist states of eastern 
Europe. 
We may also add, to go beyond Habermas here, [266] that these writers 
tend to underplay the role of the nation state, and intentionally applied 
military power, in modern social dynamics. I have already referred to the 
relative neglect of the conflict-areas of race and gender in their 
analyses. 
It would be a mistake, however, to see a~l li~ eration theology as 
I 
restricted, in its sociological dimension, to the co~cepts of Marx himself. 
I 
At least two examples of further developments are of interest • 
. [ 266 ]See sect i on 4.6 above . 
21 1 
/ Firstly Miranda, [267] deploying an argument similar to that of Lukacs, 
outli ned in 3.4.1 above, rejects the simplistic capitalist:bad / poor=good 
sche ma, and argues that attitudes related to the commodity form penetrate 
to all levels of society. [268] This phenomenon is then interpreted 
theologically as representing the solidarity of mankind in sin: 
Of course we are dealing with the sin of humankind •••• It is 
superficial to imagine that the spirit of oppression and 
exploitation has left us unscathed and has infected only that 
small section of the population known as entrepreneurs. [269] 
Thus 'any change in the socioeconomic system' is 'a priori inadequate, if 
that change does not involve a radical revolution in people's attitudes 
toward each other'. [270] Here there is a recognition of the 
deep-seatedness of the problems involved in modernity, a recognition that 
is perhaps as close to Horkheimer and Adorno as to the early Marx. [271] 
Secondly, in his recent Protestantism and Repression, [272] Rubero Alves 
combines an appropriation of the work of Max Weber, with a sophisticated 
"critical theory" reading of Marx, [273] in the context of the 
relationship between Protestantism and modernity. Alves is alive here to 
the issue of bureaucracy in its Weberian context, and its possible 
dehumanizing consequences. [274] Here there is an emphasis that needs to 
be adopted into the classical Marxian analyses of writers such as 
Gutie"rrez, to yield a social theory that seriously recognizes oppression 
(and therefore liberation) in more than one dimension. 
[267]Miranda 1977b. 
[268Jibid., pp. 4f. Miranda in fact traces this 
[269Jibid., p. 21. 
[270Jibid., pp. 21f. 
[271 ]See 1.4.6, 3.4.2 above. 
[272]Alves 1985. 
l 
insight to Lenin (ibid.). 
... 
I 
[273 ]Alves 1985, pp. xxv- xxxi ii. Alves opposes the Althusserian and 
Stalinist "Marx as scientist" schools. 
[274Jibid., pp. 20f. 
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6. THEMES FOR A RECONSTRUCTED THEOLOGY OF WORK 
6. 1 Introduction 
A Christian theology of work, I have suggested, should consist in a 
creative reapplication of certain of the central Christian themes, 
particularly the themes of sabbath, creation, cross, kingdom, and vocation, 
to the problematic of human work. In chapter 5 we have seen several 
examples of such a reapplication, examples which, I have argued, are 
unsatisfactory in various ways. The task of my final chapter is to attempt 
this project a little less inadequately. Three preliminary issues require 
discussion. I shall consider them under the headings of ideology, scope, 
and status. 
A problem that arises, firstly, in any attempt to make constructive use 
of a tradition [1] - and in this the Christian tradition is no exception -
is that language, as well as being the medium of the tradition, may also 
function as 'a medium of domination and social power', serving to 
'legitimate relations of organized force'. [2] As well as elucidating 
situations creatively, that is, language may serve to disguise injustices: 
In so far as the legi timations do not articulate the relations 
of force that they make possible, in so far as these relations 
are merely expressed in the legitimations, language is 
ideological . [3] 
It follows that any reapplication of the tradition that occurs under 
'conflictual patterns of human existence' s~ch at our own, has its 
'truthfulness ••• threatened by "ideological distortiof "'. Thus the project 
I 
of forging a theology of work must 'include the attempted critique of its 
~ 
I 
(1] On the relationship between the critical and constructive tasks of 
the theologian, Lash 1986, pp. 3-17. 
[ 2 J Habermas 1977, p. 360. Compare 3.3.3 above. 
[ 3] . Ibid. 
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own ideological elements'. [4] Hermeneutics must be accompanied by the 
critique of ideology. [5] 
A second, and not unrelated, issue concerns the scope of applicability 
of the theology of work that is proposed. In 3.6.3:A above, I noted the 
attack of Marx and Habermas upon the concept of "human work in general", a 
concept that is independent of the needs, competences, and (crucially) 
social situation of the working indi victual. Such an abstraction from 
reality is not only a dubious quantity in the light of Wittgenstein's 
concept of "family resemblances" noted in 1.~2 above, it also deserts the 
'central thrust' of Marx's 'insistence that it is human beings, not "mind" 
or "reason", who are the subjects of action and discourse': [6] 
The premisses from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premisses from which abstraction can only be 
made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which they 
live. [7] 
But if the concept of "human work in general" is thus doubtful, so also 
must be the concept of "the meaning" of work. [8] And if that is true, then 
an adequate theology of work cannot consist in a statement, of "the 
meaning" of work in theological categories. Such an idealist notion is to 
be resisted in the name of an authentic Christian materialism. [9] 
This leads to the third issue, the question of status. It would be a 
mistake to regard the forging of a theology of work as merely a matter of 
objective and disinterested description - description of the activity of 
human work in theological terms. [ 10] Such a view of the theological 
enterprise falls into the trap of the "positivism" that Habermas so 
[4] Lash 1981, p. 132. 
[5] Compare 3.3.3 above ; West 1985b. 
[6] Lash 1981, p. 139. 
[ 7 J Marx 1977, p. 160. 
[8] As noted in 5.5.1 above. 
[9] Compare Lash 1981, pp. 88-111, 135-152. 
~ 
I 
) 
[10] I have criticized such a view of the function of language in general, 
and its use in the theological enterprise in particular, in West 
1985a, p. 225 and passim. 
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persuasively attacked in Knowledge and Human Interests. [ 11 J Moreover, 
such a model of theological truth ignores the operation of the "double 
hermeneutic", which I discussed in 4.5 above: the special feature of the 
social sciences (as compared with the natural sciences) is that their 
findings, by penetrating the consciousness of the actors that constitute 
their subject matter, tend to change that subject matter as a result: 
Atoms cannot get to know what scientists say about them or 
change their behaviour in the light of that knowledge. Human 
beingscandoso. [12] 
It follows that what Habermas calls the critical social sciences [13] (and 
in this sense, at least, theology is methodologically a critical social 
science) cannot be purely descriptive; they are also partially 
constructive and transformative of the reality with which they deal. Along 
with describing social reality they also, by virtue of their description, 
promote or retard the transformation of that reality. Theological 
description must be ideological [14] or liberative; to be "neutral" is not 
an option that is available to it. 
I shall close with some comments about the structure and argument of 
this final chapter. My aim is to provide an alternative to the following 
general picture of the bearing of the relevant theological categories uopn 
the activity of work, a picture which is beset by unavoidable ideological 
consequences: 
(1) Social labour is imitative of, or even a participation in, divine 
creation. 
[11] See 2.2.1:A above. This is so despite the doubtful nature of Habermas' 
anchoring epistemology in the knowledge-constitutive interests (see 
2.2. 1 :C; 4.3 above). We may note a partial P,arallt l here with Earth's 
rejection of the idea that "creation" can be con idered in Christian 
doctrine in abstraction from the framework of, Christology (Barth 
1949, pp. 50, 52; see 6.3 below), or that theology can operate in 
autonomy from the interests of the church (!Sarth 1975, p. xiii). 
Christian truth for Barth, as truth for Haberrnas, is situated, 
framework-bound truth. 
[12] Giddens 1982b, pp. 14f. 
[ 13 J See 2.2. 1 :A above. 
[14] I her e use the t er m "ideology" in the sense outlined in West 1985b, 
pp. 429f. Compare J . Thompson 1984, p. 4. 
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(2) Its performance cont ri butes directly to the building of the 
kingdom o f God . 
(3) It is thus our Christian vocation to engage in social labour as 
diligently as possible. 
(4) The suffering that this entails is a sharing in the redemptive 
sufferings of Christ on the cross. 
I shall argue against such a tying of the theological categories to the 
performance of social labour, suggesting that these categories should 
rather be related to the transformation of social relations, of which the 
"relations of production" form a significant part. In this I shall make 
considerable use of the thought of Karl Barth, and in particular his 
Church Dogmatics III/4. [15] There are several striking parallels between 
Barth's use of the Christian symbols and the thought of Habermas in this 
area, parallels that I shall point out as and when they appear. 
6.2 Sabbath 
I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of 
Egypt , out of the house of bondage •••• Observe the sabbath day, 
to keep it holy •••• Six days you shall labour, and do all your 
work; but the seventh day is a sabbath to the LORD your God ; in 
it you shall not do any work ••• that your manservant and your 
.maidservant may rest as well as you. You shall remember that 
you were a servant in Egypt, and the LORD your God brought you 
out thence ••• therefore the LORD your God commanded you to 
keep the sabbath day. [Deut 5: 6, 12-15, RSV] 
6.2.1 Sabbath as a ·hermeneutical issue 
The origins of the Jewish sabbath 
ant iquity. [16] The Old Testament itself 
[15] Barth 1961. 
are lost fn the 
contains twr quite 
I 
~ 
J 
mists of 
different 
[16] Von Rad 1962, p. 16 note 3; Ringgren 1969, pp. 201f; Fohrer 1973, pp. 
116f; Dressler 1982, pp. 22-24; W. Schmidt 1983, pp. 88-90. Indigenous , 
Babylonian, Canaanite, and Kenite sources of the term and its content 
have been suggested. 
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reasons for its observance, that link it respectively with the creation 
(Exodus 20:8-11) and the deliverance from Egypt (Deuteronomy 5:12-15), and 
neither of these meanings of "sabbath" is likely to be particularly 
ancient. (17] In these texts the rationale for the sabbath observance is 
harmonized with the theology of (respectively) the priestly and 
deuteronomic redactors. Thus quite apart from the factors adduced in 6.1 
above, the idea of "the .meaning" of the sabbath is already problematic. 
Even within the Old Testament texts themselves "sabbath" is a theme that 
has undergone a great deal of creative reapplication, and the institution 
has a history in the community that produced our Old Testament texts which 
at best we can only sketchily reconstruct. [ 18] 
This history and diversity of the tradition is a factor that is 
frequently overlooked by commentators, such as Moltmann and John Paul II, 
who draw a close parallel between the creative activity of God and human 
social labour. In these cases, either explicitly or implicitly, it is the 
priestly redaction of the fourth commandment - and the priestly creation 
account of Genesis 1:1-2:3 which is r edactionally related to it - that is 
taken as normative. Moltmann, for example, writes that 'according to the 
biblical traditions [sic] creation and sabbath belong together'; (19] and, 
on the basis of Exodus 20:8-11 and Genesis 2: 1-3, he assumes that the 
sabbath commandment legitimates human labour as well as rest: 
The commandment to work and rest is based on its 
correspondence with the creating and resting of the Lord. In 
work and rest human beings, in their way, take part in the 
creative world process and in the joy of the Creator"" this 
(17] Ringgren 1969, p. 201; Fohrer 1973, p. 117. 
[ 18] It seems likely that the sabbath acqui r ed its current form and 
importance only during the Babylonian exile (Ri ggren 1969, p. 298) . 
Here, with circumcision, it 'won a status confess · onis' (von Rad 1962, 
p. 79 ). But that a seventh day of rest is r e ati vely ancient is 
at tested by Exodus 34:21 and 23: 12, which are th<:bught to predate the 
Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5 redactional forms (~inggren 1969, p. 202; 
Schmidt 1983, pp. 89f) . The other undoubtedly ancient aspect of 
sabbath is as a day holy to (special to, set aside for) Yahweh (Schmidt 1983, pp. 90f) . 
(19] Moltmann 1985b, p. 277; compare p. 5. This is unequivocally true only for the priestly redactor, who has compressed an original eight acts 
of creation into six days in order to make this link (Ringgren 1969, pp. 106, 201 ). 
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makes work itself meaningful. (20] 
John Paul II, similarly, regards the sabbath rest of Genesis 2 as 
legitimating human work along with rest: 
It is first by working and then by resting that man ought to 
imitate God, since God himself chose to present his own 
creative activity under the form of work and rest. [21 J 
However, there seems to be no convincing reason why this consensus as 
to either the normative value of the Exodus 20 text, or its interpretation, 
should be followed. The deuteronomic version quoted above, although itself 
redactional, has, if anything, the better claim to be the more ancient: the 
Decalogue in Exodus 20 remains in the framework of the self-identification 
of Yahweh not as creator but as liberator from Egypt. [22] And what is 
probably the oldest form of the commandment that is available to us: 
Six days you shall work, but on the seventh day you shall rest; 
in ploughing time and in harvest you shall rest. [Ex 34:21, 
RSV] [23] 
seems to concentrate on the necessity for the interruption of work, [24] 
even at the most awkward times economically. There is little sense here of 
a legitimation of social labour; it is simply taken for granted. 
Not, of course, that this in itself solves the hermeneutical problem. As 
little can we always assume that the most ancient interpretation is the 
most valid, as we can (invoking a theory of doctrinal development) accept 
the most modern without question. But even in the case of the later texts 
the Moltmann/Wojtyla position is not convincing. Schmidt denies that 
Genesis 2:2f contains the idea of 'a divine "order of creation" , with an 
(20] Moltmann 1984, p. 41; compare 5.3.1 above. 
(21 J Wojtyla 1984, p. 52. ) 
[22] Kiss 1983, p. 16. The issue of to what extent~ creation is ever 
autonomous from redemption in Old Testament thought is not unrelated 
to this issue, and has a long history in Old Testament scholarship. 
The classic case for the primacy of redemption was made by von Rad in 
1936 (von Rad 1984). Several essays in B. Anderson 1984 continue the 
argument. 
[23] Compare Ex 23:12, also ancient. 
[24] Schmidt 1983, p. 90. 
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alternation of work and rest'. [25] And it is far from clear that a primary 
intention of the Exodus 20 text is to legitimate human labour by drawing a 
parallel with the di vine creative activity. [26] In the context of the 
exile, in which this text arose, it is the sabbath rest (forming with 
circumcision the distinctive sign of the exiled Jewish community in 
Babylon) that is of major interest. [27] The status of human work itself 
is arguably not under consideration. 
A matter that deserves further consideration here, especially in view 
of my remarks in 6. 1 above, is the social setting within which the priestly 
and deuteronomic interpretations of the sabbath commandment arose. I shall 
defer consideration of this until 6.2.3 below. Meanwhile I shall outline a 
theological presentation of sabbath that concurs with me in stressing the 
primary importance of rest rather than work: that of Karl Barth in Church 
Dogmatics III/4. 
6.2.2 Sabbath in Church Dogmatics III/4 
In commenting upon the sabbath commandment, Karl Barth notes that 'in 
general, theological ethics has handled this command of God ••• with a 
casualness and feebleness which certainly do not match ••• its decisive 
material significance'. [28] Rather than relegating it to its usual 
backwater, Barth deliberately places it at the beginning of special ethics 
as a whole, and thus before anything has been said about work. [29] In this 
he intends to make an important point relevant to the concerns of this 
thesis, a point which he expresses in a set of rhetorical questions: 
Can we really understand the holy day before we have 
understood the working day and its command, its many commands? 
Ought not "rest" to be earned by preceding work? Should not 
what we say about it be in terms of what has already been said 
[25] Schmidt 1983, p. 92. ) 
[26] Compare Barth 1961, p. 473. 
~ [27] Schmidt 1983, p. 92. On the interpretation of the sabbath in Judaism 
at the beginning of the Christian era, Rowland 1982. On the history of 
the sabbath in Christianity, and its relationship to Sunday, Rordorf 
1968; Bauckham 1982a; 1982b; 1982c. 
[28] Barth 1961, p. 50. Moltmann 1985b also regards the sabbath theme as 
important (pp. 276-296 ), but uses it differently; see 6.4 below. 
[ 29 J Barth 1961, p. 50. 
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about work? The question may seem obvious, but it must 
actually be reversed. Can we understand the working day, the 
day of labour in relationship to our fellow-men, or any of its 
commands, before we have understood the holy day? •••• Is not 
this interruption the true time from which alone he can have 
other time? Is not the paradoxical 'activity' of the holy day 
the origin of all other activity which seems to have better 
reason for this designation? (30] 
Barth obviously views the sabbath as 'delimiting and relativising' [31] 
the importance of social labour in the human enterprise. Here there is an 
implicit rejection of 'the reduction of the self-generative act of the 
human species to labor', (32] a rejection which has formed a persistent 
theme of this thesis. We may usefully compare Habermas' insistence on the 
primacy of lifeworld over system with Earth's insistence that the sabbath 
constitutes the true time from which all other time is to be understood; 
and perhaps most interestingly Habermas' relativization of instrumental as 
compared with communicative action with Barth's insistence that it is the 
paradoxical activity of the sabbath that is of greater significance than 
the activity of the weekday. 
Correspondingly, Barth denies the parallel between human social labour 
and God's creation in the form in which it is accepted by Moltmann and John 
Paul II. Whereas 'every seventh day shall have for the creature the same 
content and meaning as the seventh day of creation has for God Himself', 
there neither is nor can be issued 'a corresponding summons to the week's 
work as a supplementary and imitative participation by man in God's 
creative work'. [ 33] Far from being a co-creator in the completion of 
heaven and earth, (34] man, according to Barth, enters upon a completed 
creation, experienced as a gift of grace, and initially rests. 
Barth correspondingly links the sabbath concept with the theological 
· issue of "faith and works". To see sabbath as .a 
(30] Ibid., pp. 50f. 
[31] Ibid., p. 53. 
[ 32] KHI, p. 42. 
[ 33 J Barth 1961, p. 52. 
[ 34] Ibid., p. 482; compare Hauerwas 1983, passim. 
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(temporally and in status) work, he suggests, is to promote Law ahead of 
Gospel. [35] The Genesis 1:1-2: 3 narrative, which has the seventh day as 
man 's first, is on the contrary a way of suggesting that human history 
under the command of God 
really begins with the Gospel and not with the Law, with an 
accorded celebration and not a required task ••• with a rest 
and not with an activity ••• with Sunday and not with a working 
day which could lead to ,Sunday only after a succession of 
gloomy working days. [36] 
Indeed: 
the first word said to him, the first obligation brought to 
his notice, is that without any works or merits he himself may 
rest with God and then go to his work. [37] 
Sabbath thus becomes 'the sign of the freedom which God the Creator has 
assumed to be gracious to His creature and therefore to be his Lord'. [38] 
And the New Testament, in celebrating this holy day on the first day of the 
week, far from 'rebelling against the order of creation', was in fact 
'acting in profound agreement' with it: 
In the resurrection it recognized the fulfilment of the 
covenant between God and man which was established in 
creation ••• it saw and understood that the seventh day of 
creation which is to be kept holy as the 'Lord's Day' ••• is not 
only the last but above all the first day of man, and is 
therefore to be kept as his holy day. [39] 
Man is emphatically not to be understood primarily as Homo faber . 
I noted above the parallel between Haberrnas' downgrading of the 
impo r ta nce of social labour and Barth 's handling of t he theme of sa bba th. 
In two ways , however , Barth and Haberrnas are saying something rather 
different. 
[35] Barth 196 1, p. 51. 
[ 36] I bid., p. 52. 
[ 37 J Ib i d. 
(38] Ibid . 
) 
; 
[ 39 J Ibid., p. 53. Moltmann ( 1985b, pp. 294-296) rejects the idea that the 
Jewish sabbath is to be subsumed under the Christian Sunda y as Barth 
su ggests. See further Rordorf 1968; Bauckham 1982a; 1982b; 1982c. 
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Firstly, as is to be expected, it is not only social labour that Barth 
relativizes; it is also the significance of the human social lifeworld in 
its enti rety. The sabbath commandment 
forbids [ man] on this day - in order that he may know it and 
keep to it all his days - to try to li ve by the Yes whi ch he 
can say to himself or to others or to the cosmos. [40] It 
forbids him to be satisfied with his own Yes. It forbids him 
faith in his own plans and wishes, in a justification and 
deliverance which he can make for himself •••• The aim of the 
sabbath commandment is that man shall give and allow the 
omnipotent grace of God to have the first and the last word at 
every point. [41] 
Among other things, this implies that the sabbath rest, which is to be the 
orientation point for the human active life, has a quite different texture 
to the modern (late capita list!) concept of leisure. [ 42] 
Secondly, Barth avoids the unfortunate effects of Habermas' system and 
lifeworld model that I have criticized in 4.5 and 4.7 above. Sabbath and 
weekday are integrated into the one life-history, and the significance of 
social labour is not separated off within the part of life that is 
involved in the economic sys tern, and divorced from action concepts: 
[Sabbath] does not imply an incrimination or discrediting of 
man's own willing and working, a negation of his capacity for 
it, an annu lling of the commision to make the best use of this 
capacity •••• It summons him to keep holy the Sabbath day 
merely i n order that it may dismiss and send him forth from it 
into the other days of the week •••• The omnipotent grace of God 
rules all world-occurrence as providence. But it does so from 
this sta rti ng point. [43] 
It is notable here that Barth uses (in Habermas' terms) action rather than 
s ystem concepts · to refer to social labour. Thus, whi le rejecting the 
Protestan t work ethic as classically understood, he is still able to 
r elate social l abou r to the idea of vocation, albeit \ only secondari ly. I 
[40] 
[ 41 ] 
[42] 
[43] 
,; 
I 
I 
Note in passing here a schema comparable to Habermas' "three worlds" (see 4.4 above). 
Barth 1961, p. 54. 
The Frankfurt School's critique of the "culture industry" is 
illuminating on this issue. For a summary, Held 1980, pp. 77-109. 
aarth 1961, pp. 53-55. 
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shall consider this further in 6.5.2 below. 
But if we may agree with Barth rather than Habermas at this point, we 
must recognize with Habermas the importance of class in questions of the 
significance of social labour, [44] a topic that receives little overt 
coverage in Barth's theology of work. I shall now turn to this issue by way 
of a reconsideration of the priestly and deuteronomic redactions of the 
sabbath commandment. 
6.2.3 The sabbath commandment and class relations 
Once we are able to prise the theme of sabbath away from the doctrinal 
system whi eh integrates it into an ideological legitimation of human 
labour by its comparison with di vine creation, the deuteronomic form of 
the sabbath commandment suggests a new integration point for the concept. 
In Deuteronomy 5:12-15, in accordance with the setting for the whole of the 
Decalogue in both its Exodus and Deuteronomy redactions, [45] the 
rationale for the sabbath observance is remembrance, not of creation, but 
of the deliverance from Egypt - the act that, at least in the deuteronomic 
theology, was foundational for the redeemed community in its own 
self-understanding. Here the emphasis is very clearly on the need for rest, 
particularly for those classes most likely to be oppressed in this regard. 
But it seems disingenuous to reduce the interest of the commandment to a 
purely humanitarian one in the modern liberal sense. [46] 
I suggested in 6.2.1 above that the social setting of the priestly and 
deuteronomic redactions of the sabbath commandment might be 
hermeneutically significant . It is now a commonplace that the social 
setting of the Israelites in the exile is reflected in the priestly 
theology, [47] and it is likely that the move from liberation from Egypt 
to creation as the justificatory basis for 
aspect of this: 
[44] See 3.6, 4.5, 4.6 above. 
[ 45] Exodus 20:2, Deuteronomy 5:6. 
~ 
I 
observance is an 
[46] As, for example, Ringgren 1969, p. 201; Mayes 1979, p. 169. 
[47] for example, Ackroyd 1968, p. 101. 
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What underlies this explanation of the sabbath from creation 
rather than from history, which is so unusual for the Old 
Testament? The alteration is understandable from the time at 
which the Priestly work was written: the exile marked an end 
to the primeval promises of possession of the land, of the 
temple and the covenant with David, so that commandments can 
no longer be connected with a historical event. So a 
connection is made not with a particular event, but with the 
history of the world at the beginning. [48] 
But if it is true that the setting of the whole Israelite community is 
reflected in the texts, then it is also likely that the texts will reflect 
the positions of their redactors within the Israelite social group [49] as 
a class-divided society. [50] And not only "reflect": in the light of the 
considerations adduced in 6. 1 above, we must be alive to the extent to 
which these texts functioned to maintain the status quo or to promote 
change in the society in which they originated. 
Paul Hanson's pioneering work The Dawn of Apocalyptic [51] is 
suggestive in this context, relating many of the post-exilic Old Testament 
texts to a reconstructed class struggle within the restoration 
community. [52] Hanson suggests that these texts should be read as the 
product of two distinct groups. One was the "hierocratic" group, dominated 
by a Zadokite priesthood that controlled the decisive power-centre of the 
temple, [53] responsible for such texts as Haggai and Zechariah 1-8 [54] 
and eventually Chronicles. [55] The other was a "prophetic" group, 
progressively marginalized, responsible for trite-Isaiah [56] and 
eventually Zechariah 9-14. [57] In Hanson's view, these texts thus reveal 
the struggle between these two forces: 
the one embodied in the ruling classes and devoted to 
[48] Schmidt 1983, p. 92. 
[49] So von Rad on Deuteronomy 
[50] Giddens' characterization 
( 195 3, pp. 60-69; 1966a, 1p. 23- 27 ). 
(1981, pp. 105-1 08). I 
[ 51 J Hanson 1979. 
[ 52 J Ibid., p. 212 and passim. 
[53] Hanson 1979, pp. 209f. 
[54] Ibid., pp. 240-262. 
Compare in this context i loger 1968. 
[ 55] Ibid., pp. 269-279. 
[56] Ibid., pp. 32-208. 
[57] Ibid., pp. 280-380. 
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prese r vation of the former institutional structures, the 
other found among the alienated and oppr essed and bent on 
revolution leading to change of the status quo. [58] 
We may, of course, disagree with the details of Hanson 's reconstruction, 
for example his simplification of social conflict to a struggle between 
just two well-defined groups. But he is surely correct in general that the 
social setting of texts, within the power relations and struggles of the 
groups that produced them, cannot simply be ignored as a hermeneutical key. 
It is undoubtedly the priestly strand of the Pentateuch that stands 
closer to Hanson's "hierocratic" group, and the deuteronomic strand to the 
"prophetic" . Thus it is perhaps no accident that the priestly redaction of 
the fourth commandment lays itself most open to ideological misuse, [59] 
whereas it is the story of the Exodus - the rationale for the deuteronomic 
form, and the setting for the whole Decalogue - that provides most 
inspiration for the political and liberation theologians. One such, who 
deals suggestively with the sabbath commandment and its setting in the 
Decalogue as a whole within a Marxian framework, is Friedrich Kiss. [60] 
'Work' , argues Kiss, 'is always set within a political system', [ 61 J and 
'relations of production ••• form the empirical basis from which faith and 
theology pr oceed '. [62] This, he argues, is well illustrated in the case of 
the Decalogue as a whole: 
"I am Yahweh your God , who brought you out of the land of 
Egypt, the house of slavery" •••• What God says about himself 
her e is a matter of relations of production. God can here only 
be understood by one who understands the meaning of "the house 
of slavery: Egypt" This is the background of the 
self-representation of God. From these relations of 
pr oduction he shows, so to speak, who he is. [63 ] 
In the light of 5. 5. 2 above , we may doubt the 
[58] Ibid ., p. 212; compa r e Belo 198 1, pp. 37- 59. 
[59] So 5.3, 6.2.1 above. 
[ 60 J Kiss 1983. 
[ 61] Ibid., p. 15. 
[ 62 ] I bid., p. 16. 
[ 63 J Ibid. 
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of this Marxian 
reduction of the political relations in Egypt to relat i ons of production. 
But this exegesis is suggestive in reading the sabbath commandment as 
embodying an ideal of sabbath that is critical of current social 
st r uctures. 
We can perhaps develop this idea a little more . The r e appears to be a 
play on words in Deut 5:12-15 that is theologically suggestive: 'bondage', 
'labour', 'work', 'manservant', and 'servant' all translate cognates of the 
same Hebrew root 'abad. [64] This suggests a very different view of human 
labour from the one advanced by Moltmann on the basis of Genesis 2:15. [65] 
Indeed there may have been no work - free age at the beginning , but this does 
not preclude linking freedom from toil with the idea of salvation in the 
future. If we may agree with the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews [66] 
and with Moltmann [67] in seeing the sabbath theologically as an 
eschatological category - as a proleptic presence of the conditions of the 
age to come, representing its nature as rest - then sabbath acquires a very 
different meaning. It becomes a sign of hope for the removal of toil, and 
especially the toil of the slave and servant: a toil that is figuratively 
represented by the Egyptian captivity. Work is not here legitimated as 
sharing in the divine creative activity. Rather its unpleasant and 
socially alienating dimensions are placed under judgement within the 
context of the salvation history. 
6. 3 .Cross and creation 
The work of man , the transformation of nature, continues 
creation only if it is a human act, that is to say , if it is 
not alienated by unjust socio-economic structures. [Gustavo 
Gutie'rrez] [68] 
) 
[64] This is not noted by the standard commentarirs on Deuteronomy. It 
seems to be more convincing than Moltmann's Servant/worker parallel 
criticized in West 1986a, pp. 4f. 
[ 65 J See 5.3. 1 above. 
[66] Heb 4:1-11. See van Rad 1966b, pp. 94-102; Hofius 1970. 
[67] Moltmann 1985b, pp. 276-296; see 6.4 below. 
[68] Guti6rrez 1974, p. 173. 
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6.3.1 Christology as ideology 
I have described elsewhere [69] how, by according social labour too 
great a theological significance, Jurgen Moltmann and John Paul II 
legitimate the unpleasant aspects of work by comparison with the suffering 
invol ved in di vine redemption. In their hands the cr oss - the symbol of the 
redemptive value of suffering - comes to suggest that work must be a part 
of the process of furthering the kingdom of God,_ me r ely because it is 
painful: 
The sweat and toil which are necessarily involved with work in 
the present condition of the human race always offer to the 
Christian ••• the possibility of shar ing lovingly in the work 
that Christ came to do. Suffering and death on a Cross were 
the means by which this work of salvation was done. So, by 
enduring the toil of work in union with Christ nailed to a 
cross for our sake , man in a way collabor ates with the Son of 
God in the redemption of mankind •••• The Christian finds in 
human work a small part of the Cross of Christ and accepts it 
in the same spirit of redemption as that in which Christ bore 
his Cross for us. [70] 
Such a use of the cross in the theology of work , however, tends to be 
ideological in its implications, because it deals with "pain in general" 
rather than distinguishing between the different causes of pain. Thus 
suffering may be legitimated that has little if anything to do with the 
advancement of t he kingdom of God suffering that is neither 
transformative no r inevitable. [71] Such a use fails to ask, in specific 
cases, the r eason for the pain associated with work. Is it the r esult , fo r 
example , of unjust exploitation of worker by employer? Does it follow from 
work that could quite easily be replaced either by machines or by more 
humane methods of working ? Is the necessary pain and toil of work (given 
the pr esent sta t e of t echnologi ca l development ) equitab ly shar ed among 
workfo r ce a nd society as a who l e ? [72] I n short, it \ s di ff i cult if not 
impossible to fra me a t heol ogy of work tha t us es t hJ cr oss in t hi s way 
I 
7 
(69] West 1986a. 
[70] Wojtyla 1984, p. 57. 
[71] Compare West 1985b, p. 434. 
[72] Which, I would suggest, is an implication of Habermas' discourse ethic 
as applied to the realm of social labour (compare 3. 3. 3 above) . 
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[69) West 1986a. 
[70 ) Wojtyla 1984, p. 57. 
[ 71 J Compare West 1985b, p. 434. 
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that is not also ideological - that does not '[serve] to sustain relations 
of domination' [73) - given that the theology is being produced in the 
setting of 'conflictual patterns of human existence'. [74) 
I will suggest, in 6.3.2 below, a way of using the symbol of the cross in 
this context that avoids this trap to a greater extent. Meanwhile we can 
note that the problem partly arises from John Paul II's abstraction of the 
cross from the social context in which it was embedded, and in which it had 
its initial meaning. [75) Becoming a timeless and universal symbol of the 
redemptive power of suffering-in-the-abstract, it can be applied to areas 
of the negative in human life so as to transform them into positives 
almost at will. [76) The original crucifixion, however, was not such a 
detached symbol, [77) being rather an event embedded in the social setting 
of the life and action, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. It is 
an implicate of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, I would suggest, 
not that the structures of society are immutable, [78) but that we should 
"read" what Christian theology holds to be the central revelatory act of 
God within this concrete setting. [79) 
When so read, it is arguable that the primary home of the cross symbol 
lies in what Habermas would call the social, rather than in the objective 
or subjective, worlds. In relation to the problematic of work, it is to be 
applied, not to questions of whether or not technology violates or fulfils 
inanimate nature (the objective world), [80) nor to questions of whether 
or not social labour is experienced as painful (the subjective world) [81) 
- except insofar as these are subsumable under a third question to do with 
the social world: what this symbol implies about the relations of 
production, which are one aspect of the power relations within society as 
a whole. In other words, in a theology of work, the cross should be related 
[73) J. Thompson 1984, p. 4. 
[74) Lash 1981, p. 132. ) 
[75 J Compare West 1985b, pp. 432-434, MacKinnon 1968,,_ pp. 98, 103f. 
,' [76) Compare West 1985b, pp. 433f. 
[77) MacKinnon 1968~ p. 103. 
[78) So Novak (see 5.4.2 above) . 
[ 79] Compare Hinge 1985, p. 11. 
[80] See 5.2 above. 
[81 J Compare West 1985b, p. 434. 
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to the issue of class relations. [82] In the terms of Habermas' Knowledge 
and Human Interests, it is a symbol at home within the methodological 
framework of the er i tical social sciences, with their epistemological 
framework of the "interest in emancipation". [83] 
6.3.2 Christology and creation 
What the meaning of God the Creator is and what is involved in 
the work of creation, is in itself not less hidden from us men 
than everything else that is contained in the Confession. 
[Karl Barth] [84] 
When Christian theologians wished to sketch a theology of God 
the Creator abstractly and directly, they have always gone 
astray ••• Christology, is the touchstone of all knowledge of 
God in the Christian sense, the touchstone of all theology. 
[Karl Barth] [85] 
It is frequently the case that the topics of creation and creativity 
are considered in Christian theology in abstraction from Christology in 
general, and the theology of the cross in particular. [86] Michael Novak's 
theology of creation is a case in point, as I have discussed in 5.4.2 above. 
"Creation" for Novak concerns the di vine making of the material world on 
the one hand, and the human release of its material resources on the other. 
Human creativity becomes a matter of the development of the power of 
technical control. But, as noted above, such a legitimation of the 
productivity of human work by the doctrine of creation, in avoiding the 
topics of class conflict and the ambiguity of modernity, once again tends 
to descend into ideology. [87] The use of this category to describe 
economic production [88] disguises, by virtue of the positive overtones 
carried over from di vine creation, the questionable aspects of this 
[82] See 6.2.3 above. 
[ 83 J See 2.2. 1 :A, 6. 1 above. 
[ 84] Barth 1949, p. 50; compare Barth 1958, p. 3. 
[85] Barth 1949, pp. 65f. 
~ 
I 
\ 
I 
[ 86 J For the argument of this section, compare West 1986c (appended) . 
[87] Compare 5.4.3 above . 
[ 88] Compare the use of the term "wealth creation" in Dawson 1984, pp. 13f, 
18f. 
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enterprise. 
Admittedly No vak 's is a somewhat extreme case. Yet even Jurgen Moltmann, 
in his recent God in Creation, [89] abandons his earlier Christocentric 
approach when he deals with the topic of creation. ' In the 1930s ', [90] he 
writes, 
the problem of th~ doctrine of creation was knowledge of God. 
Today the problem of the doctrine of God is knowledge of 
creation •••• Fifty years ago, discernment of the triune God 
revealed in Christ brought the church the assurance of faith; 
and today , in the same way , discernment of the God who is 
present in creation through his Holy Spirit can bring men and 
women to reconciliation and peace with nature. The salutary 
'christological concentration' in Protestant theology then, 
must be matched today by an extension of theology's horizon to 
cosmic breadth, so that it takes in the whole of God's 
creation. [91 J 
The implication is clear: we may talk about creation before we talk about 
Christology. [92] 
Here I want both to reject this abandonment of christocentricity in the 
doctrine of creation, and to propose a different paradigm for di vine 
creation and the human creativity that may be said to correspond to it. The 
way is indicated once again by Karl Barth who, as the quotations at the 
beginning of this subsection show, denies that the doctrine of creation in 
Christian theology can be autonomous from Christology. I shall supplement 
this Barthian insight by themes drawn from Old Testament theology and 
staurocentric Christology. 
It is notable that many attempts at a theology of creation start from 
the creation account in Genesis 1:1-2:3, r ead primarily as an account o f 
the making of "nature" to which the human drama of redemption is 
) 
7 [89] Moltmann 1985b. 
[90] At the time of the Barmen Declaration (ibid., p. xi ). 
[91] Ibid., pp. xif, my st ress. 
[92] This position is further implied by the order of volumes in 
Moltmann's new "systematics 11 : God in Creation ( volume II) precedes 
. Christology (volume III) (ibid., p. xv) . 
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subsequent. (93) Simply to accept this as "the Old Testament concept of 
creation" is, however, misleading. The creation theme in the Old Testament 
is perhaps better approached in terms of its treatment in Psalms and 
Deutero/Tri to-Isaiah, [ 94 J whose 'range of genres and dates offers a 
fairer sample of Israelite thought on creation than does Genesis'. [95 J 
Two themes are prominent in these texts that I want to highlight: [96) 
firstly the theme of Chaoskampf, of struggle against chaos, (97] and 
secondly the idea that the product of creation is not the natural order in 
and for itself, but the social order of the redeemed Israelite nation. [98) 
Mythologically these themes are combined, for example, in Isaiah 51:9: 
Awake, awake, put on strength, 
0 arm of the Lord .~ •• 
Was it not thou that didst cut Rahab in pieces, 
that didst pierce the dragon? 
Was it not thou that didst dry up the sea, 
the waters of the great deep; 
that didst make the depths of the sea a way 
for the redeemed to pass over? [99) 
Here the cosmological battle with the sea-monster at creation is run into 
the foundational redemptive act at the Red Sea, constitutive of Israel as 
a political entity, and into the future redemptive act of deliverance from 
the Babylonian exile. [100) Creation and redemption are not artificially 
separated, but are mutually interpreted; both are seen as parts of God's 
[93] 
[ 94 J 
[95] 
[96) 
This, however, is only one possible reading. See, for example, 
Westermann 1974, p. 17; B. Anderson 1977; Clifford 1985, pp. 520-523. 
Clifford ar-gues that Genesis 1-11 taken as a whole is 'a cosmogony' in 
the sense of 'the bringing-into-being of a people' ( 1985, p. 520). 
1985. 
Clifford 1985, p. 512. , 
See for example B. Anderson 1984, pp. 1-24; Cliffor! 
They can also be detected sot to voce in Genes; s 1, but there 
subjugated under an alternative conceptual framework (compare 
1985, pp. 49-57 ). 7 
are 
Day 
[97] The classic text here is Gunkel 1895, partially translated in B. 
Anderson 1984, pp. 25-52. See also Schmidt 1983, pp. 166-177; Day 1985, 
pp. 1-7, 18-38, 91-93, 97 and passim. 
[98] Clifford 1985, pp. 510f. 
[99] Isaiah 51:9, RSV. For other examples, Clifford 1985, pp. 512-520. 
[100]Day 1985, pp. 91-93. 
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/ seamless action in the creation of redeemed Israel. [ 101] As Gutierrez 
comments on the Exodus: 
because of it, creation is regarded as the first salvific act 
and salvation as a new creation. [ 102 J 
In passing we may note here an overlap with the discussion of the 
priestly and deuteronomic redactions of the sabbath commandment in 6.2.3 
above: Gen 1: 1-2:3 belongs to the priestly theology, while Isaiah 40-66 is, 
in Hanson's view, the basic text of the marginalized "prophetic" 
group. [ 103] But we can perhaps go further, to arrive at an absolutely 
crucial point in the argument of this chapter as a whole. If, as is widely 
accepted, the cross is the ultimate symbol of redemption in Christian 
theology, should we not in the light of the above look here for a 
transformation of our understanding of di vine creation as well - and 
therefore of human creativity? If it is the case that 'the crucified 
Christ [is] the foundation and measure of Christian theology as a 
whole', [104] that 'the paradigm of divine action is the Cross of 
Christ', [ 105] that it is supremely here that we are to find the revelation 
of God, [ 106] then surely it is here too, in this paradigmatic di vine 
action, that we should find our model for di vine creation. Moreover, to the 
extent that 'creaturely activity can take the form of correspondence to 
the di vine activity' through obedience, such that 'in his place and within 
his limits [man J with his action is the witness of Jesus Christ and 
therefore of God's will and work', [ 107] then the cross will also function 
as the paradigm for human creativity. 
[101]Clifford p. 515; 
external basis of 
of c r eation. 
compare Barth 1958, pp. 94-329\ creation is the 
the covenant, while covenent is -~he internal basis 
I 
[102]Gutitrrez 1974, p. 173; compare pp. 153-155. i [103]The author(s) of 56-66 being 'a community of those remaining faithful 
to the t r adition stemming from Second Isaiah' (Hanson 1979, p. 44). 
[104]Moltmann 1979a, p. 59. 
[ 105 ]Lash 1979, p . 152. 
[ 106]MacKinnon 1968, p. 104 ; compa r e West 1985b, p. 428. 
[107]Barth 1961 , p. 482. 
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Let us allow that this is the case, I suggest that two results follow. 
Firstly, the paradigm for the divine creative Chaoskampf becomes the 
paradoxical activity of God in the cross of Christ, Not the making of the 
material world, but this creative struggle - a struggle that is the 
birthpangs of the kingdom of God - should act as the ultimate reference 
point for assessing allegedly "creative" human activity, [108] Secondly, 
the homeland of the concept of creation moves from the natural (or 
subjective) world to the social world. The paradigm product becomes the 
new eschatological communities, a new social order witnessing to their 
future consummation in the New Creation of the kingdom of God. 
It is that which the Old and New Testaments term "New Creation", [ 109] 
I conclude, a concept replete with social and ethical overtones, that is 
the paradigm for a Christian concept of creation. Creation 'refers to the 
act by which God will remove injustice from the holy city and bring about 
a truly just and peaceful society'. [110] As Barth abbreviates: 
divine action is centrally and decisively the coming of the 
kingdom of God in Jesus Christ. [111] 
Now, if "creation" is a term concerning the bringing into being of a 
transformed social order (the kingdom of God), then human social labour 
can properly be considered "creative" only in a subsidiary sense - the 
sense in which it can contribute to the formation and maintenance of such 
[ . / an order •. 112] Such labour would constitute, as Gutierrez puts it in the 
/ quotation at the start of this section, 'a human act'. But Gutierrez is 
using "human" here in a normative rather than in a descriptive sense, and 
human work can correspond - even secondarily - to di vine creation only 
~~~;;~:-~ar~~~-e-1--:etween my model and Gustav AulL n 's theory of the 
atonement should be plain (Aulen 1931 ). However, r propose to keep the 
divine struggle grounded firmly within the soci6-cultural setting of 
the life and death of Jesus, rather than alloJ.ing it to become 'a 
mythological variable to which determinate value · can be assigned 
almost to taste' (Mac Kinnon 1968, p. 98; compare West 1985b, p. 432 ), 
[109]See for example Isaiah 65:17-19, Revelation 21:1-5. 
[110]Clifford 1985, p. 519. 
[11 1]Barth 1961 , pp. 474f. 
[ 112]See further 6. 5. 2 below. 
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when 'it is not alienated by unjust socio-economic structures'. [ 113) 
In the next section, I shall argue that this is implicit in the theme of 
the kingdom of God as preached and enacted by Jesus. 
6.4 Kingdom 
Every sabbath is a sacred anticipation of the world's 
redemption. It was with the proclamation of the messianic 
sabbath that the public ministry of Jesus of Nazareth began (Luke 4.18ff.) Through his giving of himself to death on the 
cross, and through his resurrection from the dead, the 
messianic era which he proclaimed was actually initiated 
the first day of the new creation. [Jurgen Moltmann] [114] 
I have argued above that the cross, if it is to be used theologically 
without gross ideological implications, needs to be "read" in the context 
of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, and that this is 
as true for its role in the theology of work as elsewhere. But this 
inevitably raises the complex and disputed question of the setting of 
Jesus' preaching and enactment of his central message of the kingdom of 
God. Here there is, naturally, not enough room to consider the history of 
scholarship on this vexed topic! [ 115] However , as the extract from 
Mol tmann quoted above suggests, there is arguably one element in that 
proclamation that is of particular importance in the context of this 
thesis: the theme o f the year of jubilee. Consideration of this theme will 
indicate that the relationship between social labour and the kingdom of 
God is quite different to that suggested in 6.1 above. 
-------------------- · 
[113]Gutitrrez 1974, p. 173. 
[114]Moltmann 1985b, pp. 6f. 
~ 
I 
) 
[ 115 ]For a brief bibliography, Rowland 1985, p. 347, note 4. 1. For a r ecent 
account, Sanders 1985, pp. 123 -241. 
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6.4.1 Jubilee as an Old Testament theme 
Many of the themes in the Old Testament exhibit the structure of a 
looking backwards to an earlier ideal time, be that time primaeval as in 
the creation narratives, the pre-monarchical period as in Deuteronomy, or 
the time of Solomon as in Chronicles. Such a looking back, however, rarely 
functions as mere nostalgia. Implicit is a critique of current beliefs and 
practices, and it may thus be utopian (116] in its implications. If a more 
ideal social state was possible once, the implicit argument runs, it must 
be possible once again. The ideal time thus displays a tendency to be 
transferred from an ideal past into an ideal future. The ideal king of old 
is transposed into the messiah of the future; [117] the Garden of Eden is 
reconstructed into the New Jerusalem. Of course, such beliefs may be 
misleading: the materials to construct the eternal city may not be to hand, 
or the complexity of the necessary design may be underestimated. I have 
suggested this as a problem that besets some of the liberation 
theologies. [ 118] But from the point of view of social function, it matters 
little whether or not the description of the ideal past state is 
historically accurate. The belief that change is possible, and the model of 
the alternative to the present given, can themselves act as stimuli to 
transformati ve social action. [ 119] In terms of social function, it 
matters little whether there ever was a Garden. The important question is: 
can we construct the City? As Ernst Bloch says, 'the true Genesis is not at 
the beginning, but at the end'. [ 120] 
[ 116]1 intend "utopian" in the sense defined by Karl Mannheim: 'A state of 
mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality 
within which it occurs •••• [however] •••• Only those orientations 
transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when 
they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, ~ither partially or 
wholly, the order of things prevailing at the ti e •••• a distinction 
is set up between the utopian and the ideologi al states of mind' (Mannheim 1936, p. 173 ). 1 
[ 117 ]For the king/messiah relationship, Mowinckel 195i. 
[ 118 ]See 5.5.2 above. 
[119]These models may, alternatively, be rendered 'socially impotent' by being 'confined to a world beyond history and society, where they 
could not affect the status quo', that is, be "ideological" in 
Mannheim's sense (Mannheim 1936, p. 173 ). 
[ 120]!:Uoch 1959, p. 1628, stress removed. 
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The institution of the jubilee year [121 J is one such theme. As 
presented in the Holiness Code in Leviticus [122] it has the appearance of 
an ancient institution, factually reported, reflecting an ideal 
egalitarian society of the early settlement period. As a matter of 
historical fact, there is severe doubt whether its legislation was ever 
put into practice at all, [123] and its institution even in theory was 
probably quite late. [124] But as regards its sociological and theological 
function, that is, perhaps, not the point. [ 125] Looking back to an ideal 
egalitarian society of the past, [126] it exercised a critique of present 
social relationships that could encourage (and was no doubt intended by 
its author/redactor to encourage) [127] transformative social action in 
the present. Moreover, with its absorption into the complex of later Jewish 
eschatological ideas, [128] it formed a component of an ideal future that 
could, and frequently did, become utopian rather than ideological. 
[ 121 ]Lev 25:8-55; compare Lev 27: 16-25, Num 36:4. On jubilee, North 1954; de 
Vaux 1965, pp. 175-177; Andreasen 1972, pp. 216f; Yoder 1972, pp. 64-77 
and passim; Wenham 1979, pp. 316-324; Leech 1984; Moltmann 1985b, pp. 289-292; Ringe 1985, pp. 16-32 and passim. 
[122]0n which von Rad 1953, pp. 25-36; Reventlow 1961. Its theology 
exhibits links with that of Deuteronomy (von Rad 1953, p. 25 ). 
[123]De Vaux 1965, p. 175. Compare, though, Wenharn 1979, p. 318. 
[124]De Vaux 1965, p. 177. It seems probable that the sabbath year (Lev 
25:1-7; compare Ex 21:2-6, 23:10-11, Deut 15:12-18; see Andreasen 1972, 
pp. 79f, 213-216; de Vaux 1965, pp. 173-175) was an ancient institution 
that fell later into disuse, and that 'the jubilee year was instituted 
to restore the sabbatical year by transferring the neglected 
obligations of the seventh year to the fiftieth year' (Andreasen 
1972, p. 216). 
[ 125]Contra de Vaux 1965, p. 177. 
[126]Gottwald argues for an egalitarian society in the period of the judges (1979, pp. 489-663). Whether or not this is historically 
accurate, such equality at least formed an anci1nt ideal (de Vaux 1965, p. 173). 
. 
[ 127]De Vaux 1965, pp. 173, 177. 
[ 128]Levi ticus 25, in its final form, is probably tracE!_able to a priestly 
editor of the late exilic or early post-exilic pe.riod (Ringe 1985, p. 26 ). Jubilee ideas were also taken up in another strand of post-
exilic thought, that of tri to-Isaiah. Hanson suggests that, in the 
face of the political and economic ascendency of the ruling hierocratic gr oup, God's r edeemi ng intent was pr oject ed onto a f utur e 
of God's eschatological r eign. Jubilary imagery in this context is f ound i n Isaiah 61 : 1f (Ringe 1985, pp. 28f; compare Hanson 1979, pp. 72- 76 ). 
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According to Leviticus 25, every fiftieth year was to be proclaimed a 
year of jubilee, during which not only was the land to be given a year of 
sabbath rest from cropping, [129] but slaves were to be set free, [130] 
debts cancelled, and every man restored to ownership of his own 
property. [131] Each could return to his own land because it belonged to 
God, and therefore could not be owned absolutely: 
for the land is mine; for you are strangers and sojourners 
with me. [132] 
The only absolute owner of the means of production was Yahweh: an 
arrangement that de Vaux calls 'the feudal idea ••• though transferred on to 
the theological plane'. [ 133] Moreover, Israelites could not be cast into 
perpetual slavery because they were the servants of the God who had 
brought them out of Egypt: 
For to me the people of Israel are servants, for they are my 
servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: I am 
the LORD your God. [134] 
We may note here close simlarities to the deuteronomic redaction of the 
sabbath commandment. [135] 
It is clear that we have here an attempt to forestall the entrenchment 
of the class system that was an unintended consequence of the operation of 
the Israelite economic system: 
about once in any man's lifetime the slate was wiped clean. 
Everyone had the chance to make a fresh start. The rich had to 
part with the land and slaves they had acquired in the 
previous forty-nine years, while the poor recovered their land 
and freedom. The jubilee would have restored some semblance of 
) [129]Lev 25:11f; compare verses 2-7, 19-22. 
[ 130 ]Lev 25:39-54. 
[131]Lev 25:10, 13, 28. The last is the only elemJnt of the jubilee 
legislation not also found in the legislation for the sabbath year. 
[ 132 ]Lev 25:24, RSV. 
[133]De Vaux 1965, p. 164. 
[ 134 ]Lev 25:55, RSV. 
[ 135]See 6.2 abo ve. 
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equality between men. [136] 
The development of severe economic inequalities as an unintended 
consequence of the operation of the economic system - one aspect of the 
development of a class-divided society - is rejected as an evil by 
religious legi slation that sees it as analogous to the slavery in Egypt. 
To permit this state of affairs to persist uncorrected, it is here 
suggested is to contradict the original basis of the Israelite nation, and 
to be inconsistent with the character of God's self-revelation in that 
basis - the Exodus. [137] The contrast with the position adopted by Novak 
and Benne [138] is particularly sharp, and implies a denial that economic 
efficiency and its benefits are an adequate indicator of human well-being. 
The jubilee motif embodies the view that egalitarian community has a value 
that is non-red ucible to economic well-being. In Habermas' terms, it 
implies that communicative rationality is non-reducible to purposive 
rationality. [139] 
6.4.2 Jubilee and Jesus' proclamation/enactment of the kingdom of God 
Interest has increased in recent years in the hermeneutical 
possibilities presented by the jubilee motif for understanding Jesus' 
proclamation and enactment of the kingdom of God, [140] although 
possibilities in this direction were recognized earlier. [141] Interest 
centres particular ly on the Lukan pericope of Jesus' sermon at 
Nazareth, [ 142] that is intended as programmatic for the subsequent 
[ 136 ]Wenham 1979, _p. 317. Compare ibid., p. 323; North 1954, pp. 213-218. 
However, Ringe follows Hanson in rega rding Lev 25:23 as an 
ideological justification of the r estriction of land owne rship to 
those allied to the hierocratic group (Hanson 197
1
9, pp. 240f; Ringe 
1985, pp. 26f). . 
[137]Compare Ringe 1985, p. 32. 
[ 138]See 5.4 above. Contrast this basis of the Exodui with the social 
contract myth espoused by Rawls, and taken up by Benne and Novak 
I ( 5.4. 1 above). 
· 
[ 139 ]See 3.3 above. 
[ 140]For example , Yoder 1972, Sloane 1977, Leech 1984, Ringe 1985. 
[ 141 ]For example, Plul'liller 1896, p. 121; North 1954, p. 228. 
[ 142 ]Luke 4: 16-30. See Yoder 1972, pp. 34-40; Sloane 1977, pp. 28-11 O; Ri nge 
1985, pp. 36-45. For further bibliography, Ringe 1985, pp. 103f note 2. 
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ministry, [143] and which quotes from an Isaiah 61 text that is generally 
thought to have jubilary overtones. [ 144 J Other parallels between the 
teaching of (particularly the Lukan) Jesus and the jubilee legislation are 
pointed out, [ 145] and Yoder even maintains that the setting of the 
historical Jesus and his ministry is to be seen within the context of a 
proclamation of jubilee in A.O. 26. [ 146] Be that as it may, it is clear 
that jubilary ideas had been taken up into the late Jewish escatological 
concept of the kingdom of God, [147] and if the concept of the kingdom is 
to be "read" in its sociological setting, account should be taken of this 
fact. 
Jurgen Moltmann's God in Creation makes use of this new work in its 
concluding chapter, 'The Sabbath: The Feast of Creation'. [ 148] Here, 
however, in accordance with his stress upon the need for reconciliation 
with nature that I criticized in 5.2.2 above, Moltmann concentrates upon 
the year of rest given to the land in the sabbath year and jubilee 
legislation. [ 149] The relative neglect of the other aspects of the 
jubilee legislation leads Moltmann to a rather insipid conclusion to this 
chapter, a conclusion that also betrays his own socio-economic setting: 
The ecological day of rest should be a day without pollution 
of the environment - a day when we leave our cars at home, so 
[143]Sloane 1977, p. 281. 
[144]Plurnmer 1896, p. 121; North 1954, p. 228; Sloane 1977, pp. 29, 32-42; 
Wenham 1979, p. 324. But n.b. de Vaux 1965, p. 176. 
[145]Yoder 1972, pp. 64-77; Sloane 1977, pp. 111-153. For example Luke 11:4: 
'forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive every one who is 
indebted to us' (Yoder 1972, pp. 66f; Sloane 1977, pp. 139-145; Ringe 
1985, pp. 81-84 ). 
[146]Yoder arguei that the leaving of nets and fields to follow Jesus is 
to be seen in the context of the fallow year ( 1972, p. 65 ). Certainly 
there is an interesting parallel between Luke 12:29-31 (=Matt 6:31-
33) and Leviticus 25:20f. On the relation . betw~en the historical 
Jesus and the Lukan Jesus in this context, Ringe 1f 85, pp. 42-45, 107-
109, / 
[147]IIQ Melchizedek is independent evidence that l ,saiah 61:lff was so 
understood at the time of Jesus (Sloane 1977, pp. l!3f). 
[ 148]Moltmann 1985b, pp. 276-296; for reference to Yoder, p. 356, note 25. 
[149]Moltmann 1985b, p. 289. This practice is traceable to belief in the 
need to allow the land to return to its original state so as to 
regenerate its lost energies through the liberation of its 
productive powers (symbolized by a fertility god) from the hand of 
man (Andreasen 1972, p. 214). 
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that nature too can celebrate its Sabbath. [150] 
"We" presumably does not include the German Gastarbeiter, let alone the 
poor of the third world! The eschatological transposition of the 
sabbath/jubilee rrotifs here substantially loses its critical edge in the 
social dimension, as is also shown by the following quotation: 
Jesus preached no Gentile Christian freedom from the sabbath 
•••• On the contrary, he raised working days into the messianic 
festivity of life, of which Israel's sabbath is a unique 
foretaste. Jesus' proclamation of the imminent kingdom makes 
the whole of life a sabbath feast. [151] 
To pretend that the whole of life is - now - a sabbath feast for those who 
suffer disproportionatly from the operation of the economic system is not 
only myopic; [ 152] it is also to miss the implications of the other 
aspects of the jubilee legislation. 
It is better, surely, to recognize the jubilary overtones of the concept 
of the kingdom of God as operative in Habermas I social world, as an 
implicit critique of current social relations. If, as I have argued with 
Barth, the "classic" divine action is to be seen in the establishment of 
the kingdom of God through the Chaoskampf of the cross, and if this kingdom 
is in part at least a projection of the jubilee motif, then the cross is to 
be "read" as part of, and consequence of, the struggle to establish the 
egalitarian society that formed the ancient Israelite ideal. "Part of", 
because that struggle needs to be continued; [153] "consequence of", 
because Jesus ' execution was at least in part due to the reaction of vested 
and powerful interests against any attempt to threaten their privileged 
position. [154] Naturally, as I have argued above, [155] the economic 
[ 150 ]Moltmann 1985b, p. 296. Moltmann, unlike Barth (s\re 6.2 above) , does 
not elide sabbath and Sunday (ibid., p. 294 ), but he does hold that 
'the da y of " the new cr eation"', i.e. Sunday• 'presupposes the 
ecological "day of rest" of the original creatiqn' , i.e. sabbath, and 
the sabbath yea r a nd jubilee developed from it (ibid., ·p. 296). 
[ 151 ]Ibi d., p. 292. 
[ 152]Compar e West 1986a, p. 5. 
[ 153]See 6.5.3 below. 
[154]Bonino 1976, pp. 139f. 
[ 155 ]See 3.6, 4. 5, 4. 6, 5.5.2 above. 
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-dimension is only one aspect of the power-relations involved here, and we 
should avoid the economistic foreshortening that reduces all such 
relationships to relations of production. But the jubilary overtones of 
the kingdom theme draw attention to the fact that they are an important 
part of it. 
In short, the significance of the theme of "kingdom" in a theology of 
work is not that on Sundays we should eschew the use of motor cars - if we 
are lucky enough to have them - nor even that the cause of the kingdom is 
furthered automatically by indust rious work in the economic system. It is 
rather to question the legitimacy of a society that, by leaving the 
results of the functioning of that economic system unchallenged, gives 
some people the option of voluntarily restricting the use of their motor 
cars, while others go short of the necessities of life. [156] Class, rather 
than reconciliation with nature, is the key concept here. 
6.5 Vocation 
The triumph of God 
Christian will be 
Bonino] [157] 
is the welfare of men. For this the 
/ I glad to pay the price. [Jose Miguez 
6.5. 1 The ambiguity of the concept of' vocation 
William Temple's Christianity and Social Order [158] well illustrates 
some of the problems that a modern doctrine of vocation can encounter. I 
shall briefly set out Temple's views, before assessing them. 
Although not unaware of the shortcomings of the Protestant work ethic 
as elucidated by Weber, Temple wishes to retain somethin\g of the same idea. 
There is, he says, an 'obligation to make of the occupatJ on, by which a man 
7 
[156]And, moreover, suffer disproportionately in the labour process itself (see note 72 above). 
[157]Bonino 1976, p. 140. 
[158]Temple 1976. 
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or woman earns a living, a sphere of service'. [ 159] Indeed, to make the 
choice of 'the kind of work by which they will earn their living' on 
'selfish grounds' is 'probably the greatest single sin that any young 
person can commit, for it is the deliberate withdrawal from allegiance to 
God of the greatest part of time and strength'. [ 160] The choice of 
occupation (for those with a choice) is to be made in the light of the 
field in which the young person 'can give his own best service'; [ 161 J this 
will help to generate a spirit of service in the conduct of business among 
the leaders of industry and others. 
As regards those with little or no choice in occupation, 'circumstances 
as well as inclination may be the channel through which God's call comes to 
a man', and this call may well be to 'self-sacrifice as well as to 
self-fulfilment'. Indeed, as Christianity alone teaches, 'self-sacrifice is 
in the end the truest self-fulfilment '. [162] Thus, although this must not 
be used to 'justify an order of society which offers to many men only such 
forms of livelihood as require a miracle of grace to appear as forms of 
vocation', nevertheless 'it is possible to accept the one job available, 
however distasteful or dreary, as God's call to me; and then I shall enter 
on it in the spirit of service '. [ 163] 
To find a vocation in one's work, continues Temple, is emphatically not 
to find there 'self-expression or self-fulfilment' apart from 
self-sacrifice, [164] but to do one's task, 'interesting or dreary, "as unto 
the Lord ,u. [ 165 J In many cases, indeed, the nature of work may render that 
difficult if not impossible, and we should seek to change work so as to 
make it easier . But 'for a perfect saint it might be possible to perform 
the most wearisome and monotonous task "as unto God" because it was his 
contribution to ·human welfare'. [ 166] 
[ 159Jibid., pp. 73f. 
[ 160]Ibid., p. 74. 
[161]Ibid. 
[ 162]Ibid. 
[ 163 ]Ibid. 
[ 164 ]Ibid., p. 95; compare p. 75. 
[ 165Jibid., p. 75. 
[ 166 ]Ibid., p. 95. 
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Moving now to critique, firstly we may welcome in Temple the 
recognition of the need for a conscious attitude to what for most people 
occupies a large part of ' time and strength'. I have argued above that 
Habermas' use of exclusively system concepts for social labour tends 
towards too great a dislocation in the life history of the 
indi victual. [ 167] Secondly we may welcome, this time with Habermas, the 
questioning of whether the primary function of human labour is to be 
self-expressive. [168] And thirdly we may welcome a recognition that a 
theology of work will need to find room for the concept of self-sacrifice. 
In the light of the argument of this thesis so far , however, Temple's 
position appears unacceptably naive . His exclusive concentration upon the 
attitude with which work is done ( 'the spirit of service'; 'as unto the 
Lord ' ) [169] without consideration of the intended or unintended 
consequences of that labour, clearly entails a narrowing of horizons. In 
Habermas' terms, Temple is too preoccupied with action rather than system 
concepts. [ 170 J It is not only a question of whether work is 'wearisome and 
monotonous'; it is also a question of whether or not that labour really 
contributes to 'human welfare' in the fullest sense of that term. [ 171] And 
al though there is in Temple a welcome stress upon the need to change 
alienating working conditions, [ 172 J there is no suggestion that this 
should be a concern of the worker him or herself. For Temple, change is 
something to be imposed from outside ; a position which seems to ignore the 
reality and importance of the operation of the "double hermeneutic", and 
fails to take sufficiently seriously the competence of the lay social 
actor. [173] 
Such a deficiency is ironically expressed in a poem by Karol Wojtyla, 
written befo re he became Pope John Paul II, entitled 'The armaments factory 
[ 167]See 4.5, 4. 7 above. 
[168]See 4.4, 4.7 above. 
[169]Temple 1976, pp. 74f. 
[ 170 ]See 3.5 above. 
-; 
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[ 171 ]Ibid., p.95. For the use of the term "human" in a normative sense, 
compare Guti/rrez in 6.3 above. 
[ 172]For example, Temple 1976, p. 95. 
[ 173 ]See 4.5, 6. 1 above. 
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worker': 
I cannot influence the fate of the globe. 
Do I start wars? .... 
No, I don't sin. 
It worries me not to have influence, 
that it is not I who sin. 
I on ly turn screws, weld together 
parts of destruction., 
never grasping the whole, 
or the human lot .... 
Though what I create is not good, 
the world's evil is not of my making. 
But is that enough? [174] 
Clearly it is not enough, and Wojtyla alludes fleetingly to another 
possible view of vocation in the lines: 
I could do otherwise (would parts be left out?) 
contributing then to sanctified toil [175] 
Here 'sanctified toil' is a similar concept to the work which is a 'human 
act' that Gutierrez mentioned in 6.3 above, and the worker toys with the 
idea of the transformative action - action to change social relations -
needed to make it possible. 
Another Wojtyla poem, 'The car factory worker', similarly indicates the 
need for a recognition of the significance of the double hermeneutic: 
Smart new models from under my fingers: 
whirring already in distant streets. 
I am not with them at the controls .. .. 
They stole my voice; it's the cars that speak 
My soul is open: I want to know 
with whom I am fighting, for whom I live. 
Thoughts stronger than words. No answers. 
Such questions musn ' t be asked out loud. 
Just be back every day at six in the morning. 
What makes you think that man 
can tip the balance on the scales of the world? [ )76] 
I 
What indeed? Yet clearly no adequate doctr ine of vo~ation can afford to 
I 
--------------------
[ 17 4 ]Wojtyla 1982, p. 100. 
( 175 ]Ibid. 
[ 176 ]Ibi d., p. 99. 
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ignore this question by a retreat to a simple acceptance of 'the one job 
available' [ 177] as it is pre-defined by the economic system. 
In part, this problem is an aspect of the old question in ethics as to 
the relative moral significance of intentions or consequences; but it is 
made more pressing by the realization that the class system is to a 
significant extent a result of the operation of the system of social 
labour. We may therefore sum up by saying that Temple is insufficiently 
aware of the implications of class analysis for any doctrine of vocation: 
the fact that the class system is to some extent a by-product of the very 
system of social labour that the worker is being invited to participate in 
"as unto the Lord". Could this "Lord", we ask, be the Lord of the 
self-revelation of the Exodus? [178] Temple's exhortation to 
self-sacrifice, therefore, is open to ideological misuse. 
Before considering how the notion of self-sacrifice might be 
integrated into a more adequate theology of work in 6.4.3 below, a further 
question arises: to what extent should the concept of vocation be applied 
to social labour at all? In Haberrnas' terms, this is an aspect of the 
question: to what extent should social labour be considered in action as 
well as in system concepts? 
6.5.2 Vocation in Church Dogmatics III/lJ 
A main theme of this thesis has been to emphasize, against the Marxist 
tradition, that social labour is only one aspect, albeit a very important 
one, of human existence. Thus, 'if human existence, as it is and as it might 
be made to be, is the contingent expression of the creative and 
transformative action of God', [179] then it is the whole of life to which 
this applies, and the concept of vocation could apply to social labour 
only in a derivative sense. As Barth rightly says: 
we can ha r dly say that work in itself and a) such is t he 
active life which God requires of man. In its limitations it 
undoubtedly belongs to the concrete content of/ [a] .higher and 
[ 177 ]Temple 197 6, p. 7 4. 
[ 178]See 6. 2.3 above. 
[ 179 ]Lash 1986, p. 5. 
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more inclusive concept •••• The life which is obedient to the 
command of God is much more than work. Even in so far as work 
is included it is not in itself and as such that which is 
demanded of man. [180] 
The concept of vocation has, over the years, been restricted exclusively to 
a detached "religious" dimension on the one hand, and completely 
secularized in the Protestant work ethic on the other. But neither extreme 
begins to do justice to human life, a life that is irreducible to either 
one of these two dimensions. [ 181 J 
As regards the second of these two extremes, Barth, in Church Dogmatics 
III/4, is very sensibly suspicious of the Protestant work ethic: [ 182 J 
The practical requirements, the ideals and even perhaps the 
myth of modern Western civilisation with its ethos of work are 
a very different thing from the command of God •••• It was 
indeed a decisive moment when Luther attempted to ascribe the 
dignity of worship ••• to the labours of the field and workshop 
and nursery rather than to the monastery. But both then and 
later was there not a great deal of exaggeration on the part 
of Protestants in this matter? [183] 
Barth correctly notes that the Jesus of the gospels cannot be enlisted in 
support of a high evaluation of work. Naturally Jesus recognized secular 
labour as an obvious necessity, but 
there can be no evading the awkward fact that He never called 
anyone directly to this type of work. On the contrary, He seems 
to have summoned His disciples away from their secular work. 
And even if He Himself was originally a tekton (Mk. 6:3 ), there 
is no evidence in support of the view that He continued this 
work after taking up his Messianic office. [184] 
There is little succour here for John Paul II's deduction from Jesus' trade 
[180]Barth 1961, pp. 471f. . \ 
I [181]Compare Habermas' insistence on the irreducible validity of 
cornmunicati ve and purposive-rational action (see; 3.3.2 above) . 
[ 182 ]An ethic that, Barth notes, is taken seriously by writers such as Emil 
Brunner: 'It is from the Bible that Europe draws her high ideal of the 
value of all work which helps to create a civilization' (Brunner 1937, 
p. 387; compare Barth 1961, p. 472). 
[ 183]Barth 1961, p. 472. 
[184Jibid. 
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as a carpenter to the high status to be accorded to the social labour of 
the working class! [185] Further, this high status can be deduced neither 
from Paul nor from the Old Testament. Although indeed the apostle Paul 
urges his congregations to work so as not to be a burden to others, 'his 
work is done on the margin of his apostolic existence ••• Paul has no 
positive interest either in work itself or in its achievements'. [186] 
Indeed 'we search both his own writings and the rest of the New Testament 
in vain for the passion with which the "Subdue the earth" of Gen. 1:28 has 
been interpreted and applied since the 16th century'. [187] Similarly, and 
against much modern exegesis: 
the same is true of much of the Old Testament. We are surely 
reading into the saying in Gen 1:28 more than is actually 
there if we take it to imply that cultivation is the real task 
which the Creator has set man; and the same applies to the 
observation in Gen. 2:15 that God put man in the Garden of Eden 
'to dress and to keep it'. [ 188] 
Thus although 'there is no doubt that in the Old Testament, too, work is a 
self-evident necessity of life', which man should accept, 'one of the 
favourite insights of Protestant ethics, namely, the importance of work to 
human personality and as a cultural enterprise, is very much in the 
background, if not completely invisible'. [189] Barth concludes that the 
high status of work in Protestant ethics is derived not so much from 
'biblical influences', but from 'the pressure of r ecent developments in 
European economy and economics'. [190] A very Marxian point! 
Barth continues with an assessment of 'the older Protestant ethic of 
work'. [191 J It was correct, in Earth's opinion, to suspect the medieval 
exaltation of the vita contemplati va of being too closely allied to 
an ancient Greek and Stoic view according to which the perfect 
man belongs to the higher classes and has the leisure to 
[185]Wojtyla 1984, pp. 53f. 
[186]Barth 1961, p. 472. 
[ 187Jibid. 
[188Jibid. 
[ 189 ]Ibid. Contrast Brunner 1937, p. 387. 
[ 190 ]Barth 1961, p. 473. 
[191Jlbid . 
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fashion himself physically, intellectually and aesthetically 
into a harmonious being, whereas the rest, the real working 
classes, exist only to procure for the aristocrat, who is 
occupied with himself and therefore with real living, the 
basis of existence which he too requires. (192] 
On the other hand, continues Barth, it was mistaken both as to the real 
intentions of 'the best representatives of the vita contemplativa', [193] 
and also in substituting secular work as 'the decisive and final meaning 
of human activity'. Its crucial mistake was to relate the authentic 
Christian vita activa 'immediately and properly only to secular 
work'. [194] 
Barth himself relates the concept of vocation primarily to the coming 
of the kingdom of God, which, as we saw in 6.3.2 above, is the paradigm of 
the divine action, [195] to which '[man's] active life must correspond if 
lived in obedience'. [ 196] Barth thus refuses to restrict the scope of 
vocation to the realm of social labour: if anything, he argues, its home is 
the sphere of the church. [197] Indeed, the paradigm of distinctively 
human action is not social labour, but 'the simple but very strange action 
••• of associating oneself with the community of the coming kingdom and of 
thus confirming in oneself the necessity of the reality of this community 
on earth'. [ 198] This, however, is not a retreat from a concept of Homo 
faber to one of Homo religiosus, because 'the existence of the community, 
and therefore co-operation in its life, is not an end in itself •••• the 
kingdom of God ••• is the most profound need of the world around'. [199] 
Barth, therefore, aligns the concept of vocation, not to the performance 
of social labour as such, to the mere maintenance of human life, but to the 
need for the transformation of the social world. In the terms of Habermas 1 
Knowledge and Human Interests, vocation is more closely related to the 
[192Jibid., p. 474; compare Moltmann in 5.3.1 above. 
[193Jibid., p. 473. 
[ 194Jibid., p. 474. 
[ 195 ]Ibid., pp. 47 4f; compare pp. 480, 485f. 
[ 196]Ibid., p. 475. 
[ 197 ]Ibid., p. 483. 
[ 198Jibid., p. 493. 
[199Jibid., p. 502. 
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category of the interest in emancipation than to the category of interest 
in technical control. [200 J Nevertheless, Barth suggests, 'the action of 
God has a circumference as well as [a J centre', [201] and God is 
also the King of the uni verse, the Lord, Sustainer and 
Guardian, the Regent and Director of creaturely existence as 
such •••• As He intervenes for the world, conducting at its 
centre His own cause and the world's, He does not cease to care 
also for its continu~nce before Him. [202) 
Human work, says Barth, can thus correspond to this di vine care. While work 
'cannot, then, be the centre of human activity', it 'constitutes its 
circumference, just as the rule of divine providence is not the centre but 
only the circumference of God's activity'. [203) In Habermas' terms we 
might say that social labour has meaning in that it is necessary for the 
maintenance of the material basis of the lifeworld. Its significance is 
real, but subsidiary. Barth expresses a similar idea in the following 
passage: 
What we now call the work of man corresponds to [God's] 
providential rule •••• Addressing and claiming [man] as his 
covenant-partner, or, we may now say concretely, as a member of 
the Christian community, [God] also commands him - in order to 
make this possible - to exist as His human creature, requiring 
that his active life should take this human form, and fulfil 
itself in this form. Work is this human form. [204] 
The mid-term between these two Barthian propositions: 
(1) that the primary human action we are called to is the 
transformation of society into the kingdom of God, and 
(2) that a presupposition of this is the maintenance of creaturely 
existence via social labour, 
is the problem of the unintended genesis of 
social labour. This is a problem which Barth 
[200]See 2.2.1:A above. · 
[201 ]Barth 1961, p. 516. 
[ 202 ]Ibid., pp. 516f. 
[203]Ibid., p. 517. 
[204 ]Ipid., my stress. 
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Church Dogmatics III / 4, although it is implied in his treatment of the 
theology of work as a whole. 
6.5.3 Vocation in new perspective 
Every process of social transformation even those 
so-called non-violent, is costly. There are people and groups 
that suffer ••• Christians should [be J ••• ready to go beyond 
what is demanded , to pay in their own person ••• the cost of 
transformation. [Jost M{guez Bonino] [205] 
It is a common criticism levelled against Habermas that he has no 
adequate theory of revolution, no theory as to how social change is to be 
effected . [206] Rejecting alike the revolutionary theories of Marx and 
Lenin, so the standard criticism goes, and conflating too easily the 
emancipation of Freudian analysis with social emancipation, he too lightly 
abandons Marx's "revolutionary praxis" [207] for an argumentative process 
whose only force is the "force of the better argument". This is to 
seriously underestimate the recalcitrance of the social material, and the 
power of ideology and self-interest. Habermas' model of the Ideal Speech 
Situation, [208] although constituting an attractive model of the ideal 
social or der , [209] lacks any indication of how we are to get there. 
In my opinion there is some strength in this criticism, and this is one 
important area where Habermas has something to learn from a christocentric 
Christian t heology. For along with a lack of a theory of r evoluti on, 
Habermas also lacks any constructive appreciation of the value of 
[205]Bonino 1976, p. 138. 
[206]Compare McCarthy 1984, p. 384; Giddens 
[207]0n which McLellan 1980, pp. 223-238. 
[208]See 3.3.3 above. 
... 
I 
) 
1985a, p. 95 and passim. 
[209]0r, to be more accurate, giving a framework within which concrete 
instances of alleged ideal social orders can be judged (RC, pp. 227f). 
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self-sacrifice. [210] This I take to be the value of the theme of the cross 
in social theory in general, and in a theology of work in particular. 
In this chapter I have gradually been developing a new 
integration-point for the theme of the cross in the theology of work. 
Extracting it from its role in the legitimation of the suffering involved 
in social labour as now constituted, I have sought, by linking it with the 
theme of the kingdom, to reapply it as a symbol of social transformation. 
The creative Chaoskampf of the cross, I have argued, is the Christian 
paradigm of suffering in order to promote emancipatory social 
transformation, to promote the cause of the kingdom of God. And as the 
primary Christian vocation is to identification with the cause of this 
kingdom, the primary meaning of the theme of vocation must be a calling to 
sacrificial action to bring this about. The theology of the cross can thus 
become utopian rather than ideological in Karl Mannheim's sense • 
. I / The spirit of this position is well captured by Jose Miguez Bonino in 
his Christians and Marxists: The Mutual Challenge to Revolution: 
To be a believer means to participate in the movement of love 
which brought Jesus Christ to share our human life ••• giving 
his own life even unto the death of the cross. What is at stake 
here is not a mere 'imitation' but a participation in the lot 
of solidary love, the only thing that can really create a 
possibility of new life for man. For this reason, the Apostle 
Paul does not hesitate in referring to his own suffering ••• as 
his participation in 'what still has to be fulfilled in the 
· sufferings of Christ'. It is not that Christ left something 
undone, but that he opened for us a way of serving men in which 
the disciple enters now, paying the price or, as Jesus himself 
said , ' taking up his cross '. [211 J 
I n the context of the question of social labour, this is both to deny the 
[210]Habermas does at one point consider 'the sufferink and sacrifice of 
past generations' by virtue of which 'subseque~~ generations can 
enjoy an institutionalized freedom', and in this context approves of 
'an anamnetic power of remembering that goes be~ond the concepts of 
morality itself', actualized in 'compassionate ~olidarity with the 
despair of the tormented who have suffered what cannot be made good 
again' (RC, pp. 246f; compare 4.3 above). But the context of this 
discussion is the question as to whether any world that was based on 
past suffering could be called just, rather than an attempt to assess 
the role of self-sacrifice in the present. 
[211 ]Bonino 1976, p. 139. 
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identification of vocation with a calling to succeed (or work cheerfully) 
in a job as defined by the present social order, and also to deny its 
detachment into a purely "religious" world which fails to impinge upon the 
world of social labour at all: a version of what I have called the 
"unacceptable dualism" of Habermas' banishment of action concepts from the 
realm of social labour. Neither is it to legitimate that element of 
suffering, involved with social labour as presently constituted, that is a 
result merely of our level of technological development. Nor is it to 
condone or reinforce the over-concentration of its unpleasant aspects in 
the lives of the relatively powerless. In fact it is not to interpret 
present suffering at all, but to appeal to self-sacrificial action to 
alleviate it. [212] To this creative act we are called, in fellowship with 
our crucified King. If the triumph of God is indeed the welfare of men, for 
this we should be glad to pay the price. 
6.6 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this thesis, I noted the demand from various 
quarters for a theology of work that is modern, well-structured, 
universally applicable, and not open to question or doubt. The intervening 
pages have demonstrated that the exercise of producing such a theology is 
not as straightforward as many imagine. What I have achieved is at best a 
prolegomenon rather than a finished theology. Indeed, it is to be doubted 
whether a "finished" and universally applicable theology in this context 
could exist other than for those who fail to realize that work must be a 
contextual activity. 
Nevertheless, 1 have reached several tentative conclusions, both of a 
positive and of a negative kind, about the activity of social labour 
itself, and about the possible bearing of the Christian \tradition upon it. 
I have resisted the idea that the control of nature i i social labour is 
wrong, or that there can ever be a (romantic) reconciliation with nature 
~ 
on the basis of a radically different form of scienc~ and technology. I 
have a r gued t hat the role of social labour in human life is overestimated 
[2 12]Compa r e Marx 1977, p. 158. 
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in the thought of Marx, and even of Habermas, and that as a consequence 
theological categories should not be tied as closely to its performance as 
is frequently the case. I have argued that right-wing theologies of work 
fail to recognize sufficiently the ambiguous nature of modernity, and the 
role of the economic system within it, and are therefore wrong to 
legitimize the functioning of the capitalist economic system with the 
positive use of theological categor ies such as "creation". And I have 
argued that theologies of work that are too simply Marxian neglect the 
dimension of bureaucratic power, and are consequently too optimistic - and 
theologically too positive - about the prognosis for a transition to 
socialism. 
The pervasive theme of this final chapter has been the critique of 
ideology. Recognizing that the Christian categories of creation, kingdom, 
cross, and vocation are frequently construed so as to (albeit 
unintentionally) 'sustain relations of domination', [213] I have sought to 
reinterpret their bearing upon the activity of human labour so as to avoid 
this pitfall. Denying that social labour is, except secondarily, usefully 
to be considered a process of creation, I have both interpreted the theme 
of the sabbath as indicating the non-central status of labour in the human 
enterprise, and proposed an alternative paradigm for creation in the 
creative Chaoskampf of the cross. Denying that the process of 
technological advance, and the more efficient labour that it makes 
possible, in and of themselves constitute advance towards the 
establishment of the kingdom of God, I have reinterpreted the theme of the 
kingdom, by way of its jubilary background, as being critical of the class 
system that is one result of the operation of the economic system. And 
denying that the primary Christian vocation is to engage diligently in 
social labour as presently defined by the economic system, I have 
suggested that our Christian vocation is 
emancipatory social transformation, if 
self-sacrificial suffering. 
rather to the promotion of 
need · be Jat the cost 
I 
of 
', 
Throughout this thesis, the thought of J~rgen Hab~rmas ·has determined 
both the categories and the content of the discussion. There is, indeed, a 
[213]J. Thompson 1984, p. 4. 
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great deal more to be said about work, and the Christian theology of it, 
that has not arisen under the constraint of these parameters. 
Nevertheless, I have shown that a critical interaction with Habermas' work 
raises the absolutely central questions that no theology of work can 
afford to ignore, and indicates the broad outlines of some of the answers. 
No theology of work that is adequate to its subject matter can neglect the 
issues that have been discussed, or the challenge of the answers that have 
been given. 
) 
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I I 
Spanners and Symbols: 
God's Action as Communicative Action 
P.L. West 
Within the framework of the "empiricist" philosophy widely assumed in 
English theology, there is a serious problem about how to represent God's 
action in the world. This applies equally to God's action in the life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus, and to God's action today through the Holy 
Spirit. Here I will argue that the problem can be eased by a change of 
philosophical framework. I will do so in dialogue with Maurice Wiles' The 
Remaking of Christian Doctrine1 which reveals with outstanding honesty 
and clarity the difficulties that the empiricist framework throws up. 
I 
By the "empiricist" framework I mean a general set of philosophical 
presuppositions that are deeply entrenched within our culture in general, 
and widespread within our university departments of science, philosophy 
and theology in particular. Of these (often only implicit) presuppositions I 
am interested in just two: firstly, that the chief function of language is to 
represent or "picture" reality; secondly, that "action" must take place via 
some causal mechanism, the model for which is given by the causal 
mechanisms of the natural sciences. Thus the only relation that language 
can have to action is to "picture" it. 
This pair of asswnptions is peculiarly deadly for theology, because it 
pushes back our possibilities for conceptualizing God's action to only two. 
Either we think of God's action as the communication of knowledge about 
a state of affairs-a picture of reality-or else we must see it as an 
intervention in the causal nexus so as to rearrange the course of events in 
the physical world. Each then presents insuperable problems of 
interpretation, and does not really do justice to what we (or the tradition) 
would like to say about the action of God. 
Consider, for example, the activity of the Holy Spirit in the world 
today. Wiles first rejects 'the idea of some special relation of God to 
particular events' as difficult to justify: 
The experience of divine guidance or divine providence is so 
frequent and so fundamental a Christian experience iat if it 
were to be understood as always implying , special divine 
causation •.. the occurrences of such special divine ctivity 
· J 225 
... 
I 
would have to be so numerous as to make nonsense of our 
normal understanding of the relative independence of 
causation within the world. (pp. 37f, my stress) 
Wiles, as his terminology of 'causation ... causation' indicates,. 
conceptualizes a 'special relation of God to particular events' as God 
intervening as one cause among others in the causal nexus. God's action is 
assimilated to the dominant world-view of the natural sciences, and then 
rejected. 
Thus Wiles is forced back to the only alternative available within his 
framework, the communication of information. First he rejects a 
"mentalistic" adaptation of the first model. 'God working by the way of 
love through the inner promptings of the Holy Spirit' (p. 96) cannot 
involve an extra, isolable, 'causal factor' (p. 97). Rather, revelation occurs 
when 'particular events by virtue of their intrinsic character or the results to 
which they give rise give (like the beauty of the lillies) particular expression 
to some aspect of God's creative purpose for the world as a whole' (p. 38). 
God's activity is thus to be understood as a way of speaking about those 
events in the world through which we glimpse God's overall sustaining and 
creative purpose for the whole cosmos. That is, it is to do with the 
communication of information. But is that all that we-or the 
tradition-would want to say about the action of God? 
Consider, secondly, God's action in the crucifixion. Once again the 
dichotomy operates: either the crucifix.ion must effect an intervention in 
some "cosmic mechanism" modelled on the mechanisms of the natural 
sciences, or else it just conveys information. 
Wiles clearly rejects the first option, and with it the ancient 'belief that 
in the death and resurrection of Christ God worked effectively in history to 
transform once for all man's status ... in relation to God' (p. 62f.). The 
cross does not represent 'an objective act of God ... in the history of this 
world, in virtue of which things are not as they were' (p. 64). Instead, he 
holds that 'Christ's passion is in some way a demonstration of what is true 
of God's eternal nature' (p. 79). Thus once again God's action becomes the 
communication of knowledge about a state of affairs. 
Yet this is not quite fair, because Wiles also salvages from ancient 
theories of the atonement the recognition that 'the passion of Christ has 
been remarkably effective as a historical phenomenon in the 
transformation of human lives' (p. 80, my stress). lhls, I feel, points the 
way forward, because it threatens to burst open the model of the 
"communication of information". So the question must be asked: Is it 
possible to conceptualize God as acting to transform human lives, without 
conceptualizing him as (to parody a little, but not, I think, enormously) a 
"celestial mechanic" with the Holy Spirit as his "~e1'? 
II } 
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philosophical framework; a change which rej~ the two presuppositions 
of empiricism explored above. Such a paradigm change is provided in the 
work of the German philosopher /sociologist Jurgen Haberrnas, and his 
concept of "communicative action". In what follows, I will try to show 
that Habermas' "communicative action" affords a less inadequate way of 
· conceptualizing the action of God than the two ways provided by 
empiricism. To effect the paradigm change will be a two-step process, 
because our notions of action and of language are both in need of 
reformulation. 
The first step is to break free from the conceptual tyranny of the 
natural sciences. This is a tyranny that assimilates human action-and 
God's action-to intervention in the causal nexus presupposed by science 
and technology. This is the point of the "mechanic and spanner" parody 
above. Habermas, classically in the book Knowledge and Human 
Interests\ denies that the natural sciences tell us how the world "really 
is"-i.e. give us a "picture of reality"-for the semi-pragmatist position 
that they tell us how we may manipulate the world effectively. Scientific 
knowledge is thus knowledge about how we can use the world: it is 
knowledge related to the human interest in being able to predict and 
control the behaviour of the natural world effectively. On this model, 
scientific knowledge is still real knowledge, but knowledge with a limited 
scope. It is not the only "real" sort of knowledge, such that all other forms 
of knowledge must be ultimately reducible to it, or be exposed as nonsense. 
Rather, it must be kept in its place. And specifically, in this context, its 
concepts of cause, effect and mechanism must not be allowed to escape 
from their legitimate field to dictate what God (or man) "acting" must 
mean~ 
The second step is to reformulate our ideas a!:iout language. Following 
the later Wittgenstein, Habermas rejects the concept of language as 
primarily representatory, for language as primarily active in the 
constitution of, and transformation of, our sociO<Ultural "lifeworlds". 
The ordinary use of language then becomes a form of action that does 
things in the individual and social realms. An ob,ious example, which 
Habermas quotes from Austin, is "I do" said in the context of the 
marriage service. Here the words do not describe a marriage but actually 
enact it. The words change something in the social world. Habennas 
maintains that this phenomenon is characteristic (although not always so 
obviously) of all ordinary use of language. Thus, for the ordinary use of 
language, he coins the tenn "communicative action"3• 
Seeiing communicative action as action is only possible, of course, 
because of the flexibility introduced into the concept of "action" above. 
This flexibility enables Habermas to split the concept of action into two: 
into "communicative action" and "instrumental action',... ilbe latter is 
intervention in the causal nexus of the physical world, ·operatii\~ by way of 
empirical restraints in order to achieve unilaterally conf ved ends: 
I '12] 
"action" much as in empiricism. But it is the new category, communicative 
action, that is interesting in this context. As noted above, it is a f onn of 
action because it "does" things; it is not merely a matter of description. 
But it is very different from instrumental action for two reasons. First, its 
medium is symbols instead of forces. And secondly, following from this, it 
is a form of action that can only be achieved by two (or more) persons: 
symbols must be understood and accepted for communicative action to 
succeed. Thus communicative action is conceived of as intervention in the 
social or "subjective"' worlds, in order to acheive a bilaterally conceived 
agreement, consensus or understanding. 
. 
III 
I want to suggest that our conceptions of God's action might be rather less 
inadequate to their subject matter if we were to abandon the two empiricist 
alternatives of instrumental action and the communication of infonnation 
for Habennas' communicative action. I will suggest four ways in which 
this new paradigm makes better sense of what the tradition says about the 
action of God. 
First, it makes some sense of the biblical ideas of God's creative or 
active word-and of Jesus as the word made flesh-if this word is seen as 
communicative action rather than mere description or sheer command. 
This is particularly so because language (in Habennas' model) is integrally 
involv€:(i with the formation of the individual and of society. 
Secondly, it makes some sense of the idea that God's action can be 
resisted. If God's action is implicitly conceptualized as intervention in the 
causal nexµs as one extremely potent "force" among others, then it is hard 
to see how it could be resisted if seriously applied. But if God's action is 
communicative action, and its medium is symbols instead of forces, then 
this does . not apply. Communicative actions couched in symbols can be 
misunderstood, or rejected, irrespective of the status of their author, 
because their success depends upon an unforced agreement. 
Thirdly, the paradigm of God's action-the crucifixion-no longer 
need be either simply the communication of information about God's 
nature, or causal intervention in some "cosmic mechanism"; it can be a 
real intervention by God in man's socio-cultural lif eworld, but a 
communicative one. As such it can be a truly creative or transformative 
action, leading (once understood and accepted) to a transformation of the 
individual and society. Yet as communicative action it becomes effective 
only when understood and accepted-otherwise it remains an instance of 
"failed communication". Thus what in Wiles' treatment is split up into 
two quite separate events-the event of the cross anj the modem 
transformation of a hwnan life-<:an be reunited into one mmunicative 
action. The communicative action of the cross is only mpletc-only m I 
. 
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succeeds-when it transforms the life of a believer who understands and 
accepts it. 
My last example is a good de.al more ambiguous. One key to 
Habermas' transformation of the concept of language is his contention 
that language, by virtue of its telos, is not a tool suitable for an individual 
to "use" so as to "manipulate" other people to his/her own ends6• Rather 
it is a thoroughly social phenomenon that is orientated to the production of 
community, consensus and understanding-or perhaps we might say in 
Christian terms "the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace". So, 
fourthly, God acting communicatively in our lives would not imply God 
manipulating us and aiming at our subjection to his inscrutable will on the 
model of slave and potentate. Rather it would imply that our true status is 
that of "communication partners" with him, in a loving relationship that 
transcends autonomy and subservience in communicative consensus7• 
Now, of course there is a huge problem here; the problem of 
safeguarding God's transcendence, of safeguarding the inherent 
asymmetry of the God-human relationship. It is no use deposing a picture 
of God as oriental despot to replace it by one of God as friendly neighbour! 
Which only goes to underline the obvious fact that no form of 
conceptualization can be adequate to the mystery of God and his action. 
However, the model of communicative action may be a little less 
inadequate than the models of empiricism in this area, because it offers a 
way of transcending the antithesis of autonomy and subservience. Perhaps 
using it we could make some sense of the Johannine paradox: 
You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer 
do I call you slaves, for the slave does not know what his 
master is doing. (John I5:14f) 
If God's action is conceptualized not as the operation of an extremely 
potent force, but as the offering of communicative action that needs to be 
accepted by man or woman to succeed-succeed in his/her 
transformation-then perhaps obedience and friendship are not so 
antithetical after all. 
At one point, Maurice Wiles seems to feel acutely the need for a 
category such as this. Discussing the action of the Holy Spirit in the 
believer, he rejects N.P. Williams' claim that 'the ultimate kernel of a 
"special providence" is a direct influence exerted by God upon the 
personality of a human being' via 'deftly administered subconscious 
impulses' (p. 96). Such 'causal operation over and above the specifiable 
external influences' would not be 'a suasion of love' (p. CJ7). Wiles is surely 
right to reject Williams' model at this point. But what he is rr· ecting is the 
product of an empiricist model that reduces action to unconscious 
manipulation, and the 'suasion of love' to the turn of a me tal spanner. 
With Habermas' model of communicative action this is rtot necessary. 
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Communicative action is concerned with rational appeal to the conscious 
actor, not manipulation of the unconscious behind his or her back; and its 
medium is the symbol, not a force. 
Wiles M., ~ Remaking of Christian DoctriM, SCM (London) 1974. Especially 
chapters 2, 4 and 5. Quotations from this book arc denoted by the use of single 
quotation marks. 
2 Habcmw J., Knowledge and Human lnterrsts, Heinemann (London 1978). Compare 
Hesse M., Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science, Harvester 
(Brighton) 1980, for a broadly similar stance. 
3 Habcmw' concept of communicative action is now most accessible in ~ Theory of 
Communicotive Action vol I, Heinemann (London) 1984 pp. 284-288 and 293-29S. 
lbis massive· two volwne work explores the implications of the model of communicative 
action for modem social theory as a whole. 
4 For the salr.e of simplicity I have neglected Habcrmas' concept of "strategic action", 
which denotes language used to manipulate other people for one's own ends. 
5 Habcnnas' term for the realm of experience to which the individual has privileged 
access. It docs not imply acceptan~ of what he calls the "philosophy of consciousness", 
i.e. Descartes er. seq. 
6 To use language thus is a mirusc of it that he calls "strategic action". Sec note 4. 
7 "Consensus" is a term in Habcrmas' vocabulary that suggests the unforced nature of a 
relationship in which the interests of both sides arc taken equally inlo acroWJI in mutual 
respect. 
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· Christology · as 'Ideology' 
PHILIP WEST 
There is something approaching a consensus in one broad stream of modern theology that 'the paradigm of divine action is the Cross of Christ'} 'Here is the relevation of God', writes Donald MacKinnon. 2 J i.irgen Moltmann has expressed this succinctly: 
New trends of thought have grown up which are concerned to find a consistent Christian doctrine of God. They make Christology the cornerstone of all theology [and] see the heart ofChristology in the cross of Christ ... Martin Kahler's thesis-'the cross of Christ as the foundation and measure of all Christology' ... now appears more radical and comprehensive: the crucified Christ as the foundation and measure of Christian theology as a whole. 3 
I do not want to challenge this cross-centredness. Given certain qualifications4 I think it is right. Yet to embrace it is to accept the need for continuous and careful re-examination of our conceptions of the significance of the cross; for a deformation at this hub of Christian doctrine is bound to have wide-ranging effects upon the whole. In this article I shall explore briefly one possible avenue into this critical work- the approach of the 'critique of ideology'. I intend to do so in dialogue with two essays of Donald MacKinnon in Borderlands ef Theology which, in my opinion, suggestively indicate the way forward, but yet succumb to some extent to the very dangers against which they themselves warn. 5 
-; 
I 
) 
,----------------------------
Christology as 'Ideology' 
I 
'Ideology' is a term which is widely and loosely used in the modern 
world. The major political parties regularly accuse each other of 
'ideological' intransigence, by which they mean to imply that blind 
adherence to a set of doctrines has dulled their opponents' political 
common sense. This use of the term often verges on mere abuse. I will 
not be using the term ideology in this way. Even in the serious 
sociological literature, however, 'ideology' has several distinct, even if 
overlapping, usages- usages that are reflected in the theological 
literature that is dependent upon it. 
Sometimes 'ideology' means, without any pejorative overtones, a set 
of beliefs or ideas that galvanize a social group into action. The ideal of 
'democracy' is ideological in this sense: people are prepared to die for 
it. Norman Gottwald uses the term in this way in The Tribes of Yahweh, 
to denote the active religious belief of the Old Testament Israelites in 
Yahweh as a liberating God.6 Secondly, and more pejoratively, 
'ideology' may denote a set of ideas which, unlike a 'utopia', does not 
lead on to liberating action but remains stuck in the realm of mere 
thought. This is Karl Mannheim's use of the term in Ideology and 
Utopia,1 a use taken up by Christopher Rowland in Christian Origins. 
8 
Thirdly, 'ideology' may be equated with what is, in the final analysis, 
an illusory belief about the way in which society functions, to be 
contrasted with 'science' which gives the truth about it. This is 
Althusser's use of the term,9 taken up by Denys Turner in Marxism and 
Christianity. 10 
I will not be using 'ideology' in any of these senses. Neither will I 
enter into the debate between them as to the 'real rneaning' of the 
term. 11 Instead, I will present a fourth account of ideology, that given 
in Anthony Giddens' Central Problems in Social Theory, 12 and then follow 
up its possible implications in the realm of Christology. Giddens' 
language is difficult for those who are not members of the sociological 
'guild', and I shall do my best to translate it. 
In the meantime, we can note something that all of these usages 
have in common: in each case 'ideology' is to do with the relationship 
between ideas or language and the functioning of society. To ask 
whether a Christology is 'ideological' is thus to propose one particular 
type of test for its adequacy; not its continuity with Scripture or 
tradition, or its coherence on the level of ideas, but its social implications. 
II 
In Central Problems, Giddens offers the following definition of 
'ideology': 'To analyse the ideological aspects of symbolic orders ... is 
to examine how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate 
the sectional interests of hegemonic groups' (p . . 188). JWe can 
paraphrase this as follows. The way in which language is sed (for 
example in christological statements) can have undesira le social 
consequences. To study how this occurs is to study 'the ideological 
Philip West 
aspects of symbolic orders'. It is not that the statements in question are 
just plain untrue or malevolent, but that they tend to give rise to 
unfortunate side-effects in the social sphere. Thus Christologies (for 
example) that in all other respects are perfectly satisfactory may be 
unsatisfactory in terms of their social implications. Such Christologies 
have an 'ideological aspect'. To study this ideological aspect of 
language is to see how it operates in society so as to make the interests 
of ruling ('hegemonic') groups appear as just, right or natural (to see 
how it 'legitimates' them). Despite the fact that these interests are in 
part incompatible with the interests of the rest of the community 
(being merely 'sectional' interests), the language makes it appear that 
they are interests shared by all. That society, in fact, operates so as to 
favour the interests of the powerful more than those of the weak is 
obscured. In other words, in studying ideology we are looking for 'the 
modes in which domination is concealed as domination ... for the ways 
in which power is harnessed to conceal sectional interests' (p. 193, my 
italics). 
Giddens goes on to draw a distinction within ideology on the basis of 
whom this domination of the weak by the powerful is concealed.from. 
Less interesting is the case of straightforward propaganda, where 
language is consciously manipulated by ruling groups so as to keep 
subservient populations passive. More relevant to the critique of 
ideology in Christology is its institutional form, where its effects occur 
without the deliberate intent of any of the participants involved. To 
study ideology in this sense, says Giddens, is 'to seek to identify the most 
basic structural elements which connect signification and legitimation 
in such a way as to favour dominant interests'. These elements are 
likely to be 'deeply sedimented in both a psychological and an 
historical sense' (pp. 191 f).That is, they will be oflong standing in the 
tradition and quite unconscious. The Hindu caste system affords a 
good example of the operation of institutional ideology in this way. 
Giddens concludes by listing three ways in which 'ideology actually 
operates in society'. The first is 'the representation of sectional 
interests as universal ones' (p. 193). Here he has in mind expressions 
such as 'it is in the national interest for us all to work harder and 
tighten our belts', when the belt-tightening is clearly more to the 
benefit of the rich and powerful than the poor and weak. The second, 
more obscure, is 'the denial or transmutation of contradictions' 
(p. 194). This concerns the device of defusing contradictions which 
have a revolutionary potential by transposing them into another 
sphere where they can be contained more easily (for example from the 
economic to the political system). 13 The third, and perhaps the most 
interesting in this context, is 'the naturalization of the present' or 
'reification' (p. 195). This means the representation of contingent social 
arrangements as 'natural', as governed by laws as unc1:angeable as the 
laws of physics and therefore beyond the power of uman action to 
affect-as in the political slogan 'there is no alternat ve' if and when 
there is in fact an alternative. 
1 
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I want to propose that accounts of the significance of the cross can 
operate ideologically in each of the three ways that Giddens lists, and I 
have tried to show this in tabular form in the following way. In the 
left-hand column I have listed the three ways in which 'ideology 
actually operates in society' according to Giddens. Reading across 
each row, I then link each form of ideology with a theology of the cross 
that lays itself open to ideological misuse in this way, and finally on the 
right suggest how this ideological effect comes about. 
Form of ideology Theology of the cross Effect produced 
Representation of The cross as example Preservation of the 
sectional interests of patient suffering. social status quo 
as universal ones. including the structures 
of domination built 
into it. 
Transmutation of The cross as Desire for the fulfilment 
contradictions. atonement for sin. of needs, denied by 
society, is transmuted 
into the religious realm 
as sin and dealt with 
accordingly. 
'Reification' or The cross as the Evils are an inevitable 
the naturalization symbol of the tragedy part of the human 
of the present. of human life. condition; they are to be 
suffered, not removed. 
or or 
As converter of the Undue separation of 
negative into the existential and social 
positive. aspects and 
concentration on the 
former. 
III 
For the rest of this article I will give a worked example of how a 
Christology that in all other respects seems compelling can be 
criticized on the basis of having ideological implications. I have 
chosen for this purpose two essays by Donald MacKinnon in 
Borderlands of Theology; firstly, just because they are so compelling in 
other ways and secondly, because contained within the iys 
themselves are methodological pointers which, if applied ore 
extensively, could lead to conclusions different to those of the a hor 
himsel( 1 
In these essays MacKinnon makes two methodological points.that I 
want to make my own. The first concerns the reciprocal effect of social 
structures and theological reflection, and echoes Giddens' connection i 
I 
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of the concepts of ideology and concealment, above. I think it is worth 
quoting in full: 
It is now regarded as a commonplace in critical discussion of 
Anselm's theology of the atonement that he was in unconscious 
bondage to the ethical ideas suggested by the social order of his age. 
But those who are quick to recognize the extent of his limitations in 
this respect are sometimes less willing to extend similar principles to 
the criticism of their own ideas. Yet fundamental theology must 
always reflect both the unacknowledged personal prejudices and 
the inherited moral assumptions of the theologian. In theology 
worthy of the name we are always involved with faith seeking 
understanding of itself; this understanding is rendered perpetually 
precarious by the relativity that must infect even the most 
disciplined effort of the one who seeks it. There is no field in which 
these considerations press more urgently upon the thinker than the 
doctrine of Christ's atoning work (p. 97). 
MacKinnon is appealing for the application of the critique of 
ideology, not only to the past but also to his own work-and indeed to 
ours today. Thus I want to claim his blessing for the general intention, 
even if not the actual content, of this article. 
The second point is a condemnation of the abstraction of the cross 
from its context. MacKinnon considers this in relation to Gustav 
Aulen's 'classic' conception of the work of Christ. This conception, he 
says, being 'in form and content so unashamedly mythological', 
appeals to demythologizing theologians precisely because it 'lends 
itself to translation into any terms likely to commend themselves to the 
translator ... To speak of the Cross as "a victory over the powers of 
darkness" is to use a mythological variable to which determinate value 
can be assigned almost to taste' (p. 98). It enables language, as 
Wittgenstein put it, to 'go on holiday'. 14 This amounts to an 
abdication from 'the task of evaluating Christ's work in ethical terms', 
in which terms its cross-cultural value is to be located (pp. 98f, my 
italics). Later, MacKinnon presses the same point in different terms 
while discussing the events of Good Friday: 
Always there has been besetting temptation to convert deed into 
idea, to fail properly to do justice to what is involved in finding the 
very foundation of human excellence in a raw piece of history. So 
the_ cutting edge of the doctrine is blunted by a refusal to recall the 
concrete detail of the events with which it deals. So the mystery of 
God's presence in human existence is diminished through induced 
forgetfulness of the depth to which he descended (~. 103f). 
However, in the rest of this article I will arg11e that Mac innon's own 
account of the cross also represents an abstraction of the ross from its 
context, in this case its social context of the power struttures within 
Jewish society; and that this results in a failure to ev.aluate Christ's 
work in social or political terms, in which terms its cross4:ultural value 
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is also to be located. I shall first attempt to present MacKinnon's views, 
and then offer a critique in the light of the first part of this article. 
For MacKinnon, the appropriate category for the work of Jesus is 
tragedy, not comedy (p. 100). The resurrection is emphatically not a 
Hollywood happy ending, but an 'amen' that redirects our gaze to 
Gethsemane and the cross, which are the centre of revelation (p. 95). 
A 'superficial cosmic optimism' (p. 92) is rejected for the Johannine 
irony-it is in the crucified Jesus that his paradoxical glory is most fully 
revealed-an irony which transcends both optimism and pessimism 
(p. 91 ). The appropriate category for the resurrection is thus 
vindication, not reversal (p. 96); a reversal would be, in his phrase, 'in 
effect a descent from the cross, given greater dramatic effect by a 36-
hour postponement' (p. 100). In the career of Jesus we see the 
paradigm of endurance (p. 93). Only so, enduring on the cross and 
refusing the happy ending of a 'reversal' resurrection, can he give the 
penitent robber the promise of his company in paradise, and be the 
revelation of a God that can touch us in our personal extremities of sin, 
failure, bereavement and unresolvable conflict of obligations (p. 94). 
'Here', he writes, 'is the revelation of God; but here also is that human 
deed in which the abysses of existence are sounded and the ultimate 
contradictions of life are plumbed and explored' (p. 104). 
In particular, Jesus in the cross shares fully in the human aspect of 
failure, and indeed embraces it. Thus 'to speak of Christ's readiness to 
embrace failure and defeat ... [is] to state a simple fact' (p. 103). And 
his paradoxical victory ending in the cry 'It is finished' is 'purchased at 
the price of appalling catastrophe. Judas has departed into the night, 
and before Pilate's judgement seat the chosen people have confessed 
that they have no King but Caesar' (p. 91 ). The price of revelation 
and salvation is thus inevitably the events of AD 70 and anti-Semitism. 
The element of 'sheer waste' and 'failure' in the cross is ineluctible; the 
cross involves an 'element of abdication of responsibility for his 
people's welfare' (p. 103). And the correlate of this is that there is no 
solution to the problem of evil, as any course of action whatsoever 
involves the tragic surd of the negative. 15 
Yet, moving now to critique, has MacKinnon set up a false 
dichotomy here? ls it not possible somehow to avoid surrender to 
'idealist fancy' {p. IO 1) and 'Hollywood happy endings' that 
'obliterate the sombre events' of the cross without embracing the 
category of tragedy? And does not his concept of tragedy put one foot 
bachvards into the mire of ideology while trying to avoid the trap of a 
facile optimism? Despite his own warnings of the dangers of 
converting deed intoidea, of failing to recall the concrete detail of the 
historical events involved (p. 103), he does in effect largely abstract 
from these, in · part I think because of an over-rellance on the 
Johannine account. The events are stripped down to incarnation, 
Gethsemane, trial, Judas and cross; and the result of thi is the loss of 
the social setting and power structures that brought Jesus to trial and 
execution. The cross is thus translated into a metaphor. that is in large 
I 
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part detachable from the historical crucifixion and can go 'on 
holiday'. The interpreter can apply it to areas of the negative almost 
according to taste. In MacKinnon's case, at least according to the list 
from page 94 quoted above, it speaks to us today primarily in an 
existential fashion rather than addressing our social situation. It 
becomes first and foremost an interpretative symbol of our personal 
suffering in the realm of attitudes and ideas, rather than a critical and 
transformative symbol that galvanizes to action to change the social 
world. · 
Moreover, Jesus for MacKinnon dies positively embracing failure; 
and it is difficult to say this without implying at the same time that the 
cross transforms failure to change the world into a positive value. This 
clearly does not do justice either to the Gospel accounts, particularly 
the Synoptics (and perhaps most of all to Luke- Acts), or to the post-
Easter phenomenon of the earliest Church. It is with this phenomenon 
of the earliest Church, I think, that MacKinnon's model meets the 
most problems. For was not one of the most striking features of this 
Church precisely not resignation, even of a non-pessimistic kind, but 
the creation of a new form of society? In part this dissonance is due to 
MacKinnon's tendency to collapse the resurrection back onto the 
cross. To do this is to detach not only the crucifixion but also the 
resurrection from its context-its social setting inJ udaism where, with 
the giving of the Spirit, it was among other' things a symbol of the 
dawning of the new age, 16 an age characterized significantly by 
transformed social relations.17 As such, the resurrection in its setting is 
the very antithesis of the positive embracing of failure of which 
MacKinnon speaks; it is more appropriately a sign of the possibility of 
change in social structures. MacKinnon's use of the resurrection is 
thus an interpretative move that tends to weaken its power to change 
the world in the pursuit of a reinterpretation of the world. 18 Thus, I 
would suggest, MacKinnon's account falls foul of the charge of 
ideology in two senses. 
To some extent this is of Giddens' first type. In talking of the Jewish 
people and their descendants as a coherent interest group whose 
interests Jesus neglected, he abstracts from the divisions within Jewish 
society, and represents sectional interests as universal ones. Yet it is 
these divisions that Jesus himself seems mainly to have addressed, and 
the addressing of which led to his execution. 19 It is not Jew/Gentile but 
righteous/outcast, weak/powerful that are the key differentiands in 
Jesus' -ministry and death. Thus, in MacKinnon's use of the symbol of 
the cross as the interpreter of personal suffering as such, without 
asking who is suffering and why, the cross becomes an example of 
patient suffering that transforms the negative into the ~sitive in the 
subjective realm, rather than a symbol challenging soci l oppression. 
It loses its ability to distinguish between types of the neg tive that are 
significantly different in their social contexts. Thus it dpens itself to 
misuse in the service of an indiscriminate valuation of the negative, 
including the types that are the result of avoidable human injustice. 
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Yet, as indicated above, my major unease concerns MacKinnon's 
relationship to Giddens' third type of ideology. His positive evaluation 
of failure, and insistence that there is no solution to the problem of evil 
except its paradoxical reinterpretation, encourages a reification of the 
present. In setting up a dichotomy between facile cosmic optimism 
and existentialist reinterpretation, the social dimension has largely 
fallen out of view, and the critical relation of the cross thereto has been 
attenuated. 
IV 
To conclude. It is not my case either that the critique of ideology 
should replace other forms of theological method or that a reduction of 
the. significance of the cross to an existential dimension should be 
replaced by a parallel reduction of its significance to the social 
dimension. Neither do I claim that theology should be replaced by 
sociology. 
However, I have argued that the critique of ideology is one valid 
avenue into the criticism of our concepts of the significance of the 
cross. And I have attempted to illustrate this claim by a critique of 
Donald MacKinnon's characterization of the work of Christ as 
'tragedy'. 
Philip West is a PhD student al Cambridge University. An earlier form of this 
article was presented lo the Christology Seminar al Cambridge in February 1985. 
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Cruciform Labour? The Use of the Cross in Two Recent 
Theologies of Work. 
Philip \vest 
Two Theologies of Work 
For Jurgen Moltmann, 
the crucified .Christ (is) the specific thing about 
Christian theology, both as regards its identity 
and as regards its relevance•••• All theological 
statements point to him, from the doctrine of 
creation to eschatology, and from t~e doctrine of 
the Trinity to the doctrine of sin . 
Theology that is Christian, in Moltmann's view, is cruciform. 
The crucified Christ is the focal point from which Christian 
theo~y must radiate out; statements which are not related 
to this central point have no claim to be specifically 
Christian. Hence, when r-101 tmann comes to formulate a 
theology of work, his methodology is already established: 
a theology of work, too, must 'justify what it says before 
the face of the crucified Jesus, to whom, as Christian 
2 theology, it appeals'. This project Moltmann has under-
taken in an essay on work in his recently translated 
On Human Dignity, 3 although the materials for a more 
extensive theology of work are scattered throughout his 
1 . . . 11 4 ear ier writings as we • 
Moltmann early on in the essay dismisses the ancient 
Greek idea that work is simply meaningless toil and burden, 
fit only for slaves; the idea that meaningful life exists 
onl y outside of work (pp. 37- 39). On the c ontr ary, he 
argues, the young Marx5 was correct that work, as a ;, . .l £,:invi. 
of self-express i on, is critically involved in the self-
formation of the worker. To some extent at least, 'I am 
because I work' (p. 50). This, he continues, 1oheres with the biblical witness. The fourth commandryent j ustifies 
human work on the basis that God himself worked for six 
days in creation (Ex 20:9-11). Thus: 
through their work in the world human b e ings can 
and should correspond to the creative activity of 
God, from which the world emerged •••• In work and 
rest human beings, in their way, take part in the 
creative world process and in the joy of the Creator . 
In contrast to the ancient dichotomies, this makes 
work itself meaningful. {pp. 40f) 
Moreover, he goes on, there is another group of 
specifically theological assertions about work in the 
biblical traditions, that relate work not to 'the effortless 
creation of God' but to the 'work of redemption•. (p.42) 
And it is to these we should look to derive a genuine theology 
of worke (p.43) The model here is the suffering servant 
of Isaiah 53, who 'is designated as worker, "servant of God", 
ebed Yahweh. His soul has "worked", and he "carries" 
iniquities like a porter•. (p. 42) This, he argues, is the 
model for God's action in Jesus' suffering on the cross: the 
passion story is patterned on it, Philippians 2 alludes to 
it, and 'according to the Gospel of John, the crucified one 
says of his "work", "It is finished"'. (p. 42) 
Now, Moltmann reasons, if we are to 'be of the same 
mind as Christ', (Phil 2:5) then we too must adopt 'this 
theologically rich understanding of "pain and work"'. (p. 42) 
But to do so completely transforms the concept of work in 
Christianity. (p. 43) The human concept of work is transferred 
to God's redeeming activity and then redirected to human 
beings who are supposed to correspond to God. (p. 43) 
Through faith, work is not just 'relativized or exorcized'; 
no, 'it receives through faith a messianic meaning'. And 
as a result: 
all work in the world is ••• placed on the level of 
Philippians 2 and filled with the hope of the Kingdom 
of God •••• The reapplication of this theological 
meaning of work to human beings induces them, through 
work and self-giving, to participate in the lordship 
of Christ in the world and thereby to become co-workers 
in God's kingdom, which completes creation and renews 
heaven and earth. (pp. 44f) 
Many of these themes reappear, a little surprisingly 
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other r~cent theology of wor~ _ jope John 
6 encyclical on human work, Laborlm Exercens. 
I For John Paul . II too, work is (or at least should be) 
meaningful and self-creative: 
Independently 
actions which 
tasks must be 
realizing it • 
of their objective content, the various 
man performs in connection with his 
utterly at the service of his humanity, (p. 11) 
. ih 7 k . . ~ en a man wor sit is not 
that he changes, as himself 
quoting Gaudium et Spes) 
so much objects and affairs 
that he perfects. (p. 55, 
Moreover, he goes on, there is another group of 
specifically theological assertions about work in the 
biblical traditions, that relate work not to 'the effortless 
creat ion of God' but to the 'work of redemption•. (p.42) 
And it is to these we should look to derive a genuine theology 
of wo r k. (p.43) The model here is the s uffering servant 
of Isaiah 53, who 'is designated .as worker, "servant of God", 
ebed Yahweh. His soul has "worked", and he "carries" 
iniquities like a porter• . (p. 42) This, he argues, is the 
model for God's action in Jesus' suffering on the cross: the 
passion stor y is patterned on it , Philippians 2 alludes to 
it, and 'according to the Gospel of John, the crucified one 
says of his "work" , "It is finished" ' . ( p. 42) 
Now, Moltmann reasons, if we are to 'be of the same 
mind as Christ', (Phil 2:5) then we too must adopt 'this 
theologically rich understanding of "pain and work"'. (p. 42) 
But to do so completely transforms the concept of work in 
Christianity. (p. 43) The human concept of work is transferred 
to God's redeeming activity and then redirected to human 
beings who are supposed to correspond to God. (p. 43) 
Through faith, work is not just 'relativized or exorcized'; 
no, 'it receives through faith a messianic meaning•. And 
as a result: 
all work in the world is ••• placed on the level of 
Philippians 2 and filled with the hope of the Kingdom 
of God •••• The reapplication of this theological 
meaning of work to human beings induces them, through 
wor k a nd sel f-giv i ng, t o par tic i pat e in the lordship 
of Christ in the world and thereby to become co-workers 
i n God's kingdom, which compl e t es creat ion and ren ews 
heaven and earth. (pp. 44f) 
Ma ny of these themes r eappear, a l i tt le s urprisingly 
perh aps , in another recent theology of work - Pope John 
Paul II ' s 1981 e ncy c lical o n huma n wo r k , Labo em Exercens . 6 
For John Paul II too, work is (or a t leas t should b e ) 
me aningful and s e lf-creative: ... I 
Independently 
actions which 
tas ks must b e 
realizing it . 
of the ir objective conte nt, the various 
man performs in connection with his 
utte rly a t the s ervice o f his humanity, 
(p. 11) 
1
,vhen a man 7 works it is not so much objects and affairs 
that he changes, as himself that he perfects. (p. 55, 
quoting Gaudium et Spes) 
Moreover, work is a sharing in God's creative activity. In 
this John Paul II is more explicit than Moltmann: 
Made in God's image, man shares by his labour in 
the work of the Creator, in a certain sense continuing 
to complete and perfect that work. (p. 51f) 
This awareness that man's work is a participation in the work that God is doing must permeate even 
'the most ordinary of human activities •••• They 
may rightly consider that by their labour they are 
unfolding the Creator's work••• and contributing by their personal industry to the fulfilment in history of the divine plan'. (p. 52f, quoting Gaudium 
et Spes) 
As does Moltmann, John Paul II also looks to the cross 
to provide 'the final words of the Gospel on this matter'. 
(p. 56) His approach, however, is different. For John 
Paul II, the sweat and toil which are necessarily involved 
with work in the present condition of the human race offer 
the Christian the possibility of sharing in Christ's salvific 
work: 
Suffering and death on a Cross were the means by 
which (the) work of salvation was done. So, by 
enduring the toil of work in union with Christ 
nailed to a Cross for our sake, man in a way 
collaborates with the Son of God in the redemption 
of mankind. (p. 57) 
In his work the Christian is 'carrying his own cross daily' 
( Luke 9 : 23 ) • In human work he finds 'a small part of the 
Cross of Christ'. (p. 57) 
Finilly, as does Moltmann, John Paul II relates 
human work to the Kingdom of God. Christ's resurrection 
'advertized' a new heaven and earth 'in which man and the 
world are made partakers through work's weariness'. As in 
the Cross, so too in human work is made 'a new good' which 
is 'already, as it were, a small part of the "new earth" 
where justice dwells'. (p. 57) And althou_gh etrthly progress 
is lf\ fo.e-i: to be distinguished from the growth 9f Christ's 
I kingdom, nevertheless every Christian should 'recognize the 
' place that his work has not only in earthly progress but 
also in the growth of the Kingdom of God'. (p. 58) 
For the rest of this article I will argue that both 
Moltmann and John Paul II misuse the theology of the cross 
in their theologies of work. 
sociological, and theological. 
Linguistic objections 
My criticisms are linguistic, 
Both writers use the word "work118 to descibe not only 
the creative and redemptive action of God but also a wide 
variety of human activities. And this, of course, is 
acceptable; the word "work" has a wide semantic field. 
However, this very width of semantic field makes problematic 
the deduc.ti.on of truths about human work from truths about 
God's work. Consider Moltmann's argument in propositional 
form: 
1. Man works. 
2. God also works in creation and redemption. 
3. Man ought to imitate God. Therefore, 
4. Human work has the same creative and redemptive 
character as God's work. 
This argument will only succeed provided that there is 
some essence of work, some "work as such", that God's work 
and man's work share. Only in this case can 'all work in 
the world' be transformed by reference to Christ's redemptive 
work. But this is precisely what we cannot assume. It 
does not even obviously apply to the variety of human 
activities that the word "work" can ref~r to (e.g. prayer, 
housework, working on a building site, writing a book), 
let alone to God's activity as well. 9 Moreover the unique 
character of God's creative work appears to be underlined 
by the use for it in Genesis 1 of the verb bara' ("create"), 
a verb which the Old Testament avoids using with man as 
. b. 10 its SU JeCtu 
A different but related point conce;ns t~e deductions 
that can be drawn from the sharing of the_samd root 11 by 
two words in the Hebrew of the Old Testament. , Consider 
Moltmann•s sentence quoted above: 
The chosen one ••• according to Isaiah 53 ••• is 
designated as worker, "servant of God", ebed Yahweh. 
His soul has "worked", and he "carries" iniquities 
like a porter. (p. 42) 
The underlying assumption is that 'ebed_ ("servant" or "slave"), 
because it shares the same root with 'abad ( "to work"), 
must carry overtones of "work" with it. Yet 'ebed is always 
in the Old Testament used for "slavery" (including religious 
slavery to Yahweh), that is in relational contexts, never 
for "workman" in a neutral sense. Moltmann's assumption is 
thus unfounded. It derives from what James Barr calls 
"the root fallacy", which Barr rejects thus: 
A momen~s thought should indicate that the 'meaning' 
of a 'root' is not necessarily part of the meaning 
0£ a derived form. Still less can it be assumed 
that two words having the same root suggest or 
evoke one another.12 
Moreover, the verb na£a' ("carry" ) in Is 53: 4 is a 
standard expression for the bearing of the guilt and 
consequences of one's sin. It is not true to say that an 
image of "portering" (and therefore of human labour) is 
being evoked here. ':Jhat is exceptional about Isaiah 53 :4 
is the vicariousness of the bearing of sin. Yet while this 
might be the basis for a very suggestive theology of 
redemption, there seems to be very little basis here for a 
. 13 theology of work. · 
Sociological objections 
When Moltmann says that 'all work in the world is 
thereby placed on the level of Philippians 2 and filled 
with the hope of the Kingdom of God', (p. 44, my stress) 
we must surely ask him whether by 'is' he means 'should be'. 
Does he seriously mean that all work, as now constituted, 
•completes creation and renews heaven and earth'? (p.45) 
If he does, two comments are in order. 
Firstly, it ignores types and aspects of work that are 
objectively destructive - of worker, of society, and of 
environment. Few people would seriously want, I suspect, 
to equate open-cast mining with completing th~ creation, 
or would suppose the work of AWRE Aldermaston .~o be filled 
I 
with the hope of the Kingdom of God - however~self-sacrificially 
the employees were going about their respecti~e tasks in 
the two enterprises. Moltmann's rhetoric seems to have got 
the better of him here. John Paul II is more realistic 
in this respect. He realizes that work can be dehumanizing 
for the worker. (e.g. P• 10) But even he seems to have 
something of a blind spot about the deleterious effects of 
-
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work on society and environment (see below). 
~ondly, both writers lay themselves open to the charge of 
using theological concepts ideologically - that is, using 
them so as to aid and abet {albeit unconsciously) the 
• .& • 14 T h maintenance o~ an unJust status quo. o equate t e 
"toil" of work with the sufferings of Christ1without regard to 
its nature and causes in particular cases (Laborem Exercens, 
p. 57),has the effect of making social injustice in labour 
invisible. The more unpleasant the work is, the implication 
seems to be, the more fully it is a participation in Christ's 
sufferings, and therefore, paradoxically, the more redemptive 
it is. The negative is transformed in thought into a positive, 
while leaving the reality exactly.as it is. Be that reality 
just or unjust. Similarly, to say that all work is a 
participation in the lordship of Christ in the world 
(Moltmann, p. 45), is to imply that each and every worker 
is already performing his alloted task in the great harmonious 
cosmic enterprise; be that worker a South African 
entrepreneur or a black labourer in his asbestos mine. 
No, as K 1 ~·1 h f 11 d 15 . t · ar arx as so power u y argue, 1 is 
dangerous to deal in grand abstractions like "work" and 
"man", and to make theological pronouncements about them 
in general. We need to ask first what work is being done, 
being done by what men/women, in what social situation. 
Who is profiting by their labour? What effect is it having 
upon them and others? And, as a consequence, should it not 
sometimes be a case of liberating them from dehumanizing 
labour, rather than of legitimating it by talk of 
participation in Christ's cross? Both Moltmann and John 
Paul II fail to _grapple seriously with these questions. 16 
Theological objections 
Despite their dis a vow al s to the cont.r ary ,) both Mo 1 tmann 
and John Paul II seem to equate too closely th~ establishment 
of the Kingdom of God with human progress, and correspondingly 
underrate the seriousness and pervasi~eness of human sin. 
This is especially clear in Laborem Exercens. 
John Paul II is essentially optimistic about human 
work. He shows little positive awareness of the deeply 
ambiguous nature of the achievements of modern technology 
and the proce sses of economic development and expansion. 
As a consequence, in his theology he t acitly assumes that 
work largely escapes the effects of the fall. The effect of 
sin, he says, is merely to make the execution of work 
toilsome, rather than rendering its results ambiguous or 
evil. (pp •. 56f) This has two results, 
Firstly, it explains his near equation of human 
progress with the building of the Kingdom of God. As the 
'fruit' of human work is a good (p, 57), in contrast to 
much else in man's activity it must be contributing to the 
building of the new order, Work becomes, like .the Spirit , 
an active agent of the new order proleptically present in 
this age, Secondly, it explains his equation of the toil 
of work with Christ's salvific sufferings on the cross. (p, 57) 
Without weariness, he notes, 'there is certainly nothing 
ever to be had'. (p. 57) Christ's cross ceases to be 
something totally unique, and becomes instead the paradigm 
of the more general truth that suffering is the anvil upon 
which human good is forged. Thus, as the 'Paschal Mystery' 
involves both 'the Cross of Christ' and 'the Resurrection 
with the power of the Holy Spirit', (p, 56) so too human 
work involves both 'weariness' and 'a new good' that is 
'the fruit of human work'. (p, 57) 
Conclusion 
In this article I have concentrated on criticism. 
I have tried to show that neither John Paul II nor Jurgen 
Moltmann have developed an adequate theology of work from 
t~eir theologies of the cross. Nevertheless there is 
something to be . learnt from their attempts to achieve this 
aim, They are surely right that any truly Christian 
theology of work must view human labour fr~m t~e perspective 
of the cross; that labour consistent with the efhic of the 
Kingdom of God must be "cruciform". , 
My complaint is not about their diagnosik of the 
theological task in this area, but about their execution 
of it . 
--
I I 
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A Christian Approach to the Problem of Security? 
A Reply to Gor don Du ns t an 
The holy teaching while rema1n1ng single nevertheless 
embraces things belonging to the different philosophical 
sc i ences because of the one formal meaning which is its 
inter est in all manner of things, namely the truth they bear 
in the light of God. [Aquinas, S.T., 1a.1,4] 
There are broadly two conceptions of the appropriate scope of theology 
on the market today. On the one hand there ar e those who would equate it 
with what Gordon Kaufman calls the scientific study of religion, which at 
most 'purports to interpret the meaning , significance, and value of a 
particular segment of human culture, the religious sector ' . [ 1] Theology 
here is to do with God, and that portion of individual and corporate human 
life labelled religious. The other, following the tradition of Aquinas, 
refuses this narrowing of horizons, In this tradition, it is not the 
subject matter (God, religious behaviour) but the perspective from which 
the world is viewed that gives to theology its distinctive nature and 
unity. Here theology is concerned with all the matters dealt with also by 
other fields of human study and endeavour, but in the persective of 'the 
truth they bear in the light of God'. 
To name only Aquinas and Barth, surely among the most impressive and 
influential systematicians of this millenium, is to indicate the strength 
of this second tradition, Both of these theologians, albeit in different 
ways , r eject firmly the suggestion that there are areas of human social 
l i fe about which t here is nothing of interest to say theologically. They 
r esi st the forcing of theology back into a ci r cu msc r ibed religious 
dimension th at l ea ve s th e political , economi c , and even ethical di mens i ons 
autonomous . Thus Gor don Dunstan is fa r f rom obvi ous ly co rrect when he 
s t a t es, in a r e cent artic l e ent i t l ed 'Theologi ca l Met~ od and the 
Deterrence Debate', [2] that 'there are some human activities) which cannot 
be discus sed in Christian terms at all', (p.40 ) including tpe activity of 
warfare and t he concerns of secur ity genera lly. If by this h e means t ha t 
there are some areas of human practice that are autonomous, about wh ich 
there cannot be any distinctively theologic al position, upon which the 
central Christian symbols of the cross and resurrection cannot be brought 
to bear, then he is outlining a position that is at best a contentious one. 
[ 3] 
In what follows I shall briefly set out Dunstan's argument in this 
short but dense and important article (I), argue that his theological 
method is flawed at various points (II), and suggest an alternative 
substantive conclusion in the area of the ethics of deterrence to the one 
he defends (III). 
I 
Dunstan's key contention is that 
if the language and meaning of Christianity are taken 
seriously, there are some human activities which cannot be 
discussed in Christian terms at all. There is no specifically 
'Christian' way of waging war, or of amputating limbs, or of 
fixing oil prices, or of deciding for or against the nuclear 
generation of energy. (Dunstan, p.40) 
In particular, the problem of whether to hold or use a nuclear deterrent 
is one of those tragic necessities which ••• cannot be 
categorized at all in Christian terms. There is no Christian 
solution to it. There is only a choice among evils; and there 
is the Everlasting Mercy for those who, in good faith, are 
driven to choose. (p.50) 
In such areas theology has no direct bearing at all. In fact it is true, as 
Lambeth has repeatedly affirmed, that 'war as a method of settling 
international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of 
Our Lord Jesus', and there is no "Christian" way of prosecuting 'an 
inherently unchristian pursuit'. (p.40) The Christian gospel is effective 
here only indirectly 'in the character which it imprints upon Christian 
men in the relevant exercise of judgement and use of power', above all in 
the production of the (Aristotelian) virtue of prudence; (p.51\) 
I 
Dunstan's views on the nature of theology, and on the sopial relevance 
; 
of the Old and New Testament witness, are assembled into a coherent 
picture that backs up this basic contention. "Theology" he defines as 'an 
intellectual discipline ••• possess[ing] an integrity and autonomy of its 
own in that it handles a corpus or body of material of its own in a 
2 
disciplined way ••. in its nature, an application of reason to the things of 
God, primarily the self-revelation of God'. (p.46) Especially in talk of 'a 
corpus or body of material of its own', this sounds as if Dunstan is opting 
for rr.y first (restricted) definition of the scope of theology; and this 
suspicion is confirmed by his treatment of the Old and New Testament 
traditions. Particularly striking here is his ability to distinguish 
neatly between the "political" and "religious" experience and action of 
the Israelites. On the one hand 'their religious experience was of the God 
who revealed himself to them ••• and in this experience of God they came to 
a responsive judgement upon themselves, upon good and evil, right and 
wrong, blessing and curse in man', (p. 41) while on the other 'their 
political experience', although 'related to their religious experience', 
was distinct from it. (p.41, my stress) 'Prescriptions for security', such 
as 'invade this territory ••• go out to battle ••• ally yourself with this 
nation; do not become entangled with another' etc., although 'given also out 
of religious conviction', were clearly 'political prescriptions'. (pp.41f) 
Indeed, Dunstan is able to distinguish (and condemn) possible religious 
solutions in the political arena as those involving~ passive "faith" in 
God which would leave the issue to him ••• without human political or 
military activity at all'. (p.42) Such a confusion of categories is the 
type for the modern confusion of theology and polities. 
In turning from the Old to the New Testament, Dunstan detects one 
striking and relevant difference. Whereas 'the Old Testament is the 
literature of a political community preoccupied, in every century, with 
its own security', (p.41) the New, al though also 'the product of a 
community', arose from a community that 'never saw itself as a political 
community nor acted as one'. (p.42) 'Universalistic' by its very nature, 'the 
politics of national survival were irrelevant to it'. (p.42) Not only did 
Jesus 'carefully dissociate himself and 
politic al messiah' (p.42) but, and this 
assertion of all: 
his mission _from \ that of a 
is perhaps the roort telling 
I 
there is no evidence at all that the earliest Christian 
commun.ities took political action to implement their 
theological transcendence of imposed distinctions, as between 
bond and free. In all the interpretations which they left us 
of the death of Jesus on the Cross, there is not one hint of a 
promise attached to it of political success, or of its use, 
3 
actual or potential, as a political weapon; they thought 
entirely within the purely religious idiom of the various 
traditions of sacrifice ••• (p.43, my stress) 
Politically, in Duns tan's view, the earliest Christian communities were 
quietist, looking for the ultimate promise of the Kingdom of God at the 
end, but with no attempt to change the structures meanwhile. In the face of 
sufferings, 
such as could be relieved by Christian charity were to be 
relieved - that is evident everywhere. But of political action 
to relieve them there is no hint. (p.43) 
In the meantime they had a positive appreciation of the value of (secular) 
political government, as winessed by Romans 13, I Timothy 2 and I Peter 2, 
appreciating the benefits of the Pax Romana, and refusing legal and 
military service only because of the 'idolatrous' (i.e. religious) oaths 
involved. (pp. 43f) 
Given this neat split between the political and religious realms, and 
the accompanying restriction of the legitimate scope of theology to the 
latter, Dunstan is naturally suspicious about claims to 'a specific 
"Christian approach" ••• to the problems of security', (p.40) because this 
usually amounts to ~he uncritical extrapolation of words and acts from 
the theological context of the mission of Jesus ••. to the political 
context of our own day'. (p.51) Usually such allegedly Christian approaches 
amount to a mere veneer of biblical language covering a solution reached 
on other grounds; this is the case in particular with 'some of the products 
of the World Council of Churches' and 'some "liberation theology"'· (pp.40f) 
Theology and politics must remain clearly separate . Certainly, 'Christian 
idealism, founded in ·faith' may give us 'goals', but it is 'Christian 
realism' that must dictate political action in the area of security in 
today's world, and this dictates 'the duty to deploy and cont~ol effective 
power', (p.51) including, regr{tably, the nuclear deterrent. ~kp.49f) It is 
crucial that we appreciate 'the nature of Scripture, ethics; and polities 1 
I . 
(p.44) and do not confuse them, for such category mistakes would lead us 
seriously and perhaps catastrophically astray. 
II 
4 
It is clear to me, however, that in his clear, confident and 
wide-ranging picture, Dunstan has made some category mistakes of his own. 
Perhaps the most glaring is the projection back into the society of 
ancient Israel of the contemporary distinct ion between "polities" and 
"religion". Of course these modern categories may, and perhaps must, be 
used in our analysis of the Old Testament and the community that produced 
it; indeed one of the most fundamental gains in the discipline of 
hermeneutics in r ecent years is the realization that the interpretation of 
an ancient text inevitably involves the bringing of our own categories and 
prejudices to it, that a "neutral II understanding of ~ text is impossible. 
[4] But it is a mistake to think, as Dunstan clearly does, that the 
distinction between religion and politics is really "there" in the Old or 
New Testament communities in essentially the same way as in modern western 
societies; that therefore we may divide Old and New Testament verses, 
motifs, actions and principles neatly into political and religious groups, 
and "apply" only the political ones to our current security problems. 
That the separation out of relatively autonomous political and 
economic spheres is a comparatively recent development in western social 
history, rendering modern western societies structurally quite different 
from all earlier ones, is a commonplace of modern social theory that such 
an analysis neglects. [5] But even a historically imaginative study of the 
Old and New Testaments on their own reveals plainly the differences 
between ancient Israelite society and our own. Mention need only be made 
of the terms temple and kingship to appreciate that in those societies 
what we would now call politics and religion overlapped to an alarming 
extent , It is simply not true that, for the ancient Israelites, cult was a 
matter of religion whtle warfare was a matter of politics, as Dunstan 
implies. War was holy war too, the defence of the temple at once a 
religious and a political duty, cult also a political sp~ere o1 action, The temple-kingship complex was the power-centre of the symbolic fder of what 
I we would artificially divide into the r eligious and political spheres of 
ancient Israel. [6] 
Neither is it true, as Dunstan claims, that the crucifixion of Jesus, 
that central feature of the Christian religious drama, can be neatly 
separated from what we would call political overtones. Several major 
5 
recent studies, notably those of Sanders [7] and Rowland [8], have stressed 
the opposite, and in particular that the immediate cause of Jesus' 
execution was the challenging of the religio-poli tical order of the 
temple, and its dominant place in maintaining the status quoin Israelite 
society. As Sanders, for example, comments: in discussing 'the principal 
cause of Jesus ' death, it is incorrect to make a rigid distinction between 
"religious" and "political" reasons'. (Sanders, p.296) No doubt Jesus 
rejected the idea that the Kingdom of God was to be established by force 
of arms (Sanders) p.326 ), but talk of the Kingdom, and the provocative 
symbolic acts of the triumphal entry and the temple cleansingJby no means 
betoken a Jesus who 'carefully dissociated himself and his mission from 
that of a political messiah'. (Dunstan, p.42) [9] Neither can it be 
maintained that the crucifixion was interpreted 'entirely within the 
purely religious idiom of the various traditions of sacrifice' (Dunstan, 
p.43) in the earliest church. Not only was the crucifixion interpreted in a 
wide variety of frameworks by the earliest Christians, with the use of 
legal and political as well as sacrificial metaphors, but also sacrifice 
was itself not a purely religious category in our terms - witness, for 
example, the martyrdom theology of the Maccabees. 
Moving from these general considerations to examine specifically the 
political half of Duns tan's religion/polities divide, it is clear that 
here too his analysis is lacking. Firstly, in making a case that the 
earliest church had a uniformly positive assessment of the autonomous 
political sphere of the Pax Romana (from which he derives the 
appropriateness of such an attitude for the contemporary Christian) 
Dunstan operates with his own particular canon within the canon (Romans 
13, I Timothy 2, I Peter 2). Largely absent are the synoptic gospels and , 
perhaps most significantly in this context, the book of Revelation . [ 10] It 
is only by ignoring the existence of the latter, and ~ superficial 
treatment of the former ('Put up thy sword into its sheath' t'es not imply 
Christian pacifism (p.44) etc.) for an ex.elusive stress on hi~ chosen texts 
that Dunstan is able to assume the uniformly positive re6eption of the 
political status quo that is essential to his case. No one reading Mark or 
Revelation would readily imagine that their authors were as positive about 
the world powers as Dunstan suggests, or indeed that they subscribed to 
his view of the autonomy of the political realm. 
6 
Secondly, Dunstan's actual treatment of these texts, and of the 
non-activist stance of many of the earliest Christian communities, fails 
to take into account the restricted scope for action available to them in 
their actual setting as compared to ours. Thus Ernst Bammel argues [11] 
that the positive appreciation of the state in Romans 13:1-7 is to be 
accounted for by the precarious position of the Christian communities in 
Rome at the time of writing, and the questionable nature of Paul's bona 
fides. He argues persuasively that the authentic Pauline position is to be 
found rather in I Thess 5:3, which is severely critical of the official 
Roman ideology of the state in the light of the Paul_ine apocalyptic 
framework. [12] 
And thirdly, it is clear from Dunstan's treatment not only of the New 
Testament, but also of western history and the current situation, that he 
holds an altogether too naively positive view of the state. Dunstan's state 
is the benevolent upholder of the Pax Romana within which citizens are 
freed to pursue their legitimate activities (including their religion) in 
security. It can be assumed to represent the best interests of all those it 
rules. But such a view of the state, traceable to Hegel and Durkheim in 
terms of the major sociological traditions, lacks perception of the 
critic isms that have been offered of it in the other major traditions that 
go back to Weber and Marx. It lacks the Marxist recognition that the state 
to some extent reflects and defends the class interests of the society 
that it rules; that it thus upholds the concrete injustices built into any 
present political order - an insight arguably implicit in the concept of 
the Kingdom of God that at the end will replace all earthly rule with one 
of divine jstice. And it lacks the Weberian realization of the importance 
of power, and of the a~tonomy of the state from the interests of the rest 
of society - insights again arguably implicit in the New Testament concept 
of the heavenly "powers". Both traditions cast doubt o~ the\advisability 
of cutting politics free from the critical edge of the} theological 
tradition as Dunstan proposes. Both cast doubt also on the advisability of 
trusting the instinct for self-preservation exhibited by the modern 
nuclear state as being in the best interests of the whole of its citizenry. 
[ 13] 
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Finally to return to hcrmeneutical matters, and in this I lead on to my 
positive proposals to be made in the last section, it is misleading to 
imply that the appropriate categories for the hermeneutical task are 
''application'' and 11e xtrapol at ion'~ (Dunstan, p.51) "Creative 
reinterpretation" might be a more adequate term for the appropriate use of 
the tradition. Som~thing of this nature can be seen happening to the 
tradition within the Old Testament itself (consider, for example, the 
repeatedly complex and creative reapplication of the tradition that has 
occurred within what we now call the book of Isaiah), between the 
testaments (for instance the uses of the terms Christ/Messiah and Son of 
Man), and within the New Testament also. Tellingly, within the canon we can 
see the tradition, caught up in this hermeneutical process, crossing and 
recrossing the boundaries of Dunstan's religious and political spheres. 
And so it should, It is only an anachronistic division of these two realms 
that could deny authenticity a priori to this process. 
III 
It is time to present very briefly a positive case. If, as I have argued 
at length, the biblical traditions are not to be isolated artificially 
from our modern political concerns, if the contemporary problems of 
security need also to be seen 'in the light of God', where does that leave 
us with respect to the deterrence issue? How might Dunstan's legitimation 
of the use of ultimate power in the interests of our own security look in 
the light of the foundation story of our religion; or rather, how might 
someone informed by the story of Jesus of Nazareth react to this position? 
The crucial point to be made, surely, is that in the story of Jesus the 
concepts of power and . security undergo a paradoxical transformation, a 
creative reapplication. (14) Thus the "security" that Jesus talked of in 
the Sermon on the Mount did not exclude the taking up of rhe cross to 
follow him (no doubt a literal allusion to martyrdom in .Ji ts original 
I application). And the "power" of God . was manifested in Jesus being 
delivered up - acted upon - not in the action of the legion ~f angels that 
he declined to invoke. It is a paradoxical power made perfect in weakness 
(Paul), a glory exhibited in humiliation (John), a lack of anxiety amidst 
tribulation (Matthew) with which we have to do here, And it is all - if we 
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can trust the synoptic stress on the content of Jesus' preaching, and the 
symbolic implications of his final acts - in order that the Kingdom of God 
might be established: in pursuit of a non-quietist and indeed 
(non-violent) revolutionary transformation of society, necessitating the 
criticism of, challenging of, and change of the structures of society in 
the here and now. 
The Christian religion has as its basis a crucified King, whom we 
believe to be the ultimate revelation of the character of God. It is 
difficult to see, therefore, 'in the light of God', how prudence can be 
accepted as the primary virtue, or security as an unquestionable good, or 
ultimate power as a legitimate means - at least as long as these words 
retain their usual meanings. If it is true, as Dunstan asserts, that 
warfare is an inherently unchristian pursuit, there is an alternative to 
forcing theology back into a circumscribed religious dimension, such that 
we may prepare for warfare in our defence unhindered by its prescriptions. 
And that is to renounce the use of warfare - at least warfare of as 
indiscriminate a kind as that necessitated by the use of nuclear weapons -
and suffer the consequences. This alternative may not appear to be 
palatable, and it would certainly involve the putting of our security on 
the line. It may, in fact, involve the way of the cross. But it could claim 
to be a Christian approach to the problem of security, and in my view it is 
not to be dismissed lightly. 
In today's world there is, indeed, 'only a choice among evils', as of 
course there always has been in every age. The story of Jesus, however, 
places a large question mark against the pursuit of our own security at 
the cost of choosing great evil for others. It tells of a man vindicated by 
God because of his con·sistent life and death of s elf - abandonment in the 
cause of the Kingdom; of a man who lost his life for the sake of the gospel, 
and found it . ) 
It i s r eported that he e xpected his followers to do likewise. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Philip West is a PhD student at Jesus College, Cambridge. He s tudi ed f or 
the B.D. at King's from 1980-82. 
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FOOTNOTES 
[ 1] Gordon D. Kaufman, God the Problem, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1972, 
p.18. Kaufman (p.17) subscribes to the second view of the scope of 
theology outlined here. 
[2] In Geoffrey Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, London, 
1982, pp. 40-52. 
[ 3] It clearly has connections with the Lutheran doctrine of the two 
kingdoms, that is also implicitly under attack in this article. 
[4] See classically Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, 1975. 
[5] For a model of the relati onships between the economic, political and 
other subsystems in late capitalist societies, see J~rgen Habermas, 
Legitimation Crisis, London, 1976. For an account of the distinctive 
nature of these societies in historical perspective, see Anthony 
Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge, 1985. 
[6] See further, George V. Pixley, God's Kingdom, London, 1981. 
[7] E.P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, London, 1985. 
[8] Christopher Rowland, Christian Origins, London, 1985. 
[9] This is not to accept the case that Jesus was a Zealot. On the Zealot 
hypothesis, see several essays in Ernst Bammel and C.F .D. Mou le (eds.), 
Jesus and the Poli ties of his Day, Cambridge, 1984. 
[10] On the political relevance of Revelation, see John Howard Yoder, The 
Politics of Jesus, -Grand Rapids, 1972, chapter 12. 
[11] Ernst Bammel, 'Romans 13', in Bammel and Moule (op. cit.), pp. 365-383. 
[12] He argues further that Romans 13:1-7 and I Peter 2:13ff a} e traceable 
I to similar Jewish and pagan sources: .Paul is here adapting or quoting 
' traditional materials, not giving his own position de ' novo. For an 
appreciation of the contingent nature of the Pauline arguments in 
general, see J.C. Beker, Paul the Apostle, Edinburgh, 1980. 
[ 13] On various views of the state, see Giddens (op. cit.), pp. 17- 31 and 
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Philip 'West 
Divine Creation and Human Creativity 
Like the man who gathered from the vicar's sermon on sin that 'he were 
agin it', one gathers from reading the literature that "creativity" is 
something to be approved of. Exactly what this creativity consists in, 
however, and how it relates to the concept of divine creation on the one 
hand, and the spheres of art and work on the other, is far from clear. 
It is the purpose of what follows to investigate these relationships. 
The terms "creation" and "creativity", as opposed to more mundane 
alternatives such as "making" and "productivity", seem to be used in 
many contexts because of the positive feel they carry over from the idea 
of divine creation. It is much harder, for example, to disagree with an 
activity called "wealth creation" [1J than to object to the same process 
labelled "making money". "Creation" and "creativity" are thus not 
merely neutral, descriptive terms; they alter our attitude to the 
activities that they designate. To designate an activity "creative" is -
for good or ill - to legitimate it, not just to describe it. 
In some cases, however, the activity so legitimated is less obviously 
wholesome than is divine creation itself, and the designation then 
serves to conceal dubious aspects of human behaviour. In such a case, 
the use of language acquires ideological overtones. [2J In what follows 
I shall examine three examples of the use of the idea of creation, or 
the use of the terms "creation" and "creativity", in recent literature. 
In the first two- I shall detect tendencies towards such a descent into 
ideology. The examples cho::;;en are deliberately extreme in order to make 
my point. There is, of course, more to be said in de~ence of elements 
of the views that I examine. } 
I 
1 
,; 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
11 
I 
i.1 I 
I 
' 
---------------- --- ---~--
I 
In the thought of some writers, firstly, creation is equated with the 
production of novelty, and creativity with a degree of fecundity in this 
enterprise: creation as 'when something new which was not there before 
is produced', [3] This understanding of creativity, although he 
studiously avoids the use of the term, is implicit in Richard Rorty's 
Philosophy and the Hirror of Nature. [4] Here Rorty defines the role of 
the philosopher of the future, the 'edifying philosopher', (p. 370) as 
one of keeping our ideas in a state of permanent flux . The edifying 
philosopher is 'the informed dilettante, the polypragmatic, Socratic 
intermediary between various discourses', in whose 'salon ... hermetic 
thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices'. His or her 
job is to 'keep the conversation [ of western cul tureJ going'. Cp. 377) 
Correspondingly, although overtly Rorty rejects the idea of a human 
essence (including the idea that the essence of the human person is to 
have no essence), Cp. 378) implicitly he characterizes human nature as 
creative in the sense of generating novelty. Human beings are 
(normatively) 'generators of lli;.li descriptions'. Cp. 378, my stress) The 
'freezing-over over of culture' (p. 377) which would result from 
philosophy entering upon 'the secure path of a science', [5] and ceasing 
to create neJi ideas, <pp. 369f) would amount to 'the dehumanization of 
human beings'. <p. 377) For the edifying philosopher, the authentic 
sense of 'wonder which poets can sometimes cause' comes from a 'wonder 
that there is something llil..Yl. under the sun'. Cp. 370, my stress) 
Jurgen Moltmann (in another context) traces this cry for ceaseless 
movement and acti_vity back to Hegel, for whom Geist was 'pure activity', 
'absolute restlessness'. 'This god', he comments, 'who is understood as 
actus purus or pure activity, knows no Sabbath. In this respect, he is a 
heathen god'. [6] Yet Rorty's concept of the human sp~rit is even less 
satisfactory than Hegels', because all idea of a g .. 0I1.l)for the creative 
process has been abandoned. Rorty's spirit, unlike th~t of Hegel, has no 
I 
overall direction underlying its deconstructive activity. Under the 
stimulus of its philosophical activator it merely flails about, 
satisfying itself with movement and novelty, either for their own sakes, 
, 1 
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or just to prove to itself that it is st i 11 alive. Al though the 
conversation of western culture is to be kept g_gi.ng_, there seems to be 
no concern about where it is going iQ. The truths that edifying 
philosophy produces are not the point of the philosophical enterprise, 
but 'only accidental by-products' of it . <Rorty, pp. 378f) 
The ideological possibilities of such a concept of creativity should be 
clear. If, paradoxically, ideas are good because they are new, rather 
than good because they are - good - and when all possible descriptions 
of the human good are considered equally deceptive if taken seriously as 
"true", then the basis for any fundamental change in society is cut 
away. Not only may some very unpleasant ideas and actions be legitimated 
in this way (was Hitler "creative"? - he certainly "created" a lli:li form 
of society!), but the grounds for steadfast and persistent action in 
support of an ideal are impugned. Christian faith, indeed, is no longer 
new; but is that adequate reason to abandon it? 
My second characterization of creativity is that embodied in the 
creation theology of the North American Catholic theologian Michael 
Novak. Here the notion of human creativity is assimilated fully to the 
economic sphere, and explicitly related to a notion of divine creation. 
[ 7] 
Far Novak, 'the human person is a creator and nowhere more so than at 
his daily economic tasks'. M.ade in the image of God, each person has 
'the vocation ta work and to create' ('Creation', p. 36). This 
creativity essentially consists in a high and increasing rate of 
economic production , aided and abetted by scientific and technological 
innovation ('Creation' , p. 37; ' Corporat i on', pp. 207f). In this, says 
Novak, the person is 'sharing in the creativity of the Creator ' and 
'fulfil![ ingl his vocation' as 'imago Dei, the -image) of God the Creator' 
('Creation', p. 33). What is true for the individual is true also, Novak 
I 
continues, far the modern business corporation, and_ for society as a 
/ 
whole. The modern business corporation is a 'much despised incarnation 
of God's presence in this world' that reflects the role of the suffering 
servant in Deutero-Isaiah ('Corporation', p. 203). 'Its creativity makes 
3 
available to mass :markets the riches long hidden in creation. Its 
creativity mirrors God's' ('Corporation', p. 208), Moreover, a society 
in which personal economic creativity is released, such that the entire 
economy becomes creative, is a society 'constructed ... in the image of 
the Blessed Trinity, the Creator of all things, Lord of history, Spirit 
brooding over dark creation' ( 'Creation', p. 37). 
Besides rendering the mystery of God's internal nature almost 
blasphemously mundane - the joke about Yahweh & Son seems far too close 
for comfort - this account of creativity also operates ideologically. 
Carrying over the positive overtones attached to divine action into the 
economic sphere, it draws attention away from the unfortunate side-
effects of the operation of the capitalist economic system -
specifically the generation of the class system and the impoverishment 
of the third world - and the dehumanizing aspects of many forms of 
modern social labour. [8] To say that this economic productivity mirrors 
divine creation is to obscure, more than to illuminate, its true nature . 
Creativity may also, thirdly, be regarded as a matter of self-
expression; and this may be so both in the aesthetic and in the economic 
spheres. Expressivist aesthetics, for example, regards the notion of 
creativity as belonging to the sphere of art. Thus, to take Jurgen 
Habermas as an example here, [9] art may be characterized as a matter of 
the authentic expression of the subjectivity to which we have privileged 
access. The talented artist, Habermas writes, 'lend[s] authentic 
expression to those experiences he had in encountering his awn de-
centred subjectivity, detached from the constraints of routinized 
cognition and everyday action' ; [10] while aesthetic criticism has the 
function of 'bringing us to see a work or performance in such a way that 
it can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary 
experience, in general as the embodiment of a claim ~o authenticity'. 
[11] For Marx, on the other hand, it is labour rathJr than art that is 
I 
a matter of self-expression. As he says in The Ger~n Ideology: 'the way 
; 
in which men produce their means of subsistence . . . is a definite form 
of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their 
life ' . [121 And it this activity, according to Marx, by which the world 
-as we experience it - the humanized world - has been created: 'For 
socialist man what is called world history is nothing but the creation 
of man by human labour'. (13] Ran for Marx is self-created, and human 
creativity is a matter of self-expression through labour. In much 
Marxist aesthetics these two (aesthetic and economic) views are 
combined. Non-alienated labour and art coalesce into the free expression 
of human creativity with which we will create the world in the socialist 
utopia. 
None of these views that equate creativity and self-expression seem to 
be particularly satisfactory, however. The last involves a confusion of 
categories: although labour may have an artistic/expressive element, and 
art may be functionally useful, it requires an unwarranted belief in a 
utopian harmony of man with nature to think that the two could ever 
coincide. But to reduce human creativity to the aesthetic dimension of 
human existence is also questionable - as questionable in its way as a 
reduction of it to the economic dimension . If God is not to be seen as 
the great Economist, neither is he adequately represented as the great 
Artist. 
II 
In pursuit of an alternative concept of human creativity I have two 
suggestions to make. The first is that we re-examine the account of 
divine creation to be gathered from the texts of the Old Testament, and 
derive from this a correlative account of human creativity. 
Discussion of divine creation has too often been dominated by the 
assumption that it is mainly to do with the making of "nature", the 
physical world. In the beginning God created the world, the story goes, 
and subsequently there was the quite different matter\of redemption. In 
part this story has been based upon an exegesis of th~ opening chapters 
I 
of Genesis which stresses creation as ex nihilo, pri~eval, and 
autonomous from the process of redemption. 
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To accept this as the Old Testament concept of creation is, however, 
misleading . The creation theme is better approached in terms of its 
treatment in the Psalms and Deutero-Isaiah. (14] Here God is neither 
primarily the :maker of "stuff", nor the . winder-upper of the celestia l 
clock-spring. Nor yet, however, is he the being that would be projected 
by extrapolating the accounts of Rorty, Novak, or Habermas to infinity : 
the infinitely innovative, infinitely productive, or infinitely 
expressive being. Two themes are prominent in these texts that I want to 
highlight: the theme of Chaoskampf, of struggle against chaos, and the 
idea that the product of creation is not the natural order in and for 
itself, but the social order of the redeemed Israelite nation . 
Generally in the Old Testament, creation is a :matter of the ordering of 
chaos, not a bare making of some material that was not previously 
existent. Yet it is more than just this. In these texts Chaos is 
personified as the Sea or the Night, and creation becomes a battle or 
struggle, a conflict of wills in which one party emerges victorious. 
[15] In this picture, God's creative activity consists in the forcing 
back of the personified chaos, and the holding of it at bay, to allow a 
space in which human society can emerge . Both the hostile elements, and 
human enemies, are subsumed under this category of personified chaos. 
Every night , for example, the forces of chaos press closer in to 
constrict, and threaten the ultimate extinction of, human life, only to 
be forced back again by the divine re-creation of dawn. Political 
enemies also press in and threaten to destroy the ordered fabric of 
society, similarly to be pushed back by divine action . 
There is thus a qlurring of what we see as natural and social 
categories. On the one hand, creation is seen as involving a divine 
battle with the armies of chaos. On the other, the redemptive acts of l 
Yahweh are interpreted as creative. The product in bot~ cases is 
Israelite society, the redeemed people of God . A good Jxample of this 
interplay is to be found in Isaiah 51, where the cos:mplogical battle 
I 
with the sea-monster at creation is run into the foundational redemptive 
act at the Red Sea, constitutive of Israel as a political entity: 
Awake, awake, put on strength, 
0 arm of the Lord .... 
Vas it not thou that didst cut Rahab in pieces, 
that didst pierce the dragon? 
Vas it not thou that didst dry up the sea, 
the waters of the great deep; 
that didst make the depths of the sea a way 
for the redeemed to pass over? [Is 51:91 
In this case, creation and redemption are not artificially separated, 
but mutually interpreted. Both are seen as aspects of God's seamless 
action in the creation of redeemed Israel. [16) 
The purpose of this excursus into the Old Testament is not to argue that 
we should still personify the Sea and the Night, and thus retain a fully 
mythical world-view. It is rather to note four characteristics of divine 
creation as shown here that might be of interest in the derivation of an 
alternative account of human creativity: 
(1) Its home territory is not the realm of ideas (Rorty), of the 
material world (Novak), or of our own existential subjectivities 
<Habermas), but the social world. 
(2) Unlike in the self-expressive model, it involves struggle with 
an intractable, or even hostile, (social) material, 
(3) Pace Rorty, although innovative, it is also directional: newness 
is not valued for its own sake, but only if it has a specific 
character: the character of the redeemed community, a community 
embodying the divine justice. 
(4) The concept of creation is not to separated from the concept of 
redemption. 
) 
III 
Ky second suggestion is as follows: if, as is widely accepted, the cross 
is the ultimate symbol of redemption in Christian theology, should we 
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not, in the light of section II above, look here for a transformation of 
our understanding of divine creation as well - and therefore of human 
creativity? If it is the case that 'the crucified Christ [isl the 
foundation and measure of Christian theology as a whole', [17] that 'the 
paradigm of divine action is the Cross of Christ', [18] that it is 
supremely here that we are to find the revelation of God, (19] then 
surely it is here too, in this paradigmatic divine action, that we 
should find our model for divine creation. Moreover if, as Karl Barth 
suggests, our 'creaturely activity' ought to 'take the form of 
correspondence to the divine activity', [201 then the cross will 
function as the paradigm for human creativity as well. 
Let us allow that this is the case. I suggest that two results follow. 
Firstly, the paradigm for the divine creative Chaaskampf becomes the 
paradoxical activity of God in the cross of Christ. Not the making of 
the material world, but this creative struggle - a struggle that is the 
birthpangs of the kingdom of God - should act as the ultimate reference 
point for assessing allegedly "creative" human activity. Secondly, the 
homeland of the concept of creation moves from the natural (or 
subjective) world to the social world. The paradigm product becomes the 
new eschatological communities, a new social order witnessing to their 
future consummation in the New Creation of the kingdom of God. 
It is that which the Old and New Testaments term "New Creation", [ 21] I 
conclude, a concept rich in social and ethical overtones, that is the 
paradigm for a Christian concept of creation. Creation 'refers to the 
act by which God will remove injustice from the holy city and bring 
about a truly jµst and peaceful society'. [22) The models of creativity 
implied by Rorty, Novak, and Habermas, judged in this light, are 
lacking.Thus although it is true (so Rorty) that creativity involves 
transformation or newness, this newness is neither piimarily in the 
realm of ideas, nor un-di r ect i onal . Although it is tJue (so Novak) that I 
it is primarily societies rather than individuals that can mirror the ,. 
creativity of the divine Trinity, this creativity is nefther primarily 
to be located in the economic dimension, nor in the institutional 
arrangements of late capitalist society. And although it is true (so 
Haberrnas) that creativity involves expression, what is to be expressed 
is not our decentred subjectivities, primart!y in various art forms, but 
the nature of God in actions constitutive of a certain form of society. 
At the end of creation, so we are told in Genesis 1:1-2:3, God surveyed 
what he had made, and pronouncedjudgement upon it. He found the result -
the embryonic humari society represented by Adam and Eve - neither simply 
new, economically productive, or artistically expressive, but g.Q.:Qd. I 
propose that human creativity needs to have a similar character if it is 
to be worthy of the name. 
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-ENGLISH-SPEAKING JUSTICE by George Parkin Grant, Notre Dame, 1985, xi + 104 
pages, $11.95 cl, $4 .95 pa. 
English-Speaking Justice is a republication of George Parkin Grant's 1974 Josiah 
Wood Lectures, with an introduction by Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
As the imprimateur of that editorial team suggests, the book is worth reading. 
Those who have read Macintyre's After Virtue will recognize the genre. 
In the second chapter, which I found the best, Grant provides a useful critique 
of John Rawls's influential A Theory of Justice, chosen as an example of modern 
English-speaking ethical and political theory. Among other things, Grant 
accuses Rawls of being parochial in his philosophical diet (ignoring Plato and 
Aristotle, M:arx and Nietzsche), of being unaware of the sociological setting of 
American thought (ignoring the complicating factors of public bureaucracy and 
private corporations, and the concrete basis of American liberal life in war and 
imperialism), of assuming as self- evident <against Socrates and Christ) that 
'self-interest in general is the maximising of the cosy pleasures' Cp.46), and of 
operating with an anaemic view of Kant, cut down to the size of modern analytic 
philosophy. 
The point of this critique, as chapters three and four show, is to demonstrate 
that :modern "liberal" thought is intellectually bankrupt. It bas survived in 
England and North America, Grant argues, simply because a society which is 
economically and politically successful is not forced to think too clearly about 
its philosophical assumptions. But Nietzsche had already completely 
undermined the philosophical basis of liberal society in the late nineteenth 
century, and the cracks are now beginning to show in the facade on the level of 
legal judgement. The influential Roe vs. Vade decision of the U.S. supreme court 
that 'no state has the right to pass legislation which would prevent a citizen 
from receiving an abortion during the first six months ~f prefnancy', Cp.69) 
raises the question of the ontological definition of a "person'J which 
contractual liberal thought cannot answer. The whole edifice/ is here shown to 
be without foundation, theoretically unable to resist the Nief zschean challenge 
1 -
that the weak should give way to the interests of 'the "creative" strong' Cp.83). 
Contractual liberalism must therefore be abandoned for a retreat to the 
accounts of justice offered by Plato and Christianity - accounts that have in 
any case always provided liberalism with its actual content . 
If Marx, Nietzsche and Plato are the main influences in the book as described 
so far, the influence of Heidegger shows through, not only in the phraseology, 
but also in the analysis of the nature and significance of "technology" . For 
Grant, "technology" is not just a matter of constructing bridges, it is the 
embodiment of a form of reason - in fact Max Weber's Zweckrationalitat - that 
is the key structural feature of modern western civilization, and responsible 
for much of its ambiguity. In its embodiment in private and public 
bureaucracies it is seen to be the enemy rather than the ally of the 
participatory democracy that was the early liberal ideal; and modern forms of 
cybernetics ('behaviour modification, genetic engineering, population control by 
abortion' Cp.9)) pose the problems it raises even more acutely . Grant sets up 
the issue of modernity as a straight fight between "justice" as understood by 
Plato and "technology" as thus delineated. He is pessimistic that the desired 
victory of "justice" will come from within the intellectually barren English-
speaking world. 
Any book that attempts to do justice t o the complex phenomenon of modernity in 
only 100 pages is bound to have some defects. I will suggest just two, that 
centre on Grant's use of the concept of "technology" Firstly, his analysis of 
t echnology bears a striking resemblance to that of Horkheimer and Adorno 's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (whi ch is not mentioned in text or footnotes) and 
shares its weaknesses. In particular , it assumes too readily that "technology" 
is an undifferentiated ~hole that mus t characterize our atti tude to t he social 
and subjective worlds once we allow i ts validity in our dealings with the 
natural/phys ical world . Secondly , by characterizing modernity in terms of the 
category of t echnology , Grant downplays the significance· of t~e other changes 
that have occurred in the transition to modernity, such as thJ change in the 
c lass s t ructur e and t he r is e of the nation state with i ts moFopoly of violence . 
I 
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Such weaknesses tend to suggest that Grant himself is a little too parochial in 
his intellectual diet: there has been a considerable amount of water under the 
sociological bridge that Grant does not show himself aware of. Nevertheless, as 
a critique of the predominant American ideology the book is interesting, 
persuasive and timely. 
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